Research into Human Rights Protocol Considerations
draft-tenoever-hrpc-research-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
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Authors | Niels ten Oever , Corinne Cath | ||
Last updated | 2016-04-01 (Latest revision 2016-03-17) | ||
Replaces | draft-dkg-hrpc-glossary, draft-varon-hrpc-methodology | ||
Replaced by | draft-irtf-hrpc-research, RFC 8280 | ||
RFC stream | Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) | ||
Formats | |||
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Stream | IRTF state | (None) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | irsg@irtf.org |
draft-tenoever-hrpc-research-00
Internet Engineering Task Force A. Bierman Internet-Draft YumaWorks Obsoletes: 6536 (if approved) M. Bjorklund Intended status: Standards Track Tail-f Systems Expires: April 29, 2018 October 26, 2017 Network Configuration Access Control Module draft-ietf-netconf-rfc6536bis-08 Abstract The standardization of network configuration interfaces for use with the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) or RESTCONF protocol requires a structured and secure operating environment that promotes human usability and multi-vendor interoperability. There is a need for standard mechanisms to restrict NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. This document defines such an access control model. This document obsoletes RFC 6536. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2018. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 1] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Changes Since RFC 6536 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Access Control Design Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Access Control Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3. Procedural Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4. Datastore Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5. Users and Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6. Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.7. Configuration Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.8. Identifying Security-Sensitive Content . . . . . . . . . 9 3. NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1.1. Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.2. External Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.3. Message Processing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2. Datastore Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.2.1. Mapping New Datastores to NACM . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.2.2. Access Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.2.3. RESTCONF Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2.4. <get> and <get-config> Operations . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2.5. <edit-config> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2.6. <copy-config> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.2.7. <delete-config> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2.8. <commit> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2.9. <discard-changes> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2.10. <kill-session> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.3. Model Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.3.1. Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.3.2. Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.3.3. Emergency Recovery Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.3.4. Global Enforcement Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.3.4.1. enable-nacm Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.3.4.2. read-default Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.3.4.3. write-default Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.3.4.4. exec-default Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3.4.5. enable-external-groups Switch . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3.5. Access Control Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 2] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.4. Access Control Enforcement Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.4.1. Initial Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.4.2. Session Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.4.3. "access-denied" Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.4.4. Incoming RPC Message Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.4.5. Data Node Access Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.4.6. Outgoing <notification> Authorization . . . . . . . . 27 3.5. Data Model Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.5.1. Data Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.5.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 3.7.1. NACM Configuration and Monitoring Considerations . . 41 3.7.2. General Configuration Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.7.3. Data Model Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 45 4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.1. v07 to v08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.2. v06 to v07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.3. v05 to v06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.4. v04 to v05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.5. v03 to v04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.6. v02 to v03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.7. v01 to v02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A.8. v00 to v01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A.9. v00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Appendix B. Usage Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 B.1. <groups> Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 B.2. Module Rule Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 B.3. Protocol Operation Rule Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 B.4. Data Node Rule Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 B.5. Notification Rule Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 1. Introduction The NETCONF and RESTCONF protocols do not provide any standard mechanisms to restrict the protocol operations and content that each user is authorized to access. There is a need for interoperable management of the controlled access to administrator-selected portions of the available NETCONF or RESTCONF content within a particular server. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 3] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 This document addresses access control mechanisms for the Operations and Content layers of NETCONF, as defined in [RFC6241], and RESTCONF, as defined in [RFC8040]. It contains three main sections: 1. Access Control Design Objectives 2. NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM) 3. YANG Data Model (ietf-netconf-acm.yang) YANG version 1.1 [RFC7950] adds two new constructs that need special access control handling. The "action" statement is similar to the "rpc" statement, except it is located within a data node. The "notification" statement can also be located within a data node. 1.1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The following terms are defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-revised-datastores] and are not redefined here: o datastore o configuration datastore o conventional configuration datastore o candidate configuration datastore o running configuration datastore o startup configuration datastore o operational state datastore o client o server The following terms are defined in [RFC6241] and are not redefined here: o protocol operation Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 4] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 o session o user The following terms are defined in [RFC7950] and are not redefined here: o action o data node o data definition statement The following terms are defined in [RFC8040] and are not redefined here: o data resource o datastore resource o operation resource o target resource The following term is defined in [RFC7230] and is not redefined here: o request URI The following terms are used throughout this document: access control: A security feature provided by the server that allows an administrator to restrict access to a subset of all protocol operations and data, based on various criteria. access control model (ACM): A conceptual model used to configure and monitor the access control procedures desired by the administrator to enforce a particular access control policy. access control rule: The criterion used to determine if a particular access operation will be permitted or denied. access operation: How a request attempts to access a conceptual object. One of "none", "read", "create", "delete", "update", or "execute". data node hierarchy: The hierarchy of data nodes that identifies the specific "action" or "notification" node in the datastore. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 5] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 recovery session: A special administrative session that is given unlimited NETCONF access and is exempt from all access control enforcement. The mechanism(s) used by a server to control and identify whether or not a session is a recovery session are implementation specific and outside the scope of this document. write access: A shorthand for the "create", "delete", and "update" access operations. 1.2. Changes Since RFC 6536 The NACM procedures and data model have been updated to support new data modeling capabilities in the version 1.1. of the YANG data modeling language. The "action" and "notification" statements can be used within data nodes to define data-model specific operations and notifications. An important use-case for these new YANG statements is the increased access control granularity that can be achieved over top-level "rpc" and "notification" statements. The new "action" and "notification" statements are used within data nodes, and access to the action or notification can be restricted to specific instances of these data nodes. Support for the RESTCONF protocol has been added. The RESTCONF operations are similar to the NETCONF operations, so a simple mapping to the existing NACM procedures and data model is possible. The server message processing behavior for the edit operation "none", used in the <edit-config>, has been changed. Now read access is required for such data nodes, instead of no access required. 2. Access Control Design Objectives This section documents the design objectives for the NETCONF Access Control Model presented in Section 3. 2.1. Access Control Points NETCONF allows server implementors to add new custom protocol operations, and the YANG Data Modeling Language supports this feature. These operations can be defined in standard or proprietary YANG modules. It is not possible to design an ACM for NETCONF that only focuses on a static set of standard protocol operations defined by the NETCONF protocol itself, like some other protocols. Since few assumptions can be made about an arbitrary protocol operation, the NETCONF Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 6] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 architectural server components need to be protected at three conceptual control points. These access control points, described in Figure 1, are as follows: protocol operation: Permission to invoke specific protocol operations. datastore: Permission to read and/or alter specific data nodes within any datastore. notification: Permission to receive specific notification event types. +-------------+ +-------------+ client | protocol | | data node | request --> | operation | -------------> | access | | allowed? | datastore | allowed? | +-------------+ or state +-------------+ data access +----------------+ | notification | event --> | allowed? | +----------------+ Figure 1 2.2. Simplicity There is concern that a complicated ACM will not be widely deployed because it is too hard to use. Configuration of the access control system needs to be as simple as possible. Simple and common tasks need to be easy to configure and require little expertise or domain- specific knowledge. Complex tasks are possible using additional mechanisms, which may require additional expertise. A single set of access control rules ought to be able to control all types of NETCONF protocol operation invocation, all datastore access, and all notification events. Access control ought to be defined with a small and familiar set of permissions, while still allowing full control of datastore access. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 7] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 2.3. Procedural Interface The NETCONF protocol uses a remote procedure call model and an extensible set of protocol operations. Access control for any possible protocol operation is necessary. 2.4. Datastore Access It is necessary to control access to specific nodes and subtrees within the datastore, regardless of which protocol operation, standard or proprietary, was used to access the datastore. 2.5. Users and Groups It is necessary that access control rules for a single user or a configurable group of users can be configured. The ACM needs to support the concept of administrative groups, to support the well-established distinction between a root account and other types of less-privileged conceptual user accounts. These groups need to be configurable by the administrator. It is necessary that the user-to-group mapping can be delegated to a central server, such as a RADIUS server [RFC2865][RFC5607]. Since authentication is performed by the transport layer and RADIUS performs authentication and service authorization at the same time, the underlying transport protocol needs to be able to report a set of group names associated with the user to the server. It is necessary that the administrator can disable the usage of these group names within the ACM. 2.6. Maintenance It ought to be possible to disable part or all of the access control model enforcement procedures without deleting any access control rules. 2.7. Configuration Capabilities Suitable configuration and monitoring mechanisms are needed to allow an administrator to easily manage all aspects of the ACM's behavior. A standard data model, suitable for use with the <edit-config> protocol operation, needs to be available for this purpose. Access control rules to restrict access operations on specific subtrees within the configuration datastore need to be supported. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 8] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 2.8. Identifying Security-Sensitive Content One of the most important aspects of the data model documentation, and biggest concerns during deployment, is the identification of security-sensitive content. This applies to protocol operations in NETCONF, not just data and notifications. It is mandatory for security-sensitive objects to be documented in the Security Considerations section of an RFC. This is nice, but it is not good enough, for the following reasons: o This documentation-only approach forces administrators to study the RFC and determine if there are any potential security risks introduced by a new data model. o If any security risks are identified, then the administrator must study some more RFC text and determine how to mitigate the security risk(s). o The ACM on each server must be configured to mitigate the security risks, e.g., require privileged access to read or write the specific data identified in the Security Considerations section. o If the ACM is not pre-configured, then there will be a time window of vulnerability after the new data model is loaded and before the new access control rules for that data model are configured, enabled, and debugged. Often, the administrator just wants to disable default access to the secure content, so no inadvertent or malicious changes can be made to the server. This allows the default rules to be more lenient, without significantly increasing the security risk. A data model designer needs to be able to use machine-readable statements to identify content that needs to be protected by default. This will allow client and server tools to automatically identify data-model-specific security risks, by denying access to sensitive data unless the user is explicitly authorized to perform the requested access operation. 3. NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM) 3.1. Introduction This section provides a high-level overview of the access control model structure. It describes the NETCONF protocol message processing model and the conceptual access control requirements within that model. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 9] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.1.1. Features The NACM data model provides the following features: o Independent control of remote procedure call (RPC), action, data, and notification access. o Simple access control rules configuration data model that is easy to use. o The concept of an emergency recovery session is supported, but configuration of the server for this purpose is beyond the scope of this document. An emergency recovery session will bypass all access control enforcement, in order to allow it to initialize or repair the NACM configuration. o A simple and familiar set of datastore permissions is used. o Support for YANG security tagging (e.g., "nacm:default-deny-write" statement) allows default security modes to automatically exclude sensitive data. o Separate default access modes for read, write, and execute permissions. o Access control rules are applied to configurable groups of users. o The access control enforcement procedures can be disabled during operation, without deleting any access control rules, in order to debug operational problems. o Access control rules are simple to configure. o The number of denied protocol operation requests and denied datastore write requests can be monitored by the client. o Simple unconstrained YANG instance identifiers are used to configure access control rules for specific data nodes. 3.1.2. External Dependencies The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] and RESTCONF protocol [RFC8040] are used for network management purposes within this document. The YANG Data Modeling Language [RFC7950] is used to define the data models for use with the NETCONF or RESTCONF protocols. YANG is also used to define the data model in this document. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 10] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.1.3. Message Processing Model The following diagram shows the conceptual message flow model, including the points at which access control is applied during NETCONF message processing. RESTCONF operations are mapped to the access control model based on the HTTP method and resource class used in the operation. For example, a POST method on a data resource is considered "write data node" access, but a POST method on an operation resource is considered "operation" access. The new "pre-read data acc. ctl" boxes in the diagram below refer to group read access as it relates to data node ancestors of an action or notification. As an example, if an action is defined as /interfaces/interface/reset-interface, the group must be authorized to read /interfaces and /interfaces/interface, and execute on /interfaces/interface/reset-interface. