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Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 2 (MTP2) - User Peer-to-Peer Adaptation Layer (M2PA)
draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-13

Revision differences

Document history

Date Rev. By Action
2012-08-22
13 (System) post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Sam Hartman
2012-08-22
13 (System) post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Russ Housley
2005-04-20
13 Amy Vezza State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Amy Vezza
2005-04-19
13 Amy Vezza IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent
2005-04-19
13 Amy Vezza IESG has approved the document
2005-04-19
13 Amy Vezza Closed "Approve" ballot
2005-04-19
13 Amy Vezza State Changes to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup by Amy Vezza
2005-03-09
13 Sam Hartman [Ballot Position Update] Position for Sam Hartman has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Sam Hartman
2005-02-23
13 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-13.txt
2005-02-14
13 Sam Hartman
[Ballot discuss]
Please remove the following paragraph:

When M2PA is running in professionally managed corporate or service
provider network, it is reasonable to expect that …
[Ballot discuss]
Please remove the following paragraph:

When M2PA is running in professionally managed corporate or service
provider network, it is reasonable to expect that this network
includes an appropriate security policy framework. The "Site Security
Handbook" [RFC2196] SHOULD be consulted for guidance.
2005-02-14
13 Sam Hartman [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Sam Hartman by Sam Hartman
2004-10-15
13 (System) Removed from agenda for telechat - 2004-10-14
2004-10-07
13 Jon Peterson Placed on agenda for telechat - 2004-10-14 by Jon Peterson
2004-09-10
13 Steven Bellovin
[Ballot discuss]
There are a number of places (4.1.2 stands out) where there are SHOULDs that seem like they should be MUSTs.  There is no …
[Ballot discuss]
There are a number of places (4.1.2 stands out) where there are SHOULDs that seem like they should be MUSTs.  There is no guidance on when one might not want to follow the advice.  For example, the draft says:

  It is necessary for at least one of the endpoints to be listening on
  the port on which the other endpoint is trying to establish the
  association. Therefore, at least one of the port numbers SHOULD be the
  M2PA registered port.

But that's the normal procedure for any client-server protocol.  Why is that specified explicitly here?  I agree that implementations can do things differently if they wish -- is there something more that I'm missing here?

4.1.2 says "it is RECOMMENDED that each endpoint know the IP address (or IP addresses, if multi-homing is used) and port number of both endpoints."  This needs to be clarified somewhat, in light of the text in [Security] -- each party MUST know the cryptographic identity of its authorized peers. This may or may not be an IP address.

The assertion about professionally managed networks is, in fact, quite an assumption, and one that probably doesn't belong in this document.  What could be said, instead, is a list of conditions that, if true, could justify not turning on m2pa security.
2004-09-09
13 Jon Peterson Placed on agenda for telechat - 2004-09-16 by Jon Peterson
2004-08-30
13 Steven Bellovin
[Ballot discuss]
For that matter, I'm wondering if there's enough detail on SCTP.  How many streams should be created?  (I see an implicit requirement for …
[Ballot discuss]
For that matter, I'm wondering if there's enough detail on SCTP.  How many streams should be created?  (I see an implicit requirement for at least two.  Is that enough?  Are more supported?)  Can unordered delivery be used?  There are several statements about SCTP providing reliable delivery, so I'd guess not -- but it never says so.  How are SCTP exceptional conditions dealt with, such as an unexpected shutdown or an ABORT or any of the odder things listed in Section 10.2 of RFC 2960?  Section 4.1.2 of this document shows multiple SCTP connections between multiple pairs of IP addresses; can SCTP's multihoming be used as well?  Again, I think that the information is there, but hard to find. I suggest that a section on SCTP interfacing be added.  (There's currently a subsection, but it only discusses slow start issues.)

