A standard process to quarantine and restore IoT Devices
draft-richardson-shg-un-quarantine-01

• Status
• IESG evaluation record
• IESG writeups
• Email expansions
• History

• Versions
• 00
• 01

RIPE IoT Working Group                                     M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         J. Latour
Expires: February 20, 2020                                     CIRA Labs
                                                         August 19, 2019

        A standard process to quarantine and restore IoT Devices
                 draft-richardson-shg-un-quarantine-01

Abstract

   The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) is a tool to describe the
   limited access that a single function device such as an Internet of
   Things device might need.  The enforcement of the access control
   lists described protects the device from attacks from the Internet,
   and protects the Internets from compromised devices.

   This document details the process which occurs when a device is
   detected to have violated the stated policy.  The goal of these steps
   is to ensure that the device is correctly removed from operation,
   fixed, and if possible, restored to safe operation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 20, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Richardson & Latour     Expires February 20, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               MUD-Quaranatine                 August 2019

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  An overview of the stages of activity . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Detailed description of states  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  New device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Nominal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.1.  Use of Captive Portal API . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Suspicious  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Suspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  Device of Interest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.6.  Quarantined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.7.  Disabled  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.8.  Returning to Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.9.  Owned by malicious entity ("p0wned")  . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Detailed description of transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Initial Enrollment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Re-enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.1.  factory-default re-enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.2.  simple re-enrollment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.3.  other kinds?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Initial suspicion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Confirmed suspicion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  Device identified as attack target  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.6.  Suspension of connectivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.7.  Re-Installation of valid firmware . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  An example process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Human Rights Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.1.  Captive Portal API JSON keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11