Third-Party Token-based Authentication and Authorization for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz-07
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8898.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Rifaat Shekh-Yusef , Christer Holmberg , Victor Pascual | ||
| Last updated | 2020-02-02 (Latest revision 2020-01-15) | ||
| Replaces | draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-authn | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
GENART Last Call review
(of
-12)
by Linda Dunbar
Ready w/nits
|
||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | In WG Last Call | |
| Document shepherd | Jean Mahoney | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 8898 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | Jean Mahoney <mahoney@nostrum.com> |
draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz-07
SIP Core R. Shekh-Yusef
Internet-Draft Avaya
Updates: 3261 (if approved) C. Holmberg
Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson
Expires: July 18, 2020 V. Pascual
webrtchacks
January 15, 2020
Third-Party Token-based Authentication and Authorization for Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)
draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz-07
Abstract
This document defines a SIP mechanism that relies on the OAuth 2.0
and OpenID Connect Core 1.0 to enable delegation of the user
authentication and SIP registration authorization to a third-party.
The document updates RFC 3261.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 18, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Shekh-Yusef, et al. Expires July 18, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft 3rd-Party Token-based AuthNZ for SIP January 2020
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. SIP User Agent Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. SIP Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. UAC Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Obtaining Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Protecting the Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3. REGISTER Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.4. Non-REGISTER Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. UAS and Registrar Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Proxy Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Access Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Example Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Registration with Pre-Configured AS . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] uses the framework
used by HTTP [RFC7230] for authenticating users, which is a simple
challenge-response authentication mechanism that allows a server to
challenge a client request and allows a client to provide
authentication information in response to that challenge.
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OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines a token based authorization framework to
allow clients to access resources on behalf of their user.
The OpenID Connect 1.0 [OPENID] specifications defines a simple
identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which enables
clients to verify the identity of the user based on the
authentication performed by a dedicated authorization server, as well
as to obtain basic profile information about the user.
This document updates [RFC3261], by defining the UAC procedures if it
receives a 401/407 response with multiple WWW-Authenticate/Proxy-
Authenticate header fields, providing challenges using different
authentication schemes for the same realm.
This document defines an mechanism for SIP, that relies on the OAuth
2.0 and OpenID Connect Core 1.0 specifications, to enable the
delegation of the user authentication and SIP registration
authorization to a dedicated third-party entity that is separate from
the SIP network elements that provide the SIP service.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. SIP User Agent Types
[RFC6749] defines two types of clients, confidential and public, that
apply to the SIP User Agents.
o Confidential User Agent: is a SIP UA that is capable of
maintaining the confidentiality of the user credentials and any
tokens obtained using these user credentials.
o Public User Agent: is a SIP UA that is incapable of maintaining
the confidentiality of the user credentials and any obtained
tokens.
The mechanism defined in this document MUST only be used with
Confidential User Agents, as the UA is expected to obtain and
maintain tokens to be able to access the SIP network.
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2. SIP Procedures
Section 22 of [RFC3261] defines the SIP procedures for the Digest
authentication mechanism procedures. The same procedures apply to
the Bearer authentication mechanism, with the changes described in
this section.
2.1. UAC Behavior
2.1.1. Obtaining Tokens
When a UAC sends a request without credentials (or with credentials
that are no longer valid), and receives a 401 (Unauthorized) or a 407
(Proxy Authentication Required) response that contains a WWW-
Authenticate header field (in case of a 401 response) or a Proxy-
Authenticate header field (in case of a 407 response) that indicates
"Bearer" scheme authentication and contains an address to an
Authorization Server, the UAC contacts the Authorization Server in
order to obtain tokens, and includes the requested scopes, based on a
local configuration.
The tokens returned to the UA depend on the type of AS: with an OAuth
AS, the tokens provided are the access token and refresh token. The
access token will be sent to the SIP servers to authorize UAC's
access to the service. The refresh token will only be used with the
AS to get new access token and refresh token, before the expiry of
the current access token. With an OpenID Connect server, an
additional ID-Token is returned, which contains the SIP URI and other
user specific details, and will be consumed by the UAC.
The detailed OAuth2 procedure to authenticate the user and obtain
these tokens is out of scope of this document. [RFC8252] defines
procedures for native applications. When using the mechanism defined
in [RFC8252] the user will be directed to use a browser for the
interaction with the authorization server, allowing the authorization
server to prompt the user for multi-factor authentication, redirect
the user to third-party identity providers, and the use of single-
sign-on sessions.
