NTS4PTP - Key Management System for the Precision Time Protocol Based on the Network Time Security Protocol
draft-langer-ntp-nts-for-ptp-07
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Martin Langer , Rainer Bermbach | ||
| Last updated | 2024-02-16 | ||
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draft-langer-ntp-nts-for-ptp-07
Network Time Protocol M. Langer
Internet-Draft PTB
Intended status: Standards Track R. Bermbach
Expires: 21 August 2024 Ostfalia University
18 February 2024
NTS4PTP - Key Management System for the Precision Time Protocol Based on
the Network Time Security Protocol
draft-langer-ntp-nts-for-ptp-07
Abstract
This document specifies an automatic key management service for the
integrated security mechanism (prong A) of IEEE Std 1588™-2019
(PTPv2.1) described there in Annex P. This key management follows
the immediate security processing approach of prong A and extends the
NTS Key Establishment protocol defined in IETF RFC 8915 for securing
NTPv4. The resulting NTS for PTP (NTS4PTP) protocol provides a
security solution for all relevant PTP modes and operates completely
independent of NTPv4.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 August 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2. Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Key Management for PTP Using Network Time Security . . . . . 10
2.1. Setup of a TLS Communication Channel with the NTS-KE
Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2. Setup of a TLS Communication Channel with the NTS-TSR
Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3. NTS Message Exchange for Group-Based Mode . . . . . . . . 13
2.4. NTS Message Exchange for the Ticket-Based Mode . . . . . 15
2.5. General Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5.1. Key Update Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5.2. Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.3. Time Information of the NTS-KE server . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.4. Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.5. Upfront Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5.5.1. Security Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5.5.2. Key Lifetimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5.5.3. Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5.5.4. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5.5.5. Transparent Clocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5.5.6. Start-up considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3. NTS Messages for PTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1. PTP Key Request Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2. PTP Key Response Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3. PTP Registration Request Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4. PTP Registration Response Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5. PTP Registration Revoke Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6. PTP Heartbeat Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4. NTS Records for PTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1. Overview of the NTS Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2. Detailed Description of the NTS Records . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.1. AEAD Algorithm Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.2. Association Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.3. Current Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.4. End of Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2.5. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2.6. Heartbeat Timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.7. Next Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.8. NTS Next Protocol Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2.9. NTS Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
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4.2.10. PTP Time Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.11. Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2.12. Source PortIdentity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2.13. Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.14. Supported MAC Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2.15. Ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2.16. Ticket Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.17. Ticket Key ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2.18. Validity Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5. Additional Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.1. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2. AEAD Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3. SA/SPP Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6. New TICKET TLV for PTP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7. AUTHENTICATION TLV Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1. Introduction
In its Annex P the IEEE Std 1588-2019 ([IEEE1588-2019], Precision
Time Protocol version 2.1, PTPv2.1) defines a comprehensive PTP
security concept based on four prongs (A to D). Prong A incorporates
an immediate security processing approach and specifies in section
16.14 an extension to secure PTP messages by means of an
AUTHENTICATION TLV (AuthTLV) containing an Integrity Check Value
(ICV). For PTP instances to use the securing mechanism, a respective
key needs to be securely distributed among them. Annex P gives
requirements for such a key management system and mentions potential
candidates without further specification, but allows other solutions
as long as they fulfill those requirements.
Since many time server appliances support both, the Precision Time
Protocol (PTP) and the Network Time Protocol (NTP), it should be
easier for the manufacturer of these devices and the network operator
if PTP and NTP use a key management system based on the same
technology. The Network Time Security (NTS) protocol was specified
by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to protect the
integrity of NTP messages [RFC8915]. Its NTS Key Establishment sub-
protocol is secured by the Transport Layer Security (TLS 1.3, IETF
RFC 8446 [RFC8446]) mechanism. TLS is used to protect numerous
popular network protocols, so it is present in many networks.
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This document specifies an automatic key management service, NTS for
PTP, short NTS4PTP, for the immediate security processing in prong A.
The solution [Langer_et_al._2022], [Langer_et_al._2020] is based on
and expands the NTS Key Establishment protocol defined in IETF RFC
8915 [RFC8915] for securing NTP, but works completely independent of
NTP. In addition, this document introduces a new sub-protocol, the
NTS Time Server Registration (NTS-TSR) protocol, defining the
communication between PTP unicast servers (grantors) with the NTS-Key
Establishment server (NTS-KE server). (In NTS for NTP the
specification of the communication between NTS time server and NTS-KE
server has been left open.) Figure 1 depicts the participants of the
NTS4PTP protocol and the sub-protocols they use.
+-------------------------------+
| |
| NTS-KE Server |
| (Key Distribution Center) |
| |
+-------------------------------+
^ ^ ^ ^
| | | |
NTS-KE protocol NTS-TSR protocol
| | | |
+---------+ | +----------+ +-----+
| | | |
V V V V
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| PTP | | PTP | | PTP | | PTP |
| Master | | Slaves | | Requester | | Grantor |
|(multicast)| |(multicast)| | (unicast) | | (unicast) |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
Figure 1: Communication of PTP instances with the NTS-KE server
using the NTS- KE and NTS-TSR sub-protocols
For PTP multicast communication the PTP grandmaster as well as all
participating PTP slaves use the NTS-KE protocol to obtain the
security association (SA), i.e. key, lifetime etc. for a specific
group. PTPv2.1 does not know groups, but distinguishes between PTP
domains and profiles in order to separate different PTP networks from
each other. NTS4PTP derives groups from this information to assign
the logically separated PTP networks to their own SA (see first
paragraph of Section 2.3). For such PTP multicast or mixed
multicast/unicast communication, NTS4PTP defines the group-based
mode, short GrM.
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For securing a PTP unicast communication a potential grantor (time
server) uses the NTS-TSR protocol to register with the NTS-KE server.
Thereby, ticket key, lifetime etc. for encrypting a so-called ticket
are exchanged. A potential PTP unicast client (requester) then again
uses the NTS-KE protocol to obtain the security association, i.e.
unicast key, lifetime etc., as well as an encrypted ticket for the
unicast communication with the specific grantor from the NTS-KE
server. Thereafter, the ticket is transported from requester to
grantor attached to a PTP signaling message [IEEE1588-2019] to
establish a so-called unicast contract for delivering PTP time
information. The (ticket key-) encrypted ticket holds all necessary
information for the grantor to identify the requester as well as the
(unicast) key used to secure and check the PTP messages between them.
For this PTP unicast communication (also called negotiated PTP
unicast), NTS4PTP defines the ticket-based mode, short TiM.
Though the key management for PTP is based on the NTS Key
Establishment (NTS-KE) protocol for NTP, it works completely
independent of NTP. The key management system uses the procedures
described in IETF RFC 8915 for the NTS-KE protocol and expands it
with new NTS messages for PTP. It may be applied in a key
establishment server that already manages NTP but can also be
operated only handling key establishment for PTP. Even when the PTP
network is isolated from the Internet, a key establishment server can
be installed in that network providing the PTP instances with
necessary key and security parameters.
The NTS-KE server may often be implemented as a separate unit. It
also may be collocated with a PTP instance, e.g., the Grandmaster.
In the latter case communication between the NTS-KE server program
and the PTP instance program needs to be implemented in a secure way
if TLS communication (e.g., via local host or inter-process
communication) is not or cannot be used.
Using the expanded NTS Key Establishment protocol and the newly
defined NTS Time Server Registration protocol for the NTS key
management for PTP, NTS4PTP provides the two principle approaches
specified in this document:
1. Group-based mode (GrM)
* very suitable for PTP multicast mode and mixed multicast/unicast
mode,
* definition of one or more security groups in the PTP network,
* secured 1:n communication
* suitable for unicast mode in small subgroups of very few
participants (Group-of-2, Go2, see Section 2.3) but poor scaling
and more administration work,
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2. Ticket-based mode (TiM)
* PTP unicast communication between a PTP requester and grantor,
* secured 1:1 communication
* PTP unicast only,
* very suitable for native PTP unicast mode because of good scaling.
For these modes, the NTS key management for PTP defines six new NTS
messages, see Figure 2. All messages are constructed from specific
records as described in (see Section 4):
* PTP Key Request message (use in GrM and TiM, see Section 3.1)
* PTP Key Response message (use in GrM and TiM, see Section 3.2)
* PTP Registration Request message (use in TiM, see Section 3.3)
* PTP Registration Response message (use in TiM, see Section 3.4)
* PTP Registration Revoke message (use in TiM, see Section 3.5)
* PTP Heartbeat message (use in TiM, see Section 3.6)
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| NTS4PTP |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
+-----------------------+ +------------------------------+
| NTS Key Establishment | | NTS Time Server Registration |
| (NTS-KE) Protocol | | (NTS-TSR) Protocol |
| (GrM & TiM) | | (TiM only) |
+----------+------------+ +--------------+---------------+
| |
+---------+ +-------------+
| |
| +------------------+ | +-------------------------+
|-->| PTP Key Request | +-->|PTP Registration Request |
| +------------------+ | +-------------------------+
| +------------------+ | +-------------------------+
+-->| PTP Key Response | |-->|PTP Registration Response|
: +------------------+ | +-------------------------+
: .................... | +-------------------------+
:...:*NTP Key Request* : |-->|PTP Registration Revoke |
: .................... | +-------------------------+
: .................... | +-------------------------+
:...:*NTP Key Response*: +-->|PTP Heartbeat +
.................... +-------------------------+
*messages for NTP described unnamed in [RFC8915]
Figure 2: The new messages of NTS4PTP
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1.1. Requirements Language
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”,
“SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and
“OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Terms and Abbreviations
+================+================================================+
| Term | Description |
+================+================================================+
| AEAD | Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data |
| | [RFC5116] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard, also: Rijndael |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Authentication | PTPv2.1 extension that provides authenticity |
| TLV (AuthTLV) | and integrity protection for PTP messages |
| | [IEEE1588-2019] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| ALPN | Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation |
| | [RFC7301] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| CMAC | Cipher-based Message Authentication Code, see |
| | also MAC |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Container, | Container records (short: container) comprise |
| Container | a set of NTS records in its record body that |
| records | serve a specific purpose, e.g., the Current |
| | Parameters container record. |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| CSPRNG | Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number |
| | Generator |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| DoS | Denial of Service |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| DDoS | Distributed Denial of Service |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| GMAC | Galois Message Authentication Code, see also |
| | MAC |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Go2 | Group-of-2, group-based unicast mode for small |
| | subgroups of very few participants |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| GP, Grace | Defines a period of time during which security |
| Period | parameters are accepted for a short time after |
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| | their lifetime has expired |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Group | NTS4PTP uses the term to describe PTP entities |
| | in a PTP multicast setup (e.g., master, slave, |
| | ...) that are authorized for a common security |
| | association to secure and verify PTP messages |
| | between them. |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| GrM | Group-based mode of NTS4PTP |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Group Key | Key used for authentication of PTP messages in |
| | group-based mode (GrM) |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| HMAC | Hash-based Message Authentication Code, see |
| | also MAC |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| ICV | Integrity Check Value, result of a |
| | cryptographic function used to detect |
| | unauthorized modifications of a PTP message, |
| | field in the Authentication TLV |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| IEEE 802.3 | Standards collection defining the physical |
| | layer and data link layer's media access |
| | control (MAC) of wired Ethernet, transport |
| | mode in PTP |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| IP, IPv4, IPv6 | Internet Protocol, network layer |
| | communications protocol, version 4 or version |
| | 6, part of the Internet protocol suite |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| IV | Initialization Vector, for example used with |
| | some MAC algorithms |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Lifetime | Specifies the validity period of the security |
| | parameters in seconds, which is counted down |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| MAC address | Medium Access Control address, unique |
| | identifier used as a network address within a |
| | network segment |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| MAC algorithm | Message Authentication Code, short piece of |
| | information used for authenticating and |
| | integrity-checking of a message |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| NTP | Network Time Protocol [RFC5905] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| NTS4PTP | NTS for PTP, variant of NTS to provide key |
| | management to PTP |
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+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| NTS | Network Time Security [RFC8915] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| NTS-KE | Network Time Security Key Establishment |
| | protocol |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| NTS-TSR | Network Time Security Time Server Registration |
| | protocol |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| OCSP | Online Certificate Status Protocol [RFC6960] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| PortIdentity | Specifies a specific PTP port |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| PTP | Precision Time Protocol [IEEE1588-2019] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Record, NTS | Special NTS type-length-value data structure |
| record | defining specific parameters; records build |
| | the respective NTS messages (differs from the |
| | TLV format of PTP) |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| SA | Security Association, description of the set |
| | of security parameters necessary to provide |
| | security services (e.g., authentication and |
| | integrity) between different entities sharing |
| | the same SA |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| SAD | Security Association Database |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| sdoId | Standards Development Organization Identifier, |
| | attribute for providing isolation of PTP |
| | Instances using different PTP profiles; in |
| | NTS4PTP it forms the group number in |
| | combination with the PTP domain number |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| SPP | Security Parameter Pointer |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol, part of the |
| | Internet protocol suite |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Ticket | NTS record which contains the encrypted |
| | security parameters that a grantor needs for a |
| | secured PTP unicast connection to the |
| | requester |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Ticket Key | Encryption key for the ticket, negotiated |
| | between NTS-KE server and grantor during the |
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| | registration process (different from unicast |
| | key) |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| TC, | Device in a PTP network with multiple PTP |
| Transparent | ports (switch) which measures its transit time |
| Clock | and provides it in a correction field of the |
| | PTP message |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Ticket TLV | TLV for carrying the ticket from requester to |
| | grantor within a PTP Signaling message for |
| | unicast request |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| TiM | Ticket-based mode for NTS4PTP |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| TLS | Transport Layer Security [RFC8446] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| TLV | Data set containing a type, length, and value |
| | field. Used in PTPv2.1 [IEEE1588-2019], |
| | compare to Authentication TLV and Ticket TLV |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| UDP | User Datagram Protocol, part of the Internet |
| | protocol suite |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Unicast Key | Used to secure the PTP messages between |
| | requester and grantor (different from ticket |
| | key) |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| UP, Update | During the update period new security |
| Period | parameters are available at the NTS-KE server, |
| | resp. grantors should re-register with the |
| | NTS-KE server |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| X.509 | Standard to form X.509 certificates |
| | [ITU-T_X.509] |
+----------------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Terms and abbreviations
2. Key Management for PTP Using Network Time Security
After the rundown of the different PTP instances and the sub-
protocols they use for communication with the NTS Key Establishment
(NTS-KE) server in the introduction, the following sections specify
the setup and use of TLS 1.3 to secure the communication with the
NTS-KE server, before the message exchange for both, the group-based
mode as well as the ticket-based mode is described in detail in
Section 2.3 and Section 2.4. More general topics as key update,
authentication and authorization etc. are covered in Section 2.5.
