%% You should probably cite rfc6962 instead of this I-D.
@techreport{laurie-pki-sunlight-03,
    number =    {draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-03},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-laurie-pki-sunlight/03/},
    author =    {Ben Laurie and Adam Langley and Emilia Kasper},
    title =     {{Certificate Transparency}},
    pagetotal = 25,
    year =      2012,
    month =     nov,
    day =       29,
    abstract =  {The aim of Certificate Transparency is to have every public end- entity and intermediate TLS certificate issued by a known Certificate Authority recorded in one or more certificate logs. In order to detect mis-issuance of certificates, all logs are publicly auditable. In particular, domain owners or their agents will be able to monitor logs for certificates issued on their own domain. To protect clients from unlogged mis-issued certificates, logs sign all recorded certificates, and clients can choose not to trust certificates that are not accompanied by an appropriate log signature. For privacy and performance reasons log signatures are embedded in the TLS handshake via the TLS authorization extension {[}RFC5878{]}, in a stapled {[}RFC6066{]} OCSP extension {[}RFC2560{]}, or in the certificate itself via an X.509v3 certificate extension {[}RFC5280{]}. To ensure a globally consistent view of the log, logs also provide a global signature over the entire log. Any inconsistency of logs can be detected through cross-checks on the global signature. Consistency between any pair of global signatures, corresponding to snapshots of the log at different times, can be efficiently shown. Logs are only expected to certify that they have seen a certificate, and thus we do not specify any revocation mechanism for log signatures in this document. Logs are append-only, and log signatures will be valid indefinitely.},
}