New Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP
draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-09
HIP R. Moskowitz
Internet-Draft HTT Consulting
Updates: 7401, 7402 (if approved) S. Card
Intended status: Standards Track A. Wiethuechter
Expires: 1 August 2021 AX Enterprize
28 January 2021
New Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP
draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-09
Abstract
This document provides new cryptographic algorithms to be used with
HIP. The Edwards Elliptic Curve and the Keccak sponge functions are
the main focus. The HIP parameters and processing instructions
impacted by these algorithms are defined.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. HIP Parameter values for new Cryptographic Functions . . . . 4
3.1. Elliptic Curves for Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. DIFFIE_HELLMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Edward Digital Signature Algorithm for HITs . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. HOST_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. HIT_SUITE_LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Hashing in HIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Hashing with the Sponge Functions . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.2. RHASH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.3. HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. HIP Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4.1. HIP_CIPHER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5. ESP Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5.1. ESP_TRANSFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Generating a HIT from an HI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. HIP KEYMAT Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. The Keccak KEYMAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. The Xoodyak KEYMAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Pseudorandom Function (PRF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Keymat vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. KMAC Security as a KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
This document adds new cryptographic algorithms for HIPv2 [RFC7401]
and [RFC7402]. This includes:
* New elliptic curves for ECDH.
* The Edwards Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)
used in Host Identities (HI) and for Base Exchange (BEX)
signatures.
* Hashes used in Host Identity Tag (HIT) generation, and wherever
else hashes are needed.
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* Keyed hashes used for KEYMAT generation and packet MACing
operations.
* AEAD and stream ciphers to use in HIP and HIP enabled secure
communication protocols.
The hashes and encryption are all built on the Keccak [Keccak] sponge
function and the Xoodyak [Xoodyak] lightweight scheme.
These additions reflect selection of advances in the field of
cryptography that would best benefit HIP, particularly in constrained
devices and communications.
Ed Note: The Xoodyak function calls should be considered the 1st best
effort. There are a few areas open for discussion, like which of the
3 choices for adding in the nonce to the AEAD mode and when to use
counter and Id. Also there may be copy errors from the source
specification, nicer function calls, better acronyms.
2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Definitions
cSHAKE (The customizable SHAKE function):
Extends the SHAKE scheme to allow users to customize their use of
the function.
DEC function (Doubly-Extendable Cryptographic function):
An extendable output function (XOF) that accepts sequences of
strings as input and that supports incremental queries
efficiently.
DECK function (Doubly-Extendable Cryptographic Keyed function):
A keyed function that takes a sequence of input strings and
returns a pseudorandom string of arbitrary length and that can be
computed incrementally.
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Keccak:
The family of all sponge functions with a KECCAK-f permutation as
the underlying function and multi-rate padding as the padding
rule.
KMAC (KECCAK Message Authentication Code):
A pseduo random function (PRF) and keyed hash function based on
KECCAK.
SHAKE (Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK):
A secure hash that allows for an arbitrary output length.
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are instances of XOFs. SHAKE is shorthand
for SHAKE128.
PRF (Pseudorandom Function):
A function that takes as input a key and that it is hard to
distinguish from a random oracle by an adversary that does not
know the key.
XHASH (Xoodyak Hash Algorithm):
A secure hash, based on Xoodyak, that allows for an arbitrary
output length. XHASH is an instance of XOF.
XMAC (Xoodyak Message Authentication Code):
A keyed hash function, based on Xoodyak, that allows for an
arbitrary output length.
XOF (eXtendable-Output Function):
A function on bit strings (also called messages) in which the
output can be extended to any desired length.
3. HIP Parameter values for new Cryptographic Functions
HIP parameters carry information that is necessary for establishing
and maintaining a HIP association. For example, the device's public
keys as well as the signaling for negotiating ciphers and payload
handling are encapsulated in HIP parameters. Additional information,
meaningful for end hosts or middleboxes, may also be included in HIP
parameters. The specification of the HIP parameters and their
mapping to HIP packets and packet types is flexible to allow HIP
extensions to define new parameters and new protocol behavior.
3.1. Elliptic Curves for Diffie-Hellman
Elliptic curves Curve25519 and Curve448 [RFC7748] are specified here
for use in the HIP Diffie-Hellman exchange.