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2.1. Setup of a TLS Communication Channel with the NTS-KE Protocol
TLS is a layer five protocol that runs on TCP over IP. Therefore,
PTP implementations that support NTS-based key management need to
support TCP and IP (at least on a separate management port).
A PTP instance wanting to request a key using the NTS-KE protocol
defined in [RFC8915], first starts a TLS 1.3 connection to the NTS-KE
server.
The PTP instance connects to the NTS-KE server on the NTS TCP port
(port number 4460). Then both parties perform a TLS handshake to
establish a TLS 1.3 communication channel. The details of the TLS
handshake are specified in IETF RFC 8446 [RFC8446].
Implementations MUST conform to the rules stated in Section 3 “TLS
Profile for Network Time Security” of IETF RFC 8915 [RFC8915]:
_"Network Time Security makes use of TLS for NTS key
establishment._
_Since the NTS protocol is new as of this publication, no
backward-compatibility concerns exist to justify using obsolete,
insecure, or otherwise broken TLS features or versions._
_Implementations MUST conform with RFC 7525_ [RFC7525]_or with a
later revision of BCP 195._
_Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS versions earlier than
1.3_[RFC8446]_and MAY refuse to negotiate any TLS version that has
been superseded by a later supported version._
_Use of the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation
Extension_[RFC7301]_is integral to NTS, and support for it is
REQUIRED for interoperability ... "_
The client starts the TLS 1.3 handshake with a 'Client Hello' message
to the NTS-KE server containing the Application Layer Protocol
Negotiation (ALPN) [RFC7301] extension containing "ntske/1", which
refers to the NTS Key Establishment as the subsequent protocol. The
server responds with a "Server Hello" message sending its certificate
and feasible cipher suites as well as requesting the client's
certificate using a TLS 'CertificateRequest'. (The latter does not
conflict to the procedure in NTS for NTP.)
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Afterwards, the client authenticates the server using the root CA
certificate or by means of the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP, IETF RFC 6960) [RFC6960]. In the same way, the server
authenticates the client, if it had sent its certificate (which is
always necessary with NTS4PTP, in contrast to NTS for NTP.) After
the authentication procedure both, client and server agree on the
cipher suite and then establish a secured channel that ensures
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality for subsequent NTS
messages.
Once the TLS session is established, the PTP instance will ask for a
group key as well as the associated security parameters using the new
NTS message PTP Key Request (see Section 3.1). The NTS-KE server
will respond with a PTP Key Response message (see Section 3.2).
The NTS-KE server keeps the TLS session open until a short timeout
configured by the admin expires or the 'close notify' arrives. This
allows the PTP instance to make another NTS request without starting
a new TLS handshake. Finally, the NTS-KE server also sends a 'close
notify' to the PTP instance and closes the TLS channel.
With the key and other information received, the PTP instance can
take part in the secured PTP communication in the different modes of
operation.
After the reception of the first set of security parameters the PTP
instance may resume the TLS session according to IETF RFC 8446
[RFC8446], Section 4.6.1, allowing the PTP instance to skip the TLS
version and algorithm negotiations. If TLS Session Resumption
([RFC8446], Section 2.2) is used and supported by the NTS-KE server,
a suitable lifetime (max. 24 hrs) for the TLS session key must be
defined to not open the TLS connection for security threats. If the
NTS-KE server does not support TLS resumption, a full TLS handshake
must be performed.
As the TLS session provides authentication, but not authorization
additional means have to be used for the latter (see
Section 2.5.5.4).
2.2. Setup of a TLS Communication Channel with the NTS-TSR Protocol
As already mentioned and shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the new NTS
Time Server Registration protocol is used for registering a grantor
with the NTS-KE server (ticket-based mode only). Thereby, the new
messages PTP Registration Request message, PTP Registration Response
message, PTP Registration Revoke message and PTP Heartbeat message
are applied.
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The setup of the TLS channel in this ticket-based mode (TiM) is
handled in the same way as described above for the NTS-KE protocol,
see Section 2.1. The only difference lies in the ALPN used, which is
now "ntstsr/1".
Once the TLS session is established, the grantor will register with
the NTS-KE server using the NTS message PTP Registration Request (see
Section 3.3). The NTS-KE server will respond with a PTP Registration
Response message (see Section 3.4) containing ticket key, lifetime
etc.
When the PTP Registration Request message was responded with a PTP
Registration Response, the TLS session can be closed with a 'close
notify' TLS alert from the grantor followed by a 'close notify' of
the NTS-KE server.
Also using a TLS connection with the NTS-KE server a grantor can
cancel its registration with a PTP Registration Revoke message (see
Section 3.5). With a PTP Heartbeat message (see Section 3.6) the
grantor signals continuously its availability to the NTS-KE server.
2.3. NTS Message Exchange for Group-Based Mode
As described in Section 2.1, a PTP instance wanting to join a secured
PTP communication in the group-based modes contacts the NTS-KE server
starting the establishment of a secured TLS connection using the NTS-
KE protocol (ALPN: ntske/1). Then, the client continues with a PTP
Key Request message (see Section 3.1), asking for a specific group as
shown in Figure 3. The NTS-KE server identifies the respective sub-
protocol by means of the ALPN and analyses the contents of the Next
Protocol Negotiation record. If it is PTP the server examines
whether the client had sent its certificate and that it is valid.
Finally, it checks the authorization of the client. If everything is
ok the NTS-KE server generates the respective PTP Key Response
message (see Section 3.2) for the requesting client with all the
necessary data to join the group communication. Else, it contains a
respective error code if the PTP instance is not allowed to join the
group. This procedure is necessary for all parties, which are or
will be members of that PTP group including the Grandmaster and other
special participants, e.g., Transparent Clocks. As mentioned above,
this not only applies to multicast mode but also to mixed multicast/
unicast mode (former hybrid mode) where the explicit unicast
communication uses the multicast group key received from the NTS-KE
server. The group number for both modes is primarily generated by a
concatenation of the PTP domain number and the PTP profile identifier
(sdoId - Standards Development Organization Identifier), as described
in Section 4.2.2.
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Secured
PTP Network PTP Instance NTS-KE Server
| | TLS: |
| TLS |== PTP Key Request =>| Response contains:
| secured | | GroupID, security
| communication | TLS: | parameters, group
| |<= PTP Key Response =| key, validity
| | | period etc.
| Secured PTP: | |
|--- Announce -------->| ) |
| | ) |
| Secured PTP: | ) |
|-- Sync & Follow_Up ->| ) |
| | ) Secured |
| | ) PTP messages |
| Secured PTP: | ) using |
|<-- Delay_Req --------| ) group key |
| | ) |
| Secured PTP: | ) |
|--- Delay_Resp ------>| ) |
| | ) |
V V V
Legend: TLS: Authenticated & encrypted
=============> TLS communication
Secured PTP: Group key-authenticated
-------------> PTP communication
Figure 3: Message exchange for the group-based mode (GrM)
Additionally, besides multicast and mixed multicast/unicast mode, a
group of two (or few more) PTP instances can be configured,
practically implementing a special group-based unicast communication
mode, the group-of-2 (Go2) mode.
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This Go2 mode requires additional administration in advance defining
groups-of-2 and supplying them with an additional attribute in
addition to the group number mentioned for the other group-based
modes – the subGroup attribute in the Association Mode record (see
Section 4.2.2) of the PTP Key Request message. So, addressing for
Go2 is achieved by use of the group number derived from domain
number, sdoId, and the additional attribute subGroup. Communication
in that mode is performed using multicast addresses. If the latter
is undesirable, unicast addresses can be used but the particular IP
or MAC addresses of the communication partners need to be configured
upfront, too.
In spite of its specific name, Go2 allows more than two participants,
for example additional Transparent Clocks. All participants in that
subgroup need to be configured respectively. (To enable the NTS-KE
server to supply the subgroup members with the particular security
data the respective certificates may reflect permission to take part
in the subgroup. Else another authorization method is to be used.)
Having predefined the Go2s the key management for this mode of
operation follows the same procedure (see Figure 3) and uses the same
NTS messages as the other group-based modes. Both participants, the
Group-of-2 requester and the respective grantor need to have received
their security parameters including key etc. before secure PTP
communication can take place.
After the NTS Key Establishment messages for these group-based modes
have been exchanged, the secured PTP communication can take place
using the security association(s) communicated. The participants of
the PTP network are now able to use the group key to verify secured
PTP messages of the corresponding group or to generate secured PTP
messages itself. In order to do this, the PTP node applies the group
key together with the MAC algorithm to the PTP packet to generate the
ICV transported in the AUTHENTICATION TLV of the PTP message.
The key management for these modes works relatively simple and needs
only the above mentioned two NTS messages: PTP Key Request and PTP
Key Response.
2.4. NTS Message Exchange for the Ticket-Based Mode
The scaling problems of the group-based mode are solved by the
ticket-based mode (TiM) for unicast connections. TiM ensures end-to-
end security between the two PTP communication partners, requester
and grantor, and is therefore only suitable for PTP unicast where no
group binding exists. Thus, this model scales excellently with the
number of connections. TiM also allows free MAC algorithm and server
negotiation, eliminating the need for the administrator to manually
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prepare the table of acceptable unicast masters at each individual
PTP node. In addition, this allows optional load control by the NTS-
KE server.
In PTP unicast mode using unicast message negotiation
([IEEE1588-2019], Section 16.1) any potential instance (the grantor)
which can be contacted by other PTP instances (the requesters) needs
to register upfront with the NTS-KE server as depicted in Figure 4.
For the registration, again a TLS channel has to be set up using the
new NTS Time Server Registration sub-protocol with the ALPN
"ntstsr/1" as described in Section 2.2. This also ensures the mutual
authentication of grantor and NTS-KE server.
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PTP Requester NTS-KE Server PTP Grantor
| | TLS: |Grantor
| KE generates |<= PTP Registration =|registers
| ticket key | Request |upfront
| | |
| | TLS: |gets
| KE sends |== PTP Registration >|ticket
| ticket key | Response |key to
| | |decrypt
| | |tickets
: : :
PTP instance| TLS: | |
wants unicast|== PTP Key =====>| KE generates |
communication| Request | and sends |
| | unicast key |
| TLS: | & encrypted |
|<= PTP Key ======| ticket |
| Response | |
| | |decrypts
Unicast| | |ticket,
request| Secured PTP: | |extracts
contains|-- Unicast -------------------------->|containing
ticket| Request | |unicast key
| | |
| Secured PTP: | |Grantor uses
|<- Grant ------------------------------|unicast key
| | |
V V V
Legend: TLS: Authenticated & encrypted
=============> TLS communication
Secured PTP: Unicast key-authenticated
-------------> PTP communication
Figure 4: Message exchange for ticket-based unicast mode (TiM)
_(Note: As any PTP instance may request unicast messages from any
other instance the terms requester and grantor as used in the
standard suit better than talking about slave respectively master.
In unicast PTP, the grantor is typically a PTP Port in the MASTER
state, and the requester is typically a PTP Port in the SLAVE state.
However, all PTP Ports are allowed to grant and request unicast PTP
message contracts regardless of which state they are in. A PTP port
in MASTER state may be requester, a port in SLAVE state may be a
grantor.)_
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The registration of a PTP grantor is performed via a PTP Registration
Request message (see Section 3.3). The NTS-KE server answers with a
PTP Registration Response message (see Section 3.4). If no delivery
of security data is possible for whatever reason, the PTP
Registration Response message contains a respective error code.
With the reception of the PTP Registration Response message, the
grantor holds a ticket key known only to the NTS-KE server and the
registered grantor. With this ticket key it can decrypt
cryptographic information contained in a so-called ticket which
enables secure unicast communication.
After the end of the registration process (phase 1), phase 2 begins
with the key request of the client (here called requester). Similar
to the group-based mode, a PTP instance (the requester) wanting to
start a secured PTP unicast communication with a specific grantor
contacts the NTS-KE server sending a PTP Key Request message (see
Section 3.1) as shown in Table 2, again using the TLS-secured NTS Key
Establishment protocol. The NTS-KE server performs the
authentication check of the client and then answers with a PTP Key
Response message (see Section 3.2) with all the necessary data to
begin the unicast communication with the desired partner or with a
respective error code if unicast communication with that instance is
unavailable. Though the message types are the same as in GrM the
content differs.
In TiM the PTP Key Response message includes a unicast key to secure
the PTP message exchange with the desired grantor. In addition, it
contains the above mentioned (partially) encrypted ticket which the
requester later (phase 3) transmits in a special Ticket TLV (see
Section 6) with the secured PTP message to the grantor.
After the NTS Key Establishment messages for the PTP unicast mode
have been exchanged, finally, the secured PTP communication (phase 3)
can take place using the security association(s) communicated. A
requester may send a (unicast key-) secured PTP signaling message
containing the received encrypted ticket, asking for a grant of a so-
called unicast contract which contains a request for a specific PTP
message type, as well as the desired frame rate.
The grantor receiving the PTP message decrypts the received ticket
with its ticket key and extracts the containing security parameters,
for example the unicast key used by the requester to secure the PTP
message and the requester’s identity. In that way the grantor can
check the received message, identify the requester and can use the
unicast key for further secure PTP communication with the requester
until the unicast key expires.
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A grantor that supports unicast and provides sufficient capacity will
acknowledge the request for a unicast contract with a PTP unicast
grant.
If a grantor is no longer at disposal for unicast mode during the
lifetime of registration and ticket key, it sends a TLS-secured PTP
Registration Revoke message (see Section 3.5, not shown in Figure 4)
to the NTS-KE server, so requesters no longer receive security
associations (key etc.) in PTP Key Response messages for this
grantor. Either the NTS-KE server sends response messages with SAs
of other grantors or with respective error codes.
The PTP Heartbeat message (see Section 3.6, not shown in Figure 4)
allows grantors to send messages to the NTS-KE server at regular
intervals during the validity of the current security data and to
signal their own functionality. Optionally, these messages can
contain status reports, for example, to enable load balancing between
the registered time servers or to provide additional monitoring.
With its use of the two sub-protocols, the NTS-KE and the NTS-TSR
protocol, this unicast mode (TiM) is a bit more complex than the
Group-of-2 mode and eventually uses all six new NTS messages.
However, no subgroups have to be defined upfront. Addressing a
grantor, the requesting instance simply may use the grantor's IP, MAC
address or PortIdentity attribute.
2.5. General Topics
This section describes more general topics like key update and key
generation as well as discussion of the time information on the NTS-
KE server, the use of certificates and topics concerning upfront
configuration.
2.5.1. Key Update Process
The security parameters update process is an important part of
NTS4PTP. It keeps the keys up to date, allows for both, runtime
security policy changes and easy group control. The rotation
operation allows uninterrupted PTP operation in multicast as well as
unicast mode.