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 11] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 +-------------------------+ | session | | (username) | +-------------------------+ | ^ V | +--------------+ +---------------+ | message | | message | | dispatcher | | generator | +--------------+ +---------------+ | | ^ ^ | V | | | +=============+ | | | | pre-read | | | | | data node | | | | | acc. ctl | | | | +=============+ | | | | | | V V | | +===========+ +-------------+ +----------------+ | operation |---> | reply | | <notification> | | acc. ctl | | generator | | generator | +===========+ +-------------+ +----------------+ | ^ ^ ^ V +------+ | | +-----------+ | +=============+ +================+ | operation | | | read | | <notification> | | processor |-+ | data node | | access ctl | | | | acc. ctl | | | +-----------+ +=============+ +================+ | | ^ ^ ^ V +----------------+ | | | +===========+ | | | +============+ | write | | | | | pre-read | | data node | | | | | data node | | acc. ctl | -----------+ | | | | acc. ctl | +===========+ | | | | +============+ | | | | | ^ V V V | | | +---------------+ +-------------------+ | configuration | ---> | server | | datastore | | instrumentation | | | <--- | | +---------------+ +-------------------+ Figure 2 Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 12] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 The following high-level sequence of conceptual processing steps is executed for each received <rpc> message, if access control enforcement is enabled: o For each active session, access control is applied individually to all 's a burgeoning group of academics and practitioners researched questions surrounding the societal impact of protocols. These studies vary in focus and scope: some focus on specific standards [Davidsonetal] [Musiani], others look into the political, legal, commercial or social impact of protocols [BrownMarsden] [Lessig], [Mueller]. Commercial and political influences on the management of the Internet's architecture are well-documented in the academic literature and will thus not be discussed here [Benkler] [Brownetal] [Denardis15] [Lessig] [Mueller] [Zittrain]. It is enough to say that the IETF consistently tries to push back against the standardization of surveillance and certain other issues that negatively influence end-users' experience of the Internet [Denardis14]. The role human rights play in technical engineering is much less clear. Understanding how protocols and standards impact human rights, especially the right to freedom of expression and freedom of association and assembly is crucial. Questions at the ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 10] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 intersection of human rights and Internet architecture management are particularly important as Internet Standard Developing Organizations (SDOs) are the arenas for contention over human rights and the role of technical engineers to protect human rights by design [Brownetal] [Clarketal] [Denardis14] [Lessig] [Rachovitsa]. In the academic literature four clear positions can be discerned, in relation to the role of human rights in protocol design and how to account for these human rights in protocol development: Clark et al. argue that there is a need to 'design for variation in outcome, so that the outcome can be different in different places, and the tussle takes place within the design (...) [as] Rigid designs will be broken; designs that permit variation will flex under pressure and survive [Clarketal].' They hold that human rights should not be hard-coded into protocols because of four reasons: first, the rights in the UDHR are not absolute. Second, technology is not the only tool in the tussle over human rights. Third, there are inherent dangers to blunting the tools of enforcement and last but not least, it is dangerous to make promises that can't be kept. The open nature of the Internet will never, they argue, be enough to fully protect individuals' human rights. Conversely, Brown et al. [Brownetal] state that 'some key, universal values - of which the UDHR is the most legitimate expression - should be baked into the architecture at design time.' They argue that design choices have offline consequences, and are able shape the power positions of groups or individuals in society. As such, the individuals making these technical decisions have a moral obligation to take into account the impact of their decisions on society, and by extension human rights. Brown et al recognise that values and the implementation of human rights vary across the globe. Yet they argue that all members of the United Nations have found 'common agreement on the values proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In looking for the most legitimate set of global values to embed in the future Internet architecture, the UDHR has the democratic assent of a significant fraction of the planet's population, through their elected representatives." The main disagreement between these two positions lies mostly in the question on whether a particular value system should be build into the Internet's architecture or whether the architecture needs to account for a varying set of values. A third position that is similar to that of Brown et al., is taken by [Broeders] who argues that 'we must find ways to continue guaranteeing the overall integrity and functionality of the public core of the Internet.' He argues that the best way to do this is by declaring the backbone of the Internet - which includes the tcp/ip ProtocolSuite, numerous standards, the Domain Name System (dns), and routing protocols- a common public good. This is a different approach then that of ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 11] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [Clarketal] and [Brownetal] because he does not suggest that social values should (or should not) be explicitly coded into the Internet's architecture, but rather that the existing architecture should be seen as an entity of public value. Bless and Orwat [Bless] represents a fourth position. They argue that 'pure technical solutions for enabling, enforcing or restricting rights/values are often costly, insufficient, inflexible, may have unintended consequences or create stakeholders with too much power'. They argue that it is important to search for solutions that 'create awareness in the technical community about impact of design choices on social values. And work towards a methodology for co-design of technical and institutional systems.' Our position is that hard-coding human rights into protocols in addition to being undesirable is also impossible, because each situation is dependent on its context. It is however important to make consicious design decisions that take into account the human rights protocol considerations guidelines developed below. This will ensure that the impact protocols can have on human rights is clear and explicit, both for developers and for users. In addition, it ensures that the impact of specific protocol on human rights is carefully considered and that concrete design decisions are documented in the protocol. This document details the steps taken in the research into human rights protocol considerations by the HRPC group to clarify the relation between technical concepts used in the IETF and human rights. And sets out some preliminary of steps and considerations for engineers to take into account when developing standards and protocols. 5. Methodology Mapping the relation between human rights and protocols and architectures is a new research challenge, which requires a good amount of interdisciplinary and cross organizational cooperation to develop a consistent methodology. While the authors of this first draft are involved in both human rights advocacy and research on Internet technologies - we believe that bringing this work into the IRTF facilitates and improves this work by bringing human rights experts together with the community of researchers and developers of Internet standards and technologies. The methodological choices made in this document are based on the political science-based method of discourse analysis and ethnographic research methods. This work departs from the assumption that language reflects the understanding of concepts. Or as [Jabri] holds, policy documents are 'social relations represented in texts where language is used to construct meaning and representation'. This process happens in 'the social space of society' [Schroeder] and ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 12] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 manifests itself in institutions and organizations [King] which were exposed using the ethnographic methods of semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The discourse analysis was operationalized using qualitative and quantitative means. The first step was for the research group to read RFCs and other official IETF documents. The second step was the use of a pyhon-based analyzer, using the tool Big Bang, adapted by Nick Doty [Doty] to scan for the concepts that were identified as important architetural principels (distilled on the initial reading and supplemented by the interviews and participant observation). Such a quantitative method is very precise and speeds up the research process [Richie]. But this tool is unable to understand 'latent meaning' [Denzin]. In order to mitigate these issues of automated word-frequency based approaches, and to get a sense of the 'thick meaning' [Geertz] of the data, a second qualitative analysis of the data set was performed. These various rounds of discourse analysis were used to inform the interviews and further data analysis. The ethnographic methods of the data collection process allowed the research group to acquire the data necessary to 'provide a holistic understanding of research participants' views and actions' [Denzin] that highlighted ongoing issues and case studies where protocols impact human rights. The interview participants were selected through purposive sampling [Babbie], as the research group was interested in getting a wide variety of opinions on the role of human rights in guiding protocol development. This sampling method also ensured that the individuals with extensive experience of working at the IETF in various roles were targeted. The interviewees included individuals in leadership positions (Working Group (WG) chairs, Area Directors (ADs)), 'regular participants', individuals working for specific entities (corporate, civil society, political, academic) and represented various backgrounds, nationalities and genders. 5.1. Data Sources In order to map the potential relation between human rights and protocols, so far, the HRPC research group gathered data from three specific sources:
 5.1.1. Discourse analysis of RFCs To start addressing the issue, a mapping exercise analyzing Internet architecture and protocols features, vis-a-vis possible impact on human rights is being undertaken. Therefore, research on the language used in current and historic RFCs and mailing list discussions is underway to expose core architectural principles, language and deliberations on human rights of those affected by the network. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 13] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 5.1.2. Interviews with members of the IETF community during IETF92 in Dallas Interviews with the current and past members of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), current and past members of the Internet Engineering Steering Group(IESG) and chairs of selected working groups and RFC authors. To get an insider understanding of how they view the relationship (if any) between human rights and protocols to play out in their work. 5.1.3. Participant observation in Working Groups By participating in various working groups, in person at IETF meetings and on mailinglists, information was gathered about the IETFs day-to-day workings. From which which general themes, technical concepts, and use-cases about human rights and protocols were extracted. 5.2. Data analysis strategies The data above was processed using three consecutive strategies: mapping protocols related to human rights, extracting concepts from these protocols, and creation of a common glossary (detailed under 2. vocabulary used). Before going into these strategies some elaboration on the process of identifying technical concepts as they related to human rights needs to be given. 5.2.1. Identifying qualities of technical concepts that relate to human rights 5.2.1.1. Mapping protocols and standards related to human rights By combining data from the three data sources named above, an extensive list of protocols and standards that potentially enable the internet as a tool for freedom of expression and association was assembly. In order to determine this enabling (or inhibiting) featured we relied on direct references of such impact in the RFCs, as well as input from the community. On the basis of this analysis a list of RFCs that describe standards and protocols that are potentially more closely related to human rights were compiled. 5.2.1.2. Extracting concepts from mapped RFCs Mapping the protocols and standards that are related to human rights and creating an human rights enabeling environment was the first step to focus on specific technical concepts that underlie these protocols and standards. On the basis of this list number of technical concepts that appeared frequently was extracted, and used to create a ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 14] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 lt;rpc> messages (except <close-session>) received by the server, unless the session is identified as a recovery session. o If the <action> operation defined in [RFC7950] is invoked, then read access is required for all instances in the hierarchy of data nodes that identifies the specific action in the datastore, and execute access is required for the action node. If the user is not authorized to read all the specified data nodes and execute the action, then the request is rejected with an "access-denied" error. o Otherwise, if the user is not authorized to execute the specified protocol operation, then the request is rejected with an "access- denied" error. o If a datastore is accessed by the protocol operation, then the server checks if the client is authorized to access the nodes in the datastore. If the user is not authorized to perform the requested access operation on the requested data, then the request is rejected with an "access-denied" error. The following sequence of conceptual processing steps is executed for each generated notification event, if access control enforcement is enabled: o Server instrumentation generates a notification for a particular subscription. o If the notification statement is specified within a data subtree, as specified in [RFC7950], then read access is required for all instances in the hierarchy of data nodes that identifies the specific notification in the datastore, and read access is required for the notification node. If the user is not authorized to read all the specified data nodes and the notification node, then the notification is dropped for that subscription. o If the notification statement is a top-level statement, the notification access control enforcer checks the notification event type, and if it is one that the user is not authorized to read, then the notification is dropped for that subscription. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 13] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.2. Datastore Access The same access control rules apply to all datastores that support NACM, for example, the candidate configuration datastore or the running configuration datastore. All conventional configuration datastores and the operational state datastore are controlled by NACM. Local or remote files or datastores accessed via the <url> parameter are not controlled by NACM. 3.2.1. Mapping New Datastores to NACM It is possible that new datastores will be defined over time for use with the NETCONF protocol. NACM MAY be applied to other datastores that have similar access rights as defined in NACM. To apply NACM to a new datastore, the new datastore specification needs to define how it maps to the NACM CRUDX access rights. It is possible only a subset of the NACM access rights would be applicable. For example, only retrieval access control would be needed for a read-only datastore. Operations and access rights not supported by the NACM CRUDX model are outside the scope of this document. A datastore does not need to use NACM, e.g., the datastore specification defines something else, or does not use access control. 3.2.2. Access Rights A small set of hard-wired datastore access rights is needed to control access to all possible protocol operations, including vendor extensions to the standard protocol operation set. The "CRUDX" model can support all protocol operations: o Create: allows the client to add a new data node instance to a datastore. o Read: allows the client to read a data node instance from a datastore or receive the notification event type. o Update: allows the client to update an existing data node instance in a datastore. o Delete: allows the client to delete a data node instance from a datastore. o eXec: allows the client to execute the operation. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 14] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.2.3. RESTCONF Methods The RESTCONF protocol utilizes HTTP methods to perform datastore operations, similar to the NETCONF protocol. The NACM procedures were originally written for NETCONF protocol operations so the RESTCONF methods are mapped to NETCONF operations for the purpose of access control processing. The enforcement procedures described within this document apply to both protocols unless explicitly stated otherwise. The request URI needs to be considered when processing RESTCONF requests on data resources: o For HEAD and GET requests, any data nodes which are ancestor nodes of the target resource are considered to be part of the retrieval request for access control purposes. o For PUT, PATCH, and DELETE requests, any data nodes which are ancestor nodes of the target resource are not considered to be part of the edit request for access control purposes. The access operation for these nodes is considered to be "none". The edit begins at the target resource. o For POST requests on data resources, any data nodes which are specified in the request URI, including the target resource, are not considered to be part of the edit request for access control purposes. The access operation for these nodes is considered to be "none". The edit begins at a child node of the target resource, specified in the message body. Not all RESTCONF methods are subject to access control. The following table specifies how each method is mapped to NETCONF protocol operations. The value "none" indicates that NACM is not applied at all to the specific RESTCONF method. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 15] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 +---------+-----------------+---------------------+-----------------+ | method | resource class | NETCONF operation | Access | | | | | operation | +---------+-----------------+---------------------+-----------------+ | OPTIONS | all | none | none | | HEAD | all | <get>, <get-config> | read | | GET | all | <get>, <get-config> | read | | POST | datastore, data | <edit-config> | create | | POST | operation | specified operation | execute | | PUT | data | <edit-config> | create, update | | PUT | datastore | <copy-config> | update | | PATCH | data, datastore | <edit-config> | update | | DELETE | data | <edit-config> | delete | +---------+-----------------+---------------------+-----------------+ Table 1: Mapping RESTCONF Methods to NETCONF 3.2.4. <get> and <get-config> Operations The NACM access rights are not directly coupled to the <get> and <get-config> protocol operations, but apply to all <rpc> operations that would result in a "read" access operation to the target datastore. This section describes how these access rights apply to the specific access operations supported by the <get> and <get- config> protocol operations. Data nodes to which the client does not have read access are silently omitted from the <rpc-reply> message. This is done to allow NETCONF filters for <get> and <get-config> to function properly, instead of causing an "access-denied" error because the filter criteria would otherwise include unauthorized read access to some data nodes. For NETCONF filtering purposes, the selection criteria is applied to the subset of nodes that the user is authorized to read, not the entire datastore. 3.2.5. <edit-config> Operation The NACM access rights are not directly coupled to the <edit-config> "operation" attribute, although they are similar. Instead, a NACM access right applies to all protocol operations that would result in a particular access operation to the target datastore. This section describes how these access rights apply to the specific access operations supported by the <edit-config> protocol operation. If the effective access operation is "none" (i.e., default- operation="none") for a particular data node, then read permission is required for that data node. This is required to allow access to a subtree within a larger data structure. For example, a user may be Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 16] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 authorized to create a new "/interfaces/interface" list entry but not be authorized to create or delete its parent container ("/interfaces"). If the "/interfaces" container already exists in the target datastore, then the effective operation will be "none" for the "/interfaces" node if an "/interfaces/interface" list entry is edited. If the protocol operation would result in the creation of a datastore node and the user does not have "create" access permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access-denied" error. If the protocol operation would result in the deletion of a datastore node and the user does not have "delete" access permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access-denied" error. If the protocol operation would result in the modification of a datastore node and the user does not have "update" access permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access- denied" error. A "merge" or "replace" <edit-config> operation may include data nodes that do not alter portions of the existing datastore. For example, a container or list node may be present for naming purposes but does not actually alter the corresponding datastore node. These unaltered data nodes are ignored by the server and do not require any access rights by the client. A "merge" <edit-config> operation may include data nodes but not include particular child data nodes that are present in the datastore. These missing data nodes within the scope of a "merge" <edit-config> operation are ignored by the server and do not require any access rights by the client. The contents of specific restricted datastore nodes MUST NOT be exposed in any <rpc-error> elements within the reply. 3.2.6. <copy-config> Operation Access control for the <copy-config> protocol operation requires special consideration because the administrator may be replacing the entire target datastore. If the source of the <copy-config> protocol operation is the running configuration datastore and the target is the startup configuration datastore, the client is only required to have permission to execute the <copy-config> protocol operation. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 17] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 Otherwise: o If the source of the <copy-config> operation is a datastore, then data nodes to which the client does not have read access are silently omitted. o If the target of the <copy-config> operation is a datastore, the client needs access to the modified nodes, specifically: * If the protocol operation would result in the creation of a datastore node and the user does not have "create" access permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access-denied" error. * If the protocol operation would result in the deletion of a datastore node and the user does not have "delete" access permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access-denied" error. * If the protocol operation would result in the modification of a datastore node and the user does not have "update" access permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access-denied" error. 3.2.7. <delete-config> Operation Access to the <delete-config> protocol operation is denied by default. The "exec-default" leaf does not apply to this protocol operation. Access control rules must be explicitly configured to allow invocation by a non-recovery session. 3.2.8. <commit> Operation The server MUST determine the exact nodes in the running configuration datastore that are actually different and only check "create", "update", and "delete" access permissions for this set of nodes, which could be empty. For example, if a session can read the entire datastore but only change one leaf, that session needs to be able to edit and commit that one leaf. 3.2.9. <discard-changes> Operation The client is only required to have permission to execute the <discard-changes> protocol operation. No datastore permissions are needed. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 18] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.2.10. <kill-session> Operation The &list of technical terms that combined create the enabling environment for excercising human rights on the Internet. 5.2.1.3. Building a common vocabulary of technical concepts that impact human rights While interviewing experts and mapping RFCs and compiling technical definitions several concepts of convergence and divergence were identified. To ensure that the discussion was based on a common understanding of terms a list of terms was created. The definitions are based on definitions from other IETF documents, and if these were unavailable definitions were taken from definitions from other Standards Developing Organizations or academic literature. 5.2.1.4. Translating Human Rights Concept into Technical Definitions The previous steps allowed for the clarification of relation between human rights and technical concepts. The steps taken show how the research process zoomed in, from compiling a broad lists of protocols and standards that relate to human rights to extracting the precies technical concepts that make up these protocols and standards in order to understand the relationship between the two. This sub- section presents the next step: translating human rights to technical concepts by matching the individuals components of the rights to the accompanying technical concepts, allowing for the creation of a list of technical concepts that combined create the enabling environment for human rights. 5.2.1.5. List technical terms that combined create enabling environment for human rights On the basis of the prior steps the following list of technical terms that combined create the enabling environment for human rights, such a freedom of expression and freedom of association was drafted. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 15] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 Architectural principles Enabling features and characteristics for user rights /------------------------------------------------\ | | +=================|=============================+ | = | = | = | End to end = | = | Reliability = | = | Resilience = Access as | = | Interoperability = Human Right | = Good enough | Transparency = | = principle | Data minimization = | = | Permissionless innovation = | = Simplicity | Graceful degradation = | = | Connectivity = | = | Heterogeneity = | = | = | = | = | = \------------------------------------------------/ = = +===============================================+ 5.2.2. Translation human rights to technical terms This analysis aims to translate human rights concepts that impact or are impacted by the Internet as follows: The combination of content agnosticism, connectivity, security, privacy (as defined in [RFC6973] ), and open standards are the technical principles that underlay freedom of expression on the Internet. ( Connectivity ) ( Privacy ) ( Security ) = Right to freedom of expression ( Content agnosticism ) ( Internationalization ) ( Censorship resistance ) ( Open Standards ) ( Heterogeneity support ) ( Anonymity ) ( Privacy ) = Right to non-discrimination ( Pseudonymity ) ( Content agnosticism ) ( Accessibility ) ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 16] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 ( Content Agnosticism ) ( Security ) = Right to equal protection ( Anonymity ) ( Privacy ) = Right to be presumed innocent ( Security ) ( Accessibility ) ( Internationalization ) = Right to political participation ( Censorship resistance ) ( Open standards ) ( Localization ) = Right to participate in cultural life, ( Internationalization ) arts and science ( Censorship resistance ) ( Connectivity ) ( Decentralization ) ( Censorship resistance ) = Right to freedom of assembly ( Pseudonymity ) and association ( Anonymity ) ( Security ) ( Reliability ) ( Confidentiality ) ( Integrity ) = Right to security ( Authenticity ) ( Anonymity ) 5.2.2.1. Map cases of protocols that are adversely impact human rights or are enablers thereof Taken this information above, the following list of cases of protocols that adversely impact or enable human rights was formed. 5.2.3. IP The Internet Protocol version 4, known as 'layer 3' of the internet, and specified as a common encapsulation and protocol header, is defined by [RFC0791]. The evolution of Internet communications have led to continued development in this area, encapsulated in the development of version 6 of the protocol in [RFC2460]. In spite of this updated protocol, we find that 25 years after the specification ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 17] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 of version 6 of the protocol, the older v4 standard continues to account for a sizeable majority of internet traffic. The internet was designed as a platform for free and open communication, most notably encoded in the end-to-end principle, and that philosophy is also present in the technical implementation of the Internet Protocol. [RFC3724] While the protocol was designed to exist in an environment where intelligence is at the end hosts, it has proven to provide sufficient information that a more intelligent network core can make policy decisions and enforce policy shaping and restricting the communications of end hosts. These capabilities for network control and limitations of the freedom of expression by end hosts can be traced back to the IPv4 design, helping us understand which technical protocol decisions have led to harm of these human rights. Two major shifts have occurred to harm freedom of expression through misuse of the Internet Protocol. The first is the network's exploitation of the public visibility of the host pairs for all communications, and the corresponding ability to discriminate and block traffic as a result of that metadata. The second is the selective development of IP options. Protocol extensions including Mobility and Multicasting have proposed alternate communication modes and suggest that different forms of assembly could be supported by an a robust IP layer. Instead, the protocol has limited the deployability of such extensions by not providing a mechanism for appropriate fallback behavior when unrecognized extensions are encountered. 5.2.3.1. Network visibility of Source and Destination The IPv4 protocol header contains fixed location fields for both the source and destination IP addresses [RFC0791]. These addresses identify both the host sending and receiving each message, and allow the core network to understand who is talking to whom, and to practically limit communication selectively between pairs of hosts. Blocking of communication based on the pair of source and destination is one of the most common limitations on the ability for hosts to communicate today, [caida] and can be seen as a restriction of the ability for those hosts to assemble or to consensually express themselves. Inclusion of an Internet-wide identified source in the IP header is not the only possible design, especially since the protocol is most commonly implemented over Ethernet networks exposing only link-local identifiers. [RFC0894] A variety of alternative designs including source routing, and spoofing of the source IP address are technically supported by the protocol, but neither are regularly allowed on the ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 18] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 Internet. While projects like [torproject] provide an alternative implementation of anonymity in connections, they have been developed in spite of the IPv4 protocol design. 5.2.3.2. Protocols The other major feature of the IP protocol header is that it specifies the protocol encapsulated in each message in an easily observable form, and does not encourage a design where the encapsulated protocol is not available to a network observer. This design has resulted in a proliferation of routers which inspect the inner protocol, and has resulted in a stagnation where only the TCP and UDP protocols are widely supported across the Internet. While the IP protocol was designed as the entire set of metadata needed for routing, subsequent enhanced routers have found value on making policy decisions based on the contents of TCP and UDP headers as well, and are encoded with the assumption that only these protocols will be used for data transfer. [spdy] [RFC4303] defines an encrypted encapsulation of additional protocols, but lacks widespread deployment and faces the same challenge as any other protocol of providing sufficient metadata with each message for routers to make positive policy decisions. Protocols like [RFC4906] have seen limited wide-area uptake, and these alternate designs are frequently re-implemented on top of UDP. [quic] 5.2.3.3. Address Translation and Mobility A major structural shift in the Internet which has undermined the protocol design of IPv4, and has significantly reduced the freedom of end users to communicate and assemble in the introduction network address translation. [RFC1631] Network address translation is a process whereby organizations and autonomous systems to connect two networks by translating the IPv4 source and destination addresses between the two. This process puts the router performing the translation into a privileged position, where it can decide which subset of communications are worthy of translation, and whether an unknown request for communication will be correctly forwarded to a host on the other network. This process of translation has widespread adoption despite promoting a process that goes against the stated end-to-end process of the underlying protocol [natusage]. In contrast, the proposed mechanism to provide support for mobility and forwarding to clients which may move, encoded instead as an option in the IP protocol in [RFC5944], has failed to gain traction. This situation again suggests that the compromise made in design of the protocol has resulted in a technology which failed to technical encode the freedom of expression goals it was designed to promote. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 19] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 5.2.4. DNS The Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1035], provides service discovery capabilities, and provides a mechanism to associate human readable names with services. The DNS system is organized around a set of independently operated 'Root Servers' run by organizations around the web which enact ICANN's policy by answering queries for which organizations have been delegated to manage registration under each Top Level Domain (TLD). Top Level domains are maintained and determined by ICANN. These namespaces encompass several classes of services. The initial name spaces including '.Com' and '.Net', provide common spaces for expression of ideas, though their policies are enacted through US based companies. Other name spaces are delegated to specific nationalities, and may impose limits designed to focus speech in those forums both to promote speech from that nationality, and to comply with local limits on expression and social norms. Finally, the system has been recently expanded with additional generic and sponsored name spaces, for instance '.travel' and '.ninja', which are operated by a range of organizations which may independently determine their registration policies. DNS has significant privacy issues per [RFC7626]. Most notable are the lack of encryption to limit the visibility of requests for domain resolution from intermediary parties, and a limited deployment of DNSSEC to provide authentication, allowing the client to know that they have received a correct, "authoritative", answer to a query. Together, this situation results in ongoing harm to freedom of expression as interference with the operation of DNS has become one of the central mechanisms used to block access to websites. This interference limits both the freedom of expression of the publisher to offer their content, and the freedom of assembly for clients to congregate in a shared virtual space. There have been several mechanisms used impose these limitations based on the technical design of the DNS protocol. These have led to a number of situations where limits on expression have been imposed through subversion of the DNS protocol. Each of these situations has accompanying aspects of protocol design enabling those limitations. 5.2.4.1. Removal of records There have been a number of cases where the records for a domain are removed from the name system due to real-world events. Examples of this removal includes the 'seizure' of wikileaks [bbc-wikileaks] and the names of illegally operating gambling operations by the United States ICE unit, which compelled the US-based registry in charge of the .com TLD to hand ownership of those domains over to the government. The same technique has been notably used by Libya to ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 20] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 remove sites in violation of "our Country's Law and Morality (which) do not allow any kind of pornography or its promotion." [techyum] At a protocol level, there is no technical auditing for name ownership, as in alternate systems like [namecoin]. As a result, there is no ability for users to differentiate seizure from the legitimate transfer of name ownership, which is purely a policy decision of registrars. While DNSSEC addresses network distortion events described below, it does not tackle this problem, which has the cooperation of (or compelled action by) the registry. 