A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-06
Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov
Expires: 31 January 2022 JetLend
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
K. Patel
Arrcus
J. Snijders
Fastly
R. Housley
Vigil Security
30 July 2021
A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-06
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System
Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An
Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object
that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System
holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream
providers and for the Providers to send prefixes received from the
Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and
peers.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 January 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. providerASSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed
to verify that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to
send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous
System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this
verification mechanism.
The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic
validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be
validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current
infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in
[RFC6485], or its successor.
To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of
[RFC6488]), this document defines:
1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed
object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the
encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed
attribute within the signerInfo structure).
2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload
signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1
[X680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690].
3. The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation
steps specified in [RFC6488]).
2. The ASPA Content Type
The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the
numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear
both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as
well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
structure (see [RFC6488]).
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3. The ASPA eContent
The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as
the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized to further
propagate announcements received from the customer. If customer has
multiple providers they MUST be registered in a single ASPA object.
This rule is important to avoid possible race conditions during
updates. An ASPA is formally defined as:
ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }
id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD }
ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
aFI AddressFamilyIdentifier,
customerASID ASID,
providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID }
ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) }
AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (2))
ASID ::= INTEGER
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].
3.1. version
The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0.
3.2. AFI
The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the
relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized. Presently
defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified
in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF].
3.3. customerASID
The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous
System that authorizes an upstream providers (listed in the
providerASSET) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family
other ASes.
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3.4. providerASSET
The providerASSET contains the sequence (set) of AS numbers that are
authorized to further propagate announcements in the specified
address family received from the customer.
4. ASPA Validation
Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing
announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object
itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the
validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
additional ASPA-specific validation step.
* The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is
present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the
ASPA), and the customer AS number in the ASPA is contained within
the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's autonomous
system identifier delegation extension.
5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type
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RPKI-ASPA-2020
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2020(TBD2) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-ASPA, ... }
--
-- ASPA Content Type
--
id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 }
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD }
ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }
ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
aFI AddressFamilyIdentifier,
customerASID ASID,
providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID OPTIONAL }
ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) }
AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (2))
ASID ::= INTEGER
END
6. IANA Considerations
Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018 to the SMI Security for S/MIME
Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:
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Decimal | Description | Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2020 | [ThisRFC]
Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows:
Decimal | Description | Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
TBD | id-ct-ASPA | [ThisRFC]
Please add Autonomous System Provider Authorization to the RPKI
Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/
rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows:
Name | OID | Specification
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous System Provider Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD | [ThisRFC]
Please add an item for the Autonomous System Provider Authorization
file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created
by [RFC6481] as follows:
Filename
Extension RPKI Object Reference
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.asa Autonomous System Provider Authorization [draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
7. Security Considerations
While it's not restricted, but it's highly recommended maintaining
for selected Customer AS a single ASPA object that covers all its
providers. Such policy should prevent race conditions during ASPA
updates that might affect prefix propagation. The software that
provides hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support enforcement of this
rule. In the case of the transition process between different CA
registries, the ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all
registries.
8. Acknowledgments
9. References
9.1. Normative References
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[IANA-AF] IANA, "Address Family Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/
address-family-numbers.xhtml>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2015.
[X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.
9.2. Informative References
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[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov
Yandex
Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
Eugene Uskov
JetLend
Email: eu@jetlend.ru
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
Email: randy@psg.com
Keyur Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
Email: job@fastly.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
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