A List-safe Canonicalization for DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
draft-kucherawy-dkim-list-canon-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Murray Kucherawy | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-07 (Latest revision 2015-04-05) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) introduced a mechanism whereby a mail operator can affix a signature to a message that validates at the level of the signer's domain name. It specified two possible ways of converting the message body to a canonical form, one intolerant of changes and the other tolerant of simple changes to whitespace within the message body. The provided canonicalization schemes do not tolerate changes in a structured message such as conversion between transfer encodings or addition of new message parts. It is useful to have these capabilities to allow for transport through gateways, and also for transport through handlers (such as mailing list services) that might add content that would invalidate a signature generated using the existing canonicalization schemes. This document presents a mechanism for generating a canonicalization that can allows easy detection of modified content while still being valid for the content it originally signed. It also presents a use profile of DKIM that takes advantage of this capability.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)