The MASQUE Protocol
draft-schinazi-masque-01

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Last updated 2019-07-08
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Network Working Group                                        D. Schinazi
Internet-Draft                                                Google LLC
Intended status: Experimental                              July 08, 2019
Expires: January 9, 2020

                          The MASQUE Protocol
                        draft-schinazi-masque-01

Abstract

   This document describes MASQUE (Multiplexed Application Substrate
   over QUIC Encryption).  MASQUE is a mechanism that allows co-locating
   and obfuscating networking applications behind an HTTPS web server.
   The currently prevalent use-case is to allow running a proxy or VPN
   server that is indistinguishable from an HTTPS server to any
   unauthenticated observer.  We do not expect major providers and CDNs
   to deploy this behind their main TLS certificate, as they are not
   willing to take the risk of getting blocked, as shown when domain
   fronting was blocked.  An expected use would be for individuals to
   enable this behind their personal websites via easy to configure
   open-source software.

   This document is a straw-man proposal.  It does not contain enough
   details to implement the protocol, and is currently intended to spark
   discussions on the approach it is taking.  Discussion of this work is
   encouraged to happen on the MASQUE IETF mailing list masque@ietf.org
   [1] or on the GitHub repository which contains the draft:
   https://github.com/DavidSchinazi/masque-drafts [2].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

Schinazi                 Expires January 9, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   MASQUE                        July 2019

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Usage Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Protection from Network Providers . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Protection from Web Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Making a Home Server Available  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Onion Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Invisibility of Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Invisibility of the Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Fallback to HTTP/2 over TLS over TCP  . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Overview of the Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Mechanisms the Server Can Advertise to Authenticated Clients    6
     5.1.  HTTP Proxy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  DNS over HTTPS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.3.  UDP Proxying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.4.  QUIC Proxying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.5.  IP Proxying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.6.  Path MTU Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.7.  Service Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Operation over HTTP/2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  Traffic Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  Untrusted Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
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