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Curve25519 and Curve448 are already defined in Section 5.2.1 of
[hip-dex], using the HIP-DEX CKDF. Here they are defined for using
the new KMAC [NIST.SP.800-185] or XMAC [Xoodyak] derived KDF in
Section 5.
3.1.1. DIFFIE_HELLMAN
The DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter may be included in selected HIP packets
based on the DH Group ID selected. The DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter is
defined in Section 5.2.7 of [RFC7401].
The following Elliptic Curves are defined here:
Group KDF Value
Curve25519 [RFC7748] KMAC 13
Curve448 [RFC7748] KMAC 14
A new KDF for KEYMAT, Section 6.5 of [RFC7401] using Keccak or
Xoodyak is defined in Section 5.
3.2. Edward Digital Signature Algorithm for HITs
This section is extracted from Appendix D of [drip-rid]. It may
later be pulled and only maintained there.
Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032] are
specified here for use as Host Identities (HIs) per HIPv2 [RFC7401].
Further the HIT_SUITE_LIST is specified as used in [RFC7343].
3.2.1. HOST_ID
The HOST_ID parameter specifies the public key algorithm, and for
elliptic curves, a name. The HOST_ID parameter is defined in
Section 5.2.19 of [RFC7401].
Algorithm
profiles Values
EdDSA 13 [RFC8032]
For hosts that implement EdDSA as the algorithm, the following ECC
curves are available:
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Algorithm Curve Values
EdDSA RESERVED 0
EdDSA EdDSA25519 1 [RFC8032]
EdDSA EdDSA25519ph 2 [RFC8032]
EdDSA EdDSA448 3 [RFC8032]
EdDSA EdDSA448ph 4 [RFC8032]
3.2.2. HIT_SUITE_LIST
The HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter contains a list of the supported HIT
suite IDs of the Responder. Based on the HIT_SUITE_LIST, the
Initiator can determine which source HIT Suite IDs are supported by
the Responder. The HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter is defined in
Section 5.2.10 of [RFC7401].
The following HIT Suite ID is defined, and the relationship between
the four-bit ID value used in the OGA ID field and the eight-bit
encoding within the HIT_SUITE_LIST ID field is clarified:
HIT Suite Four-bit ID Eight-bit encoding
RESERVED 0 0x00
EdDSA/cSHAKE128 5 0x50
EdDSA/XHASH 6 0x60
The following table provides more detail on the above HIT Suite
combinations. The input for each generation algorithm is the
encoding of the HI as defined herein.
The output of cSHAKE128 and XHASH are variable per the needs of a
specific ORCHID construction. It is at most 96 bits long and is
directly used in the ORCHID (without truncation).
+=======+===========+=========+===========+====================+
| Index | Hash | HMAC | Signature | Description |
| | function | | algorithm | |
| | | | family | |
+=======+===========+=========+===========+====================+
| 5 | cSHAKE128 | KMAC128 | EdDSA | EdDSA HI hashed |
| | | | | with cSHAKE128, |
| | | | | output is variable |
+-------+-----------+---------+-----------+--------------------+
| 6 | XHASH | XMAC | EdDSA | EdDSA HI hashed |
| | | | | with XMAC, output |
| | | | | is variable |
+-------+-----------+---------+-----------+--------------------+
Table 1: HIT Suites
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3.3. Hashing in HIP
Hashing is used in HIP for HIT generation and keyed hashes of HIP
payloads. The hash algorithm used is designated as part of the
HIT_SUITE_ID. The keyed hash function is the "common" such function
used in conjunction with the HIT hash.
3.3.1. Hashing with the Sponge Functions
The XOF function in SHA-3, Secure Hash Algorithm Keccak (SHAKE)
[NIST.FIPS.202] and the more recent Xoodyak [Xoodyak] algorithm are
called sponge functions. Sponge functions have a special feature in
which an arbitrary number of output bits are "squeezed" out of the
hashing state. This is a significant use change in that hash
truncation or multiple "runs" for enough bits are not used with
sponge functions.
3.3.1.1. cSHAKE, the customizable SHAKE function
The customizable SHAKE function (cSHAKE) in [NIST.SP.800-185] will be
used as a HIP hash. As a Keccak XOF, it does not use the truncation
operation that other hashes need. The invocation of cSHAKE specifies
the desired number of bits in the hash output. Further, cSHAKE has a
parameter 'S' as a customization bit string. This parameter will be
used for including hash specific customization like the ORCHID
Context Identifier in a standard fashion.
