table of contents for security architecture
draft-richardson-6tisch-table-of-contents-00

Network Working Group                                      M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                                       SSW
Intended status: Informational                             June 03, 2014
Expires: December 05, 2014

              table of contents for security architecture
              draft-richardson-6tisch-table-of-contents-00

Abstract

   This is a template for a security architecture.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 05, 2014.

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Table of Contents

   1.  security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  thread model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  implementation cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.3.  denial of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  protocol requirements/constraints/assumptions . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  inline/offline  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  time sequence diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  explanation of each step  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  size of each packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  resulting security properties obtained from this process  . .   3
   5.  deployment scenarios underlying protocol requirements . . . .   3
   6.  device identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     6.1.  PCE/Proxy vs Node identification  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     6.2.  Time source authentication / time validation  . . . . . .   3
     6.3.  description of certificate contents . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     6.4.  privacy aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   7.  slotframes to be used during join . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   8.  configuration aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   9.  authorization aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     9.1.  how to determine a proxy/PCE from a end node  . . . . . .   3
     9.2.  security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   10. security architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   11. Posture Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   13. Other Related Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   15. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   16. Normative references  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  security requirements

1.1.  thread model

1.2.  implementation cost

   (storage of security material, computational cost)

1.3.  denial of service

   other communication impacts of security protocol mechanics

2.  protocol requirements/constraints/assumptions

2.1.  inline/offline

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   dependencies on centralized or external functionality, inline and
   offline

3.  time sequence diagram

3.1.  explanation of each step

3.2.  size of each packet

   and number of frames needed to contain it.

4.  resulting security properties obtained from this process

5.  deployment scenarios underlying protocol requirements

6.  device identification

6.1.  PCE/Proxy vs Node identification

6.2.  Time source authentication / time validation

   Note: RPL Root authentication is a chartered item

6.3.  description of certificate contents

6.4.  privacy aspects

7.  slotframes to be used during join

   how is this communicated in the (extended) beacon.

8.  configuration aspects

   (allocation of slotframes after join, network statistics,
   neighboetc.)

9.  authorization aspects

   lifecycle (key management, trust management)

9.1.  how to determine a proxy/PCE from a end node

9.2.  security considerations

   what prevents a node from transmitting when it is not their turn
   (part one: jamming)

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   can a node successfully communicate with a peer at a time when not
   supposed to, may be tied to link layer security, or will it be
   policed by receiver?

10.  security architecture

   security architecture and fit of e.g. join protocol and provisioning
   into this

11.  Posture Maintenance

   (SACM related work)

12.  Security Considerations

13.  Other Related Protocols

14.  IANA Considerations

15.  Acknowledgements

16.  Normative references

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

Author's Address

   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z 5V7
   CA

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ca/

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