There are a number of places (4.1.2 stands out) where there are SHOULDs that seem like they should be MUSTs.  But no alternatives are given, or is there any guidance on when one might not want to follow the advice.  For example, 4.1.2 says "it is RECOMMENDED that each endpoint know the IP address (or IP addresses, if multi-homing is used) and port number of both endpoints."  It's rather hard to see how the two ends can communicate if they don't know each other's IP address.  (Knowing the remote end's IP address -- or certificate, or *some* sort of IPsec identity -- is also a security issue.)  Is this intended to suggest that the DNS not be used?  I'm puzzled.  The assertion about professionally managed networks is, in fact, quite an assumption, and one that probably doesn't belong in this document.  What could be said, instead, is a list of conditions that, if true, could justify not turning on m2pa security.
2004-08-30
13 Steven Bellovin
[Ballot comment]
Except for this sentence:

        The description of how to use IPsec is inadequate.

my DISCUSS issues have not been …
[Ballot comment]
Except for this sentence:

        The description of how to use IPsec is inadequate.

my DISCUSS issues have not been addressed at all.  My DISCUSS stands.
2004-08-26
13 Jon Peterson Placed on agenda for telechat - 2004-09-02 by Jon Peterson
2004-08-19
13 Harald Alvestrand
[Ballot comment]
Reviewed by John Loughney, Gen-ART (both at -11 and -12).

His comment (excerpted):
I worked with the author to resolve the DISCUSSes on …
[Ballot comment]
Reviewed by John Loughney, Gen-ART (both at -11 and -12).

His comment (excerpted):
I worked with the author to resolve the DISCUSSes on this.
I don't see any reason to hold this draft up any longer.
2004-08-19
13 Harald Alvestrand
[Ballot comment]
Reviewed by John Loughney, Gen-ART

His comment (excerpted):
I worked with the author to resolve the DISCUSSes on this.
I don't see any …
[Ballot comment]
Reviewed by John Loughney, Gen-ART

His comment (excerpted):
I worked with the author to resolve the DISCUSSes on this.
I don't see any reason to hold this draft up any longer.
2004-08-18
13 Bill Fenner [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Bill Fenner by Bill Fenner
2004-08-12
13 Jon Peterson Placed on agenda for telechat - 2004-08-19 by Jon Peterson
2004-08-12
13 Jon Peterson [Note]: 'Returning item to clear discuss' added by Jon Peterson
2004-06-17
13 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2004-06-17
12 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-12.txt
2004-05-19
13 Russ Housley [Ballot Position Update] Position for Russ Housley has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Russ Housley
2004-04-29
13 Amy Vezza State Changes to IESG Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from IESG Evaluation by Amy Vezza
2004-04-29
13 Thomas Narten [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Thomas Narten by Thomas Narten
2004-04-29
13 Bert Wijnen
[Ballot comment]
Missing IPR statements:
$ idnits <drafts/draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-11.txt
idnits 1.26, (21 Apr 2004)

The document seems to use RFC 2026 boilerplate...
The document seems to …
[Ballot comment]
Missing IPR statements:
$ idnits <drafts/draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-11.txt
idnits 1.26, (21 Apr 2004)

The document seems to use RFC 2026 boilerplate...
The document seems to lack an 2026 Section 10.4(C) Copyright Notice
The document seems to lack an RFC 2026 Section 10.4(C) Permission Grants Notice
The document seems to lack an RFC 2026 Section 10.4(C) Disclaimer
2004-04-29
13 Bert Wijnen [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Bert Wijnen by Bert Wijnen
2004-04-29
13 Margaret Cullen [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Margaret Wasserman by Margaret Wasserman
2004-04-29
13 Alex Zinin [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alex Zinin by Alex Zinin
2004-04-28
13 David Kessens [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for David Kessens by David Kessens
2004-04-28
13 Allison Mankin [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Allison Mankin by Allison Mankin
2004-04-28
13 Harald Alvestrand
[Ballot comment]
Reviewed by John Loughney, Gen-ART

Some points from his review:

2) Security section seems a bit off.  I don't know about
  the …
[Ballot comment]
Reviewed by John Loughney, Gen-ART

Some points from his review:

2) Security section seems a bit off.  I don't know about
  the M2PA usage scenarios - if it is interoperator or
  intraoperator.  If it is solely within an operator,
  perhaps "Site Security Handbook" is enough.  However,
  in general, I guess some text talking more about threats
  & how the protocol is used would be more helpful.  My
  guess is that this kind of signaling is high-value,
  so that if it gets knocked-out, there will be problems.

