Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-kent-sidrops-8211bis-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Stephen Kent  , Di Ma 
Last updated 2020-07-25
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SIDROPS                                                          S. Kent
Internet-Draft                                               Independent
Intended status: Informational                                     D. Ma
Expires: January 26, 2021                                           ZDNS
                                                           July 25, 2020

Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager
            in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
                     draft-kent-sidrops-8211bis-00

Abstract

   This document analyzes actions by or against a Certification
   Authority (CA) or an independent repository manager in the RPKI that
   can adversely affect the Internet Number Resources (INRs) associated
   with that CA or its subordinate CAs.  The analysis is done from the
   perspective of an affected INR holder.  The analysis is based on
   examination of the data items in the RPKI repository, as controlled
   by a CA (or an independent repository manager) and fetched by Relying
   Parties (RPs).  The analysis does not purport to be comprehensive; it
   does represent an orderly way to analyze a number of ways that errors
   by or attacks against a CA or repository manager can affect the RPKI
   and routing decisions based on RPKI data.

Status of This Memo

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Kent & Ma               Expires January 26, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           RPKI Adverse CA Actions               July 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Analysis of RPKI Repository Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Manifest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.3.  Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.4.  ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.5.  Ghostbusters Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     2.6.  Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   3.  Analysis of Actions Relative to Scenarios . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.1.  Scenario A  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.2.  Scenario B  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.3.  Scenario C  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.4.  Scenario D  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Introduction

   In the context of this document, any change to the Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] that diminishes the set of
   Internet Number Resources (INRs) associated with an INR holder, and
   that is contrary to the holder's wishes, is termed "adverse".  This
   analysis is done from the perspective of an affected INR holder.  An
   action that results in an adverse charge (as defined above) may be
   the result of an attack on a CA [RFC7132], an error by a CA, or an
   error by or an attack on a repository operator.  Note that the CA
   that allocated the affected INRs may be acting in accordance with
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