TLS 1.3 Extended Key Schedule
draft-jhoyla-tls-extended-key-schedule-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Hoyland , Christopher A. Wood | ||
| Last updated | 2021-06-06 (Latest revision 2020-12-03) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
TLS 1.3 is sometimes used in situations where it is necessary to inject extra key material into the handshake. This draft aims to describe methods for doing so securely. This key material must be injected in such a way that both parties agree on what is being injected and why, and further, in what order.
Authors
Jonathan Hoyland
Christopher A. Wood
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)