5.2.4.2. Distortion of records The most common mechanism by which the DNS system is abused to limit freedom of expression is through manipulation of protocol messages by the network. One form occurs at an organizational level, where client computers are instructed to use a local DNS resolver controlled by the organization. The DNS resolver will then selectively distort responses rather than request the authoritative lookup from the upstream system. The second form occurs through the use of deep packet inspection, where all DNS protocol messages are inspected by the network, and objectionable content is distorted, as in [turkey]. A notable instance of distortion has occurred in Greece [ververis], where a study found evidence of both of deep packet inspection to distort DNS replies, and overblocking of content, where ISPs prevented clients from resolving the names of domains which they were not instructed to do through the governmental order prompting the blocking systems there. At a protocol level, the effectiveness of these attacks is made possible by a lack of authentication in the DNS protocol. DNSSEC provides the ability to determine authenticity of responses when used, but it is not regularly checked by resolvers. DNSSEC is not effective when the local resolver for a network is complicit in the distortion, for instance when the resolver assigned for use by an ISP is the source of injection. Selective distortion of records has also been made possible by the predictable structure of DNS messages, which make it computationally easy for a network device to watch all passing messages even at high speeds, and the lack of encryption, which allows the network to distort only an objectionable subset of protocol messages. Specific distortion mechanisms are discussed further in [draft-hall-censorship-tech-01]. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 21] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 5.2.4.3. Injection of records Responding incorrectly to requests for name lookups is the most common mechanism that in-network devices use to limit the ability of end users to discover services. A deviation which accomplishes a similar objective, though may be seen as different from a freedom of expression perspective, is the injection of incorrect responses to queries. The most prominent example of this behavior occurs in China, where requests for lookups of sites which have been deemed inappropriate will trigger the network to respond with a bogus response, causing the client to ignore the real response when it subsequently arrives. [greatfirewall] Unlike the other forms of discussion discussed above, injection does not stifle the ability of a server to announce it's name, it instead provides another voice which answers sooner. This is effective because without DNSSEC, the protocol will respond to whichever answer is received first, without listening for subsequent answers. 5.2.5. HTTP The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), described in its version 1.1 in RFC 7230 to 7237, is a request-response application protocol developed throughout the 1990s, and factually contributed to the exponential growth of the Internet and the inter-connection of populations around the world. Because of its simple design, HTTP has become the foundation of most modern Internet platforms and communication systems, from websites, to chat systems, and computer- to-computer applications. In its manifestation with the World Wide Web, HTTP has radically revolutionized the course of technological development and the ways people interact with online content and with each other. However, HTTP is also a fundamentally insecure protocol, that doesn't natively provide encryption properties. While the definition of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), and later of Transport Layer Security (TLS), also happened during the 1990s, the fact that HTTP doesn't mandate the use of such encryption layers to developers and service providers, caused a very late adoption. Only in the middle of the 2000s we observed big Internet service providers, such as Google, starting to provide encrypted access to their web services. The lack of sensitivity and understanding of the critical importance of securing web traffic incentivized malicious and offensive actors to develop, deploy and utilize at large interception systems and later active injection attacks, in order to swipe large amounts of data, compromise Internet-enabled devices. The commercial availability of systems and tools to perform these types of attacks also led to a number of human rights abuses that have been discovered ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 22] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 and reported over the years and that painted a dark picture on the current state of control over the Internet. Generally we can identify in Traffic Interception and Traffic Manipulation the two most problematic attacks that can be performed against applications employing a clear-text HTTP transport layer. 5.2.5.1. Traffic Interception While we are seeing an increasing trend in the last couple of years to employ SSL/TLS as a secure traffic layer for HTTP-based applications, we are still far from seeing an ubiquitous use of encryption on the World Wide Web. It is important to consider that the adoption of SSL/TLS is also a relatively recent phenomena. Google introduced an option for its GMail users to navigate with SSL only in 2008 [Rideout], and turned SSL on by default later in 2010 [Schillace]. It took an increasing amount of scandalous security breaches and revelations on global surveillance from Edward Snowden to have other Internet service providers to follow Google's lead. For example, Yahoo enabled SSL/TLS by default on its webmail services only towards the end of 2013 [Peterson]. As we learned through the Snowden's revelations, intelligence agencies have been intercepting and collecting unencrypted traffic at large for many years. There are documented examples of such mass surveillance programs with GCHQ's TEMPORA and NSA's XKEYSCORE. Through these programs NSA/GCHQ have been able to swipe large amounts of data including email and instant messaging communications which have been transported by the respective providers in clear for years, unsuspecting of the pervasiveness and scale of governments' efforts and investment into global mass surveillance capabilities. However, similar mass interception of unencrypted HTTP communications is also often employed at a nation-level by less democratic countries by exercising control over state-owned Internet Service Providers (ISP) and through the use of commercially available monitoring, collection, and censorship equipment. Over the last few years a lot of information has come to public attention on the role and scale of a surveillance industry dedicated to develop interception gear of different types. We have several records of such equipment being sold and utilized by oppressive regimes in order to monitor entire segments of population especially at times of social and political distress, uncovering massive human rights abuses. For example, in 2013 the group Telecomix revealed that the Syrian regime was making use of BlueCoat products in order to intercept clear-text traffic as well as to enforce censorship of unwanted content [RSF]. Similarly in 2012 it was found that the French Amesys provided the Gaddafi's government with equipment able to intercept emails, Facebook traffic, ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 23] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 and chat messages ad a country level. The use of such systems, especially in the context of the Arab Spring and of civil uprisings against the dictatorships, has caused serious concerns of significant human rights abuses in Libya. 5.2.5.2. Traffic Manipulation The lack of a secure transport layer over HTTP connections not only exposes the users to interception of the content of their communications, but is more and more commonly abused as a vehicle for active compromises of computers and mobile devices. If an HTTP session travels in clear over the network, any node positioned at any point in the network is able to perform man-in-the-middle attacks and observe, manipulate, and hijack the session and modify the content of the communication in order to trigger unexpected behavior by the application generating the traffic. For example, in the case of a browser the attacker would be able to inject malicious code in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the browser or any of its plugins. Similarly, the attacker would be able to intercept, trojanize, and repackage binary software updates that are very commonly downloaded in clear by applications such as word processors and media players. If the HTTP session would be encrypted, the tampering of the content would not be possible, and these network injection attacks would not be successful. While traffic manipulation attacks have been long known, documented, and prototyped especially in the context of WiFi and LAN networks, in the last few years we observed an increasing investment into the production and sale of network injection equipment both available commercially as well as deployed at scale by intelligence agencies. For example we learned from some of the documents provided by Edward Snowden to the press, that the NSA has constructed a global network injection infrastructure, called QUANTUM, able to leverage mass surveillance in order to identify targets of interests and subsequently task man-on-the-side attacks to ultimately compromise a selected device. Among other attacks, NSA makes use of an attack called QUANTUMINSERT [Haagsma] which intercepts and hijacks an unencrypted HTTP communication and forces the requesting browser to redirect to a host controlled by NSA instead of the intended website. Normally, the new destination would be an exploitation service, referred in Snowden documents as FOXACID, which would attempt at executing malicious code in the context of the target's browser. The Guardian reported in 2013 that NSA has for example been using these techniques to target users of the popular anonymity service Tor [Schneier]. The German NDR reported in 2014 that NSA has also been using its mass surveillance capabilities to identify Tor users at large [Appelbaum]. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 24] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 Recently similar capabilities of Chinese authorities have been reported as well in what has been informally called the "Great Cannon" [Marcak], which raised numerous concerns on the potential curb on human rights and freedom of speech due to the increasing tighter control of Chinese Internet communications and access to information. Network injection attacks are also made widely available to state actors around the world through the commercialization of similar, smaller scale equipment that can be easily acquired and deployed at a country-wide level. Companies like FinFisher and HackingTeam are known to have network injection gear within their products portfolio, respectively called FinFly ISP and RCS Network Injector [Marquis-Boire]. The technology devised and produced by HackingTeam to perform network traffic manipulation attacks on HTTP communications is even the subject of a patent application in the United States [Googlepatent]. Access to offensive technologies available on the commercial lawful interception market has been largely documented to have lead to human rights abuses and illegitimate surveillance of journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists in many countries around the world. Companies like FinFisher and HackingTeam have been found selling their products to oppressive regimes with little concern for bad human rights records [Collins]. While network injection attacks haven't been the subject of much attention, they do enable even unskilled attackers to perform silent and very resilient compromises, and unencrypted HTTP remains one of the main vehicles. 5.2.6. XMPP The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), specified in [RFC6120], provides a standard for interactive chat messaging, and has evolved to encompass interoperable text, voice, and video chat. The protocol is structured as a federated network of servers, similar to email, where users register with a local server which acts one their behalf to cache and relay messages. This protocol design has many advantages, allowing servers to shield clients from denial of service and other forms of retribution for their expression, and designed to avoid central entities which could control the ability to communicate or assemble using the protocol. None-the-less, there are plenty of aspects of the protocol design of XMPP which shape the ability for users to communicate freely, and to assembly through the protocol. The protocol also has facets that may stifle speech as users self-censor for fear of surveillance, or find themselves unable to express themselves naturally. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 25] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 5.2.6.1. User Identification The XMPP specification dictates that clients are identified with a resource (node@domain/home [1] / node@domain/work [2]) to distinguish the conversations to specific devices. While the protocol does not specify that the resource must be exposed by the client's server to remote users, in practice this has become the default behavior. In doing so, users can be tracked by remote friends and their servers, who are able to monitor presence not just of the user, but of each individual device the user logs in with. This has proven to be misleading to many users, [pidgin] since many clients only expose user level rather than device level presence. Likewise, user invisibility so that communication can occur while users don't notify all buddies and other servers of their availability is not part of the formal protocol, and has only been added as an extension within the XML stream rather than enforced by the protocol. 5.2.6.2. Surveillance of Communication The XMPP protocol specifies the standard by which communication of channels may be encrypted, but it does not provide visibility to clients of whether their communications are encrypted on each link. In particular, even when both clients ensure that they have an encrypted connection to their XMPP server to ensure that their local network is unable to read or disrupt the messages they send, the protocol does not provide visibility into the encryption status between the two servers. As such, clients may be subject to selective disruption of communications by an intermediate network which disrupts communications based on keywords found through Deep Packet Inspection. While many operators have commited to only establishing encrypted links from their servers in recognition of this vulnerability, it remains impossible for users to audit this behavior and encrypted connections are not required by the protocol itself [xmppmanifesto]. In particular, section 13.14 of the protocol specification [RFC6120] explicitly acknowledges the existence of a downgrade attack where an adversary controlling an intermediate network can force the inter domain federation between servers to revert to a non-encrypted protocol were selective messages can then be disrupted. 5.2.6.3. Group Chat Limitations Group chat in the XMPP protocol is defined as an extension within the XML specification of the XMPP protocol (https://xmpp.org/extensions/ xep-0045.html). However, it is not encoded or required at a protocol level, and not uniformly implemented by clients. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 26] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 The design of multi-user chat in the XMPP protocol suffers from extending a protocol that was not designed with assembly of many users in mind. In particular, in the federated protocol provided by XMPP, multi-user communities are implemented with a distinguished 'owner', who is granted control over the participants and structure of the conversation. Multi-user chat rooms are identified by a name specified on a specific server, so that while the overall protocol may be federated, the ability for users to assemble in a given community is moderated by a single server. That server may block the room and prevent assembly unilaterally, even between two users neither of whom trust or use that server directly. 5.2.7. Peer to Peer Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is a network architecture (defined in [RFC7574]) in which all the participant nodes are equally responsible engaged into the storage and dissemination of information. A P2P network is a logical overlay that lives on top of the physical network, and allows nodes (or "peers") participating to it to establish contact and exchange information directly from one to each other. The implementation of a P2P network may very widely: it may be structured or unstructured, and it may implement stronger or weaker cryptographic and anonymity properties. While its most common application has traditionally been file-sharing (and other types of content delivery systems), P2P is increasingly becoming a popular architecture for networks and applications that require (or encourage) decentralization. A prime example is Bitcoin (and similar cryptocurrencies), as well as Skype, Spotify and other proprietary multimedia applications. In a time of heavily centralized online services, peer-to-peer is often seen as an alternative, more democratic, and resistant architecture that displaces structures of control over data and communications and delegates all peers equally to be responsible for the functioning, integrity, and security of the data. While in principle peer-to-peer remains critical to the design and development of future content distribution, messaging, and publishing systems, it poses numerous security and privacy challenges which are mostly delegated to individual developers to recognize, analyze, and solve in each implementation of a given P2P network. 5.2.7.1. Network Poisoning Since content, and in some occasions peer lists, are safeguarded and distributed by its members, P2P networks are prone to what are generally defined as "poisoning attacks". Poisoning attacks might be ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 27] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 directed directly at the data that is being distributed, for example by intentionally corrupting it, or at the index tables used to instruct the peers where to fetch the data, or at routing tables, with the attempt of providing connecting peers with lists of rogue or non-existing peers, with the intention to effectively cause a Denial of Service on the network. 5.2.7.2. Throttling Peer-to-Peer traffic (and BitTorrent in particular) represents a high percentage of global Internet traffic and it has become increasingly popular for Internet Service Providers to perform throttling of customers lines in order to limit bandwidth usage [torrentfreak1] and sometimes probably as an effect of the ongoing conflict between copyright holders and file-sharing communities [wikileaks]. Throttling the peer-to-peer traffic makes some uses of P2P networks ineffective and it might be coupled with stricter inspection of users' Internet traffic through Deep Packet Inspection techniques which might pose additional security and privacy risks. 5.2.7.3. Tracking and Identification One of the fundamental and most problematic issues with traditional peer-to-peer networks is a complete lack of anonymization of its users. For example, in the case of BitTorrent, all peers' IP addresses are openly available to the other peers. This has lead to an ever-increasing tracking of peer-to-peer and file-sharing users [ars]. As the geographical location of the user is directly exposed, and so could be his identity, the user might become target of additional harassment and attacks, being of physical or legal nature. For example, it is known that in Germany law firms have made extensive use of peer-to-peer and file-sharing tracking systems in order to identify downloaders and initiate legal actions looking for compensations [torrentfreak2]. It is worth nothing that there are varieties of P2P networks that implement cryptographic practices and that introduce anonymization of its users. Such implementations proved to be successful in resisting censorship of content, and tracking of the network peers. A primary example is FreeNet [freenet1], a free software application designed to significantly increase the difficulty of users and content identification, and dedicated to foster freedom of speech online [freenet2]. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 28] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 5.2.7.4. Sybil Attacks In open-membership P2P networks, a single attacker can pretend to be many participants, typically by creating multiple fake identities of whatever kind the P2P network uses [Douceur]. Attackers can use Sybil attacks to bias choices the P2P network makes collectively toward the attacker's advantage, e.g., by making it more likely that a particular data item (or some threshold of the replicas or shares of a data item) are assigned to attacker-controlled participants. If the P2P network implements any voting, moderation, or peer review- like functionality, Sybil attacks may be used to "stuff the ballots" toward the attacker's benefit. Companies and governments can use Sybil attacks on discussion-oriented P2P systems for "astroturfing" or creating the appearance of mass grassroots support for some position where there is none in reality. 5.2.7.5. Conclusions Encrypted P2P and Anonymous P2P networks already emerged and provided viable platforms for sharing material, publish content anonymously, and communicate securely [bitmessage]. If adopted at large, well- designed and resistant P2P networks might represent a critical component of a future secure and distributed Internet, enabling freedom of speech and freedom of information at scale. 5.2.8. Virtual Private Network 5.2.8.1. Introduction A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a point-to-point connection that enables two computers to communicate over an encrypted tunnel. There are multiple implementations and protocols used in provisioning a VPN, and they generally diversify by encryption protocol or particular requirements, most commonly in proprietary and enterprise solutions. VPNs are used commonly either to enable some devices to communicate through peculiar network configurations, or in order to use some privacy and security properties in order to protect the traffic generated by the end user; or both. VPNs have also become a very popular technology among human rights defenders, dissidents, and journalists worldwide to avoid local illegitimate wiretapping and eventually also to circumvent censorship. Among human rights defenders VPNs are often debated as a potential alternative to Tor or other anonymous networks. Such comparison is misleading, as some of the privacy and security properties of VPNs are often misunderstood by less tech-savvy users, which could ultimately lead to unintended problems. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 29] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 As VPNs increased in popularity, commercial VPN providers have started growing in business and are very commonly picked by human rights defenders and people at risk, as they are normally provided with an easy-to-use service and sometimes even custom applications to establish the VPN tunnel. Not being able to control the configuration of the network, and even less so the security of the application, assessing the general privacy and security state of common VPNs is very hard. Often such services have been discovered leaking information, and their custom applications have been found flawed. While Tor and similar networks receive a lot of scrutiny from the public and the academic community, commercial or non- commercial VPN networks are way less analyzed and understood, and it might be valuable to establish some standards to guarantee a minimal level of privacy and security to those who need them the most. 5.2.8.2. False sense of Anonymity One of the common misconception among users of VPNs is the level of anonymity VPN can provide. This sense of anonymity can be betrayed by a number of attacks or misconfigurations of the VPN provider. It is important to remember that, contrarily to Tor and similar systems, VPN was not designed to provide anonymity properties. From a technical point of view, the VPN might leak identifiable information, or might be subject of correlation attacks that could expose the originating address of the connecting user. Most importantly, it is vital to understand that commercial and non-commercial VPN providers are bound by the law of the jurisdiction they reside in or in which their infrastructure is located, and they might be legally forced to turn over data of specific users if legal investigations or intelligence requirements dictate so. In such cases, if the VPN providers retain logs, it is possible that the information of the user is provided to the user's adversary and leads to his or her identification. 5.2.8.3. Logging With VPN being point-to-point connections, the service providers are in fact able to observe the original location of the connecting users and they are able to track at what time they started their session and eventually also to which destinations they're trying to connect to. If the VPN providers retain logs for long enough, they might be forced to turn over the relevant data or they might be otherwise compromised, leading to the same data getting exposed. A clear log retaining policy could be enforced, but considering that countries enforce very different levels of data retention policies, VPN providers should at least be transparent on what information do they store and for how long is being kept. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 30] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 5.2.8.4. 3rd Party Hosting VPN providers very commonly rely on 3rd parties to provision the infrastructure that is later going to be used to run VPN endpoints. For example, they might rely on external dedicated server hosting providers, or on uplink providers. In those cases, even if the VPN provider itself isn't retaining any significant logs, the information on the connecting users might be retained by those 3rd parties instead, introducing an additional collection point for the adversary. 5.2.8.5. IPv6 Leakage Some studies proved that several commercial VPN providers and applications suffer of critical leakage of information through IPv6 due to improper support and configuration [PETS2015VPN]. This is generally caused by a lack of proper configuration of the client's IPv6 routing tables. Considering that most popular browsers and similar applications have been supporting IPv6 by default, if the host is provided with a functional IPv6 configuration, the traffic that is generated might be leaked if the VPN application isn't designed to manipulate such traffic properly. 5.2.8.6. DNS Leakage Similarly, VPN services that aren't handling DNS requests and are not running DNS servers of their own, might be prone to DNS leaking which might not only expose sensitive information on the activity of the user, but could also potentially lead to DNS hijacking attacks and following compromises. 5.2.8.7. Traffic Correlation As revelations of mass surveillance have been growing in the press, additional details on attacks on secure Internet communications have come to the public's attention. Among these, VPN appeared to be a very interesting target for attacks and collection efforts. Some implementations of VPN appear to be particularly vulnerable to identification and collection of key exchanges which, some Snowden documents revealed, are systematically collected and stored for future reference. The ability of an adversary to monitor network connections at many different points over the Internet, can allow them to perform traffic correlation attacks and identify the origin of certain VPN traffic by cross referencing the connection time of the user to the endpoint and the connection time of the endpoint to the final destination. These types of attacks, although very expensive and normally only performed by very resourceful adversaries, have been documented [spiegel] to be already in practice ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 31] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 and could completely vanify the use of a VPN and ultimately expose the activity and the identity of a user at risk. 5.2.9. HTTP Status Code 451 Every Internet user has run into the '404 Not Found' Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to access a particular website. It is a response status that the server sends to the browser, when the server cannot locate the URL. '403 Forbidden' is another example of this class of code signals that gives users information about what is going on. In the '403' case the server can be reached, but is blocking the request because the user is trying to access content forbidden to them. This can be because the specific user is not allowed access to the content (like a government employee trying to access pornography on a work- computer) or because access is restricted to all users (like social network sites in certain countries). As surveillance and censorship of the Internet is becoming more commonplace, voices were raised at the IETF to introduce a new status code that indicates when something is not available for 'legal reasons' (like censorship): The 451 status code would allow server operators to operate with greater transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect their operation. This transparency may be beneficial both to these operators and to end-users [Bray]. The status code would be named '451', a reference to Bradbury's famous novel on censorship During the IETF meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the usefulness of '451'. The main tension revolved around the lack of an apparent machine-readable technical use of the information. The extent to which '451' is just 'political theatre' or whether it has a concrete technical use was heatedly debated. Some argued that 'the 451 status code is just a status code with a response body' others said it was problematic because 'it brings law into the picture'. Again others argued that it would be useful for individuals, or organizations like the 'Chilling Effects' project, crawling the web to get an indication of censorship (IETF discussion on '451' - author's field notes March 2015). There was no outright objection during the Dallas meeting against moving forward on status code '451', and on December 18, 2015 the Internet Engineering Steering Group approved publication of 'An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles'. It is still in the process of becoming an RFC, but could effectively be used from the day of approval. What is interesting about this particular case is that not only technical arguments but also the status code's outright potential ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 32] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 political use for civil society played a substantial role in shaping the discussion, and the decision to move forward with this technology. It is however important to note that 451 is not a solution to detect all occasions of censorship. A large swath of Internet filtering occurs in the network rather than the server itself. For these forms of censorship 451 plays a limited role, as the servers will not be able to send the code, because they haven't received the requests (as is the case with servers with resources blocked by the Chinese Golden shield). Such filtering regimes are unlikely to voluntarily inject a 451 status code. The use of 451 is most likely to apply in the case of cooperative, legal versions of content removal resulting from requests to providers. One can think of content that is removed or blocked for legal reasons, like copyright infringement, gambling laws, child abuse, et cetera. The major use case is thus clearly on the Web server itself, not the network. Large Internet companies and search engines are constantly asked to censor content in various jurisdictions. 451 allows this to be easily discovered, for instance by initiatives like the Lumen Database. In the case of adversarial blocking done by a filtering entity on the network 451 is less useful. Overall, the strength of 451 lies in its ability to provide transparency by giving the reason for blocking, and giving the end- user the ability to file a complaint. It allows organizations to easily measure censorship in an automated way, and prompts the user to access the content via another path (e.g. TOR, VPNs) when (s)he encounters the 451 status code. Status code 451 impact human rights by making censorship more transparent and measurable. The status code increases transparency both by signaling the existence of censorship (instead of a much more broad HTTP error message like HTTP status code 404) as well as providing details of the legal restriction, which legal authority is imposing it, and what class of resources it applies to. This empowers the user to seek redress. 5.2.10. Middleboxes On the current Internet, transparency on how packets reach a destination is no longer a given. This is due to the increased presence of firewalls, spam filters, and network address translators networks (NATs) - or middleboxes as these hosts are often called - that make use of higher-layer fields to function [Walfish]. This development is contentious. The debate also unfolded at the IETF, specifically at the Session Protocol Underneath Datagrams (SPUD) Birds of a Feather (BOF) meeting held at the IETF conference in March ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 33] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 2015. The discussion at the BOF focused on questions about adding meta-data, or other information to traffic flows, to enable the sharing of information with middleboxes in that flow. During the sessions two competing arguments were distilled. On the one hand adding additional data would allow for network optimization, and hence improve traffic carriage. On the other hand, there are risks of information leakage and other privacy and security concerns. Middleboxes, and the protocols guiding them, influence individuals' ability to communicate online freely and privately. Repeatedly mentioned in the discussion was the danger of censorship that comes with middleboxes, and the IETF's role to prevent such censorship from happening. Middleboxes are becoming a proxy for the debate on the extent to which commercial interests are a valid reason to undermine the end-to-end principle. The potential for abuse and censoring, and thus ultimately the impact of middleboxes on the Internet as a place of unfiltered, unmonitored freedom of speech, is real. It is impossible to make any definitive statements about the direction the debate on middleboxes will take at the IETF. The opinions expressed in the SPUD BOF and by the various interviewees indicate that a majority of engineers are trying to mitigate the negative effects of middleboxes on freedom of speech, but their ability to act is limited by their larger commercial context that is expanding the use of middleboxes. 5.2.11. DDOS attacks Are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks a legitimate form of online protest protected by the right to freedom of speech and association? Can they be seen as the equivalent to 'million-(wo)men marches', or sit-ins? Or are they a threat to freedom of expression and access to information, by limiting access to websites and in certain cases the freedom of speech of others? These questions are crucial in our day and age, where political debates, civil disobedience and other forms of activism are increasingly moving online. Many individuals, not excluding IETF engineers, have argued that DDoS attacks are fundamentally against freedom of speech. Technically DDoS attacks are when multiple computers overload the bandwidth or resources of a website (or other system) by flooding it with traffic, causing it to temporarily stop being available to users. In their 2010 report Zuckerman et al argue that DDoS attacks are a bad thing because they are increasingly used by governments to attack and silence critics. Their research demonstrates that in many countries independent media outlets and human rights organizations are the victim of DDoS attacks, which are directly or indirectly linked to their governments. These types of attacks are particularly ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 34] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 complicated because attribution is difficult, creating a situation in which governments can effectively censor content, while being able to deny involvement in the attacks [Zuckerman]. DDoS attacks can thus stifle freedom of expression, complicate the ability of independent media and human rights organizations to exercise their right to (online) freedom of association, while facilitating the ability of governments to censor dissent. When it comes to comparing DDoS attacks to protests in offline life, it is important to remember that only a limited number of DDoS attacks involved solely willing participants. In most cases, the clients are hacked computers of unrelated parties that have not consented to being part of a DDoS (for exceptions see Operation Abibil [Abibil] or the Iranian Green Movement DDoS [GreenMovement]). In addition, DDoS attacks are increasingly used as an extortion tactic, with criminals flooding a website - rendering it inaccessible - until the owner pays them a certain amount of money to stop the attack. The costs of mitigating such attacks, either by improving security to prevent them or paying off the attackers, ends up being paid by the consumer. All of these issues seem to suggest that the IETF should try to ensure that their protocols cannot be used for DDoS attacks. Decreasing the number of vulnerabilities in the network stacks of routers or computers, reducing flaws in HTTPS implementations, and depreciating non-secure HTTP protocols could address this issue. The IETF can clearly play a role in bringing about some of these changes, and has indicated in [RFC7258] its commitment to mitigating 'pervasive monitoring (...) in the design of IETF protocols, where possible.' This means the use of encryption should become standard. Effectively, for the web this means standardized use of HTTPS. The IETF could redirect its work such that HTPPS becomes part-and-parcel of its standards. However, next to the various technical trade-offs that this might lead to it is important to consider that DDoS attacks are sometimes seen as a method for exercising freedom of speech. DDoS although disruptive, and silencing at times, can also enable as protest and speech. Or as Sauter [Sauter] argues: 'though DDoS as a tactic is still relatively novel, it fits within a centuries- long tradition of breaking laws and disrupting business as usual to make a political point. These actions aren't simply disruption for disruption's sake. Rather they serve to help the activist or dissenter to direct the attention of the public through the interpolation of difference into routine.' (30-31). An often heard argument against DDoS attacks is that you cannot construe it as a means to exercise your right to freedom of speech, when the means used effectively impede the right of the party on the receiving end of the attack