Securing HTTP State Management Information
draft-salgueiro-secure-state-management-06
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Gonzalo Salgueiro , Paul Jones | ||
| Last updated | 2012-08-22 (Latest revision 2012-02-19) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Virtually every application on the web today that allows a user to log in or manipulate information stored on a server maintains some form of state management information. Usually, the session context is established through the use of a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) parameter or a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) cookie that identifies the session. Without the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS), such an information exchange introduces a security risk. For a variety of reasons, TLS may not be desired or preferred in all situations and, in those cases, users are left vulnerable. This memo provides a simple method for enabling secure exchange of state management information through HTTP in situations where TLS is not employed.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)