The update mechanism is based on the Validity Period record in the
NTS response messages, which includes the three values lifetime,
update period (UP) and grace period (GP), see Figure 5. The lifetime
parameter specifies the validity period of the security parameters
(e.g., security association (SA) and ticket) in seconds, which is
counted down. This value can range from a few minutes to a few days.
(Due to the design of the replay protection, a maximum lifetime of up
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to 388 days is possible, but should not be exploited, see
Section 5.1). After the validity period has expired, the security
parameters may no longer be used to secure PTP messages and must be
deleted soon after.
New security parameters are available on the NTS-KE server during the
update period, a time span before the expiry of the lifetime. The
length of the update period is therefore always shorter than the full
lifetime and is typically in the range of a few minutes.
The grace period also helps to ensure uninterrupted key rotation.
This value defines a period of time after the lifetime expiry during
which the expired security parameters continue to be accepted. The
grace period covers a few seconds at most and is only intended to
compensate for runtime delays in the network during the update
process. A maximum grace period of 5 seconds is recommended. The
respective values of the three parameters are defined by the
administrator and can also be specified by a corresponding PTP
profile.
|12,389s (@time of key request) 0s|14,400s 0s|
+----------------------------------+------------------...-------+
| Lifetime (current parameters) | Lifetime (next parameters)|
+-------------------------+--------+------------------...-------+
| 300s | 3s |
|<------>|<---->|
| update |grace |
| period |period|
|________|______|
| |
V V
Request and receive new parameters Still accepting
at a random point in time old parameters
Example:
--------
lifetime (full): 14,400s = 4h
update period: 300s = 5min
grace period: 3s
Figure 5: Example of the parameter rotation using lifetime,
update period and grace period in group-based mode
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As the value for lifetime is specified in seconds which denote the
remaining time and is decremented down to zero, hard adjustments of
the clock used have to be avoided. Therefore, the use of a monotonic
clock is recommended. Requests during the currently running validity
period will receive respectively adapted count values.
The Validity Period record (see Section 4.2.18) with its parameters
lifetime, update period and grace period is contained in a so-called
Current Parameters container record. Together with other security
parameters this container record is always present in a PTP Key
respectively Registration Response message. During the update period
the response message additionally comprises the Next Parameters
container record, which holds the new lifetime etc. starting at the
end of the current lifetime as well as the other security parameters
of the upcoming lifetime cycle.
Any PTP client sending a PTP Key Request to the NTS-KE server, be it
in GrM to receive the group SA or be it in TiM asking for the unicast
SA (unicast key etc. and encrypted ticket), will receive the Current
Parameters container record where lifetime includes the remaining
time to run rather than the full. Requesting during the update
period the response includes also the new lifetime value etc. in the
Next Parameters container record. The new lifetime is the full value
of the validity starting at the end of the current lifetime and
update period. After the old lifetime has expired, only the new
parameters (including lifetime, update period and grace period) have
to be used. Merely during the grace period, the old SA will be
accepted to cope with smaller delays in the PTP communication.
All PTP clients are obliged to connect to the NTS-KE server during
the update period to allow for uninterrupted secured PTP operation.
To avoid peak load on the NTS-KE server all clients SHOULD choose a
random starting time during the update period.
In TiM the unicast grantors execute the NTS-TSR protocol to register
with the NTS-KE server. The rotation sequence (see Figure 6) and the
behavior of the PTP Registration Response message is almost identical
to the NTS-KE protocol. The main difference here is that the update
period has to start earlier so that a grantor has re-registered
before requesters ask for new security parameters at the NTS-KE
server.
As the difference between the start of the requester’s update period
and the beginning of the update period of the grantor is not
communicated, the grantor should contact the NTS-KE server directly
after the start of its update period. However, since the rotation
periods occur at different times for multiple grantors, no load peaks
occur here either.
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If a grantor does not re-register in time, requesters asking for a
key etc. may not receive a Next Parameters container record, as no
new SA is available at that point. So, requesters need to try again
later.
As unicast contracts in TiM run independently of the update cycle, a
special situation may occur. If the remaining lifetime is short, the
grantor decides whether it grants any contract longer than the
remaining lifetime or not. If a unicast contract is to be extended
within the update period and the requester already owns the new
ticket, it can already apply the upcoming security parameters here.
This corresponds to some kind of negative grace period (pre-validity
use of upcoming security parameters) and allows the requester to
negotiate the full time for the unicast contract with the grantor.
If a grantor has revoked his registration with a PTP Registration
Revoke message, requesters will receive a PTP Key Response message
with an error code when trying to update for a new unicast key. No
immediate key revoke mechanism exists. The grantor SHOULD NOT grant
respective unicast requests during the remaining lifetime of the
revoked key.
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Update process grantor:
-----------------------
(@time of registration response)
|
|14,400s 0s |14,400s 0s|
+---------------------------------------------------...---------+
|Lifetime (current ticket key) |Lifetime (next ticket key)|
+----------------------+------+------+--------------...---------+
| 480s |
|<----------->|
| update |
| period |
|_____________|
| : :
V : :
Re-registration : :
: :
: :
Update process requester: : :
------------------------- : :
: :
|12,389s (@time of key request)0s|14,400s 0s|
+--------------------------------+----------------...-------+
| Lifetime (current parameters) |Lifetime (next parameters)|
+-------------------------+------+------+---------...-------+
| 300s | 3s |
|<---->|<---->|
|update|grace |
|period|period|
|______|______|
| |
V V
Request and receive new parameters Still accepting
at a random point in time old parameters
Example:
--------
lifetime (full): 14,400s = 4h
update period grantor: 480s = 8min
update period requester: 300s = 5min
grace period: 3s
Figure 6: Example of the parameter rotation using lifetime and
update period in ticket-based mode
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2.5.2. Key Generation
In all cases keys obtained by a secure random number generator SHALL
be used. The length of the keys depends on the cryptographic
algorithm used (see also last subsection in Section 5.3).
2.5.3. Time Information of the NTS-KE server
As the NTS-KE server embeds time duration information in the
respective messages, its local time should be accurate to within a
few seconds compared to the controlled PTP network(s). To avoid any
dependencies, it should synchronize to a secure external time source,
for example an NTS-secured NTP server. The time information is also
necessary to check the lifetime of certificates used.
2.5.4. Certificates
The authentication of the TLS communication parties is based on
certificates issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) that are
utilized during the TLS handshake. In classical TLS applications
only servers are required to have them. For the key management
system described here, the PTP nodes also need certificates to allow
only authorized and trusted devices to get the group key and join a
secure PTP network. (As TLS only authenticates the communication
partners, authorization has to be managed by external means, see the
topic “Authorization” in Section 2.5.5.4.) The verification of a
certificate always requires a loose time synchronicity, because they
have a validity period. This, however, reveals the well-known start-
up problem, since secure time transfer itself requires valid
certificates. (See the discussion and proposals on this topic in
IETF RFC 8915 [RFC8915], Section 8.5 “Initial Verification of Server
certificates” which applies to client and server certificates in the
PTP key management system, too.)
Furthermore, some kind of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is
necessary, which may be conceivable via the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP, IETF RFC 6960) [RFC6960] as well as offline via root
CA certificates.
The TLS communication parties must be equipped with a private key and
a certificate in advance. The certificate contains a digital
signature of the CA as well as the public key of the sender. The key
pair is required to establish an authenticated and encrypted channel
for the initial TLS phase. Distribution and update of the
certificates can be done manually or automatically. However, it is
important that they are issued by a trusted CA instance, which can be
either local (private CA) or external (public CA).
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For the certificates the standard for X.509 [ITU-T_X.509]
certificates MUST be used. Additional data in the certificates like
domain, sdoId and/or subgroup attributes may help in authorizing. In
that case it should be noted that using the PTP device in another
network then implies to have a new certificate, too. Working with
certificates without authorization information would not have that
disadvantage, but more configuring at the NTS-KE server would be
necessary: which domain, sdoId and/or subgroup attributes belong to
which certificate.
As TLS is used to secure both sub-protocols, the NTS-KE and the NTS-
TSR protocol, a comment on the security of TLS seems reasonable. A
TLS 1.3 connection is considered secure today. However, note that a
DoS (Denial of Service) attack on the key server can prevent new
connections or parameter updates for secure PTP communication. A
hijacked key management system is also critical, because it can
completely disable the protection mechanism. A redundant
implementation of the key server is therefore essential for a robust
system. A further mitigation can be the limitation of the number of
TLS requests of single PTP nodes to prevent flooding. But such
measures are out of the scope of this document.
2.5.5. Upfront Configuration
All PTP instances as well as the NTS-KE server need to be configured
by the network administrator. This applies to several fields of
parameters.
2.5.5.1. Security Parameters
The cryptographic algorithm and associated parameters (the so-called
security association(s) – SA) used for PTP keys are configured by
network operators at the NTS-KE server. PTP instances that do not
support the configured algorithms cannot operate with the security.
Since most PTP networks are managed by a single organization,
configuring the cryptographic algorithm (MAC) for ICV calculation is
practical. This prevents the need for the NTS-KE server and PTP
instances to implement an NTS algorithm negotiation protocol.
For the ticket-based mode the AEAD algorithms need to be specified
which the PTP grantors and the NTS-KE server support and negotiate
during the registration process. Optionally, the MAC algorithm may
be negotiated during a unicast PTP Key Request to allow faster or
stronger algorithms, but a standard algorithm supported by every
instance should be defined. Eventually, suitable algorithms may be
defined in a respective PTP profile.
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2.5.5.2. Key Lifetimes
Supplementary to the above mentioned SAs the desired key rotation
periods, i.e., the lifetimes of keys respectively all security
parameters need to be configured at the NTS-KE server. This applies
to the lifetime of a group key in the group-based mode as well as the
lifetime of ticket key and unicast key in the ticket-based unicast
mode (typically for every unicast pair in general). In addition, the
corresponding update periods and grace periods need to be defined.
Any particular lifetime, update period and grace period is configured
as time spans specified in seconds.
2.5.5.3. Certificates
The network administrator has to supply each PTP instance and the
NTS-KE server with their X.509 certificates. The TLS communication
parties must be pre-equipped with a private key and a certificate
containing the public key (see Section 2.5.4).
2.5.5.4. Authorization
The certificates provide authentication of the communication
partners. Normally, they do not contain authorization information.
Authorization decides, which PTP instances are allowed to join a
group (in any of the group-based modes) or may enter a unicast
communication in the ticket-based mode and request the respective
SA(s) and key.
As mentioned, members of a group (multicast mode, mixed multicast/
unicast mode) are identified by their domain and their sdoId. PTP
domain and sdoId may be attributes in the certificates of the
potential group members supplying additional authorization. If not
contained in the certificates extra authorization means are
necessary. (See also the discussion on advantages and disadvantages
on certificates containing additional authorization data in
Section 2.5.4.)
If the special Group-of-2 mode is used, the optional subGroup
parameter (i.e., the subgroup number) needs to be specified at all
members of respective Go2s, upfront. To enable the NTS-KE server to
supply the subgroup members with the particular security data their
respective certificates may reflect permission to take part in the
subgroup. Else another authorization method is to be used.
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In native unicast mode, any authenticated grantor that is
(authorized) member of the group used for multicast may request a
registration for unicast communication at the NTS-KE server (implicit
authorization). If no group authorization is available (e.g.,
unicast only operation) another authentication scheme is necessary.
In the same way, any requester may request security data for a
unicast connection with a specific grantor. Only authentication at
the NTS-KE server using its certificate and membership in the group
used for multicast is needed (implicit authorization). If a unicast
communication is not desired by the grantor, it should not grant a
specific unicast request. Again, if no group authorization is
available (e.g., unicast only operation) another authentication
scheme is necessary.
Authorization can be executed at least in some manual configuration.
Probably the application of a standard access control system like
Diameter, RADIUS or similar would be more appropriate. Also role-
based access control (RBAC), attribute-based access control (ABAC) or
more flexible tools like Open Policy Agent (OPA) could help
administering larger systems. But details of the authorization of
PTP instances lie out of scope of this document.
2.5.5.5. Transparent Clocks
Transparent Clocks (TC) need to be supplied with respective
certificates, too. For group-based modes they must be configured for
the particular PTP domain and sdoId and eventually for the specific
subgroup(s) when using Group-of-2. They need to request for the
relevant group key(s) at the NTS-KE server to allow secure use of the
correction field in a PTP message and generation of a corrected ICV.
If TCs are used in ticket-based unicast mode, they need to be
authorized for the particular unicast path.
Authorization of TCs for the respective groups, subgroups and unicast
connections is paramount. Otherwise the security can easily be
broken with attackers pretending to be TCs in the path.
Authorization of TCs is necessary too in unicast communication, even
if the normal unicast partners need not be especially authorized.
Transparent clocks may notice that the communication runs secured.
In the group-based modes multicast mode and mixed multicast/unicast
mode they construct the GroupID from domain and sdoId and request a
group key from the NTS-KE server. Similarly, they can use the
additional subgroup attribute in Go2 mode for a (group) key request.
Afterwards they can check the ICV of incoming messages, fill in the
correction field and generate a new ICV for outgoing messages. In
ticket-based unicast mode a TC may notice a secured unicast request
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from a requester to the grantor and can request the unicast key from
the NTS-KE server to make use of the correction field afterwards. As
mentioned above upfront authentication and authorization of the
particular TCs is paramount not to open the secured communication to
attackers.
2.5.5.6. Start-up considerations
At start-up of a single PTP instance or the complete PTP network some
issues have to be considered.
At least loose time synchronization is necessary to allow for
authentication using the certificates. See the discussion and
proposals on this topic in IETF RFC 8915 [RFC8915], Section 8.5
“Initial Verification of Server certificates” which applies to client
and server certificates in the PTP key management system, too.
Similarly, to a key re-request during an update period, key requests
SHOULD be started at a random point in time after start-up to avoid
peak load on the NTS-KE server. Every grantor must register with the
NTS-KE server before requesters can request a unicast key (and
ticket).
3. NTS Messages for PTP
This section describes the structure of the specific NTS messages for
the PTP key management. Table 2 to Table 11 specify which records
the messages are composed of. The Mode column indicates the intended
use of the particular record for the respective PTP communication
mode. The next column informs whether the respective record is
mandatory or optional. The reference column in the tables refer to
the specific subsections of the record specification. The right
column shows typical values as an example.
More details especially on the records the messages are built of and
their types, sizes, requirements and restrictions are given in
Section 4.
The NTS messages MUST contain the records given for the particular
message though not necessarily in the same sequence indicated. Only
the End of Message record MUST be the final record.
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3.1. PTP Key Request Message
Table 2 shows the record structure of a PTP Key Request message. The
message starts with the NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record which in
this application always holds PTPv2.1. The following Association
Mode record describes the mode how the PTP instance wants to
communicate: In the group-based mode the desired group number (plus
eventually the subgroup attribute) is given. For ticket-based
unicast communication the Association Mode contains the
identification of the desired grantor, for example IPv4 and its IP
address.
