Service Function Chaining (SFC) Operations, Administration and Maintenance (OAM) Framework
draft-ietf-sfc-oam-framework-14
The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8924.
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Authors | Sam Aldrin , Carlos Pignataro , Nagendra Kumar Nainar , Ramki Krishnan , Anoop Ghanwani | ||
Last updated | 2020-05-23 (Latest revision 2020-04-14) | ||
Replaces | draft-aldrin-sfc-oam-framework | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
Reviews |
TSVART Telechat review
(of
-13)
by Frank Brockners
Ready w/nits
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Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Tal Mizrahi | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2019-12-16 | ||
IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 8924 (Informational) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date |
(None)
Needs a YES. |
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Responsible AD | Martin Vigoureux | ||
Send notices to | Tal Mizrahi <tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com> | ||
IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed |
draft-ietf-sfc-oam-framework-14
Network Working Group S. Kille, WG Chair Request for Comments: 1566 ISODE Consortium Category: Standards Track N. Freed, Editor Innosoft January 1994 Mail Monitoring MIB Status of this Memo This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................. 2 2. The SNMPv2 Network Management Framework ...................... 2 2.1 Object Definitions .......................................... 2 3. Message Flow Model ........................................... 3 4. MTA Objects .................................................. 3 5. Definitions .................................................. 4 6. Acknowledgements .............................................19 7. References ...................................................19 8. Security Considerations ......................................19 9. Authors' Addresses ...........................................20 Kille & Freed [Page 1] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 1. Introduction This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. In particular, this memo extends the basic Network Services Monitoring MIB [5] to allow monitoring of Message Transfer Agents (MTAs). It may also be used to monitor MTA components within gateways. 2. The SNMPv2 Network Management Framework The SNMPv2 Network Management Framework consists of four major components. They are: o RFC 1442 [1] which defines the SMI, the mechanisms used for describing and naming objects for the purpose of management. o STD 17, RFC 1213 [2] defines MIB-II, the core set of managed objects for the Internet suite of protocols. o RFC 1445 [3] which defines the administrative and other architectural aspects of the framework. o RFC 1448 [4] which defines the protocol used for network access to managed objects. The Framework permits new objects to be defined for the purpose of experimentation and evaluation. 2.1 Object Definitions Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are defined using the subset of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) defined in the SMI. In particular, each object type is named by an OBJECT IDENTIFIER, an administratively assigned name. The object type together with an object instance serves to uniquely identify a specific instantiation of the object. For human convenience, we often use a textual string, termed the descriptor, to refer to the object type. Kille & Freed [Page 2] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 3. Message Flow Model A general model of message flow inside an MTA has to be presented before a MIB can be described. Generally speaking, message flow occurs in four steps: (1) Messages are received by the MTA from User Agents, Message Stores, other MTAs, and gateways. (2) The "next hop" for the each message is determined. This is simply the destination the message is to be transmitted to; it may or may not be the final destination of the message. Multiple "next hops" may exist for a single message (as a result of either having multiple recipients or distribution list expansion); this may make it necessary to duplicate messages. (3) Messages are converted into the format that's appropriate for the next hop. (4) Messages are transmitted to the appropriate destination, which may be a User Agent, Message Store, another MTA, or gateway. Storage of messages in the MTA occurs at some point during this process. However, it is important to note that storage may occur at different and possibly even multiple points during this process. For example, some MTAs expand messages into multiple copies as they are received. In this case (1), (2), and (3) may all occur prior to storage. Other MTAs store messages precisely as they are received and perform all expansions and conversions during retransmission processing. So here only (1) occurs prior to storage. This leads to situations where, in general, a measurement of messages received may not equal a measurement of messages in store, or a measurement of messages stored may not equal a measurement of messages retransmitted, or both. 4. MTA Objects If there are one or more