to exercise that same right. The problem with this ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 35] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 line of argumentation is that it conveniently ignores the fact that online DDoS attacks are often one of the few effective ways for activists to gain the attention of the media, the government or other parties of interest. Simply putting up a website for a cause won't garner the same amount of attention as directly confronting the issue via the website of the individual or organization at the heart of the issue. The ability of activists to do so should be protected, especially considering the fact that as Sauter (2014:4) explains: 'Collectively, we have allowed the construction of an entire public sphere, the Internet, which by accidents of evolution and design, has none of the inherent free speech guarantees we have come to expect. Dissenting voices are pushed out of the paths of potential audiences, effectively removing them from the public discourse. There is nowhere online for an activist to stand with her friends and her sign. She might set up a dedicated blog--which may or may not ever be read--but it is much harder for her to stand collectively with others against a corporate giant in the online space.' Although the Internet is often compared to public space, it is not. Rather the opposite. The Internet is almost entirely owned by private entities. And the IETF plays a crucial role in developing this privatized commercialized Internet. From a legal and political perspective, the IETF does not have the legitimacy to determine when a DDoS is legitimate (in legal or political terms). It does not have the capability to make this judgment as a matter of public policy and subsequently translate it to code. Nor should the IETF try to do so. From a technical perspective, the difference between a 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' DDoS attack is meaningless because it would be extremely difficult for the IETF to engineer a way to detect that difference. In addition, there is a need for the IETF to be consistent in the face of attacks (an attack is an attack is an attack) to maintain the viability of the network. Arguing that some DDoS attacks should be allowed, based on the motivation of the attackers complicates the work of the IETF. Because it approaches PM regardless of the motivation of the attackers (see [RFC7258]) for reasoning), taking the motivation of the attackers into account for DDoS would indirectly undermine the ability of the IETF to protect the right to privacy because it introduces an element of inconsistency into how the IETF deals with attacks. David Clark recently published a paper warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues that the private sector control over the Internet is too strong, limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be used [Daedalus], including for freedom of speech. But just because freedom of speech, dissent, and protest are human rights, and DDoS is a potential expression of those rights, doesn't mean that DDoS in and of itself is a right. To widen the analogy, just because ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 36] lt;kill-session> operation does not directly alter a datastore. However, it allows one session to disrupt another session that is editing a datastore. Access to the <kill-session> protocol operation is denied by default. The "exec-default" leaf does not apply to this protocol operation. Access control rules must be explicitly configured to allow invocation by a non-recovery session. 3.3. Model Components This section defines the conceptual components related to the access control model. 3.3.1. Users A "user" is the conceptual entity that is associated with the access permissions granted to a particular session. A user is identified by a string that is unique within the server. As described in [RFC6241], the username string is derived from the transport layer during session establishment. If the transport layer cannot authenticate the user, the session is terminated. 3.3.2. Groups Access to a specific NETCONF protocol operation is granted to a session, associated with a group, not a user. A group is identified by its name. All group names are unique within the server. Access control is applied at the level of groups. A group contains zero or more group members. A group member is identified by a username string. The same user can be a member of multiple groups. 3.3.3. Emergency Recovery Session The server MAY support a recovery session mechanism, which will bypass all access control enforcement. This is useful for restricting initial access and repairing a broken access control configuration. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 19] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.3.4. Global Enforcement Controls There are five global controls that are used to help control how access control is enforced. 3.3.4.1. enable-nacm Switch A global "enable-nacm" on/off switch is provided to enable or disable all access control enforcement. When this global switch is set to "true", then all requests are checked against the access control rules and only permitted if configured to allow the specific access request. When this global switch is set to "false", then all access requested are permitted. 3.3.4.2. read-default Switch An on/off "read-default" switch is provided to enable or disable default access to receive data in replies and notifications. When the "enable-nacm" global switch is set to "true", then this global switch is relevant if no matching access control rule is found to explicitly permit or deny read access to the requested datastore data or notification event type. When this global switch is set to "permit" and no matching access control rule is found for the datastore read or notification event requested, then access is permitted. When this global switch is set to "deny" and no matching access control rule is found for the datastore read or notification event requested, then access is denied. 3.3.4.3. write-default Switch An on/off "write-default" switch is provided to enable or disable default access to alter configuration data. When the "enable-nacm" global switch is set to "true", then this global switch is relevant if no matching access control rule is found to explicitly permit or deny write access to the requested datastore data. When this global switch is set to "permit" and no matching access control rule is found for the datastore write requested, then access is permitted. When this global switch is set to "deny" and no matching access control rule is found for the datastore write requested, then access is denied. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 20] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.3.4.4. exec-default Switch An on/off "exec-default" switch is provided to enable or disable default access to execute protocol operations. When the "enable- nacm" global switch is set to "true", then this global switch is relevant if no matching access control rule is found to explicitly permit or deny access to the requested NETCONF protocol operation. When this global switch is set to "permit" and no matching access control rule is found for the NETCONF protocol operation requested, then access is permitted. When this global switch is set to "deny" and no matching access control rule is found for the NETCONF protocol operation requested, then access is denied. 3.3.4.5. enable-external-groups Switch When this global switch is set to "true", the group names reported by the transport layer for a session are used together with the locally configured group names to determine the access control rules for the session. When this switch is set to "false", the group names reported by the transport layer are ignored by NACM. 3.3.5. Access Control Rules There are four types of rules available in NACM: module rule: controls access for definitions in a specific YANG module, identified by its name. protocol operation rule: controls access for a specific protocol operation, identified by its YANG module and name. data node rule: controls access for a specific data node, identified by its path location within the conceptual XML document for the data node. notification rule: controls access for a specific notification event type, identified by its YANG module and name. 3.4. Access Control Enforcement Procedures There are seven separate phases that need to be addressed, four of which are related to the NETCONF message processing model (Section 3.1.3). In addition, the initial startup mode for a NETCONF Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 21] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 server, session establishment, and "access-denied" error-handling procedures also need to be considered. The server MUST use the access control rules in effect at the time it starts processing the message. The same access control rules MUST stay in effect for the processing of the entire message. 3.4.1. Initial Operation Upon the very first startup of the NETCONF server, the access control configuration will probably not be present. If it isn't, a server MUST NOT allow any write access to any session role except a recovery session. Access rules are enforced any time a request is initiated from a user session. Access control is not enforced for server-initiated access requests, such as the initial load of the running configuration datastore, during bootup. 3.4.2. Session Establishment The access control model applies specifically to the well-formed XML content transferred between a client and a server after session establishment has been completed and after the <hello> exchange has been successfully completed. Once session establishment is completed and a user has been authenticated, the transport layer reports the username and a possibly empty set of group names associated with the user to the NETCONF server. The NETCONF server will enforce the access control rules, based on the supplied username, group names, and the configuration data stored on the server. 3.4.3. "access-denied" Error Handling The "access-denied" error-tag is generated when the access control system denies access to either a request to invoke a protocol operation or a request to perform a particular access operation on the configuration datastore. A server MUST NOT include any information the client is not allowed to read in any <error-info> elements within the <rpc-error> response. 3.4.4. Incoming RPC Message Validation The diagram below shows the basic conceptual structure of the access control processing model for incoming NETCONF <rpc> messages within a server. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 22] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 the Internet is a medium through which the right to freedom of expression can be exercised does not make access to the Internet or specific ICTs or NCTs a human right. Uses of DDoS might or might not be legitimate for political reasons, but the IETF has no means or methods to assess this, and in general enabling DDoS would mean a deterioration of the network and thus freedom of expression. In summation, the IETF cannot be expected to take a moral stance on DDoS attacks, or create protocols to enable some attacks and inhibit others. But what it can do is critically reflect on its role in creating a commercialized Internet without a defacto public space or inherent protections for freedom of speech. 5.3. Model for developing human rights protocol considerations Having established how human rights relate to standards and protocols, a common vocabulary of technical concepts that impact human rights and how these technical concept can be combined to ensure that the Internet remains an enabling environment for human rights means the contours of a model for developing human rights protocol considerations has taken shape. This subsection provides the last step by detailing how the technical concepts identified above relate to human rights, and what questions engineers should ask themselves when developing or improving protocols. 5.3.1. Human rights threats The human rights threats on the Internet come in a myriad of forms. Protocols and standards can harm or enable the right to freedom of expression, right to non-discrimination, right to equal protection, right to be presumed innocence, right to participate in cultural life, arts and science, right to freedom of assembly and association, and the right to security. An end-user who is denied access to certain services, data or websites may be unable to disclose vital information about the malpractices of a government or other authority. A person whose communications are monitored may be prevented from exercising their right to freedom of association. In a worst-case scenario, protocols that leak information can lead to physical danger. A realistic example to consider is when opposition leaders in totalitarian regimes are subjected to torture on the basis of information gathered by the regime through information leakage in protocols. This sections details several 'common' threats to human rights, indicating how each of these can lead to human rights violations/ harms and present several examples of how these threats to human rights materialize on the Internet. This threat modeling is inspired by [RFC6973] Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols, which ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 37] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 bases itself on security threat analysis. This method is by no means a perfect solution for assessing human rights risks in Internet protocols and systems; it is however the best approach currently available. Certain human rights threats are indirectly considered in Internet protocols as part of the standard privacy and security considerations [RFC3552]. Others suggested are tailored specifically to human rights, and represents considerations not currently considered in other RFCs. Many threats, enablers and risks are linked to different rights. This is not unsurprising if one takes into account that human rights are interrelated, interdependent and universal. Here however we're not discussing all human rights because not all human rights are relevant to ICTs in general and protocols and standards in particular. This is by no means an attempt to cherry picks rights, if other rights seem relevant, please contact the authors and/or the hrpc mailinglist. 5.3.2. Guidelines for human rights considerations This section provides guidance for document authors in the form of a questionnaire about a protocol being designed. The questionnaire may be useful at any point in the design process, particularly after document authors have developed a high-level protocol model as described in [RFC4101]. Note that the guidance provided in this section does not recommend specific practices. The range of protocols developed in the IETF is too broad to make recommendations about particular uses of data or how human rights might be balanced against other design goals. However, by carefully considering the answers to each question mentioned under 7.3, document authors should be able to produce a comprehensive analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion of whether the protocol adequately protects against human rights threats. This guidance is meant to help the thought process of a human rights analysis; it does not provide specific directions for how to write a human rights protocol considerations section (following the example set in [RFC6973]). 5.3.2.1. Technical concepts as they relate to human rights 5.3.2.1.1. Connectivity Does your protocol honor the end-to-end principle? Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 38] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 - Right to freedom of assembly and association 5.3.2.1.2. Privacy Did you have a look at the Guidelines in the Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973] section 7? Does your protocol in any way impact the confidentiality of protocol metadata? Does your protocol countering traffic analysis, or data minimisation? Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression - Right to non-discrimination - Right to be presumed innocent 5.3.2.1.3. Content agnosticism If your protocol impacts packet handling, does it look at the packet content? Is it making decisions based on the content of the packet? Is the protocol transparent about its decision? Does your protocol prioritize certain content or services over others? Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression - Right to non-discrimination - Right to equal protection - Right to be presumed innocent 5.3.2.1.4. Security Did you have a look at Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations [RFC3552]? Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression - Right to freedom of assembly and association - Right to non discrimination & Right to be presumed innocent) ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 39] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 5.3.2.1.5. Internationalization Does your protocol have text strings that are readable or entered by humans? Does your protocol allow Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only, thereby shifting conversion issues away from individual choices? Did you have a look at [RFC6365]? Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression - Right to political participation - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science - Right to political participation 5.3.2.1.6. Censorship resistance Does this protocol introduce new identifiers that might be associated with persons or content? Does your protocol make it apparent or transparent when filtering happens? Identifiers of content exposed within a protocol might be used to facilitate censorship, as in the case of HTTP in this particular scenario [...]. Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression - Right to political participation - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science - Right to freedom of assembly and association 5.3.2.1.7. Open Standards Is your protocol fully documented in a way that it could be easily implemented, improved, build upon and/or further developed. Is there any proprietary code needed for the implementation, running or further development of your protocol? Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 40] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science 5.3.2.1.8. Heterogeneity Support Does your protocol support heterogeneity by design? Does your protocol allow for multiple types of hardware? Does your protocol allow for multiple types of application protocols? Impacts: - Right to freedom of expression 5.3.2.1.9. Anonymity Did you have a look at the Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially section 6.1.1 ? Impacts: - Right to non-discrimination - Right to political participation - Right to freedom of assembly and association - Right to security - Right to be presumed innocent 5.3.2.1.10. Pseudonymity Did you have a look at the Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially section 6.1.2 ? Impacts: - Right to non-discrimination - Right to freedom of assembly and association 5.3.2.1.11. Accessibility When websites, web technologies, or web tools are badly designed, they can create barriers that exclude people from using the Web. Is your protocol designed to provide an enabling environment for people with disabilities? It might be relevant to look at the W3C Web Accessibility Initiative for examples and guidance.Is your protocol NETCONF server +------------+ | XML | | message | | dispatcher | +------------+ | | V +------------+ | NC-base NS | | <rpc> | +------------+ | | | | | +-------------------------+ | +------------+ | V V V +-----------+ +---------------+ +------------+ | Vendor NS | | NC-base NS | | NC-base NS | | <my-edit> | | <edit-config> | | <unlock> | +-----------+ +---------------+ +------------+ | | | | V V +----------------------+ | | | configuration | | datastore | +----------------------+ Figure 3 Access control begins with the message dispatcher. After the server validates the <rpc> element and determines the namespace URI and the element name of the protocol operation being requested, the server verifies that the user is authorized to invoke the protocol operation. The server MUST separately authorize every protocol operation by following these steps: 1. If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the protocol operation is permitted. 