3) The folloing  section could probably be removed, I am unsure how it relates
  to this protocol.

  6.2 Protecting Confidentiality

  Particularly for wireless users, the requirement for confidentiality
  MAY include the masking of IP addresses and ports. In this case
  application-level encryption is not sufficient. IPSec ESP SHOULD be
  used instead [RFC2401].  Regardless of which level performs the
  encryption, the IPSec ISAKMP service SHOULD be used for key
  management.

4) The (and TCP) should probably be removed, as there is no mention
  of TCP usage elsewhere. Or better, it could say "TCP port 3565 is
  reserved for this protocol in case a definition for TCP is created later".

  7.1 SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier

  The SCTP (and TCP) Registered User Port Number Assignment for M2PA
  is 3565.

6) "SS7 MTP2" should be spelled out in the document title.
2004-04-28
13 Harald Alvestrand [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Harald Alvestrand by Harald Alvestrand
2004-04-27
13 Russ Housley [Ballot discuss]
Section 6.2 ought to point to IKE, not ISAKMP, for key management for IPsec.
  Further, a normative reference is needed.
2004-04-27
13 Russ Housley [Ballot discuss]
Section 6.2 ought to point to IKE, not ISAKMP, for key management for IPsec.
  Further, a normative reference is needed.
2004-04-27
13 Russ Housley [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Russ Housley by Russ Housley
2004-04-27
13 Steven Bellovin
[Ballot discuss]
The description of how to use IPsec is inadequate.

For that matter, I'm wondering if there's enough detail on SCTP.  How many streams …
[Ballot discuss]
The description of how to use IPsec is inadequate.

For that matter, I'm wondering if there's enough detail on SCTP.  How many streams should be created?  (I see an implicit requirement for at least two.  Is that enough?  Are more supported?)  Can unordered delivery be used?  There are several statements about SCTP providing reliable delivery, so I'd guess not -- but it never says so.  How are SCTP exceptional conditions dealt with, such as an unexpected shutdown or an ABORT or any of the odder things listed in Section 10.2 of RFC 2960?  Section 4.1.2 of this document shows multiple SCTP connections between multiple pairs of IP addresses; can SCTP's multihoming be used as well?  Again, I think that the information is there, but hard to find. I suggest that a section on SCTP interfacing be added.  (There's currently a subsection, but it only discusses slow start issues.)

There are a number of places (4.1.2 stands out) where there are SHOULDs that seem like they should be MUSTs.  But no alternatives are given, or is there any guidance on when one might not want to follow the advice.  For example, 4.1.2 says "it is RECOMMENDED that each endpoint know the IP address (or IP addresses, if multi-homing is used) and port number of both endpoints."  It's rather hard to see how the two ends can communicate if they don't know each other's IP address.  (Knowing the remote end's IP address -- or certificate, or *some* sort of IPsec identity -- is also a security issue.)  Is this intended to suggest that the DNS not be used?  I'm puzzled.  Similarly, the statement in 6.2 that "the IPSec ISAKMP service SHOULD be used" is quite vague.  (The assertion about professionally managed networks is, in fact, quite an assumption, and one that probably doesn't belong in this document.  What could be said, instead, is a list of conditions that, if true, could justify not turning on m2pa security.)
2004-04-27
13 Steven Bellovin
[Ballot discuss]
The description of how to use IPsec is inadequate.

For that matter, I'm wondering if there's enough detail on SCTP.  How many streams …
[Ballot discuss]
The description of how to use IPsec is inadequate.

