Skip to main content

ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2
draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05

Yes

(Alexey Melnikov)
(Kathleen Moriarty)

No Objection

(Alia Atlas)
(Alissa Cooper)
(Alvaro Retana)
(Benoît Claise)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Mirja Kühlewind)
(Suresh Krishnan)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 03 and is now closed.

Alexey Melnikov Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -04) Unknown

                            
Kathleen Moriarty Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -03) Unknown

                            
Adam Roach Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2017-05-23 for -04) Unknown
I agree with EKR's discuss -- specifying semantics for these ciphersuites with TLS 1.0 and 1.1 is a material change, and the proposed mechanism (in which servers are encouraged to infer 1.2 support even in the absence of explicit indication) is a bit baffling.

Given the scope this document covers, I recommend adding "1.2" to the title of the document. (e.g.: "ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security Version 1.2 (TLS 1.2)")
Alia Atlas Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Alissa Cooper Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Ben Campbell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2017-05-23 for -04) Unknown
I support Ekr's DISCUSS position.
Benoît Claise Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Eric Rescorla Former IESG member
(was Discuss) No Objection
No Objection (2017-05-22) Unknown
The citations to TLS 1.3 still seem pretty muddled. I think you
should just stop referencing and discussing 1.3.

S 2.
I'm not sure that the discussion of the PRF is helpful here in
mandating the non-use of these cipher suites with TLS 1.1 and
below.
Mirja Kühlewind Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Spencer Dawkins Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2017-05-24 for -04) Unknown
Ciphersuite drafts for TLS are usually above my pay grade, but I understand most of EKR's Discuss, and agree with Adam's suggestion to change the document title to "ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security Version 1.2 (TLS 1.2)" at an absolute minimum.
Suresh Krishnan Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown