Cryptographic Security Characteristics of 802.11 Wireless LAN Access Systems
draft-orr-wlan-security-architectures-00

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Network Working Group                                             S. Orr
Internet-Draft                                                 A. Grieco
Intended status: Informational                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: April 18, 2013                                       D. Harkins
                                                          Aruba Networks
                                                        October 15, 2012

  Cryptographic Security Characteristics of 802.11 Wireless LAN Access
                                Systems
                draft-orr-wlan-security-architectures-00

Abstract

   This note identifies all of the places that cryptography is used in
   Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) architectures, to simplify the
   task of selecting the protocols, algorithms, and key sizes needed to
   achieve a consistent security level across the entire architecture.

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2013.

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   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions Used In This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Architectures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Standalone WLAS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3.  Centralized WLAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.4.  Architectural Commonality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  WTP to Access Controller Service Cryptographic Security  . . .  7
   5.  Client to AAA Service Cryptographic Security . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.1.  EAP Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.2.  Pre Shared Key, or Password, Method  . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Authenticator to AAA Service Cryptographic Security  . . . . .  9
   7.  Wireless Link Layer Cryptographic Security . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Cryptographic profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.1.  DTLS and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.2.  X.509 Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.3.  Link Layer Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     8.4.  AAA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     8.5.  IPSEC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     9.1.  Algorithm Choices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   10. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

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1.  Introduction

   Wireless LAN Access Systems (WLAS) are complex systems that involve
   interworking many technology components defined by various standards
   bodies.  To ensure that the entire system is secure against
   sophisticated, persistent, and well-funded adversaries, each
   component MUST use strong cryptography.  However, the architectural-
   level cryptographic capabilities and relationships between the