An approach for end-to-end Email Security with DANE and DMARC
draft-smtp-dane-dmarc-00

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UTA                                                            R. Mukhia
Internet-Draft                                              B. Rajendran
Intended status: Standards Track                       BS. Bindhumadhava
Expires: December 12, 2019                                CDAC Bangalore
                                                           June 10, 2019

     An approach for end-to-end Email Security with DANE and DMARC
                        draft-smtp-dane-dmarc-00

Abstract

   An end-to-end email security solution is proposed by implementing
   both DANE and DMARC protocols.  DMARC enables the recipient's mail
   server, with a method to verify the sender's ingenuity.  DANE intends
   to mitigate the MITM attack, by enabling the sender a method to
   authenticate the recipient's mail domain.  DANE and DMARC therefore
   complement each other by allowing the sender to verify the
   recipient's domain, and the recipient to verify the sender's address
   respectively.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 12, 2019.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Architecture of DANE with DAMRC for secure Email  . . . . . .   3
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   SMTP is a hop-by-hop mechanism.  For a long time now, email servers
   have had the option of using TLS to transparently encrypt the message
   transmission from one server to other.  Use of TLS with SMTP,when
   available ensures that the message content are secured during
   transmission between the servers.But not all servers support TLS.Some
   of the reasons many email providers doesn't support TLS are

   1.  Purchase of one or more SSL certificates is not done

   2.  Configuration of the email servers to use them (and keep these
       configurations updated)is not done

   3.  Allocation of additional computational resources on the email
       servers is not involved

   There are some issues from sending computers or servers also like,
   They never use TLS or They use TLS if receiver side is also using it
   otherwise sends insecurely or They use TLS otherwise doesn't deliver
   at all.

   Now comes the point that actually how secure is SMTP TLS.TLS protects
   the transmission of the content of the email messages,but it doesn't
   do anything for protecting the security of the message before it is
   sent or after it arrives at its destination .And for that, other
   encryption mechanisms are required.There are many reasons to say SMTP
   TLS doesn't provide end-to-end security.As there is no mandatory
   support for SSL/TLS in the email system.

   A receiver's support of the SMTP TLS can be removed by a Man-in-the-
   middle.  In such cases opportunistic TLS will deliver messages
   securely and forced TLS will not deliver the message.If any aspect of
   the TLS negotiation is garbled,then encryption is not used.  It is

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   very easy for a man-in-the-middle to inject garbage into the TLS
   handshake(which is done in clear text ) and have the connection
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