Evolving the Web Public Key Infrastructure
draft-tschofenig-iab-webpki-evolution-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Hannes Tschofenig , Eliot Lear | ||
| Last updated | 2014-05-23 (Latest revision 2013-11-19) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The problems with the WebPKI have received the attention by the Internet security community when DigiNotar, a Dutch certification authority, had a security breach in 2011 and in the same year a Comodo affiliate was compromised. Both cases led to fraudulent issuance of certificates and raise questions regarding the strength of the WebPKI used by so many applications. Almost 2 years have passed since these incidents and various standardization activities have happened in the meanwhile offering new technical solutions to make the public key infrastructure more resilient. The important question, however, is which of the technical solutions will get widespread deployment? In this document we compare the different technical solutions in an attempt to engage the impacted stakeholders to trigger deployment actions to improve the status quo. This document does not include any recommendations what techniques to use.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)