Security Implications of the Session Identifier
draft-tschofenig-nsis-sid-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Hannes Tschofenig | ||
| Last updated | 2003-06-24 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
As one result of the analysis activities in the NSIS group it was realized that mobility and the ability to change the flow identifier causes problems with existing QoS reservations. To be able to associate a signaling message with existing state an identifier other than the flow identifier had to be used. Such an abstraction is achieved with the session identifier which allows identification of established state independently of the flow characteristics.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)