2. If the requesting session is identified as a recovery session, then the protocol operation is permitted. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 23] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3. If the requested operation is the NETCONF <close-session> protocol operation, then the protocol operation is permitted. 4. Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user- name" entry that equals the username for the session making the request. If the "enable-external-groups" leaf is "true", add to these groups the set of groups provided by the transport layer. 5. If no groups are found, continue with step 10. 6. Process all rule-list entries, in the order they appear in the configuration. If a rule-list's "group" leaf-list does not match any of the user's groups, proceed to the next rule-list entry. 7. For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order, until a rule that matches the requested access operation is found. A rule matches if all of the following criteria are met: * The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*" or equals the name of the YANG module where the protocol operation is defined. * The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined or the "rule- type" is "protocol-operation" and the "rpc-name" is "*" or equals the name of the requested protocol operation. * The rule's "access-operations" leaf has the "exec" bit set or has the special value "*". 8. If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked. If it is equal to "permit", then the protocol operation is permitted; otherwise, it is denied. 9. At this point, no matching rule was found in any rule-list entry. 10. If the requested protocol operation is defined in a YANG module advertised in the server capabilities and the "rpc" statement contains a "nacm:default-deny-all" statement, then the protocol operation is denied. 11. If the requested protocol operation is the NETCONF <kill- session> or <delete-config>, then the protocol operation is denied. 12. If the "exec-default" leaf is set to "permit", then permit the protocol operation; otherwise, deny the request. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 24] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 If the user is not authorized to invoke the protocol operation, then an <rpc-error> is generated with the following information: error-tag: access-denied error-path: Identifies the requested protocol operation. The following example represents the <edit-config> protocol operation in the NETCONF base namespace: <error-path xmlns:nc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> /nc:rpc/nc:edit-config </error-path> If a datastore is accessed, either directly or as a side effect of the protocol operation, then the server MUST intercept the access operation and make sure the user is authorized to perform the requested access operation on the specified data, as defined in Section 3.4.5. 3.4.5. Data Node Access Validation If a data node within a datastore is accessed, or an action or notification tied to a data node, then the server MUST ensure that the user is authorized to perform the requested "read", "create", "update", "delete", or "execute" access operation on the specified data node. If an action is requested to be executed, the server MUST ensure that the user is authorized to perform the "execute" access operation on the requested action. If a notification tied to a data node is generated, the server MUST ensure that the user is authorized to perform the "read" access operation on the requested notification. The data node access request is authorized by following these steps: 1. If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the access operation is permitted. 2. If the requesting session is identified as a recovery session, then the access operation is permitted. 3. Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user- name" entry that equals the username for the session making the request. If the "enable-external-groups" leaf is "true", add to these groups the set of groups provided by the transport layer. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 25] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 4. If no groups are found, continue with step 9. 5. Process all rule-list entries, in the order they appear in the configuration. If a rule-list's "group" leaf-list does not match any of the user's groups, proceed to the next rule-list entry. 6. For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order, until a rule that matches the requested access operation is found. A rule matches if all of the following criteria are met: * The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*" or equals the name of the YANG module where the requested data node is defined. * The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined or the "rule- type" is "data-node" and the "path" matches the requested data node, action node, or notification node. * For a "read" access operation, the rule's "access-operations" leaf has the "read" bit set or has the special value "*". * For a "create" access operation, the rule's "access- operations" leaf has the "create" bit set or has the special value "*". * For a "delete" access operation, the rule's "access- operations" leaf has the "delete" bit set or has the special value "*". * For an "update" access operation, the rule's "access- operations" leaf has the "update" bit set or has the special value "*". * For an "execute" access operation, the rule's "access- operations" leaf has the "exec" bit set or has the special value "*". 7. If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked. If it is equal to "permit", then the data node access is permitted; otherwise, it is denied. For a "read" access operation, "denied" means that the requested data is not returned in the reply. 8. At this point, no matching rule was found in any rule-list entry. 9. For a "read" access operation, if the requested data node is defined in a YANG module advertised in the server capabilities Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 26] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 and the data definition statement contains a "nacm:default-deny- all" statement, then the requested data node is not included in the reply. 10. For a "write" access operation, if the requested data node is defined in a YANG module advertised in the server capabilities and the data definition statement contains a "nacm:default-deny- write" or a "nacm:default-deny-all" statement, then the data node access request is denied. 11. For a "read" access operation, if the "read-default" leaf is set to "permit", then include the requested data node in the reply; otherwise, do not include the requested data node in the reply. 12. For a "write" access operation, if the "write-default" leaf is set to "permit", then permit the data node access request; otherwise, deny the request. 13. For an "execute" access operation, if the "exec-default" leaf is set to "permit", then permit the request; otherwise, deny the request. 3.4.6. Outgoing <notification> Authorization Configuration of access control rules specifically for descendant nodes of the notification event type element are outside the scope of this document. If the user is authorized to receive the notification event type, then it is also authorized to receive any data it contains. If the notification is specified within a data subtree, as specified in [RFC7950], then read access to the notification is required. Processing continues as described in Section 3.4.5. The following figure shows the conceptual message processing model for outgoing <notification> messages. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 41] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 optimized for low bandwidth and high latency connections? Could your protocol also be developed in a stateless manner? Impacts: - Right to non-discrimination - Right to freedom of assembly and association - Right to education - Right to political participation 5.3.2.1.12. Localization Does your protocol live up to standards of internationalization? Have you considered localizing your protocol for relevant audiences? Impacts: - Right to non-discrimination - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science 5.3.2.1.13. Decentralization Does your protocol contribute to more centralized points of control? Can your protocol be implemented without one single point of control? If applicable, can your protocol be deployed in a federated manner? What is the potential for discrimination against users of your protocol? How can use of your protocol be used to implicate users? Impacts: - Right to freedom of assembly and association - Right to be presumed innocent 5.3.2.1.14. Reliability Is your protocol fault tolerant? Does it degrade gracefully? Do you have a documented way to announce degradation? Do you have measures in place for recovery or partial healing from failure? Is your protocol able to maintain dependability and performance in the face of unanticipated changes or circumstances? Impacts: ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 42] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 - Right to security 5.3.2.1.15. Confidentiality (cf [RFC6973] ) Which information related to identifiers or data is exposed to each other protocol entity (i.e., recipients, intermediaries, and enablers)? Are there ways for protocol implementers to choose to limit the information shared with each entity? Are there operational controls available to limit the information shared with each entity? What controls or consent mechanisms does the protocol define or require before personal data or identifiers are shared or exposed via the protocol? If no such mechanisms or controls are specified, is it expected that control and consent will be handled outside of the protocol? Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to share different information with different recipients? If not, are there mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide initiators with such control? Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to limit which information is shared with intermediaries? If not, are there mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide users with such control? Is it expected that users will have relationships that govern the use of the information (contractual or otherwise) with those who operate these intermediaries? Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to express individuals' preferences to recipients or intermediaries with regard to the collection, use, or disclosure of their personal data? Impacts: - Right to security 5.3.2.1.16. Integrity Does your protocol maintain and assure the accuracy of data? Does your protocol maintain and assure the consistency of data? Does your protocol in any way allow for the data to be (intentionally or unintentionally) altered? Impacts: - Right to security ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 43] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 5.3.2.1.17. Authenticity Do you have enough measures to confirm the truth of an attribute of a single piece of data or entity? Can the attributes get garbled along the way (see security)? If relevant have you implemented IPsec and other Standard Security Best Practices? Impacts: - Right to security 5.3.2.1.18. Acceptability Do your protocols adhere to the principle of non-discrimination? Do your protocols adhere to the principle of content agnosticism? Impacts: - Right to education 5.3.2.1.19. Availability Do your protocols use or depend on proprietary code? Also see 'Open Standards' above. Also see 'Connectivity' above. Impacts: - Right to education 5.3.2.1.20. Adaptability Could your protocol stifle or hinder permissionless innovation in any way? See 'Connectivity' above Impacts: - Right to education 6. Acknowledgements A special thanks to all members of the hrpc RG who contributed to this draft. The following deserve a special mention: - Joana Varon for helping draft the first iteration of the methodology, previous drafts and the direction of the film Net of Rights and working on the interviews at IETF92 in Dallas. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 44] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 - Daniel Kahn Gillmor (dkg) for helping with the first iteration of the glossary as well as a lot of technical guidance, support and language suggestions. - Claudio Guarnieri for writing the first iterations of the case studies on VPN, HTTP, and Peer to Peer. - Will Scott for writing the first iterations of the case studies on DNS, IP, XMPP. - Avri Doria for proposing writing a glossary in the first place, help writing the initial proposals and Internet Drafts and contributing to the glossary. and Stephane Bortzmeyer, Barry Shein, Joe Hall, and Tim Sammut who made a lot of excellent suggestions, many of which found their way directly into the text. We would also like to thank Molly Sauter, Arturo Filasto, Eleanor Saitta and all others who provided input on the draft or the conceptualization of the idea. 7. Security Considerations As this document concerns a research document, there are no security considerations. 8. IANA Considerations This document has no actions for IANA. 9. Research Group Information The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations proposed working group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org [3]. Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the list is at https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail- archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html 10. References 10.1. Normative References [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 45] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 10.2. Informative References [Abbate] Abbate, J., "Inventing the Internet", MIT Press , 2000, <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inventing-internet>. [Abibil] Danchev, D., "Dissecting 'Operation Ababil' - an OSINT Analysis", 2012, <http://ddanchev.blogspot.be/2012/09/ dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.html>. [Appelbaum] Appelbaum, J., Gibson, A., Kabish, V., Kampf, L., and L. Ryge, "NSA targets the privacy-conscious", 2015, <http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/ nsa230_page-1.html>. [Babbie] Babbie, E., "The Basics of Social Research", Belmont CA Cengage , 2010. [Benkler] Benkler, Y., "The wealth of Networks - How social production transforms markets and freedom", New Haven and London - Yale University Press , 2006, <http://is.gd/rxUpTQ>. [Berners-Lee] Berners-Lee, T. and M. Fischetti, "Weaving the Web,", HarperCollins p 208, 1999. [Bless] Bless, R. and C. Orwat, "Values and Networks", 2015. [Blumenthal] Blumenthal, M. and D. Clark, "Rethinking the design of the Internet: The end-to-end arguments vs. the brave new world", ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 2001, pp 70-109. , 2001. [Bray] Bray, T., "A New HTTP Status Code for Legally-restricted Resources", 2016, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf- httpbis-legally-restricted-status-04>. [Broeders] Broeders, D., "The public core of the Internet", WRR , 2015, <http://www.wrr.nl/en/publications/publication/article/ de-publieke-kern-van-het-internet-1/>. [Brown] Brown, I. and M. Ziewitz, "A Prehistory of Internet Governance", Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. , 2013. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 46] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [BrownMarsden] Brown, I. and C. Marsden, "Regulating code", MIT Press , 2013, <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/regulating-code>. [Brownetal] Brown, I., Clark, D., and D. Trossen, &Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 27] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 NETCONF server +------------+ | XML | | message | | generator | +------------+ ^ | +----------------+ | <notification> | | generator | +----------------+ ^ | +=================+ | <notification> | | access control | | <eventType> | +=================+ ^ | +------------------------+ | server instrumentation | +------------------------+ | ^ V | +----------------------+ | configuration | | datastore | +----------------------+ Figure 4 The generation of a notification for a specific subscription [RFC5277] is authorized by following these steps: 1. If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the notification is permitted. 2. If the session is identified as a recovery session, then the notification is permitted. 3. If the notification is the NETCONF <replayComplete> or <notificationComplete> event type [RFC5277], then the notification is permitted. Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 28] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 4. Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user- name" entry that equals the username for the session making the request. If the "enable-external-groups" leaf is "true", add to these groups the set of groups provided by the transport layer. 5. If no groups are found, continue with step 10. 6. Process all rule-list entries, in the order they appear in the configuration. If a rule-list's "group" leaf-list does not match any of the user's groups, proceed to the next rule-list entry. 7. For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order, until a rule that matches the requested access operation is found. A rule matches if all of the following criteria are met: * The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*" or equals the name of the YANG module where the notification is defined. * The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined or the "rule- type" is "notification" and the "notification-name" is "*" or equals the name of the notification. * The rule's "access-operations" leaf has the "read" bit set or has the special value "*". 8. If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked. If it is equal to "permit", then permit the notification; otherwise, drop the notification for the associated subscription. 9. Otherwise, no matching rule was found in any rule-list entry. 10. If the requested notification is defined in a YANG module advertised in the server capabilities and the "notification" statement contains a "nacm:default-deny-all" statement, then the notification is dropped for the associated subscription. 11. If the "read-default" leaf is set to "permit", then permit the notification; otherwise, drop the notification for the associated subscription. 