Confirming the Certificate structure in TLS with Secure DNS
draft-josefsson-keyassure-tls-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Simon Josefsson | ||
Last updated | 2010-08-23 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
TLS supports X.509 and OpenPGP certificate based mechanisms to authenticate a server. Users want their applications to verify that the certificate provided by the TLS server is in fact associated with the domain name they expect. Instead of trusting a certificate authority to have made this association correctly, and an X.509/ OpenPGP implementation to validate that properly, the user might instead trust the authoritative DNS server for the domain name to make that association. This document describes how to use secure DNS to associate the certificate chain transferred by TLS with the intended domain name.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)