If the UAC receives a 401/407 response with multiple WWW-
Authenticate/Proxy-Authenticate header fields, providing challenges
using different authentication schemes for the same realm, the UAC
provides credentials for one or more of the schemes that it supports,
based on local policy.
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NOTE: The address of the Authorization Server might be known to the
UAC e.g., using means of configuration, in which case the UAC can
contact the Authorization Server in order to obtain the access token
before it sends SIP request without credentials.
2.1.2. Protecting the Access Token
[RFC6749] mandates that Access Tokens are protected with TLS when in
transit. However, TLS only guarantees hop-to-hop protection when
used to protect SIP signaling. Therefore the Access Token MUST be
protected in a way so that only authorized SIP servers will have
access to it. Endpoints that support this specification MUST support
encrypted JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [RFC7519] for encoding and protecting
Access Token when included in SIP requests, unless some other
mechanism is used to guarantee that only authorized SIP endpoints
have access to the Access Token.
2.1.3. REGISTER Request
The procedures in this section assumes that the UAC has obtained a
token as specified in section Section 2.1.1
When the UAC sends a REGISTER request after it received a challenge
containing the Bearer scheme, then to resolve that particular
challenge it needs to send a request with an Authorization header
field containing the response to that challenge, including the Bearer
scheme carrying a valid access token in the request, as specified in
[RFC6750].
Note that if there were multiple challenges with different schemes
then it maybe able to successfully retry the request using non-Bearer
credentials.
Based on local policy, the UAC MAY include an access token that has
been used for another binding associated with the same AOR in the
request.
If the access token included in a REGISTER request is not accepted,
and the UAC receives a 401 response or a 407 response, the UAC
follows the procedures in Section 2.1.1.
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2.1.4. Non-REGISTER Request
The procedures in this section assumes that the UAC has obtained a
token as specified in section Section 2.1.1
When a UAC sends a request, after it received a challenge containing
the Bearer scheme, then the UAC MUST include an Authorization header
field with a Bearer scheme, carrying a valid access token in the
request, as specified in [RFC6750]. Based on local policy, the UAC
MAY include an access token that has been used for another dialog, or
for another stand-alone request, if the target of the new request is
the same.
If the access token included in a request is not accepted, and the
UAC receives a 401 response or a 407 response, the UAC follows the
procedures in Section 2.1.1.
2.2. UAS and Registrar Behavior
When a UAS or Registrar receives a request that fails to contain
authorization credentials acceptable to it, it SHOULD challenge the
request by sending a 401 (Unauthorized) response. To indicate that
it is willing to accept an OAuth2 token as a credential the UAS/
Registrar MUST include a Proxy-Authentication header field in the
response, indicate "Bearer" scheme and include an address of an
Authorization Server from which the originator can obtain an access
token.
When a UAS/Registrar receives a SIP request that contains an
Authorization header field with an access token, the UAS/Registrar
MUST validate the access token, using the procedures associated with
the type of access token used, e.g. [RFC7519]. If the validation is
successful the UAS/Registrar can continue to process the request
using normal SIP procedures. If the validation fails, the UAS/
Registrar MUST reject the request.
2.3. Proxy Behavior
When a proxy receives a request that fails to contain authorization
credentials acceptable to it, it SHOULD challenge the request by
sending a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response. To indicate
that it is willing to accept an OAuth2 token as a credential the
proxy MUST include a Proxy-Authentication header field in the
response, indicating "Bearer" scheme and including an address to an
Authorization Server from which the originator can obtain an access
token.
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When a proxy wishes to authenticate a received request, it MUST
search the request for Proxy-Authorization header fields with 'realm'
parameters that match its realm. It then MUST successfully validate
the credentials from at least one Proxy-Authorization header field
for its realm. When the scheme is Bearer the proxy MUST validate the
access token, using the procedures associated with the type of access
token used, e.g. [RFC7519].
3. Access Token Claims
The type of services that an access token grants access to can be
determined using different methods. Which methods are used and the
granted access provided by the token is based on local policy agreed
between the AS and the registrar.
