Controlling Actuators with CoAP

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors John Preuß Mattsson  , John Fornehed  , Göran Selander  , Francesca Palombini  , Christian Amsüss 
Last updated 2019-03-25 (latest revision 2018-09-17)
Replaced by draft-mattsson-core-coap-attacks
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control actuators are essential in a world of connected and networking things interacting with the physical world. In this memo we show that just using COAP with a security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCORE is not enough. We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker can do, and discusses tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the attacks. While this document is focused on actuators, some of the attacks apply equally well to sensors.


John Preuß Mattsson (
John Fornehed (
Göran Selander (
Francesca Palombini (
Christian Amsüss (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)