Lightweight Authorization for Authenticated Key Exchange.
draft-selander-ace-ake-authz-02
Network Working Group G. Selander
Internet-Draft J. Mattsson
Intended status: Informational Ericsson AB
Expires: 6 May 2021 M. Vucinic
INRIA
M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
A. Schellenbaum
Institute of Embedded Systems, ZHAW
2 November 2020
Lightweight Authorization for Authenticated Key Exchange.
draft-selander-ace-ake-authz-02
Abstract
This document describes a procedure for augmenting the authenticated
Diffie-Hellman key exchange EDHOC with third party assisted
authorization targeting constrained IoT deployments (RFC 7228).
Note to Readers
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/EricssonResearch/ace-ake-authz
(https://github.com/EricssonResearch/ace-ake-authz).
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Selander, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Lightweight Authorization for AKE. November 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Domain Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. The Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Device <-> Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Device <-> Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.1. Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.2. Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.3. Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Authenticator <-> Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3.1. Voucher Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3.2. Voucher Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. ACE Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. AS Request Creation Hints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Client-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.4. AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
For constrained IoT deployments [RFC7228] the overhead contributed by
security protocols may be significant which motivates the
specification of lightweight protocols that are optimizing, in
particular, message overhead (see [I-D.ietf-lake-reqs]). This
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