Connected Identity for STIR
draft-peterson-stir-rfc4916-update-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Jon Peterson  , Chris Wendt 
Last updated 2021-02-22
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Network Working Group                                        J. Peterson
Internet-Draft                                                   Neustar
Intended status: Informational                                  C. Wendt
Expires: August 26, 2021                                         Comcast
                                                       February 22, 2021

                      Connected Identity for STIR
                 draft-peterson-stir-rfc4916-update-03

Abstract

   The SIP Identity header conveys cryptographic identity information
   about the originators of SIP requests.  The Secure Telephone Identity
   Revisited (STIR) framework however provides no means for determining
   the identity of the called party in a traditional telephone calling
   scenario.  This document updates prior guidance on the "connected
   identity" problem to reflect the changes to SIP Identity that
   accompanied STIR, and considers a revised problem space for connected
   identity as a means of detecting calls that have been retargeted to a
   party impersonating the intended destination, as well as the spoofing
   of mid-dialog or dialog-terminating events by intermediaries or third
   parties.

Status of This Memo

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Connected Identity Problem Statement for STIR . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Connected Identity in Provisional Dialogs . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Connected Identity in Mid-Dialog and Dialog-Terminating
       Requests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Interaction with Divert PASSporT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Authorization Policy for Callers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Pre-Association with Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. Updates to RFC4916  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   14. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] initiates sessions,
   and as a step in establishing sessions, it exchanges information
   about the parties at both ends of a session.  Users review
   information about the calling party, for example, to determine
   whether to accept communications initiated by a SIP, in the same way
   that users of the telephone network assess "Caller ID" information
   before picking up calls.  This information may sometimes be consumed
   by automata to make authorization decisions.

   STIR [RFC8224] provides a cryptographic assurance of the identity of
   calling parties in order to prevent impersonation, which is a key
   enabler of unwanted robocalls, swatting, vishing, voicemail hacking,
   and similar attacks (see [RFC7340]).  There also exists a related
   problem: the identity of the party who answers a call can differ from
   that of the initial called party for various innocuous reasons such
   as call forwarding, but in certain network environments, it is
   possible for attackers to hijack the route of a called number and
   direct it to a resource controlled by the attacker.  It can
   potentially be difficult to determine why a call reached a target

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   other than the one originally intended, and whether the party
   ultimately reached by the call is one that the caller should trust.
   The lack of mutual authentication of parties moreover makes it
   possible for outside attackers to inject forged messages (e.g.  BYE)
   into a SIP session.

   The property of providing identity in the backwards direction of a
   call is here called "connected identity."  Previous work on connected
   identity focused on fixing the core semantics of SIP.  [RFC4916]
   allowed a mid-dialog request, such as an UPDATE [RFC3311], to convey
   identity in either direction within the context of an existing
   INVITE-initiated dialog.  In an update to the original [RFC3261]
   behavior, [RFC4916] allowed that UPDATE to alter the From header
   field value for requests in the backwards direction: previously
   [RFC3261] required that the From header field values sent in requests
   in the backwards direction reflect the To header field value of the
   dialog-forming request, for various backwards-compatibility reasons.
   In other words, if Alice sent a dialog-forming request to Bob, then
   under the original [RFC3261] rules, even if Bob's SIP service
   forwarded that dialog-forming request to Carol, Carol would still be
   required to put Bob's identity in the From header field value in any
   mid-dialog requests in the backwards direction.

   One of the original motivating use cases for [RFC4916] was the use of
   connected identity with the SIP Identity [RFC4474] header field.
   While a mid-dialog request in the backwards direction (e.g.  UPDATE)
   can be signed with Identity like any other SIP request, forwarded
   requests would not be signable without the ability to change the mid-
   dialog From header field value: Carol, say, would not be able to
   furnish a key to sign for Bob's identity, if Carol wanted to sign
   requests in the backwards direction.  Carol would however be able to
   sign for her own identity in the From header field value, if mid-
   dialog requests in the backwards direction were permitted to vary
   from the original To header field value.

   With the obsolence of [RFC4474] by [RFC8224], this specification
   updates [RFC4916] to reflect the changes to the SIP Identity header
   and the revised problem space of STIR.  It also explores some new
   features that would be enabled by connected identity for STIR,
   including the use of connected identity to prevent route hijacking
   and to notify callers when an expected called party has successfully
   been reached.  This document also addresses concerns about applying
   [RFC4916] connected identity to STIR as given in [RFC8862].

