Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home Address Options
draft-savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Pekka Savola | ||
| Last updated | 2002-12-02 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
All IPv6 nodes must be able to process Routing Header [IPV6] and Home Address [MIPV6] Options. With these, packet filter access lists can be tricked (among other things) as the destination and source addresses, respectively, are being rewritten as the packet traverses the network. Some of the security considerations of these features are analyzed, and a few possible solutions presented. It will be shown that with the current architecture, the network-based security does not seem to scale to the requirements of Mobile IPv6; it seems possible that unless security is taken seriously when implementing the nodes, the new Mobile IPv6 requirements might not be allowed to be used at all in some circumstances.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)