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BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-02

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Expired & archived
Authors Roque Gagliano , Keyur Patel , Brian Weis
Last updated 2013-10-17 (Latest revision 2013-04-15)
Replaces draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover
Replaced by draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover, RFC 8634
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
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Responsible AD (None)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:

Abstract

BGPSEC will need to address the impact from regular and emergency rollover processes for the BGPSEC End-Entity (EE) certificates that will be performed by Certificate Authorities (CAs) participating at the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document provides general recommendations for that process and specifies how this process is used to control BGPSEC's window of exposure to replay attacks.

Authors

Roque Gagliano
Keyur Patel
Brian Weis

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)