Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions-02

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Authors Stephen Kent  , Di Ma 
Last updated 2016-04-15 (latest revision 2015-11-19)
Replaced by RFC 8211
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status (None)
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Expired & archived
pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream WG state Adopted by a WG
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions-02.txt

Abstract

This document analyzes actions by or against a CA or independent repository manager in the RPKI that can adversely affect the Internet Number Resources (INRs) associated with that CA or its subordinate CAs. The analysis is based on examination of the data items in the RPKI repository, as controlled by a CA (or independent repository manager) and fetched by Relying Parties (RPs). The analysis is performed from the perspective of an affected INR holder. The analysis does not purport to be comprehensive; it does represent an orderly way to analyze a number of ways that errors by or attacks against a CA or repository manager can affect the RPKI and routing decisions based on RPKI data.

Authors

Stephen Kent (kent@bbn.com)
Di Ma (madi@zdns.cn)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)