*PTP Key Request (NTS-KE protocol)*
+==============+======+===========+===========+====================+
| NTS Record | Mode | Use | Reference | Exemplary body |
| Name | | | | contents |
+==============+======+===========+===========+====================+
| NTS Next | GrM | mandatory | Section | PTPv2.1 |
| Protocol | / | | 4.2.8 | |
| Negotiation | TiM | | | |
+--------------+------+-----------+-----------+--------------------+
| Association | GrM | mandatory | Section | (Association |
| Mode | / | | 4.2.2 | Type || |
| | TiM | | | Association Value) |
+--------------+------+-----------+-----------+--------------------+
| Supported | TiM | optional | Section | CMAC |
| MAC | | | 4.2.14 | |
| Algorithms | | | | |
+--------------+------+-----------+-----------+--------------------+
| Source | TiM | mandatory | Section | {binary data} |
| PortIdentity | | | 4.2.12 | |
+--------------+------+-----------+-----------+--------------------+
| End of | GrM | mandatory | Section | (no record body) |
| Message | / | | 4.2.4 | |
| | TiM | | | |
+--------------+------+-----------+-----------+--------------------+
Table 2: Record structure of the PTP Key Request message
Only in TiM, an optional record may follow. It offers the
possibility to choose from additional MAC algorithms and presents the
supported algorithms from which the NTS-KE server may choose. Again,
only in ticket-based unicast mode, the Source PortIdentity record
gives the data of the identification of the applying requester, for
example IPv4 and its IP address. The messages always end with an End
of Message record.
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3.2. PTP Key Response Message
Table 3 shows the record structure of a PTP Key Response message from
the NTS-KE server (NTS-KE protocol). The message starts with the NTS
Next Protocol Negotiation record which in this application always
holds PTPv2.1.
*PTP Key Response (NTS-KE protocol)*
+=============+======+================+===========+===============+
| NTS Record | Mode | Use | Reference | Exemplary |
| Name | | | | body contents |
+=============+======+================+===========+===============+
| NTS Next | GrM | mandatory | Section | PTPv2.1 |
| Protocol | / | | 4.2.8 | |
| Negotiation | TiM | | | |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+---------------+
| Current | GrM | mandatory | Section | set of |
| Parameters | / | | 4.2.3 | records {...} |
| | TiM | | | |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+---------------+
| Next | GrM | mandatory | Section | set of |
| Parameters | / | (only during | 4.2.7 | records {...} |
| | TiM | update period) | | |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+---------------+
| End of | GrM | mandatory | Section | (no record |
| Message | / | | 4.2.4 | body) |
| | TiM | | | |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+---------------+
Table 3: Record structure of the PTP Key Response message.
The following Current Parameters record is a container record
containing in separate records all the security data needed to join
and communicate in the secured PTP communication during the current
validity period. Table 5 shows the records contained in that
container record, again with exemplary contents in the right column.
For more details on the records contained in the Current Parameters
container record see Section 4.2.3.
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If the request lies inside the update period, a Next Parameters
container record is additionally appended in the PTP Key Response
message giving all the security data needed in the upcoming validity
period. Its structure follows the same composition as the Current
Parameters container record. (If that specific client is to be
excluded from the group in the upcoming SA period no Next Parameters
container SHALL be sent.) In case of an error, both parameters
container records are removed and a single error record is inserted
(see Table 4). The messages always end with an End of Message
record.
*PTP Key Response with Error (NTS-KE protocol)*
+===================+=======+===========+===========+===============+
| NTS Record Name | Mode | Use | Reference | Exemplary |
| | | | | body contents |
+===================+=======+===========+===========+===============+
| NTS Next Protocol | GrM | mandatory | Section | PTPv2.1 |
| Negotiation | / | | 4.2.8 | |
| | TiM | | | |
+-------------------+-------+-----------+-----------+---------------+
| Error | GrM | mandatory | Section | Not |
| | / | | 4.2.5 | authorized |
| | TiM | | | |
+-------------------+-------+-----------+-----------+---------------+
| End of Message | GrM | mandatory | Section | (no record |
| | / | | 4.2.4 | body) |
| | TiM | | | |
+-------------------+-------+-----------+-----------+---------------+
Table 4: Record structure of the PTP Key Response message in case
of an error.
The structure of the respective container records (Current Parameters
and Next Parameters) used in the PTP Key Response message is given
below:
*Current/Next Parameters container - PTP Key Response (NTS-KE
protocol)*
+=============+=======+===========+===========+===================+
| NTS Record | Mode | Use | Reference | Exemplary body |
| Name | | | | contents |
+=============+=======+===========+===========+===================+
| Security | GrM / | mandatory | Section | data set {...} |
| Association | TiM | | 4.2.11 | |
+-------------+-------+-----------+-----------+-------------------+
| Validity | GrM / | mandatory | Section | {1560s||300s||3s} |
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| Period | TiM | | 4.2.18 | |
+-------------+-------+-----------+-----------+-------------------+
| PTP Time | TiM | mandatory | Section | data set {...} |
| Server | | | 4.2.10 | |
+-------------+-------+-----------+-----------+-------------------+
| Ticket | TiM | mandatory | Section | data set {...} |
| | | | 4.2.15 | |
+-------------+-------+-----------+-----------+-------------------+
Table 5: Record structure of the container records
3.3. PTP Registration Request Message
The PTP Registration Request message (NTS-TSR protocol) starts with
the NTS Message Type record containing the message type as well as
the message version number, here always 1.0, see Table 6. (As the
message belongs to the NTS-TSR protocol, no NTS Next Protocol
Negotiation record is necessary.)
*PTP Registration Request (NTS-TSR protocol)*
+=============+====+===========+===========+======================+
| NTS Record |Mode| Use | Reference | Exemplary body |
| Name | | | | contents |
+=============+====+===========+===========+======================+
| NTS Message |TiM | mandatory | Section | PTP Registration |
| Type | | | 4.2.9 | Request||v1.0 |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+----------------------+
| PTP Time |TiM | mandatory | Section | data set {...} |
| Server | | | 4.2.10 | |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+----------------------+
| AEAD |TiM | mandatory | Section | {AEAD_512||AEAD_256} |
| Algorithm | | | 4.2.1 | |
| Negotiation | | | | |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+----------------------+
| Supported |TiM | mandatory | Section | {CMAC||HMAC} |
| MAC | | | 4.2.14 | |
| Algorithms | | | | |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+----------------------+
| End of |TiM | mandatory | Section | (no record body) |
| Message | | | 4.2.4 | |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+----------------------+
Table 6: Record structure of the PTP Registration Request message
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The PTP Time Server record presents all known network addresses of
this grantor that are supported for a unicast connection. The
following AEAD Algorithm Negotiation record indicates which
algorithms for encryption of the ticket the grantor supports.
Then the next record (not optional as in PTP Key Request) follows,
presenting all the grantor's supported MAC algorithms. The Supported
MAC Algorithms record contains a list and comprises the MAC
algorithms supported by the grantor that are feasible for calculating
the ICV when securing the PTP messages in TiM. The message always
ends with an End of Message record.
3.4. PTP Registration Response Message
The PTP Registration Response message (NTS-TSR protocol) from the
NTS-KE server starts with the NTS Message Type record containing the
message type as well as the message version number, here always 1.0,
see Table 7. (As the message belongs to the NTS-TSR protocol, no NTS
Next Protocol Negotiation record is necessary.)
*PTP Registration Response (NTS-TSR protocol)*
+=============+======+================+===========+================+
| NTS Record | Mode | Use | Reference | Exemplary body |
| Name | | | | contents |
+=============+======+================+===========+================+
| NTS Message | TiM | mandatory | Section | PTP |
| Type | | | 4.2.9 | Registration |
| | | | | Response||v1.0 |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+----------------+
| Current | TiM | mandatory | Section | set of records |
| Parameters | | | 4.2.3 | {...} |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+----------------+
| Next | TiM | mandatory | Section | set of records |
| Parameters | | (only during | 4.2.7 | {...} |
| | | update period) | | |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+----------------+
| Heartbeat | TiM | optional | Section | 900s |
| Timeout | | | 4.2.6 | |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+----------------+
| End of | TiM | mandatory | Section | (no record |
| Message | | | 4.2.4 | body) |
+-------------+------+----------------+-----------+----------------+
Table 7: Record structure of the PTP Registration Response message.
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As in the NTS-KE protocol, the following Current Parameters record is
a container record containing in separate records all the necessary
parameters for the current validity period. Table 9 shows the
records contained in that container record, again with exemplary
contents in the right column. For more details on the records
contained in the Current Parameters container record see
Section 4.2.3.
*PTP Registration Response with error (NTS-TSR protocol)*
+=================+======+===========+===========+==================+
| NTS Record | Mode | Use | Reference | Exemplary body |
| Name | | | | contents |
+=================+======+===========+===========+==================+
| NTS Message | TiM | mandatory | Section | PTP Registration |
| Type | | | 4.2.9 | Response||v1.0 |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+------------------+
| Error | TiM | mandatory | Section | Not authorized |
| | | | 4.2.5 | |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+------------------+
| End of | TiM | mandatory | Section | (no record body) |
| Message | | | 4.2.4 | |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+------------------+
Table 8: Record structure of the PTP Registration Response
message in case of an error.
The structure of the respective container records (Current Parameters
and Next Parameters) used in the PTP Registration Response message is
given below:
*Current/Next Parameters container - PTP Registration Response (NTS-
TSR protocol)*
+=============+====+===========+===========+=======================+
| NTS Record |Mode| Use | Reference | Exemplary body |
| Name | | | | contents |
+=============+====+===========+===========+=======================+
| AEAD |TiM | mandatory | Section | AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_512 |
| Algorithm | | | 4.2.1 | |
| Negotiation | | | | |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+-----------------------+
| Validity |TiM | mandatory | Section | {2460s||400s||3s} |
| Period | | | 4.2.18 | |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+-----------------------+
| Ticket Key |TiM | mandatory | Section | 278 |
| ID | | | 4.2.17 | |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+-----------------------+
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| Ticket Key |TiM | mandatory | Section | {binary data} |
| | | | 4.2.16 | |
+-------------+----+-----------+-----------+-----------------------+
Table 9: Record structure of the container records in the PTP
Registration Response message
If the registration request lies inside the update period a Next
Parameters container record is additionally appended giving all the
security data needed in the upcoming validity period. Its structure
follows the same composition as the Current Parameters container
record. (If the respective grantor has not registered yet for the
upcoming SA period or has revoked its service no Next Parameters
container will be sent.) In case of an error, both parameters
container records are removed and a single error record is inserted
(see Table 8). The messages always end with an End of Message
record.
3.5. PTP Registration Revoke Message
The PTP Registration Revoke message (NTS-TSR protocol) from the
grantor starts with the NTS Message Type record containing the
message type as well as the message version number, here always 1.0,
see Table 10. (As the message belongs to the NTS-TSR protocol, no
NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record is necessary.)
*PTP Registration Revoke (NTS-TSR protocol)*
+=================+======+===========+===========+==================+
| NTS Record | Mode | Use | Reference | Exemplary body |
| Name | | | | contents |
+=================+======+===========+===========+==================+
| NTS Message | TiM | mandatory | Section | PTP Registration |
| Type | | | 4.2.9 | Revoke||v1.0 |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+------------------+
| Source | TiM | mandatory | Section | {binary data} |
| PortIdentity | | | 4.2.12 | |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+------------------+
| End of | TiM | mandatory | Section | (no record body) |
| Message | | | 4.2.4 | |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+------------------+
Table 10: Record structure of the PTP Registration Revoke message
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The second record contains the Source PortIdentity which identifies
the grantor wanting to stop its unicast support. This allows the
NTS-KE server to uniquely identify the grantor if the PTP device
communicates with the NTS-KE server via a management port running
multiple grantors. The message always ends with an End of Message
record.
3.6. PTP Heartbeat Message
The PTP Heartbeat message (NTS-TSR protocol) from the grantor to the
NTS-KE server starts with the NTS Message Type record containing the
message type as well as the message version number, here always 1.0,
see Table 11. (As the message belongs to the NTS-TSR protocol, no
NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record is necessary.)
*PTP Heartbeat Message (NTS-TSR protocol)*
+=================+======+===========+===========+=================+
| NTS Record Name | Mode | Use | Reference | Exemplary body |
| | | | | contents |
+=================+======+===========+===========+=================+
| NTS Message | TiM | mandatory | Section | PTP |
| Type | | | 4.2.9 | Heartbeat||v1.0 |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+-----------------+
| Status | TiM | optional | Section | {grantor |
| | | | 4.2.13 | load||15} |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+-----------------+
| End of Message | TiM | mandatory | Section | (no record |
| | | | 4.2.4 | body) |
+-----------------+------+-----------+-----------+-----------------+
Table 11: Record structure of the PTP Heartbeat message in the
NTS-TSR protocol
The second record contains the optional Status record which allows
the grantor to present various status updates to the NTS-KE server.
The message always ends with an End of Message record.
PTP Heartbeat messages provide grantors with the ability to send
messages to the NTS-KE server at regular intervals to signal their
own functionality. These messages can optionally also contain one or
multiple status records (see Table 11), for example to improve load
balancing between the registered time servers or to provide
additional monitoring. The NTS-KE server MUST accept PTP Heartbeat
messages from a grantor if they have been previously requested by the
NTS-KE server in the Registration Response message. However, the
NTS-KE server MAY discard heartbeat messages if they arrive more
frequently than specified by the heartbeat timeout (see
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Section 4.2.6). If the NTS-KE server receives heartbeat messages
from a grantor even though this is not requested, the NTS-KE server
SHOULD discard these messages and not process them further.
Processing of the status information is optional and the status
records MAY be ignored by the NTS-KE server. If the grantor sends
heartbeat messages to the NTS-KE server, the frames SHOULD NOT exceed
the maximum transmission unit (MTU, 1500 octets for Ethernet).
4. NTS Records for PTP
The sections above described the principle communication sequences
and structure for the new NTS messages. All messages follow the “NTS
Key Establishment Process” stated in the first part (until the
description of Figure 3 starts) of Section 4 of IETF RFC 8915
[RFC8915] with the exception that registration requests use the ALPN
"ntstsr/1" and do not contain a Next Protocol Negotiation record:
_"The NTS key establishment protocol is conducted via TCP port
4460. The two endpoints carry out a TLS handshake in conformance
with Section 3, with the client offering (via an ALPN
extension_[RFC7301])_, and the server accepting, an application-
layer protocol of "ntske/1". Immediately following a successful
handshake, the client SHALL send a single request as Application
Data encapsulated in the TLS-protected channel. Then, the server
SHALL send a single response. After sending their respective
request and response, the client and server SHALL send TLS
"close_notify" alerts in accordance with Section 6.1 of RFC
8446_[RFC8446].