If an access token is encoded as a JWT, it might contain a list of
claims [RFC7519], some registered and some are application specific
claims. The REGISTRAR can grant access to services either based on
such claims, using some other mechanism, or a combination of claims
and some other mechanism. If an access token is a reference token,
the REGISTRAR will grant access based on some other mechanism.
Examples of such other mechanisms are introspection [RFC7662], user
profile lookups, etc.
4. WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field
This section describes the syntax of the WWW-Authenticate Response
Header Field when used with the Bearer scheme to challenge the UA for
credentials, by extending the 'challnge' header field defined by
[RFC3261].
challenge =/ ("Bearer" LWS bearer-cln *(COMMA bearer-cln))
bearer-cln = realm / scope / authz-server / error /
auth-param
authz-server = "authz_server" EQUAL authz-server-value
authz-server-value = https-URI
realm = <defined in RFC3261>
auth-param = <defined in RFC3261>
scope = <defined in RFC6749>
error = <defined in RFC6749>
https-URI = <defined in RFC7230>
The authz-server parameters contains the HTTPS URI, as defined in
[RFC7230], of the authorization server. The UA can discover metadata
about the AS using a mechanism like the one defined in [RFC8414].
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The realm and auth-param parameters are defined in [RFC3261].
As per [RFC3261], the realm string alone defines the protection
domain. [RFC3261] states that the realm string must be globally
unique and recommends that the realm string contains a hostname or
domain name. It also states that the realm string should be human-
readable identifier that can be rendered to the user.
The scope and error parameters are defined in [RFC6749].
The scope parameter could be used by the registrar/proxy to indicate
to the UAC the minimum scope that must be associated with the access
token to be able to get service. As defined in [RFC6749], the value
of the scope parameter is expressed as a list of space-delimited,
case-sensitive strings. The strings are defined by the authorization
server. The values of the scope parameter is out of scope of this
document. The UAC will use the scope provided by the registrar to
contact the AS and obtain a proper token with the requested scope.
The error parameter could be used by the registrar/proxy to indicate
to the UAC the reason for the error, with possible values of
"invalid_token" or "invalid_scope".
5. Example Flows
5.1. Registration
The figure below shows an example of a SIP registration, where the UA
is informed about the Authorization Server (AS) from where to obtain
an access token by the registratar in a 401 response to the REGISTER
request.
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UA Registrar AS
---------------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
| [1] REGISTER | |
|------------------------------>| |
| | |
| [2] 401 Unauthorized | |
| WWW-Authenticate: Bearer "authz_server"="<authz_server>" |
|<------------------------------| |
| | |
| [3] The UA interacts with the AS and obtains tokens, using |
| some out of scope mechanism. |
|<=============================================================>|
| | |
| [4] REGISTER | |
| Authorization: Bearer <access_token> |
|------------------------------>| |
| | [5] HTTP POST /introspect |
| | {access_token} |
| |------------------------------>|
| | |
| | [6] 200 OK {metadata} |
| |<------------------------------|
| | |
| [7] 200 OK | |
|<------------------------------| |
| | |
In step [1], the UA starts the registration process by sending a SIP
REGISTER request to the registrar without any credentials.
In step [2], the registrar challenges the UA, by sending a SIP 401
(Unauthorized) response to the REGISTER request. In the response the
registrar includes information about the AS to contact in order to
obtain a token.
In step [3], the UA interacts with the AS, potentially using the
OAuth Native App mechanism defined in [RFC8252], authenticates the
user and obtains the tokens needed to access the SIP service.
In step [4], the UA retries the registration process by sending a new
SIP REGISTER request that includes the access token that the UA
obtrained previously.
The registrar validates the access token. If the access token is a
reference token, the registrar MAY perform an introspection, as in
steps [5] and [6], in order to obtain more information about the
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access token and its scope, as per [RFC7662]. Otherwise, after the
registrar validates the token to make sure it was signed by a trusted
entity, it inspects its claims and act upon it.
In step [7], once the registrar has succesfully verified and accepted
the access token, it sends a 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER
request.
5.2. Registration with Pre-Configured AS
The figure below shows an example of a SIP registration, where the UA
has pre-configured information about the Authorization Server (AS)
from where to obtain the access token.
