BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress-01
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Randy Bush , Rüdiger Volk , Jakob Heitz | ||
Last updated | 2019-12-01 (Latest revision 2019-05-30) | ||
Replaced by | draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS.
Authors
Randy Bush
Rüdiger Volk
Jakob Heitz
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)