Soure Address Validation Architecture (SAVA): Intra-domain Use Cases

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Dan Li  , Jianping Wu  , Yunan Gu  , Lancheng Qin  , Tao Lin 
Last updated 2021-01-14 (latest revision 2020-07-13)
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Expired & archived
pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


This document identifies scenarios where existing approaches for detection and mitigation of source address spoofing don't perform perfectly. Either Ingress ACL filtering [RFC3704], unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) [RFC3704], feasible path uRPF [RFC 3704], or Enhanced Feasible-Path uRPF [RFC8704] has limitations regarding eihter automated implemetation objective or detection accuracy objective (0% false positive and 0% false negative). This document identifies two such scenarios and provides solution discussions.


Dan Li (
Jianping Wu (
Yunan Gu (
Lancheng Qin (
Tao Lin (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)