Problem Statement and Use Cases of Trustworthiness-based Routing
draft-lin-opsec-trustroute-problem-statement-04

Network Working Group                                             T. Lin
Internet-Draft                                                     H. Li
Intended status: Informational                      New H3C Technologies
Expires: 27 July 2024                                             X. Shi
                                                                  X. Yin
                                                     Tsinghua University
                                                                 W. Chen
                                               Capital Normal University
                                                                 M. Chen
                                                    New H3C Technologies
                                                         24 January 2024

    Problem Statement and Use Cases of Trustworthiness-based Routing
            draft-lin-opsec-trustroute-problem-statement-04

Abstract

   Currently, network operators are trying to provide fine-granularity
   Service Level Agreement (SLA) guarantee to achieve better Quality of
   Experience (QoE) for end users and engage customers, such as ultra-
   low latency and high reliability service.  However, with increasing
   security threats, differentiated QoE services are insufficient, the
   demands for more differentiated security service are emerging.

   This document explores the requirements for differentiated security
   services and identifies the scenarios for network operators.  To
   provide differentiated security services, possible trustworthiness-
   based routing solution is discussed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 July 2024.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Use Case 1: Customers Require Security Service  . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Use Case 2: Providers Require Secure defense  . . . . . .   4
   4.  Solution Discussions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   For the traditional best effort service provided by IP networks,
   routing is optimized for a single arbitrary metric, e.g.  IGP cost in
   OSPF and IS-IS.  To support differentiated services, additional
   routing metrics are used, such as bandwidth, jitter and delay.
   However, security metrics and methods of corresponding treatment are
   seldom taken into considerations.

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   Customers may request the network to transfer their traffic flows
   with different security guarantees.  Or the provider may classify
   traffic flows into different classes by security-related features.
   These traffic flows of different security service classes are
   expected to be transmitted by different sets of nodes, because the
   trustworthiness of different nodes is possibly not the same.  The
   traffic flows which have higher security requests are expected to be
   transmitted by the nodes with higher trustworthiness.
   Trustworthiness is used as a security metric to evaluate the
   qualification of network elements for differentiated security
   services.

   This document describes the requirements and use cases of
   trustworthiness-based routing.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Trustworthiness: The attribute of a network element used to evaluate
   its qualification for security services.

3.  Problem Statement

   With more and more security incidents occur repeatedly, security
   continues to be an increasingly important common concern for network
   users and network operators.  Good connectivity is insufficient,
   higher and higher requirements for network security are emerging.
   From different perspectives of operators and end users, there will be
   different needs.  On the one hand, end users require network
   operators to ensure network security, on the other hand, network
   operators need to prevent the intrusion and attack from malicious
   users.  Two following use cases are described:

3.1.  Use Case 1: Customers Require Security Service

   From the perspective of end users, different users may have different
   security level requirements.  Some users are sensitive to security
   and would like the network path given by the operator to have higher
   security.  The network path is composed by many network forwarding
   devices, and the trustworthiness of each device affects the
   trustworthiness of the whole path.  These network forwarding devices
   come from different vendors, have different security capabilities,
   and may have different security status at a certain time.  Therefore,

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   operators need to evaluate the trustworthiness of network forwarding
   devices, and choose different security level paths for users with
   different security requirements.

                   +--------+    ##########    +--------+
   Customer 1 --+--| node 1 |----# node 2 #----| node 3 |--- App Server
                |  +--------+    ##########    +--------+
   Customer 2 --+       |             |             |
                        |             |             |
                   +--------+    +--------+    +--------+
                   | node 4 |----| node 5 |----| node 6 |
                   +--------+    +--------+    +--------+

   In the above network, node 1, node 3, node 4, node 5 and node 6 have
   advanced anti-hacker modules, but node 2 does not have such module.
   Two customers at node 1 both need to visit the application server at
   node 3.  Customer 1 requests normal service.  Customer 2 needs to
   transmit confidential information and requests the network to provide
   secure service.

   For the packets from Customer 1, the shortest path <node 1, node 2,
   node 3> is used.  For the packets from Customer 2, the path only
   contains the nodes with advanced anti-hacker modules, which can
   reduce the risk of manipulation or disclosure.  Therefore, node 2 is
   excluded and the best path is <node 1, node 4, node 5, node 6, node
   3>.

