TM-RID Authentication Formats
draft-wiethuechter-tmrid-auth-04
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
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|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Adam Wiethuechter , Stuart W. Card , Robert Moskowitz | ||
| Last updated | 2019-12-19 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-wiethuechter-tmrid-auth-04
TMRID A. Wiethuechter
Internet-Draft S. Card
Intended status: Standards Track AX Enterprize
Expires: 21 June 2020 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
19 December 2019
TM-RID Authentication Formats
draft-wiethuechter-tmrid-auth-04
Abstract
This document describes how to include trust into the proposed ASTM
Remote ID specification defined in WK65041 by the F38 Committee under
a Broadcast Remote ID (RID) scenario. It defines a few different
message schemes (based on the authentication message) that can be
used to assure past messages sent by a UA and also act as a assurance
for UA trustworthiness in the absence of Internet connectivity at the
receiving node.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 June 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Problem Space And Document Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. ASTM Authentication Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Thoughts on ASTM Authentication Message . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. TM-RID Supporting Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. HIP Based Extensions to the ASTM Authentication Message . . . 6
4.1. HIP Based Authentication Wrapper . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Signed Hash Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.1. Hash Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.2. Pseudo-blockchain Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.3. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. HIP Based Offline Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Trusted Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Wrapped Signed Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
UA Systems (UAS) are usually in a volatile environment when it comes
to communication. UA are generally small with little computational
(or flying) horsepower to carry standard communication equipment.
This limits the mediums of communication to few viable options.
Observer systems (e.g. smartphones and tablets) place further
constraints on the communication options. The Remote ID Broadcast
messages MUST be available to applications on these platforms without
modifying the devices.
The ASTM standard focuses on two ways of communicating to a UAS for
RID: Broadcast and Network.
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This document will focus on adding trust to Broadcast RID in the
current authentication message format, using the Host Identity
Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2) [RFC7401] Hierarchical HIT (HHIT)
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit].
2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Definitions
CAA
Civil Aeronautics Administration. An example is the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States of America.
C2
Command and Control. A set of organizational and technical
attributes and processes that employs human, physical, and
information resources to solve problems and accomplish missions.
Mainly used in military contexts.
HI
Host Identity. The public key portion of an assymetric keypair
from HIP. In this document it is assumed that the HI is based on
a EdDSA25519 keypair. This is supported by new crypto defined in
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-new-crypto].
HIT
Host Identity Tag. A 128 bit handle on the HI. Defined in HIPv2
[RFC7401].
HHIT
Hierarchical Host Identity Tag. A 128 bit handle on the HI contain
extra information not found in a standard HIT. Defined in
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit].
UA
Unmanned Aircraft. In this document UA's are typically though of
as drones of commerical or military variety. This is a very
strict definition which can be relaxed to include any and all
aircraft that are unmanned.
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UAS
Unmanned Aircraft System. Composed of Unmanned Aircraft and all
required on-board subsystems, payload, control station, other
required off-board subsystems, any required launch and recovery
equipment, all required crew members, and C2 links between UA and
the control station.
UTM
UAS Traffic Management. A "traffic management" ecosystem for
uncontrolled operations that is separate from, but complementary
to, the FAA's Air Traffic Management (ATM) system.
USS
UAS Service Supplier. Provide UTM services to support the UAS
community, to connect Operators and other entities to enable
information flow across the USS network, and to promote shared
situational awareness among UTM participants. (From FAA UTM
ConOps V1, May 2018).
RID
Remote ID. A unique identifier found on all UA to be used in
communication and in regulation of UA operation.
Observer
Referred to in other UAS documents as a "user", but there are also
other classes of RID users, so we prefer "observer" to denote an
individual who has observed an UA and wishes to know something
about it, starting with its RID.
3. Background
3.1. Problem Space And Document Focus
The current draft standard for Remote ID (RID) does not, in any
meaningful capacity, address the concerns of trust in the UA space
with communication in the Broadcast RID environment. This is a
requirement that will need to be addressed eventually for various
different parties that have a stake in the UA industry.
The following subsections will provide a high level reference to the
ASTM standard for authentication messages and how their current
limitations effect trust in the Broadcast RID envirorment.
3.2. ASTM Authentication Message
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Page 0:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| ASTM UAS RID HEADERS +---------------+
| | |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| Authentication Data / Signature |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Page 1 - 4:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Authentication Data / Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
ASTM UAS RID Headers: (7 bytes)
Contains header information for the authentication message
from ASTM UAS RID Standard.
A short 1 byte header is also present as ASTM HEADER included
on every page.
Authentication Data / Signature: (109 bytes: 17+23*4)
Opaque authentication data.
