Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness
draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (cfrg RG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | John Preuß Mattsson , Erik Thormarker , Sini Ruohomaa | ||
| Last updated | 2020-09-12 (latest revision 2020-03-11) | ||
| Stream | IRTF | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | IRTF state | Candidate RG Document | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02.txt
Abstract
Deterministic elliptic-curve signatures such as deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA have gained popularity over randomized ECDSA as their security do not depend on a source of high-quality randomness. Recent research has however found that implementations of these signature algorithms may be vulnerable to certain side-channel and fault injection attacks due to their determinism. One countermeasure to such attacks is to re-add randomness to the otherwise deterministic calculation of the per-message secret number. This document updates RFC 6979 and RFC 8032 to recommend constructions with additional randomness for deployments where side-channel attacks and fault injection attacks are a concern.
Authors
John Preuß Mattsson
(john.mattsson@ericsson.com)
Erik Thormarker
(erik.thormarker@ericsson.com)
Sini Ruohomaa
(sini.ruohomaa@ericsson.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)