IPv6 Segment Routing Security Considerations
draft-vyncke-6man-segment-routing-security-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Éric Vyncke , Stefano Previdi , David Lebrun | ||
| Last updated | 2015-08-31 (Latest revision 2015-02-27) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Segment Routing (SR) allows a node to steer a packet through a controlled set of instructions, called segments, by prepending a SR header to the packet. A segment can represent any instruction, topological or service-based. SR allows to enforce a flow through any path (topological, or application/service based) while maintaining per-flow state only at the ingress node to the SR domain. Segment Routing can be applied to the IPv6 data plane with the addition of a new type of Routing Extension Header. This document analyzes the security aspects of the Segment Routing Extension Header (SRH) and how it is used by SR capable nodes to deliver a secure service.
Authors
Éric Vyncke
Stefano Previdi
David Lebrun
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)