Hardware implementation of Keccak in VHDL is available from Keccak
[Keccak] team website.
3.3.1.2. The Xoodyak Hash
The Xoodyak [Xoodyak] sponge function is a candidate in the NIST
Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) Standardization process. Xoodyak has
been selected here for use in HIP from the LWC 2nd round candidates
as it was developed by the Keccak team, making it more directly in
line with Keccak.
Xoodyak has a hash function mode. More specifically, this hash mode
is an extendable output function (XOF).
As the Xoodyak specification [Xoodyak_Spec] does not provide high-
level function calls, rather a set of primitives to use to construct
the various modes, the appropriate primitive calls will be detailed
below. Xoodyak as a hash will be called here "XHASH".
To get a n-byte digest of some input x: XHASH(n, x), use the
following set of Xoodyak primitives:
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Cyclist(ε,ε,ε)
Absorb(x)
Squeeze(n)
Xoodyak can also naturally implement a DEC function and process a
sequence of strings. Here the output depends on the sequence as such
and not just on the concatenation of the different strings. To
compute a n-byte digest, XHASH(n, {x1, x2, x3}) the Xoodyak
primitives are:
Cyclist(ε,ε,ε)
Absorb(x1)
Absorb(x2)
Absorb(x3)
Squeeze(n)
The equivalent of the parameter 'S' in cSHAKE above can be
implemented as the last Absorb primitive call in the DEC function.
That is: XHASH(L, {S, N, X}) is equivalent to cSHAKE(X, L, N, S).
3.3.2. RHASH
RHASH is the general term used throughout [RFC7401] to refer to the
hash used for a specific HIT suite. For this addendum cSHAKE128 for
Keccak or XHASH for Xoodyak is used, even for HITs of EdDSA448.
Unless otherwise specified, L of cSHAKE128 or n of XHASH is 256,
resulting in a similar output to SHA256. Any truncation used for,
older, fixed output hashes is still used. This is to simplify code
integration. One exception to this is in Section 4.
3.3.3. HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC2
The HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC2 parameters in [RFC7401] use HMAC [RFC2104].
This performs two hashes on a string with a key for a keyed hash the
length of the underlying hash.
For both HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC2 use, the parameter S below is NULL. It
is included for complete function definition.
3.3.3.1. The Keccak Keyed MAC
Here, KMAC from NIST SP 800-185 [NIST.SP.800-185] is used. This is a
single pass using the underlying cSHAKE function. The function call
is:
KMAC128(Key, Input String, 256, S)
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3.3.3.2. The Xoodyak Keyed MAC
Here, XMAC is defined as the keyed hash function based on Xoodyak.
It is built with primitives from [Xoodyak_Spec] as a DEC function.
To get a n-byte keyed MAC of some input x: XMAC(Key, n, {x, S}).
Where n=256, use the following set of Xoodyak primitives:
Cyclist(Key,Id,ε)
Absorb(S) Only if S is non-null
Absorb(Input String)
Squeeze(32)
Id is "HIP_MAC" and "HIP_MAC2" respectively. Note since S is null in
this XMAC usage, the first Absorb call is not performed.
3.4. HIP Cipher
HIP encrypted parameters use the HIP_CIPHER, Section 5.2.8 of
[RFC7401]. The Xoodyak cipher, [Xoodyak], is recommended. Here
Xoodyak is used in encrypt only mode.
3.4.1. HIP_CIPHER
The HIP_CIPHER parameter value for Xoodyak is:
hip_cipher
Suite ID Value
Xoodyak 6 (Xoodyak)
The Xoodyak primitive calls for encrypt only are:
Cyclist(Key,Id,ε)
Absorb(IV)
C ← Encrypt(P)
Where Id is HIP parameter name (e.g. "ENCRYPTED").
IV is from the encrypted HIP parameter.
P is the plain-text per the specific HIP encrypted parameter.
C is the ciphertext.
3.5. ESP Transform
The ESP_TRANSFORM parameter is used during ESP SA establishment,
Section 5.1.2 of [RFC7402]. The Xoodyak cipher, [Xoodyak], is
recommended. Here Xoodyak is used in AEAD mode.