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2.  Terminology

   In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "SHOULD",
   and "SHOULD NOT", are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Connected Identity Problem Statement for STIR

   The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] enumerates robocalling,
   voicemail hacking, vishing, and swatting as problems with the modern
   telephone network that are enabled, or abetted, by impersonation: by
   the ability of a calling party to arbitrarily set the telephone
   number that will be rendered to end users to identify the caller.

   Today, sophisticated adversaries can redirect calls on the PSTN to
   destinations other than the intended called party.  For some call
   centers, like those associated with financial institutions,
   healthcare, and emergency services, an attacker could hope to gain
   valuable information about people or to prevent some classes of
   important services.  Moreover, on the Internet, the lack of any
   centralized or even federated routing system for telephone numbers
   has resulted in deployments where the routing of calls is arbitrary:
   calls to telephone numbers might be unceremoniously dumped on a PSTN
   gateway, they might be sent to a default intermediary that makes
   forwarding decisions based on a local flat file, various mechanisms
   like private ENUM might be consulted, or routing might be determined
   in some other, domain specific way.  In short, there are numerous
   attack surfaces that an adversary could explore to attempt to
   redirect calls to a particular number to someplace other than the
   intended destination.

   Another motivating use case for connected identity is mid-dialog
   requests, including BYE.  The potential for an intermediary to
   generate a forged BYE in the backwards direction has always been
   built-in to the stateful dialog management of SIP.  For example,
   there is a class of mobile fraud attacks ("short-stopping") that rely
   on intermediary networks making it appear as if a call has terminated
   to one side, while maintaining that the call is still active to the
   other, in order to create a billing discrepancy that could be
   pocketed by the intermediary.  If BYE requests in both directions of
   a SIP dialog could be authenticated with STIR, just like dialog-
   forming requests, then another impersonation vector leading to fraud
   in the telephone network could be shut down.

   There are however practical limits to what securing the signaling can
   achieve.  [RFC4916] rightly observed that once a SIP call has been
   answered, the called party can be replaced by a different party with
   a different identity due to call transfer, call park and retrieval,
   and so on.  In some cases, due to the presence of a back-to-back user

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   agent, it can be effectively impossible for the calling party to know
   that this has happened.  The problem statement considered for STIR
   focuses solely on signaling, not whether media from the connected
   party should be rendered to the caller when a dialog has been
   established.  This specification does not consider further any
   threats that arise from a substitution of media.

4.  Connected Identity in Provisional Dialogs

   [RFC4916] identified a means of sending Identity header field values
   in the backwards direction before a final response to a dialog has
   been received by the UAC.  It relied on the use of the UPDATE method
   to send the connected identity in the backwards direction after the
   UAS had received and responded to a PRACK [RFC3262] from the UAC,
   which would in turn have been triggered by a provisional 1xx response
   sent earlier by the UAC.  [RFC4916] permits the From header field of
   the UPDATE to change the address of record of the recipient: if the
   original INVITE had been sent with a To header field value of
   "sip:bob@example.com", the UAS in its UPDATE could set the From
   header field value to "sip:carol@example.com."  For STIR, this is a
   very important property, as Carol might not even possess a credential
   that can legitimately sign for Bob.

   Per [RFC3262], UAC's that require connected identity MUST thus send a
   Require header field with the option tag 100rel in INVITEs in
   addition to an Identity header field value containing a PASSporT.
   UAS's that support this mechanism will first send a Require header
   field with the option tag 100rel in 1xx class responses to INVITEs
   that they receive, along with the necessary RSeq header field.  The
   UAC will send a PRACK when it receives the reliable 1xx response from
   the UAS; the UAS, upon receiving a PRACK, responds with a 200 OK.  At
   this point, the terminating UA is free to send an UPDATE [RFC3311]
   request in the backwards direction to the originating UA.  This
   update will contain an Identity header, with a PASSporT that signs
   for the connected identity in its "orig" claim.  If the PASSporT is
   valid, the originating UA will respond with an OK, and may perform
   any behaviors associated with the updated identity (see Section 7).
   Even if connected identity is not required by the originator of an
   INVITE request, it can still be solicited if available by sending the
   100rel option tag in a Supported header field when sending an INVITE
   with an Identity header, which will trigger the preceding flow if the
   UAS supports connected identity.