3.5. Data Model Definitions Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 29] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 3.5.1. Data Organization The following diagram highlights the contents and structure of the NACM YANG module. module: ietf-netconf-acm +--rw nacm +--rw enable-nacm? boolean +--rw read-default? action-type +--rw write-default? action-type +--rw exec-default? action-type +--rw enable-external-groups? boolean +--ro denied-operations yang:zero-based-counter32 +--ro denied-data-writes yang:zero-based-counter32 +--ro denied-notifications yang:zero-based-counter32 +--rw groups | +--rw group* [name] | +--rw name group-name-type | +--rw user-name* user-name-type +--rw rule-list* [name] +--rw name string +--rw group* union +--rw rule* [name] +--rw name string +--rw module-name? union +--rw (rule-type)? | +--:(protocol-operation) | | +--rw rpc-name? union | +--:(notification) | | +--rw notification-name? union | +--:(data-node) | +--rw path node-instance-identifier +--rw access-operations? union +--rw action action-type +--rw comment? string 3.5.2. YANG Module The following YANG module specifies the normative NETCONF content that MUST by supported by the server. The "ietf-netconf-acm" YANG module imports typedefs from [RFC6991]. <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-netconf-acm@2017-10-26.yang" module ietf-netconf-acm { namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm"; Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 30] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 prefix "nacm"; import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; } organization "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; contact "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> Author: Andy Bierman <mailto:andy@yumaworks.com> Author: Martin Bjorklund <mailto:mbj@tail-f.com>"; description "Network Configuration Access Control Model. Copyright (c) 2012, 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; revision "2017-10-26" { description "Added support for YANG 1.1 actions and notifications tied to data nodes. Clarify how NACM extensions can be used by other data models."; reference "RFC XXXX: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model"; } revision "2012-02-22" { description Bierman & Bjorklund Expires April 29, 2018 [Page 31] Internet-Draft NACM October 2017 "Initial version"; reference "RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model"; } /* * Extension statements */ extension default-deny-write { description "Used to indicate that the data model node represents a sensitive security system parameter. If present, the NETCONF server will only allow the designated 'recovery session' to have write access to the node. An explicit access control rule is required for all other users. If the NACM module is used, then it must be enabled (i.e., /nacm/enable-nacm object equals 'true'), or this extension is ignored. The "Should specific values be embedded in the Internet Architecture?", Sigcomm , 2010, <http://conferences.sigcomm.org/co- next/2010/Workshops/REARCH/ReArch_papers/10-Brown.pdf>. [Clark] Clark, D., "The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols", Proc SIGCOMM 88, ACM CCR Vol 18, Number 4, August 1988, pp. 106-114. , 1988. [Clarketal] Clark, D., Wroclawski, J., Sollins, K., and R. Braden, "Tussle in cyberspace - defining tomorrow's Internet", ACM Digital Library , 2005, <https://dl.acm.org/ citation.cfm?id=1074049>. [Collins] Collins, K., "Hacking Team's oppressive regimes customer list revealed in hack", 2015, <http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2015-07/06/ hacking-team-spyware-company-hacked>. [Daedalus] Clark, D., "The Contingent Internet", Daedalus Winter 2016, Vol. 145, No. 1. p. 9-17 , 2016, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/toc/daed/current>. [Davidsonetal] Davidson, A., Morris, J., and R. Courtney, "Strangers in a strange land", Telecommunications Policy Research Conference , 2002, <https://www.cdt.org/files/publications/piais.pdf>. [Denardis14] Denardis, L., "The Global War for Internet Governance", Yale University Press , 2014, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vkz4n>. [Denardis15] Denardis, L., "The Internet Design Tension between Surveillance and Security", IEEE Annals of the History of Computing (volume 37-2) , 2015, <http://is.gd/7GAnFy>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 47] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [Denzin] Denzin, N. and Y. Lincoln, "Handbook of Qualitative Research", Thousand Oaks CA Sage , 2000, <http://www.amazon.com/SAGE-Handbook-Qualitative-Research- Handbooks/dp/1412974178>. [Doty] Doty, N., "Automated text analysis of Requests for Comment (RFCs)", 2014, <https://github.com/npdoty/rfc-analysis>. [Douceur] Douceur, J., "The Sybil Attack", 2002, <http://research.microsoft.com:8082/pubs/74220/ IPTPS2002.pdf>. [Elahi] Elahi, T. and I. Goldberg, "CORDON - A taxonomy of Internet Censorship Resistance Strategies", 2012, <http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2012/ cacr2012-33.pdf>. [FIArch] "Future Internet Design Principles", January 2012, <http://www.future-internet.eu/uploads/media/ FIArch_Design_Principles_V1.0.pdf>. [FRAMEWORK] ISO/IEC, ., "Information technology - Framework for internationalization, prepared by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 22/WG 20 ISO/IEC TR 11017", 1997. [Geertz] Clifford, G., "Kinship in Bali", Chicago University of Chicago Press. , 1975, <http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/K/ bo3625088.html>. [Googlepatent] Google, ., "Method and device for network traffic manipulation", 2012, <https://www.google.com/patents/ EP2601774A1?cl=en>. [GreenMovement] Villeneuve, N., "Iran DDoS", 2009, <https://www.nartv.org/2009/06/16/iran-ddos/>. [HRC2012] United Nations Human Rights Council, "UN General Assembly Resolution "The right to privacy in the digital age" (A/C.3/68/L.45)", 2011, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/554342.120885849.html>. [Haagsma] Haagsma, L., "Deep dive into QUANTUM INSERT", 2015, <http://blog.fox-it.com/2015/04/20/ deep-dive-into-quantum-insert/>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 48] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [ICCPR] United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", 1976, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ CCPR.aspx>. [ICESCR] United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 1966, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ CESCR.aspx>. [Jabri] Jabri, V., "Discourses on Violence - conflict analysis reconsidered", Manchester University Press , 1996. [King] King, C., "Power, Social Violence and Civil Wars", Washington D.C. United States Institute of Peace Press , 2007. [Lessig] Lessig, L., "Code - And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0.", New York Basic Books , 2006, <http://codev2.cc/>. [Marcak] Marcak, B., Weaver, N., Dalek, J., Ensafi, R., Fifield, D., McKune, S., Rey, A., Scott-Railton, J., Deibert, R., and V. Paxson, "China's Great Fire Cannon", 2015, <https://citizenlab.org/2015/04/chinas-great-cannon/>. [Marquis-Boire] Marquis-Boire, M., "Schrodinger's Cat Video and the Death of Clear-Text", 2014, <https://citizenlab.org/2014/08/cat- video-and-the-death-of-clear-text/>. [Mueller] Mueller, M., "Networks and States", MIT Press , 2010, <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/networks-and-states>. [Musiani] Musiani, F., "Giants, Dwarfs and Decentralized Alternatives to Internet-based Services - An Issue of Internet Governance", Westminister Papers in Communication and Culture , 2015, <http://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.214>. [NETmundial] NETmundial, "NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement", 2014, <http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>. [PETS2015VPN] Pera, V., Barbera, M., Tyson, G., Haddadi, H., and A. Mei, "A Glance through the VPN Looking Glass", 2015, <http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/~hamed/papers/ PETS2015VPN.pdf>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 49] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [Peterson] Peterson, A., Gellman, B., and A. Soltani, "Yahoo to make SSL encryption the default for Webmail users. Finally.", 2013, <http://gmailblog.blogspot.de/2010/01/ default-https-access-for-gmail.html>. [RFC0226] Karp, P., "Standardization of host mnemonics", RFC 226, DOI 10.17487/RFC0226, September 1971, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc226>. [RFC0760] Postel, J., "DoD standard Internet Protocol", RFC 760, DOI 10.17487/RFC0760, January 1980, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc760>. [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>. [RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>. [RFC0894] Hornig, C., "A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over Ethernet Networks", STD 41, RFC 894, DOI 10.17487/RFC0894, April 1984, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc894>. [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>. [RFC1122] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, DOI 10.17487/ RFC1122, October 1989, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>. [RFC1631] Egevang, K. and P. Francis, "The IP Network Address Translator (NAT)", RFC 1631, DOI 10.17487/RFC1631, May 1994, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1631>. [RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>. [RFC1984] IAB and , "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984, DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1984>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 50] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [RFC2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, DOI 10.17487/RFC2277, January 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2277>. [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460, December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>. [RFC2606] Eastlake 3rd, D. and A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS Names", BCP 32, RFC 2606, DOI 10.17487/RFC2606, June 1999, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2606>. [RFC2775] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775, DOI 10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2775>. [RFC3365] Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", BCP 61, RFC 3365, DOI 10.17487/RFC3365, August 2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3365>. [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>. [RFC3724] Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, "The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture", RFC 3724, DOI 10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3724>. [RFC4084] Klensin, J., "Terminology for Describing Internet Connectivity", BCP 104, RFC 4084, DOI 10.17487/RFC4084, May 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4084>. [RFC4101] Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101, DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4101>. [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>. [RFC4906] Martini, L., Ed., Rosen, E., Ed., and N. El-Aawar, Ed., "Transport of Layer 2 Frames Over MPLS", RFC 4906, DOI 10.17487/RFC4906, June 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4906>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 51] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. [RFC5944] Perkins, C., Ed., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised", RFC 5944, DOI 10.17487/RFC5944, November 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5944>. [RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120, March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120>. [RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365, DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>. [RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>. [RFC7574] Bakker, A., Petrocco, R., and V. Grishchenko, "Peer-to- Peer Streaming Peer Protocol (PPSPP)", RFC 7574, DOI 10.17487/RFC7574, July 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7574>. [RFC7626] Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 7626, DOI 10.17487/RFC7626, August 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7626>. [RSF] RSF, ., "Syria using 34 Blue Coat Servers to spy on Internet users", 2013, <https://en.rsf.org/syria-syria- using-34-blue-coat-servers-23-05-2013,44664.html>. [Rachovitsa] Rachovitsa, A., "Engineering "Privacy by Design" in the Internet Protocols - Understanding Online Privacy both as a Technical and a Human Rights Issue in the Face of Pervasive Monitoring", International Journal of Law and Information Technology , 2015, <https://www.ietf.org/mail- archive/web/hrpc/current/pdfRBnRYFeVsm.pdf>. [Richie] Richie, J. and J. Lewis, "Qualitative Research Practice - A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers", London Sage , 2003, <http://www.amazon.co.uk/ Qualitative-Research-Practice-Students-Researchers/ dp/0761971106>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 52] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [Rideout] Rideout, A., "Making security easier", 2008, <http://gmailblog.blogspot.de/2008/07/ making-security-easier.html>. [Saltzer] Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-to-End Arguments in System Design", ACM TOCS, Vol 2, Number 4, November 1984, pp 277-288. , 1984. [Sauter] Sauter, M., "The Coming Swarm", Bloomsbury, London , 2014. [Schillace] Schillace, S., "Default https access for Gmail", 2010, <http://gmailblog.blogspot.de/2010/01/ default-https-access-for-gmail.html>. [Schneier] Schneier, B., "Attacking Tor - how the NSA targets users' online anonymity", 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/ tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity>. [Schroeder] Schroeder, I. and B. Schmidt, "Introduction - Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practice", London and New York Routledge , 2001, <http://resourcelists.st- andrews.ac.uk/items/ BFC20363-67B0-B3EF-EA48-13E5230E7899.html>. [UDHR] United Nations General Assembly, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights", 1948, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>. [UNGA2013] United Nations General Assembly, "UN General Assembly Resolution "The right to privacy in the digital age" (A/C.3/68/L.45)", 2013, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1133732.05065727.html>. [W3Ci18nDef] W3C, "Localization vs. Internationalization", 2010, <http://www.w3.org/International/questions/qa-i18n.en>. [WP-Debugging] "Debugging", n.d., <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Debugging>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 53] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [WP-Stateless] "Stateless protocol", n.d., <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateless_protocol>. [Walfish] Walfish, M., Stribling, J., Krohn, M., Balakrishnan, H., Morris, R., and S. Shenker, "Middleboxes No Longer Considered Harmful", 2004, <http://nms.csail.mit.edu/doa>. [Zittrain] Zittrain, J., "The Future of the Internet - And How to Stop It", Yale University Press , 2008, <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4455262/ Zittrain_Future%20of%20the%20Internet.pdf?sequence=1>. [Zuckerman] Zuckerman, E., Roberts, H., McGrady, R., York, J., and J. Palfrey, "Report on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks", The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University , 2010, <https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/ cyber.law.harvard.edu/ files/2010_DDoS_Attacks_Human_Rights_and_Media.pdf>. [ars] Anderson, N., "P2P researchers - use a blocklist or you will be tracked... 100% of the time", 2007, <http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/10/p2p- researchers-use-a-blocklist-or-you-will-be-tracked-100-of- the-time/>. [bbc-wikileaks] BBC, "Whistle-blower site taken offline", 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7250916.stm>. [bitmessage] Bitmessage, "Bitmessage Wiki?", 2014, <https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page>. [caida] Dainotti, A., Squarcella, C., Aben, E., Claffy, K., Chiesa, M., Russo, M., and A. Pescape, "Analysis of Country-wide Internet Outages Caused by Censorship", 2013, <http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2014/ outages_censorship/outages_censorship.pdf>. [draft-hall-censorship-tech-01] Hall, J., Aaron, M., and B. Jones, "A Survey of Worldwide Censorship Techniques", 2015, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hall-censorship-tech- 01>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 54] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [freenet1] Freenet, "What is Freenet?", n.d., <https://freenetproject.org/whatis.html>. [freenet2] Ian Clarke, ., "The Philosphy behind Freenet?", n.d., <https://freenetproject.org/philosophy.html>. [greatfirewall] Anonymous, ., "Towards a Comprehensive Picture of the Great Firewall's DNS Censorship", 2014, <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci14/ foci14-anonymous.pdf>. [namecoin] Namecoin, "Namecoin - Decentralized secure names", 2015, <https://namecoin.info/>. [natusage] Maier, G., Schneider, F., and A. Feldmann, "NAT usage in Residential Broadband networks", 2011, <http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs/networking/ NATusage11.pdf>. [pidgin] js, . and Pidgin Developers, "-XMPP- Invisible mode violating standard", July 2015, <https://developer.pidgin.im/ticket/4322>. [quic] The Chromium Project, "QUIC, a multiplexed stream transport over UDP", 2014, <https://www.chromium.org/ quic>. [spdy] The Chromium Project, "SPDY - An experimental protocol for a faster web", 2009, <https://www.chromium.org/spdy/spdy- whitepaper>. [spiegel] SPIEGEL, "Prying Eyes - Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security", 2014, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html>. [techyum] Violet, ., "Official - vb.ly Link Shortener Seized by Libyan Government", 2010, <http://techyum.com/2010/10/ official-vb-ly-link-shortener-seized-by-libyan- government/>. ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 55] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [torproject] The Tor Project, ., "Tor Project - Anonymity Online", 2007, <https://www.torproject.org/>. [torrentfreak1] Van der Sar, E., "Proposal for research on human rights protocol considerations", 2015, <https://torrentfreak.com/ is-your-isp-messing-with-bittorrent-traffic-find-out- 140123/>. [torrentfreak2] Andy, ., "LAWYERS SENT 109,000 PIRACY THREATS IN GERMANY DURING 2013", 2014, <https://torrentfreak.com/lawyers- sent-109000-piracy-threats-in-germany-during- 2013-140304/>. [turkey] Akguel, M. and M. Kirlidoğ, "Internet censorship in Turkey", 2015, <http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/ internet-censorship-turkey>. [ververis] Vasilis, V., Kargiotakis, G., Filasto, A., Fabian, B., and A. Alexandros, "Understanding Internet Censorship Policy - The Case of Greece", 2015, <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci15/ foci15-paper-ververis-update.pdf>. [wikileaks] Sladek, T. and E. Broese, "Market Survey - Detection & Filtering Solutions to Identify File Transfer of Copyright Protected Content for Warner Bros. and movielabs", 2011, <https://wikileaks.org/sony/docs/05/docs/Anti-Piracy/CDSA/ EANTC-Survey-1.5-unsecured.pdf>. [xmppmanifesto] Saint-Andre, P. and . XMPP Operators, "A Public Statement Regarding Ubiquitous Encryption on the XMPP Network", 2014, <https://raw.githubusercontent.com/stpeter/manifesto/ master/manifesto.txt>. 10.3. URIs [1] mailto:node@domain/home [2] mailto:node@domain/work ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 56] Internet-Draft hrpcr March 2016 [3] mailto:hrpc@ietf.org Authors' Addresses Niels ten Oever Article19 EMail: niels@article19.org Corinne Cath Oxford Internet Institute EMail: corinne.cath@oii.ox.ac.uk ten Oever & Cath Expires September 18, 2016 [Page 57]