Transport Layer Security (TLS) Secure Renegotiation
draft-mrex-tls-secure-renegotiation-04

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2009-12-15
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mrex-tls-secure-renegotiation-04.txt

Abstract

A protocol design flaw in the TLS renegotiation handshake leaves all currently implemented protocol version of TLS (SSLv3 to TLSv1.2) vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks where the attacker can establish a TLS session with a server, send crafted application data of his choice to the server and then proxy an unsuspecting client's TLS handshake into the TLS renegotiation handshake of the server. Many applications on top of TLS see the data injected by the attacker and the data sent by the client as a single data stream and assume that an authentication during the TLS renegotiation handshake or contained in the client's application data applies to the entire data stream received through the TLS-protected communication channel. This document describes a protocol change for all protocol versions of TLS and SSLv3 that will fix this vulnerability for all communication between updated TLS clients and updated TLS servers.

Authors

Martin Rex (mrex@sap.com)
Stefan Santesson (sts@aaa-sec.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)