BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-02
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Roque Gagliano , Keyur Patel , Brian Weis | ||
Last updated | 2013-10-17 (Latest revision 2013-04-15) | ||
Replaces | draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover | ||
Replaced by | draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover, RFC 8634 | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
BGPSEC will need to address the impact from regular and emergency rollover processes for the BGPSEC End-Entity (EE) certificates that will be performed by Certificate Authorities (CAs) participating at the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document provides general recommendations for that process and specifies how this process is used to control BGPSEC's window of exposure to replay attacks.
Authors
Roque Gagliano
Keyur Patel
Brian Weis
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)