_The client's request and the server's response each SHALL consist
of a sequence of records formatted according to_ Figure 7_. The
request and a non-error response each SHALL include exactly one
NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record. The sequence SHALL be
terminated by a "End of Message" record. The requirement that all
NTS-KE messages be terminated by an End of Message record makes
them self-delimiting._
_Clients and servers MAY enforce length limits on requests and
responses, however, servers MUST accept requests of at least 1024
octets and clients SHOULD accept responses of at least 65536
octets._
_The fields of an NTS-KE record are defined as follows:_
- _C (Critical Bit): Determines the disposition of unrecognized
Record Types. Implementations which receive a record with an
unrecognized Record Type MUST ignore the record if the Critical
Bit is 0 and MUST treat it as an error if the Critical Bit is 1
(see Section 4.1.3)._
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- _Record Type Number: A 15-bit integer in network byte order.
The semantics of record types 0–7 are specified in this memo.
Additional type numbers SHALL be tracked through the IANA
Network Time Security Key Establishment Record Types registry._
- _Body Length: The length of the Record Body field, in octets,
as a 16-bit integer in network byte order. Record bodies MAY
have any representable length and need not be aligned to a word
boundary._
- _Record Body: The syntax and semantics of this field SHALL be
determined by the Record Type._
_For clarity regarding bit-endianness: the Critical Bit is the
most-significant bit of the first octet. In the C programming
language, given a network buffer `unsigned char b[]` containing an
NTS-KE record, the critical bit is `b[0] >> 7` while the record
type is `((b[0] & 0x7f) << 8) + b[1]`."_
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|C| Record Type | Body Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
: :
: Record Body :
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: NTS-KE record format
Thus, all NTS messages consist of a sequence of records, each
containing a Critical Bit C, the Record Type, the Body Length and the
Record Body, see Figure 7. More details on record structure as well
as the specific records used here are given in this section and
respective subsections. So-called container records (short:
container) themselves comprise a set of records in the record body
that serve a specific purpose, e.g., the Current Parameters container
record.
The records contained in a message may follow in arbitrary sequence
(though nothing speaks against using the sequence given in the record
descriptions), only the End of Message record MUST be the last one in
the sequence indicating the end of the current message. Container
records do not include an End of Message record.
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4.1. Overview of the NTS Records
In Table 12 below, this section lists all NTS records the messages
are built from. In addition to the NTS records already defined for
NTP in IETF RFC 8915 (compare [RFC8915], Section 7.6. Network Time
Security Key Establishment Record Types Registry), further records
are required and begin with Record Type 1024 (needs to be defined by
the IANA). The detailed structure and respective content of the
records is given in Section 4.2. Besides the record number the sub-
protocol it is used with, Table 12 indicates where to find it in
[RFC8915] respectively in this document.
+========+==================+==========+===========================+
| NTS | Description | Record | Reference |
| Record | | Used in | |
| Types | | Protocol | |
+========+==================+==========+===========================+
| 0 | End of Message | NTS-KE / | [RFC8915] in |
| | | NTS-TSR | Section 4.1.1. This |
| | | | document in Section 4.2.4 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1 | NTS Next | NTS-KE | [RFC8915] in |
| | Protocol | | Section 4.1.2. This |
| | Negotiation | | document in Section 4.2.8 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 2 | Error | NTS-KE / | [RFC8915] in |
| | | NTS-TSR | Section 4.1.3. This |
| | | | document in Section 4.2.5 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 3 | Warning | NTS-KE | [RFC8915] in |
| | | | Section 4.1.4. Not used |
| | | | for PTP |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 4 | AEAD Algorithm | NTS-TSR | [RFC8915] in |
| | Negotiation | | Section 4.1.5. This |
| | | | document in Section 4.2.1 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 5 | New Cookie for | NTS-KE | [RFC8915] in |
| | NTPv4 | | Section 4.1.6. Not used |
| | | | for PTP |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 6 | NTPv4 Server | NTS-KE | [RFC8915] in |
| | Negotiation | | Section 4.1.7. Not used |
| | | | for PTP |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 7 | NTPv4 Port | NTS-KE | [RFC8915] in |
| | Negotiation | | Section 4.1.8. Not used |
| | | | for PTP |
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+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 8 - | Reserved for NTP | | |
| 1023 | | | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1024 | Association Mode | NTS-KE | Section 4.2.2 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1025 | Current | NTS-KE / | Section 4.2.3 |
| | Parameters | NTS-TSR | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1026 | Heartbeat | NTS-TSR | Section 4.2.6 |
| | Timeout | | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1027 | Next Parameters | NTS-KE / | Section 4.2.7 |
| | | NTS-TSR | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1028 | NTS Message Type | NTS-TSR | Section 4.2.9 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1029 | PTP Time Server | NTS-KE / | Section 4.2.10 |
| | | NTS-TSR | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1030 | Security | NTS-KE | Section 4.2.11 |
| | Association | | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1031 | Source | NTS-KE / | Section 4.2.12 |
| | PortIdentity | NTS-TSR | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1032 | Status | NTS-TSR | Section 4.2.13 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1033 | Supported MAC | NTS-KE / | Section 4.2.14 |
| | Algorithms | NTS-TSR | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1034 | Ticket | NTS-TSR | Section 4.2.15 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1035 | Ticket Key | NTS-TSR | Section 4.2.16 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1036 | Ticket Key ID | NTS-TSR | Section 4.2.17 |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1037 | Validity Period | NTS-KE / | Section 4.2.18 |
| | | NTS-TSR | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 1038 - | Unassigned | | |
| 16383 | | | |
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| 16384 | Reserved for | | [RFC8915] |
| - | Private or | | |
| 32767 | Experimental Use | | |
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+--------+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
Table 12: NTS Key Establishment and Time Server Registration
record types registry
4.2. Detailed Description of the NTS Records
The following subsections describe the specific NTS records used to
construct the NTS messages for the PTP key management system in
detail. They appear in alphabetic sequence of their individual
names. See Section 3 for the application of the records in the
respective messages.
Note: For easier editing of the content, most of the descriptions in
the following subsections are written as bullet points.
4.2.1. AEAD Algorithm Negotiation
Used in NTS-TSR protocol
This record is required in Ticket-based mode (TiM) and enables the
negotiation of the AEAD algorithm needed to encrypt and decrypt the
ticket. The negotiation takes place between the PTP grantor and the
NTS-KE server by using the NTS registration messages. The structure
and properties follow the record defined in IETF RFC 8915 [RFC8915],
Section 4.1.5.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 4 and the Critical Bit MAY
be set.
* The Record Body contains a sequence of 16-bit unsigned integers in
network byte order:
*Supported AEAD Algorithms = {AEAD 1 || AEAD 2 || …}*
* Each integer represents a numeric identifier of an AEAD algorithm
registered by the IANA [IANA_AEAD].
* Duplicate identifiers SHOULD NOT be included.
* Grantor and NTS-KE server MUST support at least the
AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256 algorithm.
* A list of recommended AEAD algorithms is shown in the following
Table 13.
* Other AEAD algorithms MAY also be used.
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+=========+=======================+=======+============+===========+
| Numeric | AEAD Algorithm | Use | Key Length | Reference |
| ID | | | (Octets) | |
+=========+=======================+=======+============+===========+
| 15 | AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256 | mand. | 32 | [RFC5297] |
+---------+-----------------------+-------+------------+-----------+
| 16 | AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_384 | opt. | 48 | [RFC5297] |
+---------+-----------------------+-------+------------+-----------+
| 17 | AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_512 | opt. | 64 | [RFC5297] |
+---------+-----------------------+-------+------------+-----------+
Table 13: Recommended AEAD algorithms
* In a PTP Registration Request message, this record MUST be
contained exactly once.
* In that message at least the AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256 algorithm MUST
be included.
* If multiple AEAD algorithms are supported, the grantor SHOULD put
the algorithm identifiers in descending priority in the Record
Body.
* Strong algorithms with higher bit lengths SHOULD have higher
priority.
* In a PTP Registration Response message, this record MUST be
contained exactly once in the Current Parameters container record
and exactly once in the Next Parameters container record.
* The Next Parameters container record MUST be present only during
the update period.
* The NTS-KE server SHOULD choose the highest priority AEAD
algorithm from the request message that grantor and NTS-KE server
support.
* The NTS-KE server MAY ignore the priority and choose a different
algorithm that grantor and NTS-KE server support.
* In a PTP Registration Response message, this record MUST contain
exactly one AEAD algorithm.
* The selected algorithm MAY differ in the corresponding Current
Parameters container record and Next Parameters container record.
4.2.2. Association Mode
Used in NTS-KE protocol
This record enables the NTS-KE server to distinguish between a group
based request (multicast, mixed multicast/unicast, Group-of-2) or a
unicast request. A multicast request carries a group number, while a
unicast request contains an identification attribute of the grantor
(e.g., IP address or PortIdentity).
Content and conditions:
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* In a PTP Key Request message, this record MUST be contained
exactly once.
* The record has a Record Type number of 1024 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The Record Body SHALL consist of one association tuple:
+===================+========+========+
| Field | Octets | Offset |
+===================+========+========+
| Association Type | 2 | 0 |
+-------------------+--------+--------+
| Association Value | A | 2 |
+-------------------+--------+--------+
Table 14: Association Mode record
* The Association Type is a 16-bit unsigned integer.
* The length of Association Value depends on the value of
Association Type.
* All data in the fields are stored in network byte order.
* The type numbers of Association Type (tbd. by IANA) as well as the
length and content of Association Value are shown in the following
table and more details are given below.
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+==============+========+==================+===============+========+
| Description | Assoc. | Association | Association | Assoc. |
| | Type | Mode | Value Content | Value |
| | Number | | | Octets |
+==============+========+==================+===============+========+
| Group | 0 | Multicast / | Group Number | 5 |
| | | Unicast* | | |
+--------------+--------+------------------+---------------+--------+
| IPv4 | 1 | Unicast | IPv4 address | 4 |
| | | | of the target | |
| | | | port | |
+--------------+--------+------------------+---------------+--------+
| IPv6 | 2 | Unicast | IPv6 address | 16 |
| | | | of the target | |
| | | | port | |
+--------------+--------+------------------+---------------+--------+
| 802.3 | 3 | Unicast | MAC address | 6 |
| | | | of the target | |
| | | | port | |
+--------------+--------+------------------+---------------+--------+
| PortIdentity | 4 | Unicast | PortIdentity | 10 |
| | | | of the target | |
| | | | PTP entity | |
+--------------+--------+------------------+---------------+--------+
| | 5 - | Unassigned | | |
| | 32767 | | | |
+--------------+--------+------------------+---------------+--------+
+--------------+--------+------------------+---------------+--------+
| | 32768 | Reserved for | | |
| | - | Private or | | |
| | 65565 | Experimental | | |
| | | Use | | |
+--------------+--------+------------------+---------------+--------+
Table 15: Association Types
Unicast*: predefined groups of two (Group-of-2, Go2, see Group entry
below)
Group:
* This Association Type allows a PTP instance to join a PTP
multicast group.
* A group is identified by the PTP domain, the PTP profile (sdoId)
and a sub-group attribute (see table below).
* The PTP domainNumber is an 8-bit unsigned integer in the closed
range 0 to 255.
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* The sdoId of a PTP domain is a 12-bit unsigned integer in the
closed range 0 to 4095:
- The most significant 4 bits are named the majorSdoId.
- The least significant 8 bits are named the minorSdoId.
- Reference: IEEE Std 1588-2019, Section 7.1.1
*sdoId = {majorSdoId || minorSdoId}*
* The subGroup is 16-bit unsigned integer, which allows the division
of a PTP multicast network into separate groups, each with
individual security parameters.
* This also allows manually configured unicast connections (Group-
of-2), which can include transparent clocks as well.
* The subGroup number is defined manually by the administrator.
* Access to the groups is controlled by authorization procedures of
the PTP devices (see Section 2.5.5.4).
* If no subgroups are needed, this attribute MUST contain the value
zero.
* The group number is eventually formed by concatenation of the
following values:
*group number = {domainNumber || 4 bit zero padding || sdoId ||
subGroup}*
This is equivalent to:
+============================+====================+========+========+
| Bits 7 - 4 | Bits 3 - 0 | Octets | Offset |
+============================+====================+========+========+
| domainNumber (high) | domainNumber (low) | 1 | 0 |
+----------------------------+--------------------+--------+--------+
| zero padding | majorSdoId | 1 | 1 |
+----------------------------+--------------------+--------+--------+
| minorSdoId (high) | minorSdoId (low) | 1 | 2 |
+----------------------------+--------------------+--------+--------+
| subGroup high octet | subGroup high | 1 | 4 |
| (high) | octet (low) | | |
+----------------------------+--------------------+--------+--------+
| subGroup low octet | subGroup low octet | 1 | 5 |
| (high) | (low) | | |
+----------------------------+--------------------+--------+--------+
Table 16: Group Association
IPv4:
* This Association Type allows a requester to establish a PTP
unicast connection to the desired grantor.
* The Association Value contains the IPv4 address of the target PTP
entity.
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* The total length is 4 octets.
IPv6:
* This Association Type allows a requester to establish a PTP
unicast connection to the desired grantor.
* The Association Value contains the IPv6 address of the target PTP
entity.
* The total length is 16 octets.
802.3:
* This Association Type allows a requester to establish a PTP
unicast connection to the desired grantor.
* The Association Value contains the MAC address of the Ethernet
port of the target PTP entity.
* The total length is 6 octets.
* This method supports the IEEE 802.3 mode in PTP, where no UDP/IP
stack is used.
PortIdentity:
* This Association Type allows a requester to establish a PTP
unicast connection to the desired grantor.
* The Association Value contains the PortIdentity of the target PTP
entity.
* The total length is 10 octets.
* The PortIdentity consists of the attributes clockIdentity and
portNumber:
*PortIdentity = {clockIdentity || portNumber}*
* The clockIdentity is an 8 octet array and the portNumber is a
16-bit unsigned integer.
* Source: IEEE Std 1588-2019, Sections 5.3.5 and 7.5
4.2.3. Current Parameters
Used in NTS-KE and NTS-TSR protocol
This record is a simple container that can carry an arbitrary number
of NTS records. It holds all security parameters relevant for the
current validity period. The content as well as further conditions
are defined by the respective NTS messages. The order of the
included records is arbitrary and the parsing rules are so far
identical with the NTS message. One exception: An End of Message
record SHOULD NOT be present and MUST be ignored. When the parser
reaches the end of the Record Body quantified by the Body Length, all
embedded records have been processed.
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Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1025 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* In a PTP Key Response message, this record MUST be contained
exactly once.