UA Registrar AS
---------------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
| [1] The UA interacts with the AS and obtains tokens, using |
| some out of scope mechanism. |
|<=============================================================>|
| | |
| [2] REGISTER | |
| Authorization: Bearer <access_token> |
|------------------------------>| |
| | [3] HTTP POST /introspect |
| | {access_token} |
| |------------------------------Asai, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 7666 Virtual Machine Monitoring MIB October 2015
has a corresponding parent physical network interface managed in the
'ifTable' of IF-MIB, the entry contains a pointer 'vmNetworkParent'
to the physical network interface.
The objects related to virtual switches are not included in the MIB
module defined in this document though virtual switches MAY be placed
on a hypervisor. This is because the virtual network interfaces are
the lowest abstraction of network resources allocated to a virtual
machine. Instead of including the objects related to virtual
switches, for example, IEEE8021-BRIDGE-MIB [IEEE8021-BRIDGE-MIB] and
IEEE8021-Q-BRIDGE-MIB [IEEE8021-Q-BRIDGE-MIB] could be used.
The other objects related to virtual machines such as management IP
addresses of a virtual machine are not included in this MIB module
because this MIB module defines the objects common to general
hypervisors, but they are specific to some hypervisors. They may be
included in the entLogicalTable of ENTITY-MIB [RFC6933].
The SNMPv2-MIB [RFC3418] provides an object 'sysObjectID' that
identifies the network management subsytem and an object 'sysUpTime'
that reports the uptime of the network management portion of the
system. The HOST-RESOURCES-MIB [RFC2790] provides an object
'hrSystemUptime' that reports the uptime of the host's operating
system. To complement these objects, the new 'vmHvUpTime' object
reports the time since the hypervisor was last re-initialized, and
the new 'vmHvObjectID' provides an identification of the hypervisor
software.
6. Definitions
6.1. VM-MIB
VM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, NOTIFICATION-TYPE, TimeTicks,
Counter64, Integer32, mib-2
FROM SNMPv2-SMI
OBJECT-GROUP, MODULE-COMPLIANCE, NOTIFICATION-GROUP
FROM SNMPv2-CONF
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, PhysAddress, TruthValue
FROM SNMPv2-TC
SnmpAdminString
FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB
UUIDorZero
FROM UUID-TC-MIB
InterfaceIndexOrZero
FROM IF-MIB
Asai, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 7666 Virtual Machine Monitoring MIB October 2015
IANAStorageMediaType
FROM IANA-STORAGE-MEDIA-TYPE-MIB;
vmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "201510120000Z" -- 12 October 2015
ORGANIZATION "IETF Operations and Management Area Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO
"WG Email: opsawg@ietf.org
Mailing list subscription info:
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg
Hirochika Asai
The University of Tokyo
7-3-1 Hongo
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656
Japan
Phone: +81 3 5841 6748
Email: panda@hongo.wide.ad.jp
Michael MacFaden
VMware Inc.
Email: mrm@vmware.com
Juergen Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University
Campus Ring 1
Bremen 28759
Germany
Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de
Keiichi Shima
IIJ Innovation Institute Inc.
3-13 Kanda-Nishikicho
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0054
Japan
Email: keiichi@iijlab.net
Tina Tsou
Huawei Technologies (USA)
2330 Central Expressway
Santa Clara, CA 95050
United States
Email: tina.tsou.zouting@huawei.com"
DESCRIPTION
"This MIB module is for use in managing a hypervisor and
virtual machines controlled by the hypervisor.
Asai, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 7666 Virtual Machine Monitoring MIB October 2015
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the
Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the
IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)."
REVISION "201510120000Z" -- 12 October 2015
DESCRIPTION
"The initial version of this MIB, published as
RFC 7666."
::= { mib-2 236 }
vmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { vmMIB 0 }
vmObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { vmMIB 1 }
vmConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { vmMIB 2 }
-- Textual conversion definitions
--
VirtualMachineIndex ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "d"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value, greater than zero, identifying a
virtual machine. The value for each virtual machine
MUST remain constant at least from one re-initialization
of the hypervisor to the next re-initialization."
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
VirtualMachineIndexOrZero ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "d"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This textual convention is an extension of the
VirtualMachineIndex convention. This extension permits
the additional value of zero. The meaning of the value
zero is object-specific and MUST therefore be defined as
part of the description of any object that uses this
syntax. Examples of the usage of zero might include
situations where a virtual machine is unknown, or when
none or all virtual machines need to be referenced."
