Ephemeral keying for ABFAB
draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Linus Nordberg , Josh Howlett | ||
| Last updated | 2014-09-07 (Latest revision 2014-03-06) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes how EAP-GSS provides forward secrecy by encrypting each session in an ephemeral key generated in the initial state of the context establishment. This Diffie-Hellman key is shared by the initiator (EAP peer) and acceptor (EAP authenticator). The goal is to stop a passive attacker with access to the traffic between an ABFAB user and the service she uses (Relying Party), from getting access to key material and information linkable to the user or from being able to fingerprint the user.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)