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Further, it is recommended to use Implicit IV ESP [RFC8750] to match
its lightweight over-the-air format with the lightweight Xoodyak AEAD
cipher.
3.5.1. ESP_TRANSFORM
The ESP_TRANSFORM Suite IDs for Xoodyak are:
hip_cipher
Suite ID Value
Xoodyak-96 16 (Xoodyak)
Xoodyak 17 (Xoodyak)
Implicit IV 18 [8750]
The Implicit IV Suite ID is unique in that it is an AND condition
with ciphers that can use it. That is AES-GCM and Xoodyak can both
use 'regular' ESP [RFC4303] or [RFC8750].
The Xoodyak primitive calls for AEAD encrypt are:
Cyclist(Key,Id,ε)
Absorb(IV)
Absorb(A)
C ← Encrypt(P)
T ← Squeeze(t)
Where Id is "ESP_TRANSFORM". The IV is either a 32 bit ESP IV per
[RFC4303] or the ESP Seq Number per[RFC8750]. P is the plain-text
and A is the associated data. t is either 12 or 16. T is the ESP
ICV of length t.
4. Generating a HIT from an HI
The EdDSA/cSHAKE based HITs require a new ORCHID generation method
than that described in section 3.2 of [RFC7401]. The XOF
functionality of cSHAKE produces an output of L bits. This replaces
the Encode_96 function in the ORCHID generation.
For identities that are EdDSA public keys, ORCHIDs will be generated
per the process defined in Appendix C.2.1 of [drip-rid].
5. HIP KEYMAT Generation
For either the Keccak or Xoodyak KEYMAT generation, the inputs are
consistent. The only practical difference is that cSHAKE allows for
128 or 256 bits of strength, whereas Xoodyak only provides 128 bits.
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L is the derived key bit length. Since 4 HIP keys are "drawn" from
this output, the length is 4 * HIP_key_size. Per ASIACRYPT 2017, pp.
606-637 [ASIACRYPT-2017] each of these derived keys will have the
same strength as the Diffie-Hellman shared secret.
S is the byte string 01001011 || 01000100 || 01000110, which
represents the sequence of characters "K", "D", and "F" in 8-bit
ASCII.
Salt and info are derived as defined in sec 6.5 of [RFC7401]. There
are special security considerations for IKM per [RFC7748].
5.1. The Keccak KEYMAT
The KMAC function provides a new, more efficient, key derivation
function over HKDF [RFC5869]. KMAC as a KDF is defined below.
The two HIs MUST be used in constructing IKM as follows:
IKM = Diffie-Hellman secret | sort(HI-I | HI-R)
The two HIs are separately DER encoded per [RFC7401]
The choice of KMAC128 or KMAC256 is based on the strength of the
output key material. For 256 bits of strength equivalent to HMAC-
SHA256, use KMAC256. Per [NIST.SP.800-56Cr1], Section 4.1, Option 3:
OKM = KMAC[128|256](salt | info, IKM, L, S)
5.2. The Xoodyak KEYMAT
Here, XMAC from Section 3.3.3.2 is used. The DEC function XMAC("",
L, {DH, sort(HI-I, HI-R), info, Salt, S}) primitives are:
Cyclist(ε, ε, ε)
Absorb(S)
Absorb(salt)
Absorb(info)
Absorb(max(HI-I , HI-R))
Absorb(min(HI-I , HI-R))
Absorb(Diffie-Hellman secret)
Squeeze(L) Where L is bytes
Ed Note: Need to check that all above are well defined bytestrings
per 7401. I think they are.
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6. Pseudorandom Function (PRF)
Appendix B of NIST SP 800-185 [NIST.SP.800-185] defines how to use
SHAKE, cSHAKE, or KMAC as a PRF.
For Xoodyak, XMAC from Section 3.3.3.2 is used in the same manner as
KMAC above.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA will need to make the following changes to the "Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) Parameters" registries:
Diffie Hellman:
This document defines the new Curve25519 and Curve448 for the
Diffie-Hellman exchange (see Section 3.1.1).
Host ID:
This document defines the new EdDSA Host ID (see Section 3.2.1).
HIT Suite ID:
This document defines the new HIT Suite of EdDSA/cSHAKE and EdDSA/
XHASH (see Section 3.2.2).