SYNTAX Integer32 (0..2147483647)
VirtualMachineAdminState ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
Asai, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 7666 Virtual Machine Monitoring MIB October 2015
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The administrative state of a virtual machine:
running(1) The administrative state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine
is currently online or should be brought
online.
suspended(2) The administrative state of the virtual
machine where its memory and CPU execution
state has been saved to persistent store
and will be restored at next running(1).
paused(3) The administrative state indicating the
virtual machine is resident in memory but
is no longer scheduled to execute by the
hypervisor.
shutdown(4) The administrative state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine
is currently offline or should be
shutting down."
SYNTAX INTEGER {
running(1),
suspended(2),
paused(3),
shutdown(4)
}
VirtualMachineOperState ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The operational state of a virtual machine:
unknown(1) The operational state of the virtual
machine is unknown, e.g., because the
implementation failed to obtain the state
from the hypervisor.
other(2) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating that an operational
state is obtained from the hypervisor, but
it is not a state defined in this MIB
module.
preparing(3) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
Asai, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 7666 Virtual Machine Monitoring MIB October 2015
currently in the process of preparation,
e.g., allocating and initializing virtual
storage after creating (defining) the
virtual machine.
running(4) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
currently executed, but it is not in the
process of preparing(3), suspending(5),
resuming(7), migrating(9), and
shuttingdown(10).
suspending(5) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
currently in the process of suspending
to save its memory and CPU execution
state to persistent store. This is a
transient state from running(4) to
suspended(6).
suspended(6) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
currently suspended, which means the
memory and CPU execution state of the
virtual machine are saved to persistent
store. During this state, the virtual
machine is not scheduled to execute by
the hypervisor.
resuming(7) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
currently in the process of resuming
to restore its memory and CPU execution
state from persistent store. This is a
transient state from suspended(6) to
running(4).
paused(8) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
resident in memory but no longer
scheduled to execute by the hypervisor.
migrating(9) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
currently in the process of migration
from/to another hypervisor.
shuttingdown(10)
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The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
currently in the process of shutting
down. This is a transient state from
running(4) to shutdown(11).
shutdown(11) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine is
down, and CPU execution is no longer
scheduled by the hypervisor and its
memory is not resident in the hypervisor.
crashed(12) The operational state of the virtual
machine indicating the virtual machine
has crashed."
SYNTAX INTEGER {
unknown(1),
other(2),
preparing(3),
running(4),
suspending(5),
suspended(6),
resuming(7),
paused(8),
migrating(9),
shuttingdown(10),
shutdown(11),
crashed(12)
}
VirtualMachineAutoStart ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The autostart configuration of a virtual machine:
unknown(1) The autostart configuration is unknown,
e.g., because the implementation failed
to obtain the autostart configuration
from the hypervisor.
enabled(2) The autostart configuration of the
virtual machine is enabled. The virtual
machine should be automatically brought
online at the next re-initialization of
the hypervisor.
disabled(3) The autostart configuration of the
virtual machine is disabled. The virtual
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machine should not be automatically
brought online at the next
re-initialization of the hypervisor."
SYNTAX INTEGER {
unknown(1),
enabled(2),
disabled(3)
}
VirtualMachinePersistent ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This value indicates whether a virtual machine has a
persistent configuration, which means the virtual machine
will still exist after shutting down:
unknown(1) The persistent configuration is unknown,
e.g., because the implementation failed
to obtain the persistent configuration
from the hypervisor. (read-only)
persistent(2) The virtual machine is persistent, i.e.,
the virtual machine will exist after it
shuts down.
transient(3) The virtual machine is transient, i.e.,
the virtual machine will not exist after
it shuts down."
SYNTAX INTEGER {
unknown(1),
persistent(2),
transient(3)
}
VirtualMachineCpuIndex ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "d"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value for each virtual machine, greater than
zero, identifying a virtual CPU assigned to a virtual
machine. The value for each virtual CPU MUST remain
constant at least from one re-initialization of the
hypervisor to the next re-initialization."
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
VirtualMachineStorageIndex ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "d"
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION
"A unique value for each virtual machine, greater than
zero, identifying a virtual storage device allocated to
a virtual machine. The value for each virtual storage
device MUST remain constant at least from one
re-initialization of the hypervisor to the next
re-initialization."
