IPsec sequence number integrity check value
draft-song-ipsecme-seq-icv-00
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jifei Song, Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU) , Vishwas Manral | ||
| Last updated | 2013-06-27 | ||
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draft-song-ipsecme-seq-icv-00
IPSECME Working Group J. Song
Internet-Draft T. Tsou
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies
Expires: October 31, 2013 V. Manral
Hewlett-Packard Company
April 29, 2013
IPsec sequence number integrity check value
draft-song-ipsecme-seq-icv-00
Abstract
This document specifies an IPsec AH and ESP sequence number
validation scheme, which is complementary to the existing ICV
mechanism and anti-replay mechanism of AH and ESP in defense against
DOS attack. It is an optional feature negotiable through IKE, for
this feature to be negotiated, both sender and receiver must
implement it. If any party doesn't support it, then this feature
should be excluded from negotiation. The rationale for such a scheme
is discussed first; then requirements and guidelines for design of
the scheme are laid out. There can be various ways to implement the
scheme, some reference designs are discussed to set the base for
effort of identifying best practice and eventually establishing a
standard on the subject.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2013.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction
As defense against replay attack, IPsec, both AH and ESP, uses anti-
replay window to keep track of the sequence numbers of received
packets, and reject packets with sequence number that is either too
old (below anti-replay window) or duplicate (within anti-replay
window, but marked as received). Anti-replay window is not effective
against DOS attack by packets with sequence number that are above
anti-replay window, in which case the sequence number is neither
considered too old, nor duplicate. Attack packets with sequence
number above anti-replay window would penetrate anti-replay check and
only be rejected after failing ICV check. The issue is that ICV
check, which involves hashing operation, is rather expensive in terms
of resource and time consumption. In case of ESP, when hardware
crypto acceleration engine is used, ICV check and decryption often
need to be performed together to optimize bandwidth efficiency, which
makes the operation even more expensive. Large number of such
packets would cause recevier's service degradation or interruption
because significant amount of receiver's resource and time would be
consumed by performing expensive ICV check on these packets.
An inexpensive mechanism to check sequence number would allow
rejecting such packets without causing service degradation or
interruption. This check can be performed either before or after
anti-replay check depending on policy and situation, but must be
performed before ICV check. Such check doesn't have to be 100%
accurate as long as it doesn't yield false positive result, i.e.
mistaking correct sequence number as incorrect sequence number, since
the packet with false negative result, i.e. incorrect sequence number
passing the check, will be caught by ICV check eventually. But it
must be significantly more resource and time efficient than ICV check
to be beneficial.
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This check will increase packet length slightly, and incur slight
computation overhead per packet, but greatly improve IPsec's
capability to withstand DOS attack. This check would not be
effective if attacker can prevent original packets from reaching
destination, since in such case the attacker doesn't need to change
sequence number, instead he or she can change payload, then the
packet would pass both anti-replay check and this proposed sequence
number check. But in order to shoot down original packets, attacker
must compromise intermediate router. The proposed sequence number
check is not designed to defend against attacks that involves
compromised intermediate router, instead it is designed against
attacks where attacker does not control intermediate router, but is
able to obtain copy of original packets and launch attack by changing
sequence number of the original packets to values that are greater so
that anti-replay check would pass and ICV check is required. The
latter is simpler attack and easier to carry out therefore is a more
serious threat.
This check is not designed for systems that are capable of line rate
ICV check; instead it is designed for systems that are not capable of
line rate ICV check. This check makes it possible for systems that
are not capable of line rate ICV check to continue with normal
function when under attacks, as long as the original packets are
still being delivered, or in another words, as long as the network in
between is not compromised. Systems that are capable of line rate
ICV check should decline SEQ-ICV in negotiation.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. SEQ-ICV
A value generated by sender for each IPsec packet based on packet
sequence number and some secret known and only known to sender and
receiver. The value is transmitted together with the packet to
receiver, which generates its own value locally the same way as
sender, then compares with the transmitted value. If the value is
the same, then the sequence number is considered to be good,
otherwise the sequence number is considered to be bad.
3. SEQ-ICV type
SEQ-ICV type is defined by its length and how it is transmitted.
