A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-00
Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov
Expires: November 18, 2019 Qrator Labs
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
K. Patel
Arrcus
J. Snijders
NTT
R. Housley
Vigil Security
May 17, 2019
A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-00
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System
Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An
Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object
that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System
holder has authorized a Provider Autonomous System to be its upstream
provider and for the Provider to send prefixes received from the
Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and
peers.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Azimov, et al. Expires November 18, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft ASPA Profile May 2019
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 18, 2019.
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. providerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed
to verify that a Provider AS (PAS) has permission from a Customer AS
(CAS) holder to send routes in all directions. The digitally signed
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