3.3. Thoughts on ASTM Authentication Message
The format proposed by the ASTM is designed with a few major
considerations in mind, which the authors feel put significant
limitations on the expansion of the standard.
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The primary consideration (in this context) is the use of the
Bluetooth 5.X Extended Frame format. This method allows for a 255
byte payload to be sent in what the ASTM refers to as an "atomic
message".
The idea is to include up to five standard ASTM Broadcast RID
messages (each of which are 25 bytes) plus a single authentication
message (5 pages of 25 bytes each) in an atomic message. The
reasoning is then the authentication message is for the entire atomic
message pack.
The authors have no issues with this proposed approach; this is a
valid format to use for the authentication message provided by the
ASTM. However, by limiting the authentication message to ONLY five
pages in the standard it ignores the possibility of other formatting
options to be created and used.
3.4. TM-RID Supporting Levels
This document is assuming that the first two levels of TM-RID
(Identification and Authentication) are implemented. This document
serves as a expansion to these two levels, leveraging the abilities
of the HHIT Registries [I-D.moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries] to its
fullest potential.
4. HIP Based Extensions to the ASTM Authentication Message
The following section describes various methods that HIP can help
enable more trustworthy communication using the Authentication
Message as the base. Each diagram will show all 5 pages of the
format filled out.
4.1. HIP Based Authentication Wrapper
Page 0:
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+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| ASTM UAS RID HEADERS +---------------+
| | RESERVED |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT |
| |
| |
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| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Page 1:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | Trust Timestamp /
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
/ | RESERVED | |
+---------------+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Page 2:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
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| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Payload |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
HHIT: (16 bytes)
HHIT using the EdDSA25519 HI.
Trust Timestamp: (4 bytes)
Timestamp denoting a future time to trust message to.
HHIT Signature: (64 bytes)
Signature of payload using the EdDSA25519 keypair.
Spread across 3 pages.
Payload: (0 to 23/25 bytes)
Opaque payload data that has been used in signing.
This can be increased to 25 by removing padding RESERVED
sections.
This format is a way to authenticate a given UA using Level 1 and
Level 2 of the TM-RID architecture.
When this authentication format is recieved the HHIT (provided by
Level 1 TM-RID) is first looked up by mechanisms defined in Level 2.
This lookup chain ultimately obtains, on the Observers device, the
full HI associated with the HHIT recieved. Once completed the
signature can then be verifed with the respective data it was signed
with. This data, at a minimum would be the payload in the
authentication message.
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The payload can be anything that fits within the 23/25 byte limit.
Some examples of what could be done with this format are found in
Section 5.
4.2. Signed Hash Lists
Page 0:
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+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| ASTM UAS RID HEADERS +---------------+
| | H-Alg | H-Len |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Hash of Previous Auth. Message |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Hash of Current Auth. Message |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
DataPage 1:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | H-Alg | H-Len | RESERVED |
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Page 2:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | RESERVED | Signature Length |
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| Signature Algorithm | |
+-------------------------------+ |
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| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
H-Alg, H-Len: (4 bits), (4 bits)
These are fields for relaying information of the Hash
algorithm used for the messages and the Hash length (in octets).
For this example of the format a length of 4 bytes is
used.
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H-Alg Values
----- ------
RESERVED 0
cSHAKE128 1 [sp800-185] (RECOMMENDED)
Hash of Previous Auth. Message: (4 bytes)
A hash of the previously sent Authentication message.
Hash of Current Auth. Message: (4 bytes)
A hash of the current Authentication message.
Message Hash: (4 bytes)
A hash of a previously sent message.
Signature Length: (2 bytes)
Length of signature in octets, excluding Length, and Padding
Signature Algorithm: (2 bytes)
Self explanatory.
HHIT Signature: (64 bytes)
EdDSA25519 signature using an EdDSA25519-based HI from HIP.
Spread across 3 pages.
This format is designed to provide provenance to Broadcast RID
messages sent by a given UAS. It should be noted that the HHIT is
not provided in the format like others specified here - instead it
must be obtained via the Basic ID Message in a detached fashion.
By hashing previously sent messages and signing them we gain trust in
UAS previous reports. An observer who has been listening for any
length of time can hash received messages and cross check against
listed hashes. The signature is signed across the list of hashes.
4.2.1. Hash Operation
With cSHAKE128 NIST SP 800-185 [NIST.SP.800-185], the hash is
computed as follows:
cSHAKE128(MAC|Message, 8*H-Len, "", "RemoteID Auth Hash")
The message MAC is prepended to the message, as the MAC is the only
information that links a UA's messages from a specific UA.
