Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness
draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (cfrg RG)
Last updated 2020-09-12 (latest revision 2020-03-11)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02.txt

Abstract

Deterministic elliptic-curve signatures such as deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA have gained popularity over randomized ECDSA as their security do not depend on a source of high-quality randomness. Recent research has however found that implementations of these signature algorithms may be vulnerable to certain side-channel and fault injection attacks due to their determinism. One countermeasure to such attacks is to re-add randomness to the otherwise deterministic calculation of the per-message secret number. This document updates RFC 6979 and RFC 8032 to recommend constructions with additional randomness for deployments where side-channel attacks and fault injection attacks are a concern.

Authors

John Preuß Mattsson (john.mattsson@ericsson.com)
Erik Thormarker (erik.thormarker@ericsson.com)
Sini Ruohomaa (sini.ruohomaa@ericsson.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)