SEQ-ICV can be arbitrary number of bytes long and transmitted in band
or out of band. Ease of generation and transmission should be the
major factors in choosing SEQ-ICV type. Following are some
recommended SEQ-ICV types, a solution can pick and choose to support
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one or more of them. For each type, different algorithms can be used
to generate SEQ-ICV. SEQ-ICV type and generation algorithm should be
negotiated through IKE. An algorithm to generate SEQ-ICV-4 is
defined in Appendix A.
1. SEQ-ICV-1 : 1 byte is generated and embedded anywhere after AH/
ESP header
2. SEQ-ICV-2 : 2 bytes are generated and embedded anywhere after AH
/ESP header
3. SEQ-ICV-3 : 3 bytes are generated and embedded anywhere after AH
/ESP header
4. SEQ-ICV-4 : 4 bytes are generated and embedded anywhere after AH
/ESP header
5. SEQ-ICV-1-1 : 2 bytes are generated and embedded as two 1 byte
separately anywhere after AH/ESP header
6. SEQ-ICV-1-2 : 3 bytes are generated and embedded as an 1 byte
and a 2 byte separately anywhere after AH/ESP header
7. SEQ-ICV-1-1-1 : 3 bytes are generated and embedded as three 1
byte separately anywhere after AH/ESP header
8. SEQ-ICV-1-3 : 4 bytes are generated and embedded as an 1 byte
and a three byte separately anywhere after AH/ESP header
9. SEQ-ICV-2-2 : 4 bytes are generated and embedded as two 2 byte
separately anywhere after AH/ESP header
10. SEQ-ICV-1-1-2 : 4 bytes are generated and embedded as two 1 byte
and one 2 byte separately anywhere after AH/ESP header
11. SEQ-ICV-1-1-1-1 : 4 bytes are generated and embedded as four 1
byte separately anywhere after AH/ESP header
4. SEQ generation rules
1. part or whole of sequence number must be used
2. must be significantly more memory and time efficient than whole
packet ICV check
5. SEQ SEQ-ICV transmission rules
1. can be embedded anywhere after AH/ESP header
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2. can be embedded as whole, or pieces
6. SEQ-ICV retrieval and check rules
1. must be checked before ICV check
2. can be checked either before or after anti-replay check if
enabled
7. Relation to IKE
Like authentication and encryption, type of SEQ-ICV and algorithm
used to generate/transmit SEQ-ICV should all be negotiable through
IKE. Following information should be negotiated as part of SA,
1. whether SEQ-ICV is supported
2. operation mode of SEQ-ICV : static - SEQ-ICV is always enabled;
dynamic - SEQ-ICV is enabled and disabled dynamically by receiver
based on whether it is under attack
3. type of SEQ-ICV chosen
4. algorithm for SEQ-ICV generation and transmission
5. key, if needed, for SEQ-ICV generation
8. Outbound processing
AH transport/tunnel mode
1. generate ICV
2. generate SEQ-ICV
3. embed SEQ-ICV
4. adjust packet length in IP header
Packet length field can only be adjusted after generating ICV, which
must be based on the packet length without SEQ-ICV
ESP transport/tunnel mode
1. encrypt packet payload
2. generate ICV
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3. generate SEQ-ICV
4. embed SEQ-ICV
9. Inbound processing
AH transport/tunnel mode
1. reject if failed anti-replay check
2. generate SEQ-ICV
3. retrieve, in reverse order if consists of multiple parts,
transmitted SEQ-ICV
4. Compare locally generated SEQ-ICV with transmitted SEQ-ICV
5. Reject packet if not same, otherwise adjust packet length field
of IP header proceed to AH processing
Packet length field must be adjusted before AH processing
ESP transport/tunnel mode
1. reject if failed anti-replay check
2. generate SEQ-ICV
3. retrieve, in reverse order if consists of multiple parts,
transmitted SEQ-ICV
4. Compare locally generated SEQ-ICV with transmitted SEQ-ICV
5. Reject packet if not same, otherwise proceed to ESP processing
In calculating ESP payload length, SEQ-ICV must be excluded.
Enable SEQ-ICV dynamically
If too many packets passed anti-replay but failed ICV check, then
notify sender to enable SEQ-ICV, and receiver begins SEQ-ICV check
but would not reject packets that failed SEQ-ICV check, once receiver
no longer observes packets passing ICV check but failing SEQ-ICV
check, then receiver considers SEQ-ICV has been enabled, and begins
to reject packet that failed SEQ-ICV check.