For that matter, I'm wondering if there's enough detail on SCTP.  How many streams should be created?  (I see an implicit requirement for at least two.  Is that enough?  Are more supported?)  Can unordered delivery be used?  There are several statements about SCTP providing reliable delivery, so I'd guess not -- but it never says so.  How are SCTP exceptional conditions dealt with, such as an unexpected shutdown or an ABORT or any of the odder things listed in Section 10.2 of RFC 2960?  Section 4.1.2 of this document shows multiple SCTP connections between multiple pairs of IP addresses; can SCTP's multihoming be used as well?  Again, I think that the information is there, but hard to find.
I suggest that a section on SCTP interfacing be added.  (There's currently a subsection, but it only discusses slow start issues.)

There are a number of places (4.1.2 stands out) where there are SHOULDs that seem like they should be MUSTs.  But no alternatives are given, or is there any guidance on when one might not want to follow the advice.  For example, 4.1.2 says "it is RECOMMENDED that each endpoint know the IP address (or IP addresses, if multi-homing is used) and port number of both endpoints."  It's rather hard to see how the two ends can communicate if they don't know each other's IP address.  (Knowing the remote end's IP address -- or certificate, or *some* sort of IPsec identity -- is also a security issue.)  Is this intended to suggest that the DNS not be used?  I'm puzzled.  Similarly, the statement in 6.2 that "the IPSec ISAKMP service SHOULD be used" is quite vague.  (The assertion about professionally managed networks is, in fact, quite an assumption, and one that probably doesn't belong in this document.  What could be said, instead, is a list of conditions that, if true, could justify not turning on m2pa security.)
2004-04-27
13 Steven Bellovin [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Steve Bellovin by Steve Bellovin
2004-04-27
13 Ted Hardie [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Ted Hardie by Ted Hardie
2004-04-27
13 Scott Hollenbeck [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Scott Hollenbeck by Scott Hollenbeck
2004-04-26
13 Amy Vezza State Changes to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for Writeup by Amy Vezza
2004-04-21
13 Jon Peterson Placed on agenda for telechat - 2004-04-29 by Jon Peterson
2004-04-21
13 Jon Peterson [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Jon Peterson
2004-04-21
13 Jon Peterson Ballot has been issued by Jon Peterson
2004-04-21
13 Jon Peterson Created "Approve" ballot
2004-04-14
13 (System) State has been changed to Waiting for Writeup from In Last Call by system
2004-03-31
13 Amy Vezza Last call sent
2004-03-31
13 Amy Vezza State Changes to In Last Call from Last Call Requested by Amy Vezza
2004-03-30
13 Jon Peterson Last Call was requested by Jon Peterson
2004-03-30
13 Jon Peterson State Changes to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation::Revised ID Needed by Jon Peterson
2004-03-30
13 (System) Ballot writeup text was added
2004-03-30
13 (System) Last call text was added
2004-03-30
13 (System) Ballot approval text was added
2004-03-07
(System) Posted related IPR disclosure: ECI Telecom's Statement about IPR claimed in draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa
2004-02-02
11 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-11.txt
2004-01-19
13 Jon Peterson State Changes to AD Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from AD Evaluation by Jon Peterson
2004-01-06
13 Jon Peterson State Changes to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested by Jon Peterson
2003-10-24
13 Dinara Suleymanova State Changes to Publication Requested from AD is watching by Dinara Suleymanova
2003-10-24
13 Dinara Suleymanova Intended Status has been changed to Proposed Standard from None
2003-10-16
10 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-10.txt
2003-07-01
09 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-09.txt
2003-04-23
08 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-08.txt
2003-03-29
13 Jon Peterson Shepherding AD has been changed to Peterson, Jon from Bradner, Scott
2003-01-20
07 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-07.txt
2002-08-29
06 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-06.txt
2002-05-06
05 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-05.txt
2002-05-03
13 Scott Bradner 2002-05-03 - from Lyndon Ong
expect to complete before Yokohama (no major issues)
2002-05-03
13 Scott Bradner A new comment added
by sob
2002-04-27
13 Scott Bradner Draft Added by Scott Bradner
2002-03-01
04 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-04.txt
2001-07-24
03 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-03.txt
2001-03-02
02 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-02.txt
2000-11-28
01 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-01.txt
2000-11-09
00 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-sigtran-m2pa-00.txt