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
VirtualMachineStorageSourceType ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The source type of a virtual storage device:
unknown(1) The source type is unknown, e.g., because
the implementation failed to obtain the
media type from the hypervisor.
other(2) The source type is other than those
defined in this conversion.
block(3) The source type is a block device.
raw(4) The source type is a raw-formatted file.
sparse(5) The source type is a sparse file.
network(6) The source type is a network device."
SYNTAX INTEGER {
unknown(1),
other(2),
block(3),
raw(4),
sparse(5),
network(6)
}
VirtualMachineStorageAccess ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The access permission of a virtual storage:
unknown(1) The access permission of the virtual
storage is unknown.
readwrite(2) The virtual storage is a read-write
device.
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readonly(3) The virtual storage is a read-only
device."
SYNTAX INTEGER {
unknown(1),
readwrite(2),
readonly(3)
}
VirtualMachineNetworkIndex ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "d"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value for each virtual machine, greater than
zero, identifying a virtual network interface allocated
to the virtual machine. The value for each virtual
network interface MUST remain constant at least from one
re-initialization of the hypervisor to the next
re-initialization."
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
VirtualMachineList ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "1x"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Each octet within this value specifies a set of eight
virtual machine vmIndex values, with the first octet
specifying virtual machine 1 through 8, the second octet
specifying virtual machine 9 through 16, etc. Within
each octet, the most significant bit represents the
lowest-numbered vmIndex, and the least significant bit
represents the highest-numbered vmIndex. Thus, each
virtual machine of the host is represented by a single
bit within the value of this object. If that bit has
a value of '1', then that virtual machine is included
in the set of virtual machines; the virtual machine is
not included if its bit has a value of '0'."
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
-- The hypervisor group
--
-- A collection of objects common to all hypervisors.
--
vmHypervisor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { vmObjects 1 }
vmHvSoftware OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE (0..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION
"A textual description of the hypervisor software. This
value SHOULD NOT include its version as it SHOULD be
included in 'vmHvVersion'."
::= { vmHypervisor 1 }
vmHvVersion OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE (0..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual description of the version of the hypervisor
software."
::= { vmHypervisor 2 }
vmHvObjectID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OBJECT IDENTIFIER
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The vendor's authoritative identification of the
hypervisor software contained in the entity. This value
is allocated within the SMI enterprises
subtree (1.3.6.1.4.1). Note that this is different from
sysObjectID in the SNMPv2-MIB (RFC 3418) because
sysObjectID is not the identification of the hypervisor
software but the device, firmware, or management
operating system."
::= { vmHypervisor 3 }
vmHvUpTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeTicks
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The time (in centiseconds) since the hypervisor was
last re-initialized. Note that this is different from
sysUpTime in the SNMPv2-MIB (RFC 3418) and hrSystemUptime
in the HOST-RESOURCES-MIB (RFC 2790) because sysUpTime is
the uptime of the network management portion of the
system, and hrSystemUptime is the uptime of the
management operating system but not the hypervisor
software."
::= { vmHypervisor 4 }
-- The virtual machine information
--
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-- A collection of objects common to all virtual machines.
--
vmNumber OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (0..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of virtual machines (regardless of their
current state) present on this hypervisor."
::= { vmObjects 2 }
vmTableLastChange OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeTicks
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of vmHvUpTime at the time of the last creation
or deletion of an entry in the vmTable."
::= { vmObjects 3 }
vmTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF VmEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A list of virtual machine entries. The number of
entries is given by the value of vmNumber."
::= { vmObjects 4 }
vmEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VmEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry containing management information applicable
to a particular virtual machine."
INDEX { vmIndex }
::= { vmTable 1 }
VmEntry ::=
SEQUENCE {
vmIndex VirtualMachineIndex,
vmName SnmpAdminString,
vmUUID UUIDorZero,
vmOSType SnmpAdminString,
vmAdminState VirtualMachineAdminState,
vmOperState VirtualMachineOperState,
vmAutoStart VirtualMachineAutoStart,
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vmPersistent VirtualMachinePersistent,
vmCurCpuNumber Integer32,
vmMinCpuNumber Integer32,
vmMaxCpuNumber Integer32,
vmMemUnit Integer32,
vmCurMem Integer32,
vmMinMem Integer32,
vmMaxMem Integer32,
vmUpTime TimeTicks,
vmCpuTime Counter64
}
vmIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VirtualMachineIndex
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value, greater than zero, identifying the
virtual machine. The value assigned to a given virtual
machine may not persist across re-initialization of the
hypervisor. A command generator MUST use the vmUUID to
identify a given virtual machine of interest."