* The Record Body is defined as a set of records and MAY contain the
following records:
+=================+====================+===========+===========+
| NTS Record Name | Communication Type | Use | Reference |
+=================+====================+===========+===========+
| Security | Multicast / | mandatory | Section |
| Associations | Unicast | | 4.2.11 |
+-----------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+
| Validity Period | Multicast / | mandatory | Section |
| | Unicast | | 4.2.18 |
+-----------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+
| PTP Time Server | Unicast | mandatory | Section |
| | | | 4.2.10 |
+-----------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+
| Ticket | Unicast | mandatory | Section |
| | | | 4.2.15 |
+-----------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+
Table 17: Current Parameters container for PTP Key Response
message
* The records Security Association and Validity Period MUST be
contained exactly once.
* Additionally, the records PTP Time Server and Ticket MUST be
included exactly once if the client wants a unicast connection in
TiM and MUST NOT be included if the client wants to join a
multicast group in GrM.
* In a PTP Registration Response message, the Current Parameters
container record MUST be contained exactly once.
* The Record Body MUST contain the following records exactly:
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+============================+===========+================+
| NTS Record Name | Use | Reference |
+============================+===========+================+
| AEAD Algorithm Negotiation | mandatory | Section 4.2.1 |
+----------------------------+-----------+----------------+
| Validity Period | mandatory | Section 4.2.18 |
+----------------------------+-----------+----------------+
| Ticket Key ID | mandatory | Section 4.2.17 |
+----------------------------+-----------+----------------+
| Ticket Key | mandatory | Section 4.2.16 |
+----------------------------+-----------+----------------+
Table 18: Current Parameters container for PTP
Registration Response Message
4.2.4. End of Message
Used in NTS-KE and NTS-TSR protocol
The End of Message record is defined in IETF RFC 8915 [RFC8915],
Section 4:
_"The record sequence in an NTS message SHALL be terminated by an
“End of Message” record. The requirement that all NTS-KE messages
be terminated by an End of Message record makes them self-
delimiting."_
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 0 and a zero-length body.
* The Critical Bit MUST be set.
* This record MUST occur exactly once as the final record of every
NTS message.
* This record SHOULD NOT be included in the container records and
MUST be ignored if present.
* See also: IETF RFC 8915, Section 4.1.1
4.2.5. Error
Used in NTS-KE and NTS-TSR protocol
The Error record is defined in IETF RFC 8915 [RFC8915],
Section 4.1.3. In addition to the Error codes 0 to 2 specified there
the following Error codes 3 to 4 (tbd. by IANA) are shown below:
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+===============+==========================================+
| Error Code | Description |
+===============+==========================================+
| 0 | Unrecognized Critical Record |
+---------------+------------------------------------------+
| 1 | Bad Request |
+---------------+------------------------------------------+
| 2 | Internal Server Error |
+---------------+------------------------------------------+
| 3 | Not Authorized |
+---------------+------------------------------------------+
| 4 | Grantor not Registered |
+---------------+------------------------------------------+
| 5 - 32767 | Unassigned |
+---------------+------------------------------------------+
| 32768 - 65535 | Reserved for Private or Experimental Use |
+---------------+------------------------------------------+
Table 19: Error Codes
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 2 and body length of two
octets consisting of an unsigned 16-bit integer in network byte
order, denoting an error code.
* The Critical Bit MUST be set.
* The Error code 3 "Not Authorized" is sent by the NTS-KE server if
the requester is not authorized to join the desired multicast
group or if a grantor is prohibited to register with the NTS-KE
server.
* The Error record MUST NOT be included in a PTP Registration
Request message.
* The Error code 4 "Grantor not Registered" is sent by the NTS-KE
server when the requester wants to establish a unicast connection
to a grantor that is not registered with the NTS-KE server.
* The Error record MUST NOT be included in a PTP Key Request
message.
4.2.6. Heartbeat Timeout
Used in NTS-TSR protocol
This record provides the NTS-KE server the capability to monitor the
availability of the registered grantors. If this optional record is
used, the registered grantors SHOULD send a PTP Heartbeat message to
the NTS-KE server before the timeout expires.
Content and conditions:
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* The record has a Record Type number of 1026 and the Critical Bit
SHOULD NOT be set.
* The Record Body consists of a 16-bit unsigned integer in network
byte order and denotes the heartbeat timeout in seconds.
* The timeout set by the NTS-KE server MUST NOT be less than 1s.
* The timeout starts at the NTS-KE server with the generation of the
Registration Response message.
* Grantors that receive an invalid value as a heartbeat timeout MUST
ignore this record and MUST NOT send heartbeat messages.
* Grantors that receive a valid value SHOULD send a PTP Heartbeat
message to the NTS-KE server before the timeout has elapsed.
* The grantors SHOULD keep the heartbeat intervals and MAY also send
heartbeat messages more frequently.
* After transmitting a heartbeat from the grantor to the NTS-KE
server, both sides reset the timeout to the start value and let
the time count down again.
* If this timeout is exceeded without receiving a heartbeat message
or several heartbeats are missing in a row, the NTS-KE server MAY
delete the grantor from its registration list, so that a new
registration of the grantor is necessary.
* Grantors that are not (or no longer) registered with a NTS-KE
server MUST NOT send heartbeat messages and NTS-KE servers MUST
discard heartbeat messages from non-registered grantors.
* NTS-KE servers MAY respond in such cases with a Registration
Response message containing error code 4 "Grantor not Registered".
4.2.7. Next Parameters
Used in NTS-KE and NTS-TSR protocol
This record is a simple container that can carry an arbitrary number
of NTS records. It holds all security parameters relevant for the
upcoming validity period. The content as well as further conditions
are defined by the respective NTS messages. The order of the
included records is arbitrary and the parsing rules are so far
identical with the NTS message. One exception: An End of Message
record SHOULD NOT be present and MUST be ignored. When the parser
reaches the end of the Record Body quantified by the Body Length, all
embedded records have been processed.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1027 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The Record Body is defined as a set of records.
* The structure of the record body and all conditions MUST be
identical to the rules described in Section 4.2.3 of this
document.
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* In both the PTP Key Response and PTP Registration Response
message, this record MUST be contained exactly once during the
update period.
* Outside the update period, this record MUST NOT be included.
* In GrM, this record MAY also be missing if the requesting client
is to be explicitly excluded from a multicast group after the
security parameter rotation process by the NTS-KE server.
* More details are described in Section 2.5.1.
4.2.8. NTS Next Protocol Negotiation
Used in NTS-KE protocol
The Next Protocol Negotiation record is defined in IETF RFC 8915
[RFC8915], Section 4.1.2:
_"The Protocol IDs listed in the client's NTS Next Protocol
Negotiation record denote those protocols that the client wishes
to speak using the key material established through this NTS-KE
server session. Protocol IDs listed in the NTS-KE server's
response MUST comprise a subset of those listed in the request and
denote those protocols that the NTP server is willing and able to
speak using the key material established through this NTS-KE
server session. The client MAY proceed with one or more of them.
The request MUST list at least one protocol, but the response MAY
be empty."_
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1 and the Critical Bit MUST
be set.
* The Record Body consists of a sequence of 16-bit unsigned integers
in network byte order.
*Record body = {Protocol ID 1 || Protocol ID 2 || …}*
* Each integer represents a Protocol ID from the IANA "Network Time
Security Next Protocols" registry (tbd.) as shown in the table
below.
* For NTS request messages for PTPv2.1 (NTS-KE protocol merely),
only the Protocol ID for PTPv2.1 SHOULD be included.
* This prevents the mixing of records for different time protocols.
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+=============+=========================+=============+
| Protocol ID | Protocol Name | Reference |
+=============+=========================+=============+
| 0 | Network Time Protocol | [RFC8915], |
| | version 4 (NTPv4) | Section 7.7 |
+-------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| 1 | Precision Time Protocol | This |
| | version 2.1 (PTPv2.1) | document |
+-------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| 2 - 32767 | Unassigned | |
+-------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| 32768 - | Reserved for Private or | |
| 65535 | Experimental Use | |
+-------------+-------------------------+-------------+
Table 20: NTS next protocol IDs
Possible NTP/PTP conflict:
* The support of multiple protocols in this record may lead to the
problem that records in NTS messages can no longer be assigned to
a specific time protocol.
* For example, an NTS request could include records for both NTP and
PTP.
* However, NTS for NTP does not use NTS message types and the End of
Message record is also not defined for the case of multiple NTS
requests in one TLS message.
* This leads to the mixing of the records in the NTS messages.
* A countermeasure is the use of only a single time protocol in the
NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record that explicitly assigns the
NTS message to a specific time protocol.
* When using NTS-secured NTP and NTS-secured PTP, two separate NTS
requests i.e., two separate TLS sessions MUST be made.
4.2.9. NTS Message Type
Used in NTS-TSR protocol
This record enables the distinction between different NTS message
types and message versions for the NTS-TSR protocol. It MUST be
included exactly once in each NTS message in the NTS-TSR protocol.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1028 and the Critical Bit
MUST be set.
* The Record Body MUST consist of three data fields:
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+=========================+===============+========+========+
| Field | | Octets | Offset |
+=========================+===============+========+========+
| Message Type | | 2 | 0 |
+-------------------------+---------------+--------+--------+
| Message Version | Major version | 1 | 2 |
+-------------------------+---------------+--------+--------+
| Message Version (cont.) | Minor version | 1 | 3 |
+-------------------------+---------------+--------+--------+
Table 21: Content of the NTS Message Type record
* The Message Type field is a 16-bit unsigned integer in network
byte order, denoting the type of the current NTS message.
* The following values (tbd. by IANA) are defined for the Message
Type:
+======================+==========================================+
| Message Type (value) | NTS Message (NTS-TSR protocol) |
+======================+==========================================+
| 0 | PTP Registration Request |
+----------------------+------------------------------------------+
| 1 | PTP Registration Response |
+----------------------+------------------------------------------+
| 2 | PTP Registration Revoke |
+----------------------+------------------------------------------+
| 3 | PTP Heartbeat |
+----------------------+------------------------------------------+
| 4 - 32767 | Unassigned |
+----------------------+------------------------------------------+
| 32768 - 65535 | Reserved for Private or Experimental Use |
+----------------------+------------------------------------------+
Table 22: NTS Message Types for the NTS-TSR protocol
* The Message Version consists of a tuple of two 8-bit unsigned
integers in network byte order:
*NTS Message Version = {major version || minor version}*
* The representable version is therefore in the range 0.0 to 255.255
(e.g., v1.4 = 0104h).
* All NTS messages for PTPv2.1 described in this document are in
version number 1.0.
* Thus the Message Version MUST match 0100h.
4.2.10. PTP Time Server
Used in NTS-KE and NTS-TSR protocol
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The PTP Time Server record is used exclusively in TiM (PTP unicast
connection) and signals to the client (PTP requester) for which
grantor the security parameters are valid. This record is used both,
in the NTS-KE protocol in the PTP Key Response, and in NTS-TSR
protocol in the PTP Registration Request message.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1029 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The record body consists of a set of association values
constructed of the data tuple which forms the record body of the
Association Mode record described in Section 4.2.2 (Association
Mode).
* The structure of the record body and all conditions MUST be
identical to the rules described in Section 4.2.2 (Association
Mode) of this document, with the following exceptions:
* In a PTP Key Response message, this record MUST be contained
exactly once within a container record (e.g., Current Parameters
container record).
* The PTP Time Server record contains a list of all available
addresses of the grantor assigned by the NTS-KE server.
* This MUST be one of the following association types: IPv4, IPv6,
MAC address, as well as the PortIdentity of the grantor.
* It MUST NOT be the association type Group.
* The list SHALL contain only one of each association type.
* This allows the client to change the PTP transport mode (e.g.,
from IPv4 to IEEE 802.3) without performing a new NTS request.
* The list in the PTP Time Server record MUST NOT contain the
Association Type number 0 (multicast group) and MUST contain at
least one entry.
* The NTS-KE server SHOULD provide the grantor addresses requested
by the client in the PTP Key Request message, but MAY also assign
a different grantor to the client.
* In a PTP Registration Request message, this record MUST be
included exactly once.
* The grantor MUST enter all network addresses that are supported
for a unicast connection.
* This can be an IPv4, IPv6, MAC address, as well as the
PortIdentity.
* The list in the PTP Time Server record MUST NOT contain the
Association Type number 0 (multicast group) and MUST contain at
least the PortIdentity.
* The PortIdentity is especially needed by the NTS-KE server to
identify the correct PTP instance (the grantor) in case of a PTP
Registration Revoke message.
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4.2.11. Security Association
Used in NTS-KE protocol
This record contains the information "how" specific PTP message types
must be secured. It comprises all dynamic (negotiable) values
necessary to construct the AUTHENTICATION TLV (IEEE Std 1588-2019,
Section 16.14.3). Static values and flags, such as the
secParamIndicator, are described in more detail in Section 7.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1030 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The Record Body is a sequence of various parameters in network
byte order and MUST be formatted according to the following table:
+============================+========+========+
| Field | Octets | Offset |
+============================+========+========+
| Security Parameter Pointer | 1 | 0 |
+----------------------------+--------+--------+
| Integrity Algorithm Type | 2 | 1 |
+----------------------------+--------+--------+
| Key ID | 4 | 3 |
+----------------------------+--------+--------+
| Key Length | 2 | 7 |
+----------------------------+--------+--------+
| Key | K | 9 |
+----------------------------+--------+--------+
Table 23: Security Association record
* In a PTP Key Response message, the Security Association record
MUST be included exactly once in the Current Parameters container
record and the Next Parameters container record.
* The Next Parameters container record MUST be present only during
the update period.
* In TiM, the Security Association record MUST be included exactly
once in the encrypted Ticket as well.
Security Parameter Pointer
* The Security Parameter Pointer (SPP) is an 8-bit unsigned integer
in the closed range 0 to 255.
* This value enables the mutual assignment of SA, SP and
AUTHENTICATION TLVs.
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* The generation and management of the SPP is controlled by the NTS-
KE server (see Section 5.3).
Integrity Algorithm Type
* This value is a 16-bit unsigned integer in network byte order.
* The possible values are equivalent to the MAC algorithm types from
the table in Section 4.2.14.
* The value used depends on the negotiated or predefined MAC
algorithm.
Key ID
* The key ID is a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte order.
* The field length is oriented towards the structure of the
AUTHENTICATION TLV.
* The generation and management of the key ID is controlled by the
NTS-KE server.
* The NTS-KE server MUST ensure that every key ID is unique.
- Previous key IDs SHOULD NOT be reused for a certain number of
rotation periods or a defined period of time (see Section 5.3).
Key Length
* This value is a 16-bit unsigned integer in network byte order,
denoting the length of the key in octets.
Key
* The value is a sequence of octets with a length of Key Length.
* This symmetric key is needed together with the MAC algorithm to
calculate the ICV.
* It can be both a group key (GrM) or a unicast key (TiM).
4.2.12. Source PortIdentity
Used in NTS-KE and NTS-TSR protocol
This record contains a PTP PortIdentity and serves as an identifier.