Disable SEQ-ICV dynamically
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If no packets passed anti-replay but failed SEQ-ICV, then notify
sender to disable SEQ-ICV, and receiver stops rejecting packets that
failed SEQ-ICV check, once receiver no longer observes packets
passing both SEQ-ICV and ICV check, but only packets passing ICV
check, then receiver considers SEQ-ICV has been disabled, and stops
checking SEQ-ICV
Following is summary of conditions that could occur throughout the
whole process of dynamically enabling and disabling SEQ-ICV with
assumption that original packets are delivered,
--------------------------------------------------------------
| id |condition | packet |anti-replay|seq-icv| icv | action |
|----|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | normal, |original| pass | skip | pass | accept |
| 1 | seq-icv | | | | | |
| | disabled | | | | | |
|----|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | under |original| pass | skip | pass | accept |
| | attack, | | | | | |
| | seq-icv | | | | | |
| | disabled | | | | | |
| 2 |----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| |under | with | pass | skip | fail | reject |
| |attack, | fake | | | | |
| |seq-icv | seq | | | | |
| |disabled | | | | | |
|----|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | under |original| pass | fail | pass | accept |
| | attack, | | | | | |
| | enabling | | | | | |
| | seq-icv | | | | | |
| 3 |----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | under | with | pass | fail | fail | reject |
| | attack, | fake | | | | |
| | enabling | seq | | | | |
| | seq-icv | | | | | |
|----|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | under |original| pass | pass | pass | accept |
| | attack, | | | | | |
| | enabling | | | | | |
| | seq-icv | | | | | |
| | ready | | | | | |
| 4 |----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | under | with | pass | fail | fail | reject |
| | attack, | fake | | | | |
| | enabling | seq | | | | |
| | seq-icv | | | | | |
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| | ready | | | | | |
|----|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | under |original| pass | pass | pass | accept |
| | attack, | | | | | |
| | seq-icv | | | | | |
| | enabled | | | | | |
| 5 |----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | under | with | pass | fail | skip | reject |
| | attack, | fake | | | | |
| | seq-icv | seq | | | | |
| | enabled | | | | | |
|----|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | normal, |original| pass | pass | pass | accept |
| 6 | seq-icv | | | | | |
| | enabled | | | | | |
|----|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------|--------|
| | normal, |original| pass | fail | pass | accept |
| 7 | disabling| | | | | |
| | seq-icv | | | | | |
--------------------------------------------------------------
1 - normal, seq-icv disabled
2 - under attack, seq-icv disabled
3 - under attack, enabling seq-icv
4 - under attack, enabling seq-icv ready
5 - under attack, seq-icv enabled
6 - normal, seq-icv enabled
7 - normal, disabling seq-icv
SEQ-ICV enabling process is 1 through 5
SEQ-ICV disabling process is 6 -> 7 -> 1
10. Appendix A : An Algorithm for SEQ-ICV-4 generation and transmission
1. SEQ is sequence number
2. AK is authentication key
3. CIPHER is the encrypted payload
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4. SEQ-ICV-4 is generated as follows : SEQ-ICV-4[n] = (AK[n] +
CIPHER[n]) ^ (AK[n+4] + SEQ[n]), 0 <= n <= 3
5. Location of SEQ-ICV-4 is derived as follows : offset-in-
encrypted-payload = max(SEQ-ICV-4 % payload-length , 4)
6. Increase Packet length of IP header by 4 to account for SEQ-ICV-4
11. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
12. Security Considerations
13. Acknowledgments
Robert Moskowitz reminded us of importance of grammatical integrity.
Tero Kivinen pointed out issue with original sample SEQ-ICV-4
generation algorithm and provided insightful feedback on issues like
compatibility with existing standard and usage scenario of SEQ-ICV.
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December
2005.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
4303, December 2005.
14.2. Informative References
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
5996, September 2010.
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Appendix A. Encapsulation Mode
Appendix B. Justification
Authors' Addresses
Jifei Song
Huawei Technologies
Email: jifei.song@huawei.com
Tina Tsou
Huawei Technologies
2330 Central Expressway
Santa Clara
USA
Phone: +1-408-330-4424
Email: tina.tsou.zouting@huawei.com
Vishwas Manral
Hewlett-Packard Company
3000 Hanover St.
Palo Alto
USA
Email: vishwas.manral@hp.com
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