3.2.  Use Case 2: Providers Require Secure defense

   For network operators, different users have different levels of
   trustworthiness.  Most users are normal and harmless, but there are
   also a small number of users suspected of threatening network
   security.  Therefore, for users with threats, operators may consider
   choosing paths with different security levels.

   Traffic Flow 1
   <Src A, Dest B>-+   +--------+    ##########    +--------+  +- Addr B
                   +-->| node 1 |----# node 2 #----| node 3 |--+
   Traffic Flow 2 -+   +--------+    ##########    +--------+  +- Addr D
   <Src C, Dest D>          |             |             |
                            |             |             |
                       +--------+    +--------+    +--------+
                       | node 4 |----| node 5 |----| node 6 |
                       +--------+    +--------+    +--------+

   In the above network, node 1, node 3, node 4, node 5 and node 6 have
   tracing modules which can record attacking packets, but node 2 does
   not have such module.  Two traffic flows enter the network at node 1

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   and need to be transmitted to node 3.  A and B are authenticated
   addresses, but C or D is not.  The traffic flow which comes from an
   authenticated address and goes to another authenticated address is
   classified by the provider as a credible flow.  Therefore, Traffic
   Flow 1 is classified as credible, and Traffic Flow 2 is classified as
   incredible.  For Traffic Flow 1, the shortest path <node 1, node 2,
   node 3> is used.  For Traffic Flow 2, the packets are transmitted by
   the nodes with tracing modules.  If there are attacking packets in
   Traffic Flow 2, these packets will be recorded and may be analyzed to
   trace the attacker.  Therefore, node 2 is excluded and the best path
   is <node 1, node 4, node 5, node 6, node 3>.

4.  Solution Discussions

   To provide differentiated security services, specific traffic flows
   should be identified by the network.  For example, the IPv4 TOS
   field, the IPv6 Traffic Class field, or the 5-tuple in the IP and
   transport protocol header of a packet can be used to determine its
   security service class.

   For the traditional best effort service, routing is optimized for a
   single arbitrary metric, e.g.  IGP cost in OSPF and IS-IS.  To
   support differentiated services, additional routing metrics are used,
   such as bandwidth, jitter and delay.

   Trustworthiness is an attribute of a network element which is used as
   a security metric to evaluate its qualification for differentiated
   security services.  Trustworthiness attributes may be taken into
   consideration of device capability, administration authority,
   security protocol, etc.

   When computing paths for differentiated security services,
   trustworthiness attributes are added into the constraints.  Then
   particular traffic flows are steered into these paths.  There are
   several existing technologies that can steer traffic over a path that
   is computed using different constraints instead of the shortest IGP
   path.  They may be extended to implement trustworthiness-based
   routing.  For example, Segment Routing Policy, as defined in
   [RFC9256], enables the instantiation of an ordered list of segments
   on a node for implementing a source routing policy with a specific
   intent for traffic steering from that node.  For another example,
   Flexible Algorithm, as defined in [RFC9350], provides a mechanism for
   IGP to compute constraint-based paths under a combination of
   calculation-type, metric-type, and constraints.  Other technologies,
   such as multi-topology routing, may also be candidates.  Because of
   the flexibility of these technologies, they can adapt to different
   perspectives and needs from end users and network operators.

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5.  Security Considerations

   TBD.

6.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA action is required so far.

7.  Contributors

   In addition to the authors listed on the front page, the following
   co-authors have also contributed to this document:

   Xiangqing Chang
   New H3C Technologies

   Email: chang.xiangqing@h3c.com

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC9256]  Filsfils, C., Talaulikar, K., Ed., Voyer, D., Bogdanov,
              A., and P. Mattes, "Segment Routing Policy Architecture",
              RFC 9256, DOI 10.17487/RFC9256, July 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9256>.

   [RFC9350]  Psenak, P., Ed., Hegde, S., Filsfils, C., Talaulikar, K.,
              and A. Gulko, "IGP Flexible Algorithm", RFC 9350,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9350, February 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9350>.

Authors' Addresses

   Tao Lin
   New H3C Technologies
   Email: lintao@h3c.com

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   Hao Li
   New H3C Technologies
   Email: lihao@h3c.com

   Xingang Shi
   Tsinghua University
   Email: shixg@cernet.edu.cn

   Xia Yin
   Tsinghua University
   Email: yxia@tsinghua.edu.cn

   Wenlong Chen
   Capital Normal University
   Email: chenwenlong@cnu.edu.cn

   Mengxiao Chen
   New H3C Technologies
   Email: chen.mengxiao@h3c.com

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