In a PTP Key Request message, it enables the unique assignment of the
NTS request to the PTP instance of the sender, since the request may
have been sent to the NTS-KE server via a management port.
The PortIdentity is embedded in the PTP Key Response message within
the ticket to bind it to the PTP requester. Grantors can verify that
the ticket comes from the correct sender when it is received and
before it is decrypted, to prevent possible crypto-performance
attacks. In a PTP registration Revoke message this record enables
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the assignment of the grantor at the NTS-KE server to revoke an
existing registration. This is necessary because requesting PTP
devices may have multiple independent PTP ports and possibly multiple
registrations with the KE.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1031 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The record contains the PTP PortIdentity of the sender in network
byte order, with a total length of 10 octets.
* In a PTP Key Request message, this record MUST be included exactly
once if the client intends a unicast request in TiM and MUST NOT
be included if the client intends to join a multicast group/Go2 (=
GrM).
* In a PTP Registration Revoke message, this record MUST be included
exactly once.
* The PortIdentity consists of the attributes clockIdentity and
portNumber:
*PortIdentity = {clockIdentity || portNumber}*
* The clockIdentity is an 8-octet array and the portNumber is a
16-bit unsigned integer (source: [IEEE1588-2019], Sections 5.3.5
and 7.5)
4.2.13. Status
Used in NTS-TSR protocol
The Status record is an optional record that represents the current
load of the grantor if status type is 0. It allows the NTS-KE server
to improve load balancing when assigning grantors to the requesting
PTP clients in TiM. The content of the record is designed in such a
way that it can also transmit other information (e.g., manufacturer-
related information).
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1032 and the Critical Bit
SHOULD NOT be set.
* The Record Body MUST consist of two data fields:
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+=============+========+========+
| Field | Octets | Offset |
+=============+========+========+
| Status Type | 2 | 0 |
+-------------+--------+--------+
| Status Data | D | 2 |
+-------------+--------+--------+
Table 24: Structure of the
Status record
* The Status Type is a 16-bit unsigned integer in network byte
order, denoting the content of the Status Data field.
* The Status Data field is a sequence of octets in network byte
order whose length, content and structure is determined by the
Status Type field.
* The following values are currently set:
+===============+========================+==============+
| Status Type | Status Data length | Description |
+===============+========================+==============+
| 0 | 1 octet (unsigned int) | grantor load |
+---------------+------------------------+--------------+
| 1 - 32767 | Unassigned | |
+---------------+------------------------+--------------+
| 32768 - 65535 | Reserved for Private | |
| | or Experimental Use | |
+---------------+------------------------+--------------+
Table 25: Values for Status Data
* With Status Type 0 (tbd. by IANA) the value designates the grantor
load percentage (0% - 100%).
* The NTS-KE server shall ignore values greater than 100.
* In a PTP Heartbeat message this record MAY be contained once or
several times.
* If multiple status records are included, the status type MUST NOT
occur twice.
* The NTS-KE server MAY use the status record for optimizations and
MAY also ignore them.
4.2.14. Supported MAC Algorithms
Used in NTS-KE and NTS-TSR protocol
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This record allows free negotiation of the MAC algorithm needed to
generate the ICV. Since multicast groups are restricted to a shared
algorithm, this record is used mandatorily in a PTP Registration
Request message and MAY be used (optionally) in a PTP Key Request
message.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1033 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The Record Body contains a sequence of 16-bit unsigned integers in
network byte order.
*Supported MAC Algorithms = {MAC 1 || MAC 2 || …}*
* Each integer (tbd. by IANA) represents a MAC Algorithm Type
defined in the table below.
* Duplicate identifiers SHOULD NOT be included.
* Each PTP node MUST support at least the HMAC-SHA256-128 algorithm.
+===============+==================+============+===================+
| MAC Algorithm | MAC Algorithm | ICV | Reference |
| Types | | Length | |
| | | (octets) | |
+===============+==================+============+===================+
| 0 | HMAC-SHA256-128 | 16 | [fiPS-PUB-198-1], |
| | | | [IEEE1588-2019] |
+---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+
| 1 | HMAC-SHA256 | 32 | [fiPS-PUB-198-1] |
+---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+
| 2 | AES-CMAC | 16 | [RFC4493] |
+---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+
| 3 | AES-GMAC-128 | 16 | [RFC4543] |
+---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+
| 4 | AES-GMAC-192 | 24 | [RFC4543] |
+---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+
| 5 | AES-GMAC-256 | 32 | [RFC4543] |
+---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+
| 6 - 32767 | Unassigned | | |
+---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+
| 32768 - 65535 | Reserved for | | |
| | Private or | | |
| | Experimental Use | | |
+---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+
Table 26: MAC Algorithms
In Group-based mode (GrM):
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* This record is not necessary, since all PTP nodes in a multicast
group MUST support the same MAC algorithm.
* Therefore, this record SHOULD NOT be included in a PTP Key Request
message and the NTS-KE server MUST ignore this record if the
Association Type in the Association Mode record is 0 (= multicast
group).
* Unless this is specified otherwise by a PTP profile, the HMAC-
SHA256-128 algorithm SHALL be used by default.
In Ticket-based mode (TiM):
* In a PTP Key Request message, this record MAY be contained if the
requester wants a unicast connection (TiM, not Go2) to a specific
grantor.
* The requester MUST NOT send more than one record of this type.
* If this record is present, at least the HMAC-SHA256-128 MAC
algorithm MUST be included.
* If multiple MAC algorithms are supported, the requester SHOULD put
the desired algorithm identifiers in descending priority in the
record body.
* Strong algorithms with higher bit lengths SHOULD have higher
priority.
* In a PTP Registration Request message, this record MUST be present
and the grantor MUST include all supported MAC algorithms in any
order.
* The NTS-KE server selects the algorithm after receiving a PTP Key
Request message in unicast mode.
* The NTS-KE server SHOULD choose the highest priority MAC algorithm
from the request message that grantor and requester support.
* The NTS-KE server MAY ignore the priority and choose a different
algorithm that grantor and requester support.
* If the MAC Algorithm Negotiation record is not within the PTP Key
Request message, the NTS-KE server MUST choose the default
algorithm HMAC-SHA256-128.
Initialization Vector (IV)
* If GMAC is to be supported as a MAC algorithm, then an
Initialization Vector (IV) must be constructed according to IETF
RFC 4543 [RFC4543], Section 3.1.
* Therefore, the IV MUST be eight octets long and MUST NOT be
repeated for a specific key.
* This can be achieved, for example, by using a counter.
4.2.15. Ticket
Used in NTS-KE protocol
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This record contains the parameters of the negotiated AEAD algorithm
chosen between the grantor and the NTS-KE server, as well as an
encrypted security association. The record contains all the
necessary security parameters that the grantor needs for a secured
PTP unicast connection to the requester. The ticket is encrypted by
the NTS-KE server with the symmetric ticket key which is also known
to the grantor. The requester is not able to decrypt the encrypted
security association within the ticket.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1034 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The Record Body consists of several data fields and MUST be
formatted as follows.
+================================+========+========+
| Field | Octets | Offset |
+================================+========+========+
| Ticket Key ID | 4 | 0 |
+--------------------------------+--------+--------+
| Source PortIdentity | 10 | 4 |
+--------------------------------+--------+--------+
| Nonce Length | 2 | 14 |
+--------------------------------+--------+--------+
| Nonce | N | 16 |
+--------------------------------+--------+--------+
| Encrypted SA Length | 2 | N+16 |
+--------------------------------+--------+--------+
| Encrypted Security Association | E | N+18 |
+--------------------------------+--------+--------+
Table 27: Structure of a Ticket record
* In a PTP Key Response message, this record MUST be included
exactly once each in the Current Parameters container record and
the Next Parameters container record if the requesting client
wants a unicast communication to a specific grantor in TiM.
* The Next Parameters container record MUST be present only during
the update period.
Ticket Key ID
* This is a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte order, denoting
the key ID of the ticket key.
* The value is set by the NTS-KE server and is valid for the
respective validity period.
* See also Section 4.2.17 for more details.
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Source PortIdentity
* This 10-octet long field contains the identical Source
PortIdentity of the PTP client from the PTP Key Request message.
Nonce Length
* This is a 16-bit unsigned integer in network byte order, denoting
the length of the Nonce field in octets.
Nonce
* This field contains the Nonce needed for the AEAD operation.
* The length and conditions attached to the Nonce depend on the AEAD
algorithm used.
* More details and conditions are described in Section 5.2.
Encrypted SA Length
* This is a 16-bit unsigned integer in network byte order, denoting
the length of the Encrypted Security Association field in octets.
Encrypted Security Association
* This field contains the output of the AEAD operation
(“Ciphertext”) after the encryption process of the respective
Record Body of the respective Security Association record.
* The plaintext of this field is described in Section 4.2.11.
* More details about the AEAD process and the required input data
are described in Section 5.2.
4.2.16. Ticket Key
Used in NTS-TSR protocol
This record contains the ticket key, which together with an AEAD
algorithm is used to encrypt and decrypt the ticket payload (content
of the Encrypted Security Association field in the Ticket record).
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1035 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The Record Body consists of a sequence of octets holding the
symmetric key for the AEAD function.
* The generation and length of the key MUST meet the requirements of
the associated AEAD algorithm.
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* In a PTP Registration Response message, this record MUST be
included exactly once each in the Current Parameters container
record and the Next Parameters container record.
* The Next Parameters container record MUST be present only during
the update period.
4.2.17. Ticket Key ID
Used in NTS-TSR protocol
The Ticket Key ID record is a unique identifier that allows a grantor
to identify the associated ticket key. The NTS-KE server is
responsible for generating this key ID, which is also unique to the
PTP network and incremented at each rotation period. The associated
key is known only to the NTS-KE server and grantor, and is generated
and exchanged during the registration phase of the grantor. All
tickets generated by the NTS-KE server for the corresponding grantor
in this validity period using the same ticket key ID.
Content and conditions:
* The record has a Record Type number of 1036 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The Record Body consists of a 32-bit unsigned integer in network
byte order.
* The generation and management of the ticket key ID is controlled
by the NTS-KE server.
* The NTS-KE server must ensure that every ticket key has a unique
number.
- The value is implementation dependent and MAY be an
enumeration.
- Previous IDs SHOULD NOT be reused for a certain number of
rotation periods or a defined period of time.
* In a PTP Registration Response message, this record MUST be
included exactly once in the Current Parameters container record
and once in the Next Parameters container record.
* The Next Parameters container record MUST be present only during
the update period.
* The Ticket record MUST be present in TiM and MUST NOT be present
in GrM.
4.2.18. Validity Period
Used in NTS-KE and NTS-TSR protocol
This record contains the validity information of the respective
security parameters (see also Section 2.5.1).
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Content and conditions:
* In a PTP Key Response as well as in the PTP Registration Response
message, this record MUST be included exactly once each in the
Current Parameters container record and the Next Parameters
container record.
* The record has a Record Type number of 1037 and the Critical Bit
MAY be set.
* The Record Body MUST consist of three data fields:
+===============+========+========+
| Field | Octets | Offset |
+===============+========+========+
| Lifetime | 4 | 0 |
+---------------+--------+--------+
| Update Period | 4 | 4 |
+---------------+--------+--------+
| Grace Period | 4 | 8 |
+---------------+--------+--------+
Table 28: Structure of a
Validity Period record
Lifetime
* The Lifetime is a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte order.
* If this record is within a Current Parameters container record, it
shows the remaining lifetime of the security parameters for the
current validity period in seconds.
* If this record is within a Next Parameters container record, it
shows the total lifetime of the security parameters for the next
validity period in seconds.
* The counting down of the Next Parameters lifetime starts as soon
as the remaining lifetime of the Current Parameters reaches 0s.
* The maximum value is set by the NTS-KE administrator or the PTP
profile.
* In conjunction with a PTP unicast establishment in TiM, the
lifetime of the unicast key (within the Security Association
record), the ticket key and registration lifetime of a grantor
with the NTS-KE server MUST be identical.
Update Period
* The Update Period is a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte
order.
* It specifies how many seconds before the lifetime expires the
update period starts.
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* Unlike the lifetime, this is a fixed value that is not counted
down.
* The Update Period value MUST NOT be greater than the full
Lifetime.
* Recommended is an Update Period of 120s-300s if the full Lifetime
is 900s or longer.
* If the value of the Update Period in the Current Parameters
container record is greater than the Lifetime, then the key update
process has started.
* The presence or absence of the Next Parameters container record is
specified in Section 4.2.7.
Grace Period
* The Grace Period is a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte
order.
* It defines how many seconds expired security parameters MUST still
be accepted.
* This allows the verification of incoming PTP messages that were
still on the network and secured with the old parameters.
* The Grace Period value MUST NOT be greater than the Update Period.
* Recommended is a Grace Period of 0 to 5 seconds.
Notes:
* Requests during the currently running lifetime will receive
respectively adapted count values.
* The lifetime is a counter that is decremented and marks the
expiration of defined parameters when the value reaches zero.
* The realization is implementation-dependent and can be done for
example by a secondly decrementing.
* It MUST be ensured that jumps (e.g., by adjustment of the local
clock) are avoided.
* The use of a monotonic clock is suitable for this.
* Furthermore, it is to be considered which consequences the
drifting of the local clock can cause.
* With sufficiently small values of the lifetime (<12 hours), this
factor should be negligible.
5. Additional Mechanisms
This section provides information about the replay protection to be
applied, the use of the negotiated AEAD algorithm as well as the
generation of the security policy pointers.
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5.1. Replay Protection
Protection against replay attacks is an important mechanism in
NTS4PTP. Without it, attackers can distribute false timing
information in the PTP network, especially in multicast communication
mode, by replaying intercepted and authenticated PTP packets. For
unicast connections, the lack of an anti-replay mechanism can lead to
attackers breaking an existing contract of a requester or initiating
a new one for it. Furthermore, attackers would be able to perform
DoS amplification attacks using unicast contracts.
In principle, there are three ways to implement replay protection.
The first option is to use a one-time-use random number that is
embedded in a message as a unique identifier. In the case of
bidirectional communication, such an identifier is included in a
request, which the communication partner then copies into the
response message. If the identifiers between request and response
are identical, then a replay can be ruled out. The advantage is the
statelessness of the responding communication partner, but this
method can only be used with pure unicast connections
(request–response principle).
The second option is to use absolute time information, such as that
used by Kerberos [RFC4120] in its tickets. Messages have a defined
lifetime and can no longer be misused. . However, this requires
time-synchronous devices and since PTP transmits timing information
as payload data, the use of this variant is not possible.
The last one is the use of sequence numbers. Here, the sender
increments a number contained in each message. The advantage is that
both the packet sequence and possible packet loss can be identified.
But this requires a stateful sender and possibly negotiation of the
starting value. Furthermore, the range of values must not be too
small, otherwise the protection may be broken if the overflow is not
taken into account.
