SeND Hash Threat Analysis
draft-kukec-csi-hash-threat-02

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2008-10-27 (latest revision 2008-07-01)
Replaced by draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kukec-csi-hash-threat-02.txt

Abstract

This document analysis the use of hashes in SeND, possible threats and the impact of recent attacks on hash functions used by SeND. Current SeND specification [rfc3971] uses SHA-1 [sha-1] hash algorithm and PKIX certificates [rfc3280] and does not provide support for the hash algorithm agility. Based on previous analysis, this document suggests multiple hash support that should be included in the SeND update specification.

Authors

Ana Kukec (ana.kukec@fer.hr)
Suresh Krishnan (suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com)
Sheng Jiang (shengjiang@huawei.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)