HIP Cipher:
This document defines the new Xoodyak cipher for HIP encrypted
parameters (see Section 3.4.1).
ESP Transform:
This document defines the new Xoodyak cipher and use of [RFC8750]
for the ESP Transform parameter (see Section 3.5).
8. Security Considerations
8.1. Keymat vulnerabilities
[RFC7748] warns about using Curve25519 and Curve448 in Diffie-Hellman
for key derivation:
Designers using these curves should be aware that for each public
key, there are several publicly computable public keys that are
equivalent to it, i.e., they produce the same shared secrets. Thus
using a public key as an identifier and knowledge of a shared secret
as proof of ownership (without including the public keys in the key
derivation) might lead to subtle vulnerabilities.
Thus the two Host IDs are included with the Diffie-Hellman secret in
the KEYMAT generation.
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8.2. KMAC Security as a KDF
Section 4.1 of NIST SP 800-185 [NIST.SP.800-185] states:
"The KECCAK Message Authentication Code (KMAC) algorithm is a PRF and
keyed hash function based on KECCAK . It provides variable-length
output"
That is, the output of KMAC is indistinguishable from a random
string, regardless of the length of the output. As such, the output
of KMAC can be divided into multiple substrings, each with the
strength of the function (KMAC128 or KMAC256) and provided that a
long enough key is used, as discussed in Sec. 8.4.1 of SP 800-185.
For example KMAC128(K, X, 512, S), where K is at least 128 bits, can
produce 4 128 bit keys each with a strength of 128 bits. That is a
single sponge operation is replacing perhaps 5 HMAC-SHA256 operations
(each 2 SHA256 operations) in HKDF.
9. Acknowledgments
Quynh Dang of NIST gave considerable guidance on using Keccak and the
NIST supporting documents. Joan Deamen of the Keccak team was
especially helpful in many aspects of using Keccak and Xoodyak,
particularly with the KEYMAT section and the strength of the derived
keys.
NIST is entering round 3 (final) of its Lightweight Crypto
Competition with anticipated selection the end of 2021 or early in
2022. Events in this process will impact selections in this
document.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[NIST.FIPS.202]
Dworkin, M., "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and
Extendable-Output Functions", National Institute of
Standards and Technology report,
DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.202, July 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.202>.
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[NIST.SP.800-185]
Kelsey, J., Change, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 derived
functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash",
National Institute of Standards and Technology report,
DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-185, December 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-185>.
[NIST.SP.800-56Cr1]
Barker, E., Chen, L., and R. Davis, "Recommendation for
key-derivation methods in key-establishment schemes",
National Institute of Standards and Technology report,
DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-56cr1, April 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-56cr1>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[RFC7402] Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R., and J. Melen, "Using the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format with
the Host Identity Protocol (HIP)", RFC 7402,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7402, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7402>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[Xoodyak] Daemen, J., Hoffert, S., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G., and
R. Van Keer, "The Xoodyak Cipher and Hash",
<https://keccak.team/xoodyak.html>.
[Xoodyak_Spec]
Daemen, J., Hoffert, S., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G., and
R. Van Keer, "Xoodoo cookbook", 2019,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/767.pdf>.
10.2. Informative References
[ASIACRYPT-2017]
Daemen, J., Mennink, B., and G. Van Assche, "Full-State
Keyed Duplex with Built-In Multi-user Support",
Moskowitz, et al. Expires 1 August 2021 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2021
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_21, Advances in Cryptology -
ASIACRYPT 2017 pp. 606-637, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_21>.
[drip-rid] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-rid-06, 31 December 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-rid-06>.
[hip-dex] Moskowitz, R., Hummen, R., and M. Komu, "HIP Diet EXchange
(DEX)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-hip-
dex-22, 14 December 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-hip-dex-22>.
[Keccak] Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G., and
R. Van Keer, "The Keccak Function",
<https://keccak.team/index.html>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC7343] Laganier, J. and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay
Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers Version 2
(ORCHIDv2)", RFC 7343, DOI 10.17487/RFC7343, September
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7343>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires 1 August 2021 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2021
[RFC8750] Migault, D., Guggemos, T., and Y. Nir, "Implicit
Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 8750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8750, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8750>.
Authors' Addresses
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Stuart W. Card
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Moskowitz, et al. Expires 1 August 2021 [Page 16]