::= { vmEntry 1 }
vmName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE (0..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual name of the virtual machine."
::= { vmEntry 2 }
vmUUID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX UUIDorZero
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The virtual machine's 128-bit Universally Unique
Identifier (UUID) or the zero-length string when a
UUID is not available. If set, the UUID MUST uniquely
identify a virtual machine from all other virtual
machines in an administrative domain. A zero-length
octet string is returned if no UUID information is
known."
::= { vmEntry 3 }
vmOSType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE (0..255))
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MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual description containing operating system
information installed on the virtual machine. This
value corresponds to the operating system the hypervisor
assumes to be running when the virtual machine is
started. This may differ from the actual operating
system in case the virtual machine boots into a
different operating system."
::= { vmEntry 4 }
vmAdminState OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VirtualMachineAdminState
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The administrative state of the virtual machine."
::= { vmEntry 5 }
vmOperState OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VirtualMachineOperState
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The operational state of the virtual machine."
::= { vmEntry 6 }
vmAutoStart OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VirtualMachineAutoStart
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The autostart configuration of the virtual machine. If
this value is enable(2), the virtual machine
automatically starts at the next initialization of the
hypervisor."
::= { vmEntry 7 }
vmPersistent OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VirtualMachinePersistent
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This value indicates whether the virtual machine has a
persistent configuration, which means the virtual machine
will still exist after its shutdown."
::= { vmEntry 8 }
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vmCurCpuNumber OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (0..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of virtual CPUs currently assigned to the
virtual machine."
::= { vmEntry 9 }
vmMinCpuNumber OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (-1|0..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The minimum number of virtual CPUs that are assigned to
the virtual machine when it is in a power-on state. The
value -1 indicates that there is no hard boundary for
the minimum number of virtual CPUs."
::= { vmEntry 10 }
vmMaxCpuNumber OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (-1|0..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The maximum number of virtual CPUs that are assigned to
the virtual machine when it is in a power-on state. The
value -1 indicates that there is no limit."
::= { vmEntry 11 }
vmMemUnit OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The multiplication unit in bytes for vmCurMem, vmMinMem,
and vmMaxMem. For example, when this value is 1024, the
memory size unit for vmCurMem, vmMinMem, and vmMaxMem is
KiB."
::= { vmEntry 12 }
vmCurMem OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (0..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The current memory size currently allocated to the
virtual memory module in the unit designated by
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vmMemUnit."
::= { vmEntry 13 }
vmMinMem OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (-1|0..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The minimum memory size defined to the virtual machine
in the unit designated by vmMemUnit. The value -1
indicates that there is no hard boundary for the minimum
memory size."
::= { vmEntry 14 }
vmMaxMem OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (-1|0..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The maximum memory size defined to the virtual machine
in the unit designated by vmMemUnit. The value -1
indicates that there is no limit."
::= { vmEntry 15 }
vmUpTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeTicks
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The time (in centiseconds) since the administrative
state of the virtual machine was last changed from
shutdown(4) to running(1)."
::= { vmEntry 16 }
vmCpuTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
UNITS "microsecond"
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total CPU time used in microseconds. If the number
of virtual CPUs is larger than 1, vmCpuTime may exceed
real time.
Discontinuities in the value of this counter can occur
at re-initialization of the hypervisor and
administrative state (vmAdminState) changes of the
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virtual machine."
::= { vmEntry 17 }
-- The virtual CPU on each virtual machines
vmCpuTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF VmCpuEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The table of virtual CPUs provided by the hypervisor."
::= { vmObjects 5 }
vmCpuEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VmCpuEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry for one virtual processor assigned to a
virtual machine."
INDEX { vmIndex, vmCpuIndex }
::= { vmCpuTable 1 }
VmCpuEntry ::=
SEQUENCE {
vmCpuIndex VirtualMachineCpuIndex,
vmCpuCoreTime Counter64
}
vmCpuIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VirtualMachineCpuIndex
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value identifying a virtual CPU assigned to
the virtual machine."
