BGP Security Analysis
draft-murphy-bgp-secr-04

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2001-11-30
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-murphy-bgp-secr-04.txt

Abstract

BGP, along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, is designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms in BGP to protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior.

Authors

Sandra Murphy (sandy@tislabs.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)