Trust Anchor Publication Advice
draft-ymbk-ta-publication-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2013-02-17 (latest revision 2012-08-16) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
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https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ymbk-ta-publication-00.txt
Abstract
Many Internet protocols and services rely on credentials which use asymmetric keys. Many of these are hierarchic structures having certification authorities (CAs) that act as trust anchors (TAs). There is little general guidance on procedures for how these trust anchors can be distributed or otherwise published with prudence. To quote a well known security expert, "It's a matter of oral tradition in security circles." This document attempts to capture some of that lore.
Authors
Steven Bellovin
(bellovin@acm.org)
Randy Bush
(randy@psg.com)
Russ Housley
(housley@vigilsec.com)
Stephen Kent
(kent@bbn.com)
Sean Turner
(turners@ieca.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)