Requirements for a Lightweight AKE for OSCORE.
draft-selander-lake-reqs-02

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Network Working Group                                         M. Vucinic
Internet-Draft                                                     INRIA
Intended status: Informational                               G. Selander
Expires: April 18, 2020                                      J. Mattsson
                                                             Ericsson AB
                                                        October 16, 2019

             Requirements for a Lightweight AKE for OSCORE.
                      draft-selander-lake-reqs-02

Abstract

   This document compiles the requirements for a lightweight
   authenticated key exchange protocol for OSCORE.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2020.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Problem description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.2.  Crypto Agility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  AKE for OSCORE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.4.  Lightweight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Requirements Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   OSCORE [RFC8613] is a lightweight communication security protocol
   providing end-to-end security on application layer for constrained
   IoT settings (cf.  [RFC7228]).  It is expected to be deployed with
   standards and frameworks using CoAP such as 6TiSCH, LPWAN, OMA
   Specworks LwM2M, Fairhair Alliance and Open Connectivity Foundation.
   OSCORE lacks a matching authenticated key exchange protocol (AKE).
   This document compiles the requirements for such an AKE.

2.  Problem description

2.1.  Credentials

   IoT deployments differ in terms of what credentials can be supported.
   Currently many systems use pre-shared keys (PSK) provisioned out of
   band, for various reasons.  PSK are often used in a first deployment
   because of its percieved simplicity.  The use of PSK allows for
   protection of communication without major additional security
   processing, and also enables the use of symmetric crypto algorithms
   only, reducing the implementation and computational effort in the
   endpoints.

   However, PSK based provisioning has inherent weaknesses.  There has
   been reports of massive breaches of PSK provisioning systems, and as
   many systems use PSK without perfect forward secrecy (PFS) they are
   vulnerable to passive pervasive monitoring.  The security of these
   systems can be improved by adding PFS through an AKE authenticated by
   the provisioned PSK.

   Shared keys can alternatively be established in the endpoints using
   an AKE protocol authenticated with asymmetric public keys instead of
   symmetric secret keys.  Raw public keys (RPK) can be provisioned with

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   the same scheme as PSKs, and allows a more relaxed trust model since
   RPKs need not be secret.

   By running the same asymmetric key AKE with public key certificates
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