In NTS4PTP, the first variant is used for bidirectional communication
(e.g., delay req/resp messages) whereas the third variant is used for
unidirectional communication (e.g., sync messages). It does not
matter whether the communication takes place in GrM or TiM. PTPv2.1
already uses a sequence ID in the PTP header to ensure the correct
packet sequence, so that statelessness is not a goal. However, the
sequence ID of two octets is too small to provide effective replay
protection. With a maximum frame rate of 128 sync messages per
second, an overflow already occurs after 8 min and 32 s. Even with
unicast connections, this is not sufficient if the negotiated
contract duration corresponds to the maximum duration of 1000s (16 m
40s) suggested by the PTP standard ([IEEE1588-2019], p. 374]. For
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this reason, NTS4PTP defines its own sequence numbers, which are
handled individually for each PTP message type and for each PTP
signaling message type. The sequence numbers have a size of four
octets each, so that at the maximum frame rate an overflow only
occurs after 388 days. A sequence number of a PTP message is stored
in the corresponding SA as well as in the AuthTLV of a secured PTP
message.
The mode of operation is based on the anti-replay algorithm defined
for IPsec [RFC6479]. Replay protection therefore uses a sliding
window whose size is configurable by the administrator. NTS4PTP
initiates the sequence numbers with zero regardless of GrM or TiM and
resets after each key rotation period to prevent the sequence numbers
from overflowing. Since a new key is used to secure the PTP messages
after resetting the sequence numbers, a replay attack is also
prevented here. However, there is a special case with the random
numbers (variant 1), which are used in bidirectional communication.
These protect the PTP client from replay, but not the PTP server.
This is problematic in unicast negotiation, because an attacker can
negotiate new contracts at the grantor, which a PTP client did not
want at all. NTS4PTP solves it with the grantor storing the random
numbers from the unicast requests of a PTP client for the duration of
the current validity period. Thus the grantor can check on incoming
unicast requests whether the given number has already been used.
Since the collision probability is very low when generating random
numbers, the grantor could assume a replay attempt in such a case and
discard the received message. The short-term buffering of numbers is
not problematic from the current point of view, since only a few
numbers need to be stored due to the short validity periods. Since
this is only the case for authenticated messages, an attacker cannot
fill the memory with bogus packets.
5.2. AEAD Operation
General information about AEAD:
* The AEAD operation enables the integrity protection and the
optional encryption of the given data, depending on the input
parameters.
* While the structure of the AEAD output after the securing
operation is determined by the negotiated AEAD algorithm, it
usually contains an authentication tag in addition to the actual
ciphertext.
* The authentication tag provides the integrity protection, whereas
the ciphertext represents the encrypted data.
* The AEAD algorithms supported in this document (see Section 4.2.1)
always return an authentication tag with a fixed length of 16
octets.
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* The size of the following ciphertext is equal to the length of the
plaintext.
* The concatenation of authentication tag and ciphertext always form
the unit “Ciphertext”:
*Ciphertext = {authentication tag || ciphertext}*
* Hint: The term “Ciphertext” is distinguished between upper and
lower case letters.
* The following text always describes "Ciphertext".
* Separation of the information concatenated in Ciphertext is not
necessary at any time.
* Six parameters are relevant for the execution of an AEAD
operation:
- AEAD (...): is the AEAD algorithm itself
- A: Associated Data
- N: Nonce
- K: Key
- P: Plaintext
- C: Ciphertext
* The protection and encryption of the data is done as follows: C =
AEAD (A, N, K, P)
* Therefore, the output of the AEAD function is the Ciphertext.
* The verification and decryption of the data is done this way: P =
AEAD (A, N, K, C)
* The output of the AEAD function is the Plaintext if the integrity
verification is successful.
AEAD algorithm and input/output values for the Ticket record:
* AEAD (…):
- The AEAD algorithm that is negotiated between grantor and NTS-
KE server during the registration phase.
- A list of the AEAD algorithms considered in this document can
be found in Section 4.2.1.
* Associated Data:
- The Associated Data is an optional AEAD parameter and can be of
any length and content, as long as the AEAD algorithm does not
give any further restrictions.
- In addition to the Plaintext, this associated data is also
included in the integrity protection.
- When encrypting or decrypting the Security Association record,
this parameter MUST remain empty.
* Nonce:
- Corresponds to the value from the Nonce field in the Ticket
(Section 4.2.15).
- The requirements and conditions depend on the selected AEAD
algorithm.
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- For the AEAD algorithms defined in Section 4.2.1 (with numeric
identifiers 15, 16, 17), a cryptographically secure random
number MUST be used.
- Due to the block length of the internal AES algorithm, the
Nonce SHOULD have a length of 16 octets.
* Key:
- This is the symmetric key required by the AEAD algorithm.
- The key length depends on the selected algorithm.
- When encrypting or decrypting the Security Association record,
the ticket key MUST be used.
* Plaintext:
- This parameter contains the data to be encrypted and secured.
- For AEAD encryption, this corresponds to the Record Body of the
Security Association record with all parameters inside.
- This is also the output of the AEAD operation after the
decryption process.
* Ciphertext:
- Corresponds to the value from the Encrypted Security
Association field in the Ticket (Section 4.2.15).
- The Ciphertext is the output of the AEAD operation after the
encryption process.
- This is also the input parameter for the AEAD decryption
operation.
5.3. SA/SPP Management
This section describes the requirements and recommendations attached
to SA/SPP management, as well as details about the generation of
identifiers.
Requirements for the Security Association Database management:
* The structure and management of the Security Association Database
(SAD) are implementation-dependent both on the NTS-KE server and
on the PTP devices.
* An example of this, as well as other recommendations, are
described in Annex P of IEEE Std 1588-2019 ([IEEE1588-2019].
* A PTP device MUST contain exactly one SAD and Security Policy
Database (SPD).
* For multicast and Group-of-2 connections, SPPs MUST NOT occur more
than once in the SAD of a PTP device.
* For unicast connections, SPPs MAY occur more than once in the SAD
of a PTP device.
* The NTS-KE server MUST ensure that SPPs can be uniquely assigned
to a multicast group or unicast connection.
* This concerns both the NTS-KE server and all PTP devices assigned
to the NTS-KE server.
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SPP generation:
The generation of the SPP always takes place on the NTS-KE server
and enables the identification of a corresponding SA. The value
of the SPP can be either a random number or an enumeration. An
SPP used in any multicast group MUST NOT occur in any other
multicast group or unicast connection. If a multicast group or
unicast connection is removed by the NTS-KE server, the released
SPPs MAY be reused for new groups or unicast connections. Before
reusing an SPP, the NTS-KE server MUST ensure that the SPP is no
longer in use in the PTP network (e.g., within Next Parameters).
In different PTP devices, an SPP used in a unicast connection MAY
also occur in another unicast connection, as long as they are not
used in multicast groups.
Key/Key ID generation:
The generation of the keys MUST be performed by using a
Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG)
on the NTS-KE server (see also Section 2.5.2). The length of the
keys depends on the MAC algorithm used. The generation and
management of the key ID is also controlled by the NTS-KE server.
The NTS-KE server MUST ensure that every key ID is unique at least
within an SA with multiple parameter sets. The value of the key
ID is implementation dependent and MAY be either a random number,
a hash value or an enumeration. Key IDs of expired keys MAY be
reused but SHOULD NOT be reused for a certain number of rotation
periods or a defined period of time. Before reusing a key ID, the
NTS-KE server MUST be ensured that the key ID is no longer in use
in the PTP network (e.g., within Next Parameters).
6. New TICKET TLV for PTP Messages
Once a PTP port is registered as a grantor for association in unicast
mode another PTP port (requester) can associate with it by first
requesting a key from the NTS-KE server with Association Type in the
Association Mode record set to one of the values 1 to 4 (IPv4, IPv6,
802.3 or PortIdentity), and Association Values to the related address
of the desired grantor. After the reception of a PTP Key Response
message during the NTS-KE protocol the requester obtains the unicast
key and the Ticket record containing the Record Body of the Security
Association record (see Section 2.4 and Section 4.2.15). The ticket
includes the identification of the requester, the Encrypted SA along
with the unicast key as well as the lifetime in the Validity record.
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To provide the grantor with the security data, the requester sends a
secured unicast request to the grantor, e.g., an Announce request (=
Signaling message with a REQUEST_UNICAST_TRANSMISSION TLV with
Announce as messageType in the TLV), which is secured with the
unicast key.
To accomplish that, the requester sends a newly defined TICKET TLV
with the Ticket embedded and the AUTHENTICATION TLV with the PTP
unicast negotiation message. The TICKET TLV must be positioned
before the AUTHENTICATION TLV to include the TICKET TLV in the
securing by the ICV. The receiving grantor decrypts the Ticket
(actually the encrypted security association) from the TICKET TLV
getting access to the information therein. With the contained
unicast key, the grantor checks the requester identity and the
authenticity of the request message.
Thereafter, all secured unicast messages between grantor and
requester will use the unicast key for generating the ICV in the
AUTHENTICATION TLV for authentication of the message until the
unicast key expires.
If the requester’s identity does not match with the Source
PortIdentity field in the Ticket or the ICV in the AUTHENTICATION TLV
is not identical to the generated ICV by the grantor, then the
unicast request message MUST be denied.
The TICKET TLV structure is given in Table 29 below.
+===============+========+========+
| Field | Octets | Offset |
+===============+========+========+
| tlvType | 2 | 0 |
+---------------+--------+--------+
| lengthfield | 2 | 2 |
+---------------+--------+--------+
| Ticket record | T | 4 |
+---------------+--------+--------+
Table 29: Structure of the
TICKET TLV
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To comply with the TLV structure of IEEE Std 1588-2019
([IEEE1588-2019], Section 14.1) the TICKET TLV is structured as
presented in Table 29 with a newly defined tlvType, a respective
length field and the Ticket record (see Section 4.2.15) containing
the encrypted security association. Eventually the Ticket TLV may be
defined externally to IEEE 1588 SA, e.g., by the IETF. Then the
structure should follow IEEE Std 1588-2019 ([IEEE1588-2019],
Section 14.3) to define a new standard organization extension TLV as
presented in Table 30 below.
+=====================+========+========+
| Field | Octets | Offset |
+=====================+========+========+
| tlvType | 2 | 0 |
+---------------------+--------+--------+
| lengthfield | 2 | 2 |
+---------------------+--------+--------+
| organizationId | 3 | 4 |
+---------------------+--------+--------+
| organizationSubType | 3 | 7 |
+---------------------+--------+--------+
| Ticket record | T | 10 |
+---------------------+--------+--------+
Table 30: Structure of an
organization extension TLV form for
the TICKET TLV
The TICKET TLV will be added to the PTP message preceding the
AUTHENTICATION TLV as shown in figure 48 of IEEE Std 1588-2019
([IEEE1588-2019], Section 16.14.1.1).
7. AUTHENTICATION TLV Parameters
The AUTHENTICATION TLV is the heart of the integrated security
mechanism (prong A) for PTP. It provides all necessary data for the
processing of the security means. The structure is shown in Table 31
below (compare to figure 49 of [IEEE1588-2019]).
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+===================+===========+================================+
| TLV Field | Use | Description |
+===================+===========+================================+
| tlvType | mandatory | TLV Type |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
| lengthfield | mandatory | TLV Length Information |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
| SPP | mandatory | Security Parameter Pointer |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
| secParamIndicator | mandatory | Security Parameter Indicator |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
| keyID | mandatory | Key Identifier or Current Key |
| | | Disclosure Interval, depending |
| | | on verification scheme |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
| disclosedKey | optional | Disclosed key from previous |
| | | interval |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
| sequenceNo | optional | Sequence number |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
| RES | optional | Reserved |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
| ICV | mandatory | ICV based on algorithm OID |
+-------------------+-----------+--------------------------------+
Table 31: Structure of the AUTHENTICATION TLV
The tlvType is AUTHENTICATION and lengthfield gives the length of the
TLV. When using the AUTHENTICATION TLV with NTS key management, the
SPP and keyID will be provided by the NTS-KE server in the PTP Key
Response message
The optional disclosedKey, sequenceNo, and RES fields are omitted.
So all of the flags in the SecParamIndicator MUST be FALSE.
ICV field contains the integrity check value of the particular PTP
message calculated using the integrity algorithm defined by the key
management.
(... Use of the field sequenceNo has to be discussed with the
IEEE1588. If used it may enable replay protection for more than 388
days before an overflow occurs, see Section 5.1 ... )
8. IANA Considerations
Considerations should be made ...
...
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9. Security Considerations
...
10. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank ...
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[fiPS-PUB-198-1]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)",
NIST fiPS PUB 198-1, 2008.
[IANA_AEAD]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA, "Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) Parameters",
IANA AEAD Parameters (2022), December 2022,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/aead-parameters/aead-
parameters.xhtml>.
[IEEE1588-2019]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers - IEEE
Standards Association, "IEEE Standard for a Precision
Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement
and Control Systems", IEEE Standard 1588-2019, 2019.
[ITU-T_X.509]
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), "Information
technology – Open systems interconnection – The Directory:
Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", ITU-T
Recommendation X.509 (2008), November 2008.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4120, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4120>.
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[RFC4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4543, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8915] Franke, D., Sibold, D., Teichel, K., Dansarie, M., and R.
Sundblad, "Network Time Security for the Network Time
Protocol", RFC 8915, DOI 10.17487/RFC8915, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8915>.
11.2. Informative References
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[Langer_et_al._2020]
Langer, M., Heine, K., Sibold, D., and R. Bermbach, "A
Network Time Security Based Automatic Key Management for
PTPv2.1", 2020 IEEE 45th Conference on Local Computer
Networks (LCN), Sydney, Australia,
DOI 10.1109/LCN48667.2020.9314809, November 2020,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9314809>.
[Langer_et_al._2022]
Langer, M. and R. Bermbach, "A comprehensive key
management solution for PTP networks", Computer
Networks, Volume 213 (2022), 109075,
DOI 10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109075, June 2022,
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S1389128622002158>.
[RFC4493] Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The
AES-CMAC Algorithm", RFC 4493, DOI 10.17487/RFC4493, June
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4493>.
[RFC5297] Harkins, D., "Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV)
Authenticated Encryption Using the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES)", RFC 5297, DOI 10.17487/RFC5297, October
2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5297>.
[RFC6479] Zhang, X. and T. Tsou, "IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm
without Bit Shifting", RFC 6479, DOI 10.17487/RFC6479,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6479>.
Authors' Addresses
Martin Langer
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB)
Bundesallee 100
38116 Braunschweig
Germany
Email: martin.langer@ptb.de
Rainer Bermbach
Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences
Salzdahlumer Straße 46/48
38302 Wolfenbüttel
Germany
Email: r.bermbach@ostfalia.de
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