Quantum Relief for TLS with Kerberos
draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-05

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Network Working Group                                        R. Van Rein
Internet-Draft                                               T. Vrancken
Intended status: Standards Track                               ARPA2.net
Expires: February 17, 2020                               August 16, 2019

                  Quantum Relief for TLS with Kerberos
                        draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-05

Abstract

   This specification adds Kerberos to the TLS protocol, both as a
   method of authentication and to insert entropy into the key schedule
   from a source that does not start in public key cryptography.

   This brings relief from attacks by quantum computers, and that is
   specified as part of a more general framework, to make it easier for
   other technologies to achieve similar benefits.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 17, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Van Rein & Vrancken     Expires February 17, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   TLS-KDH                     August 2019

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Quantum Relief from Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Design of TLS-KDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  New Data Structures and Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Extension quantum_relief  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Ticket-based Encryption Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Kerberos Ticket and TGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Changes to TLS Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  ClientHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  ServerHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Server-sent VerifyRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.4.  Server-sent Certificate and CertificateVerify . . . . . .  10
     5.5.  Client-sent Certificate and CertificateVerify . . . . . .  10
     5.6.  Length of Finished  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.7.  Selection of Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.8.  Tickets and Connection Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Cryptographic Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  Quantum Relief for Encryption in TLS 1.3  . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  Quantum Relief for Encryption in TLS 1.2  . . . . . . . .  12
     6.3.  Kerberos Ticket as Certificate and CertificateVerify  . .  13
   7.  KDH-Only Application Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   TLS protects many application protocols from many security problems.
   To enable this, it habitually relies on public-key cryptography.  But
   in the foreseeable future, quantum computers are expected to destroy
   these public-key underpinnings.  This is not a current problem for
   authentication, but it does endanger encrypted data being passed
   today, which may be captured and stored, ready for decryption as soon
   as quantum computers hit the playing field.

   Most present-day applications of TLS are threatened by quantum
   computers; some may not be able to live up to legal requirements for
   long-term encryption.  There even is a risk of future power
   imbalances between those who have a quantum computer and those who
   have not.

   The solution is to not rely solely on public-key cryptography, but
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