   Usually, the updated Identity reflects a changed to the From header
   field value.  But in many operating environments, the From header
   field value does not contain the identity of the caller that has been
   asserted by the network, which is instead conveyed by the P-Asserted-
   Identity header field [RFC3325].  The contents of PAID are not used

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   for dialog matching, and so in environments where PAID is used, it
   can be altered more dynamically.  However, in order for the connected
   identity and a PASSporT to be conveyed in the backwards direction, a
   provisional dialog still needs to be established, and an UPDATE sent:
   in this case, it will be the UDPATE that contains the connected
   identity in its P-Asserted-Identity header field value, and that
   value will be signed by the PASSporT.

5.  Connected Identity in Mid-Dialog and Dialog-Terminating Requests

   The use of the connected identity mechanism here specified is not
   limited to provisional dialog requests.  Once a dialog has been
   established with connected identity, any re-INVITEs from either the
   originating and terminating side, as well as any BYE requests, MUST
   contain Identity headers with valid PASSporTs based on the current
   To/From header field values for the dialog.  This prevents third-
   parties from spoofing any mid-dialog requests in order to redirect
   media or similarly interfere with communications, as well as
   preventing denial of service teardowns by attackers.

   Theoretically, any SIP requests in a dialog could be signed in this
   fashion, though it is unclear how valuable it would be for some (e.g.
   OPTIONS).  Requests with specialized payloads such as INFO or
   MESSAGE, however, would require additional specification for how
   integrity protection for their bodies could be implemented.  Some
   work has been done toward that for MESSAGE (see
   [I-D.peterson-stir-messaging].  This specification thus does not
   mandate PASSporTs for any requests sent in a dialog other than
   INVITE, UPDATE, and BYE.

   It might seem tempting to require that, if an INVITE has been with an
   Identity header containing a PASSporT, any CANCEL request received
   for the dialog initiated by that INVITE must also contain an Identity
   header with a PASSporT.  However, because CANCEL requests can also
   sent be sent by stateful proxy servers engaged in parallel forking,
   for example, when branches need to be canceled because a final
   response has been received from a UAS.  It is however REQUIRED by
   this specification that if a UAC sends a CANCEL for its own PASSporT-
   protected INVITE request, that it include an Identity header with a
   valid PASSporT in the CANCEL.  UAS policy will have to determine the
   instances where it will accept unsigned CANCEL requests for a dialog
   initiated with a signed INVITE.

6.  Interaction with Divert PASSporT

   Many of the use cases that motivate connected identity involve
   retargeting: when a call acquires a new target (in its Request-URI)
   during transit, the terminating side needs a way to express to the

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   originating side which destination the INVITE reached.  In STIR, the
   "div PASSporT type [I-D.ietf-stir-passport-divert] was created to
   securely record when a call was retargeted from one destination to
   another.  Those "div" PASSporTs can be consumed on the terminating
   side by verification services to determine that a call has reached
   its eventual destination for the right reasons.

   As specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport-divert], the only way those
   diversion PASSporTs will be seen by the calling party is if
   redirection is used (SIP 3XX responses) instead of retargeting; while
   some network policies may want to conceal service logic from the
   originating party, sending redirections in the backwards direction is
   the only current defined way for secure indications of redirection to
   be revealed to the calling party.  That in turn would allow the
   calling user agent to have a strong assurance that legitimate
   entities in the call path caused the request to reach a party that
   the caller did not anticipate.

   This specification introduces another alternative.  When per
   Section 4 the terminating side sends an UPDATE with an Identity
   header containing a PASSporT for its current From (or PAID) header
   field value, it MAY include in Identity header field values any "div"
   PASSporTs it received in the INVITE that initiated this provisional
   dialog.  These "div" PASSporTs will enable the originating side to
   receive a secure assurance that the call is being fielded by the
   proper recipient per the routing of the call.  Note however that
   "div" is not universally supported, and thus calls may be retargeted
   with generating a "div" PASSporT, so sending those PASSporTs in the
   backwards direction cannot be mandated.

7.  Authorization Policy for Callers

   In a traditional telephone call, the called party receives an
   alerting signal and can make a decision about whether or not to pick
   up a phone.  They may have access to displayed information, like
   "Caller ID", to help them arrive at an authorization decision.  The
   situation is more complicated for callers, however: callers typically
   expect to be connected to the proper destination and are often
   holding telephones in a position that would not enable them to see
   displayed information, if any were available for them to review--and
   moreover, their most direct response to a security breach would be to
   hang up the call they were in the middle of placing.

