A standard process to quarantine and restore IoT Devices
draft-richardson-shg-un-quarantine-02

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Network Working Group                                      M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         J. Latour
Expires: 23 August 2020                                        CIRA Labs
                                                        20 February 2020

        A standard process to quarantine and restore IoT Devices
                 draft-richardson-shg-un-quarantine-02

Abstract

   The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) is a tool to describe the
   limited access that a single function device such as an Internet of
   Things device might need.  The enforcement of the access control
   lists described protects the device from attacks from the Internet,
   and protects the Internets from compromised devices.

   This document details the process which occurs when a device is
   detected to have violated the stated policy.  The goal of these steps
   is to ensure that the device is correctly removed from operation,
   fixed, and if possible, restored to safe operation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 August 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.

Richardson & Latour      Expires 23 August 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               MUD-Quaranatine               February 2020

   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  An overview of the stages of activity . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Detailed description of states  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  New device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Nominal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.1.  Use of Captive Portal API . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Suspicious  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Suspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  Device of Interest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.6.  Quarantined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.7.  Disabled  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.8.  Returning to Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.9.  Owned by malicious entity ("p0wned")  . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Detailed description of transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Initial Enrollment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Re-enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.1.  factory-default re-enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.2.  simple re-enrollment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.3.  other kinds?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Initial suspicion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Confirmed suspicion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  Device identified as attack target  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.6.  Suspension of connectivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.7.  Re-Installation of valid firmware . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  An example process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Human Rights Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.1.  Captive Portal API JSON keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11