Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity
draft-jholland-mboned-ambi-01
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Expired & archived
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Authors | Jake Holland , Kyle Rose | ||
Last updated | 2019-04-26 (Latest revision 2018-10-23) | ||
Replaced by | draft-ietf-mboned-ambi | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document introduces Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI). AMBI allows each receiver of a stream of multicast packets to check the integrity of the contents of each packet in the data stream. AMBI operates by employing a cryptographically-verifiable, loss- resilient sequence of manifests containing integrity information for both data and integrity packet payloads.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)