Alternative Approach for Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security
draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-02
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Valery Smyslov
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2020-08-03
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Network Working Group V. Smyslov
Internet-Draft ELVIS-PLUS
Intended status: Standards Track August 3, 2020
Expires: February 4, 2021
Alternative Approach for Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Post-quantum
Security
draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-02
Abstract
An IKEv2 extension defined in [RFC8784] allows IPsec traffic to be
protected against someone storing VPN communications today and
decrypting it later, when (and if) quantum computers are available.
However, this protection doesn't cover an initial IKEv2 SA, which
might be unacceptable in some scenarios. This specification defines
an alternative way get the same protection against quantum computers,
which allows to extend it on the initial IKEv2 SA.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 4, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Smyslov Expires February 4, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 August 2020
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Alternative Approach Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Computing IKE SA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Comparison of the Conventional and the Alternative Approaches 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
The Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2, defined in [RFC7296],
is used in the IPsec architecture to perform authenticated key
exchange. [RFC8784] defines an extension of IKEv2 for protecting
today's VPN traffic against future quantum computers. At the time
this extension was being developed, it was a consensus in the IPSECME
WG that only IPsec traffic needs to have such a protection. It was
believed that no sensitive information is transferred over IKE SA and
extending the protection to also cover IKE SA traffic would require
serious modifications to core IKEv2 protocol, that contradicted to
one of the goals to minimize such changes. For the cases when this
protection is needed it was suggested to immediately rekey IKE SA
once it is created.
In some situations it is desirable to have this protection for IKE SA
from the very beginning, when an initial IKE SA is created. An
example of such situation is Group Key Management protocol using
IKEv2, defined in [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2]. In this protocol
session keys are transferred from Group Controller / Key Server
(GCKS) to Group Members (GM) immediately once an initial IKE SA is
created. While it is possible to postpone transfer of the keys until
the IKE SA is rekeyed (and [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2] specifies how
to do it), the needed sequence of actions introduces an additional
delay and adds unnecessary complexity to the protocol.
Since [RFC8784] was written, a new IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange for
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