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A toxonomy of eavesdropping attacks
draft-richardson-saag-onpath-attacker-01

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Author Michael Richardson
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draft-richardson-saag-onpath-attacker-01
anima Working Group                                        M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Standards Track                        29 December 2020
Expires: 2 July 2021

                  A toxonomy of eavesdropping attacks
                draft-richardson-saag-onpath-attacker-01

Abstract

   The terms on-path attacker and Man-in-the-Middle Attack have been
   used in a variety of ways, sometimes interchangeably, and sometimes
   meaning different things.

   This document offers an update on terminology for network attacks.  A
   consistent set of terminology is important in describing what kinds
   of attacks a particular protocol defends against, and which kinds the
   protocol does not.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 July 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Three kinds of attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  First Kind of attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Second Kind of attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Second Kind of attack with bypass . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Third Kind of attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Three proposals on terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  QUIC terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Malory/Man in various places  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Council of Attackers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   A number of terms have been used to describe attacks against
   networks.

   In the [dolevyao] paper, the attacker is assumed to be able to:

   *  view messages as they are transmitted

   *  selectively delete messages

   *  selectively insert or modify messages

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   Some authors refer to such an attacker as an "on-path" attack
   [reference], or a "Man-in-the-Middle" attack [reference].  In
   general, most authors form a clear consensus about this mode.  Some
   authors are not happy with the gender of the attack ("Man") being
   assumed, and have sought other terminology.

   Where opinions diverge is what to call other forms of attack or
   eavesdropping.

   The term "passive attack" has been used in many cases to describe
   situations where the attacker can only observe messages, but can not
   intersept, modify or delete any messages.

   There are situations where an eavesdropper has a better network
   connection than the actual corresponds, and so while no messages can
   be removed, such an attacker may be able to beat the original packet
   in a race.

   The summary is that there are probably three variations of attack:

   1.  An on-path attacker that can view, delete and modify messages.
       This is the Dolev-Yao attack.

   2.  An off-path attacker that can view messages and insert new
       messages.

   3.  An off-path attacker that can only view messages.

2.  Three kinds of attack

   The attacks are numbered in this section as no consensus on naming
   the attacks yet.  In the diagrams below, the sender is named "Alice",
   and the recipient is named "Bob", as is typical in many cryptographic
   protocols [alicebob], as first introduced by [digisign].

   The attacker in is named "Mallory"

   .-------.                   .-----.
   | Alice |------------------>| Bob |
   '-------'                   '-----'

                   Figure 1: Alice communicating with Bob

2.1.  First Kind of attack

   In this attack, the attacker is involved with the forwarding of the
   packets.  A firewall or network router is ideally placed for this
   attack.

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   .-------.      ***********       .-----.
   | Alice |------* Mallory *------>| Bob |
   '-------'      ***********       '-----'

                     Figure 2: The first kind of attack

   In this case Mallory can:

   *  view all packets

   *  selectively forward or drop any packet

   *  modify any packets that is forwarded

   *  insert additional packets

2.2.  Second Kind of attack

   In this attack, the attacker is not involved with the forwarding of
   the packets.  The attacker receives a copy of packets that are sent.
   This could be from, for instance, a mirror port or SPAN [span].
   Alternatively, a copy of traffic may be obtained via passive
   (optical) tap [fibertap].

   .-------.                        .-----.
   | Alice |---------.------------->| Bob |
   '-------'         |              '-----'
                     v
                ***********
                * Mallory *
                ***********

                    Figure 3: The second kind of attack

   In this case Mallory can:

   *  view all packets

2.3.  Second Kind of attack with bypass

   In some cases, Mallory may be able to send messages to Bob via
   another route which due to some factor will arrive at Bob prior to
   the original message from Alice.

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   .-------.                  .->--.    .-----.
   | Alice |---------------|  |    |  .>| Bob |
   '-------'     |         |  |    |  | '-----'
                 |         |  |    v  |     ^
                 |         |  |    |  |     |
                 v         '-->    '->|     |
            ***********                     |
            * Mallory *---------------------'
            ***********

              Figure 4: The second kind of attack with bypass

   In that case Mallory can:

   *  view all packets

   *  insert additional/copied packets into the stream

   But Mallory will be unable to drop or modify the original packets.
   Bob however, may be unable to distinguish packets from Alice vs
   packets sent from Mallory that purport to be from Alice.

2.4.  Third Kind of attack

   The third kind of attack is one in which Mallory can not see any
   packets from Alice.  This is usually what is meant by an "off-path"
   attack.  Mallory can usually forge packets purporting to be from
   Alice, but can never see Alice's actual packets.

   .-------.                            .-----.
   | Alice |--------------------------->| Bob |
   '-------'                            '-----'
                                            ^
                                            |
                                            |
            ***********                     |
            * Mallory *---------------------'
            ***********

                     Figure 5: The third kind of attack

   In this case Mallory can:

   *  insert additional packets

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3.  Three proposals on terminology

   This document aspires to pick a single set of terms and explain them.

3.1.  QUIC terms

   [quic] ended up with a different taxonomy:

   *  nn-path [Dolev-Yao]

   *  Limited on-path (cannot delete)

   *  Off-path

3.2.  Malory/Man in various places

   [malory] proposes:

   *  man-in-the-middle [Dolev-Yao]

   *  man-on-the-side

   *  man-in-the-rough

   Alternatively:

   *  Malory-in-the-middle [Dolev-Yao]

   *  Malory-on-the-side

   *  Malory-in-the-rough

3.3.  Council of Attackers

   [alliteration] proposes the "the council of attackers"

   *  malicious messenger [Dolev-Yao: who rewrites messages sent]

   *  oppressive observer [who uses your information against you]

   *  off-path attacker

4.  Security Considerations

   This document introduces a set of terminology that will be used in
   many Security Considerations sections.

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5.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no IANA requests.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The SAAG mailing list.

7.  Changelog

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [alicebob] "Alice and Bob", 2020,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob>.

   [alliteration]
              "Council of Attackers", 2020,
              <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/
              R0uevzT0Vz9uqqaxiu98GtK1rks/>.

   [digisign] Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., and L. Adleman, "A method for
              obtaining digital signatures and public-key
              cryptosystems", February 1978,
              <https://doi.org/10.1145/359340.359342>.

   [dolevyao] "On the Security of Public Key Protocols", 1983,
              <https://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~dolev/pubs/dolev-yao-ieee-
              01056650.pdf>.

   [fibertap] "Fiber Tap", 2020,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A>.

   [malory]   "Man-in-the-Middle", 2020,
              <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/b26jvEz4NRHSm-
              Xva6Lv5-L8QIA/>.

   [quic]     "QUIC terms for attacks", 2020,
              <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/
              wTtDYlRAADMmgqd6Vhm8rFybr_g/>.

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   [span]     "Port Mirroring", 2020,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_mirroring>.

Contributors

Author's Address

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

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