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4.2.2. Pseudo-blockchain Hashes
Two special hashes are included; a previous authentication hash,
which links to the previous signed hash list message, as well as a
current hash. This gives a pseudo-blockchain provenance to the
authentication message that could be traced back if the observer was
present for extended periods of time.
In regards to the creation and use of the current authentication hash
field:
During creation and signing of this message format this field MUST
be set to 0. So the signature will be based on this field being
0, as well as its own hash. It is an open question of if we
compute the hash, then sign or sign then compute.
There a few different ways to cycle this message. We can "roll
up" the hash of 'current' to 'previous' when needed or to
completely recompute the hash. This mostly depends on the
previous note.
4.2.3. Limitations
With the current format proposed by ASTM only 7 messages can be
hashed reasonably in the above format. RESERVED padding, the
Signature Algorithm, Signature Length and redundant H-Alg, H-Len
fields could be removed. This would increase the total list of
hashes to 9 while losing word alignment of the hashes in each page.
To address this problem properly the authors feel that the
Authentication Messages needs to have a max bound of 10 pages,
instead of 5.
4.3. HIP Based Offline Authentication
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| DEV HHIT |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TIMESTAMP |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| DEV HHIT |
| SIG |
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. .
. .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| DEV HI |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AUTH TIMESTAMP |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| AUTH HHIT |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| AUTH |
| SIG |
. .
. .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ PAYLOAD /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
DEV HHIT 16 byte Dev HHIT of EdDSA25519 HI
TIMESTAMP 4 byte packet trust until timestamp
DEV HHIT SIG 64 byte Signature of whole packet
DEV HI 32 byte Device HI of EdDSA25519 HI
AUTH TIMESTAMP 4 byte Dev HHIT trust until timestamp
AUTH HHIT 16 byte Authorizer's HHIT of EdDSA25519 HI
AUTH SIG 64 byte Signature of Device HHIT-HI
PAYLOAD 0 to n bytes of payload
Length 200 + n bytes
This specific format does not currently fit within the ASTM
specification. Requiring a minimum of 200 bytes, this would require
the Authentication Message to have 10 pages, instead of the current 5
page limit.
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What this will grant, if attainable in future revisions of the ASTM
specification, is the ability to authenticate UA information when the
receiving device of the observer (e.g. a smartphone with a dedicated
RID application) has no Internet service (e.g. LTE signal).
By including the device HI along with a signature from the registry
the UA is under, we can assert trust of a given UA without requiring
the need for immediate reverse lookups online.
5. Example Use Cases
This section introduces potentional use cases of the HIP based
extensions to the proposed ASTM standard authentication message.
5.1. Trusted Messages
Using the HIP Based Authentication Wrapper any single Broadcast RID
message defined by ASTM can become what the authors refer to as a
"Trusted Message".
One specific use case that is useful in the UAS RID space is the
creation of a "Trusted Vector Message". By placing a previous [or
new] vector message into the Payload section of this format a
verifiable broadcast can be created.
Due to being signed this creates an authentic vector that is hard to
spoof, which can confirm flight paths in near real time.
The figure below is a example of a "Trusted Vector Message". Note
that the padding (RESERVED) byte are now gone. The "Trust Timestamp"
and "Vector Message" fields now span multiple pages instead of being
aligned to pages.
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+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| ASTM UAS RID HEADERS +---------------+
| | |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT |
| |
| +---------------+
| | /
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+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
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+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER / Trust Timestamp |
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
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| |
| +-------------------------------+
| | Vector Message /
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
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+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER / |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Vector Message |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
5.2. Wrapped Signed Hashes
Using the HIP Based Authentication Wrapper a [short] list of hashes
can be signed. These hashes are of previous individual RID messages.
This follows the format of the Signed Hash List, excluding the
psuedo-blockchain hashes and various other fields enabling it to fit
within the 23 byte limit of the final page.
To the authors, this format has limited use due to numerous concerns
of replay attacks. It is suggested to instead use the full Signed
Hash List format.
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+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| ASTM UAS RID HEADERS +---------------+
| | RESERVED |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT |
| |
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| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | Trust Timestamp /
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
/ | RESERVED | |
+---------------+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
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| HHIT Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Page 4:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| ASTM HEADER | H-Alg | H-Len | RESERVED |
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Message Hash |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
6. IANA Considerations
TBD
7. Security Considerations
TBD
8. Acknowledgments
TBD
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[NIST.SP.800-185]
Kelsey, J., Change, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 derived
functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash",
National Institute of Standards and Technology report,
DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-185, December 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-185>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-01, 17 October
2019, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hhit-registries-01>.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-02, 17 October
2019, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hierarchical-hit-02>.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-new-crypto]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "New
Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-02, 3
October 2019, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-02>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
Authors' Addresses
Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
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Stuart W. Card
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
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