::= { vmCpuEntry 1 }
vmCpuCoreTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
UNITS "microsecond"
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total CPU time used by this virtual CPU in
microseconds.
Discontinuities in the value of this counter can occur
at re-initialization of the hypervisor and
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administrative state (vmAdminState) changes of the
virtual machine."
::= { vmCpuEntry 2 }
-- The virtual CPU affinity on each virtual machines
vmCpuAffinityTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF VmCpuAffinityEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A list of CPU affinity entries of a virtual CPU."
::= { vmObjects 6 }
vmCpuAffinityEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX VmCpuAffinityEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry containing CPU affinity associated with a
particular virtual machine."
INDEX { vmIndex, vmCpuIndex, vmCpuPhysIndex }
::= { vmCpuAffinityTable 1 }
VmCpuAffinityEntry ::=
SEQUENCE {
vmCpuPhysIndex Integer32,
vmCpuAffinity INTEGER
}
vmCpuPhysIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A value identifying a physical CPU on the hypervisor.
On systems implementing the HOST-RESOURCES-MIB, the
value MUST be the same value that is used as the index
in the hrProcessorTable (hrDeviceIndex)."
::= { vmCpuAffinityEntry 2 }
vmCpuAffinity OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
unknown(0), -- unknown
enable(1), -- enabled
disable(2) -- disabled
}
MAX-ACCESS read-only
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The CPU affinity of this virtual CPU to the physical
CPU represented by 'vmCpuPhysIndex'.&>|
| | |
| | [4] 200 OK {metadata} |
| |<------------------------------|
| | |
| [5] 200 OK | |
|<------------------------------| |
| | |
In step [1], the UA interacts with the AS, potentially using the
OAuth Native App mechanism defined in [RFC8252], authenticates the
user and obtains the tokens needed to access the SIP service.
In step [2], the UA retries the registration process by sending a new
SIP REGISTER request that includes the access token that the UA
obtrained previously.
The registrar validates the access token. If the access token is a
reference token, the registrar MAY perform an introspection, as in
steps [3] and [4], in order to obtain more information about the
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access token and its scope, as per [RFC7662]. Otherwise, after the
registrar validates the token to make sure it was signed by a trusted
entity, it inspects its claims and act upon it.
In step [5], once the registrar has succesfully verified and accepted
the access token, it sends a 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER
request.
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations for OAuth are defined in [RFC6749]. The
security considerations for bearer tokens are defined in [RFC6750].
The security considerations for JSON Web Tokens (JWT) are defined in
[RFC7519]. These security considerations also apply to SIP usage of
access token as defined in this document.
[RFC6749] mandates that Access Tokens are protected with TLS.
However, TLS only guarantees hop-to-hop protection when used to
protect SIP signaling. Therefore the Access Token MUST be protected
in a way so that only authorized SIP endpoints will have access to
it. Endpoints that support this specifications MUST support
encrypted JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [RFC7519] for encoding and protecting
Access Token when included in SIP requests, unless some other
mechanism is used to guarantee that only authorized SIP endpoints
have access to the Access Token.
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7. IANA Considerations
8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to specially thank Paul Kyzivat for his
multiple detailed reviews and suggested text that significanly
improved the quality of the document.
The authors would also like to thank the following for their review
and feedback on this document:
Olle Johansson, Roman Shpount, Dale Worley, and Jorgen Axell.
The authors would also like to thank the following for their review
and feedback of the original document that was replaced with this
document:
Andrew Allen, Martin Dolly, Keith Drage, Paul Kyzivat, Jon Peterson,
Michael Procter, Roy Radhika, Matt Ryan, Ivo Sedlacek, Roman Shpount,
Robert Sparks, Asveren Tolga, and Dale Worley.
9. Normative References
[OPENID] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", February 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3840] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and P. Kyzivat,
"Indicating User Agent Capabilities in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3840,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3840, August 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3840>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
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[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8252] Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps",
BCP 212, RFC 8252, DOI 10.17487/RFC8252, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8252>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
Authors' Addresses
Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
Avaya
425 Legget Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
Phone: +1-613-595-9106
EMail: rifaat.ietf@gmail.com
Christer Holmberg
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
Jorvas 02420
Finland
EMail: christer.holmberg@ericsson.com
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Victor Pascual
webrtchacks
Spain
EMail: victor.pascual.avila@gmail.com
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