   While this specification will not prescribe any user experience
   associated with placing a call, it assumes that callers might have
   some way to a set an authorization posture that will result in the
   right thing happening when the connected identity is not expected.
   This is analogous to a situation where SRTP negotiation fails because

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   the keys exchanges at the media layer do not match fingerprints
   exchanged at the signaling layer: when a user requests
   confidentiality services, and they are unavailable, media should not
   be exchanged.  Thus we assume that users have a way in their
   interface to require this criticality, on a per-call basis, or
   perhaps on a per-destination basis, that would cause their user agent
   to send the INVITE with a Require for 100rel.  Similarly, users will
   not always place calls where the connected identity is crucial--but
   when they do, they should have a way to tell their devices that the
   call should not be completed if it arrives at an unexpected party.

   Ultimately, authorization policy for called parties is difficult to
   set, as calls can end up at unexpected places for legitimate reasons.
   Some work has been done to make sure that secure diversion works with
   STIR, as described in Section 6.

8.  Pre-Association with Destinations

   Any connected identity mechanism will work best if the user knows
   before initiating a call that connected identity is supported by the
   destination side.  Not every institution that a user wants to connect
   to securely will support STIR and connected identity out of the gate.

   The user interface of modern smartphones support an address book from
   which users select telephone numbers to dial.  Even when dialing a
   number manually, the interface frequently checks the address book and
   will display to users any provisioned name for the target of the call
   if one exists.  Similarly, when clicking on a telephone number viewed
   on a web page, or similar service, smartphone often prompt users
   approve the access to the outbound dialer.  These sorts of decision
   points, when the user is still interacting with the user interface,
   provide an opportunity to form a pre-association with the
   destination, and potentially even to exchange STIR PASSporTs in order
   to validate whether or not the expected destination can be reached
   securely.  Again, this is probably most meaningful for contacting
   financial, government, or emergency services, for cases where
   reaching an unintended destination may have serious consequences.

   Future versions of this specification will explore how the security
   features of destinations can be discovered before calls are set up so
   that calling parties can make more informed authorization decisions.
   This may rely on the establishment of a provisional, media-less SIP
   dialog which can then negotiate media when the user approves of the
   destination.  In some environments, that may require the use of
   mechanisms defined by [I-D.ietf-stir-oob].

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9.  Examples

   [TBD: Revise RFC4916 examples to show new Identity header present in
   UPDATE and in a backwards-direction BYE.]

10.  Updates to RFC4916

   [TBD - ways that UPDATEs in the backwards direction can carry
   additional information in support of the above]

   In general, the guidance of RFC4916 remains valid for RFC8224.

   The deprecation of the Identity-Info header has a number of
   implications for RFC4916; all of the protocol examples need to be
   updated to reflect that.

11.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank YOU for your contributions to this
   specification.

12.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

13.  Security Considerations

   TBD.

14.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-modern-problem-framework]
              Peterson, J. and T. McGarry, "Modern Problem Statement,
              Use Cases, and Framework", draft-ietf-modern-problem-
              framework-04 (work in progress), March 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-stir-oob]
              Rescorla, E. and J. Peterson, "STIR Out-of-Band
              Architecture and Use Cases", draft-ietf-stir-oob-07 (work
              in progress), March 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-stir-passport-divert]
              Peterson, J., "PASSporT Extension for Diverted Calls",
              draft-ietf-stir-passport-divert-09 (work in progress),
              July 2020.

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   [I-D.peterson-modern-teri]
              Peterson, J., "An Architecture and Information Model for
              Telephone-Related Information (TeRI)", draft-peterson-
              modern-teri-04 (work in progress), March 2018.

   [I-D.peterson-stir-messaging]
              Peterson, J. and C. Wendt, "Messaging Use Cases for STIR",
              draft-peterson-stir-messaging-00 (work in progress),
              November 2020.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.

   [RFC3262]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Reliability of
              Provisional Responses in Session Initiation Protocol
              (SIP)", RFC 3262, DOI 10.17487/RFC3262, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3262>.

   [RFC3311]  Rosenberg, J., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
              UPDATE Method", RFC 3311, DOI 10.17487/RFC3311, October
              2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3311>.

   [RFC3325]  Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
              Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
              Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3325, November 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3325>.

   [RFC4474]  Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
              Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4474, August 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4474>.

   [RFC4916]  Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4916, DOI 10.17487/RFC4916, June
              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4916>.

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   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

   [RFC7340]  Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
              Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
              RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.

   [RFC8224]  Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
              "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jon Peterson
   Neustar, Inc.
   1800 Sutter St Suite 570
   Concord, CA  94520
   US

   Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar

   Chris Wendt
   Comcast
   One Comcast Center
   Philadelphia, PA  19103
   USA

   Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net

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