The Delegation_Only DNSKEY flag
draft-pwouters-powerbind-03

• Status
• IESG evaluation record
• IESG writeups
• Email expansions
• History

• Versions
• 00
• 01
• 02
• 03

DNSOP                                                         P. Wouters
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Updates: 4035 (if approved)                                  W. Hardaker
Intended status: Informational                                   USC/ISI
Expires: May 7, 2020                                    November 4, 2019

                    The Delegation_Only DNSKEY flag
                      draft-pwouters-powerbind-03

Abstract

   This document introduces a new DNSKEY flag called DELEGATION_ONLY
   that indicates that the particular zone will never sign zone data
   across a label.  That is, every label (dot) underneath is considered
   a zone cut and must have its own (signed) delegation.  Additionally,
   it indicates the zone is expecting its parent to never bypass or
   override the zone.  DNSSEC Validating Resolvers can use this bit to
   mark any data that violates the DELEGATION_ONLY policy as BOGUS.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

Wouters & Hardaker         Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Delegation Only DNSKEYs           November 2019

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Deep Link State problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  The DELEGATION_ONLY DNSKEY flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  _underscore label exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Parental Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.3.  Marking zone keys DELEGATION_ONLY without parental
           support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.4.  Marking the Root DNSKEY DELEGATION_ONLY . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.5.  Migrating to and from DELEGATION_ONLY . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Human Rights Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The DNS Security Extensions [DNSSEC] use public key cryptography to
   create an hierarchical trust base with the DNSSEC root public keys at
   the top, followed by Top Level domain (TLD) keys one level
   underneath.  While the root and TLD zones are asumed to be almost
   exclusively delegation-only zones, there is currently no method to
   audit these zones to ensure they behave as a delegation-only zone.
   This creates an attractive target for malicious use of these zones -
   either by their owners or through coercion.

   This document defines a mechanism for zone owners, at DNSKEY creation
   time, to indicate they will only delegate the remainder of the tree
   to lower-level zones, allowing easier logging and auditing of DNS
   responses they serve.

   This document introduces a new DNSKEY flag allowing zone owners to
   commit that the zone will never sign any DNS data that traverses a
   single label and if any such signed data is encountered by validating