MTAs on the host, the following mta group may be used to monitor them. Any number of the MTAs on a host may be monitored. Each MTA is dealt with as a separate application and has its own applTable entry in the Network Services Monitoring MIB. The MIB described in this document covers only the portion which is specific to the monitoring of MTAs. The network service related part of the MIB is covered in a separate document [5]. Kille & Freed [Page 3] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 5. Definitions MTA-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS OBJECT-TYPE, Counter32, Gauge32 FROM SNMPv2-SMI DisplayString, TimeInterval FROM SNMPv2-TC mib-2 FROM RFC1213-MIB applIndex FROM APPLICATION-MIB; mta MODULE-IDENTITY LAST-UPDATED "9311280000Z" ORGANIZATION "IETF Mail and Directory Management Working Group" CONTACT-INFO " Ned Freed Postal: Innosoft International, Inc. 250 West First Street, Suite 240 Claremont, CA 91711 US Tel: +1 909 624 7907 Fax: +1 909 621 5319 E-Mail: ned@innosoft.com" DESCRIPTION &Aldrin, et al. Expires November 24, 2020 [Page 17] Internet-Draft SFC OAM Framework May 2020 8. Manageability Considerations This document does not define any new manageability tools but consolidates the manageability tool gap analysis for SF and SFC. Table 4 below is not exhaustive. Table 4: OAM Tool GAP Analysis +----------------+--------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | Layer |Configuration |Orchestration|Topology|Notification | +----------------+--------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | Underlay N/w |CLI, NETCONF | CLI, NETCONF| SNMP |SNMP, Syslog,| | | | | |NETCONF | +----------------+--------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | Overlay N/w |CLI, NETCONF | CLI, NETCONF| SNMP |SNMP, Syslog | | | | | |NETCONF | +----------------+--------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | Classifier |CLI, NETCONF | CLI, NETCONF| None | None | +----------------+--------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | SF |CLI, NETCONF | CLI, NETCONF| None | None | +----------------+--------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | SFC |CLI, NETCONF | CLI, NETCONF| None | None | +----------------+--------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ Configuration, orchestration and other manageability tasks of SF and SFC could be performed using CLI, NETCONF [RFC6241] , etc. While the NETCONF capabilities are readily available as depicted in Table 4, the information and data models are needed for configuration, manageability and orchestration for SFC. With virtualized SF and SFC, manageability needs to be done programmatically. 9. Security Considerations Any security considerations defined in [RFC7665] and [RFC8300] is applicable for this document. The OAM information from the service layer at different components may collectively or independently reveal sensitive information. The information may reveal the type of service functions hosted in the network, the classification rules and the associated service chains, specific service function paths, etc. The sensitivity of the information from the SFC layer raises a need for careful security considerations. The mapping and the rules information at the classifier component may reveal the traffic rules and the traffic mapped to the SFC. The SFC Aldrin, et al. Expires November 24, 2020 [Page 18] Internet-Draft SFC OAM Framework May 2020 information collected at an SFC component may reveal the SFs associated within each chain and this information together with classifier rules may be used to manipulate the header of synthetic attack packets that may be used to bypass the SFC and trigger any internal attacks. The SF information at the SF component may be used by a malicious user to trigger Denial of Service (DoS) attack by overloading any specific SF using rogue OAM traffic. To address the above concerns, SFC and SF OAM should provide mechanisms for mitigating: o Misuse of the OAM channel for denial-of-services, o Leakage of OAM packets across SFC instances, and o Leakage of SFC information beyond the SFC domain. The documents proposing the OAM solution for SF components should provide rate-limiting the OAM probes at a frequency guided by the implementation choice. Rate-limiting may be applied at the Classifier, SFF or the SF . The OAM initiator may not receive a response for the probes that are rate-limited resulting in false negatives and the implementation should be aware of this. To mitigate any attacks that leverage OAM packets, future documents proposing OAM solutions should describe the use of any technique to detect and mitigate anomalies and various security attacks. The documents proposing the OAM solution for any service layer components should consider some form of message filtering to prevent leaking any internal service layer information outside the administrative domain. 10. IANA Considerations No action is required by IANA for this document. 11. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Mohamed Boucadair, Adrian Farrel, Greg Mirsky, Tal Mizrahi, Martin Vigoureux, Tirumaleswar Reddy, Carlos Bernados, Martin Duke, Barry Leiba, Eric Vyncke, Roman Danyliw, Erik Kline, Benjamin Kaduk, Robert Wilton, Frank Brockner, Alvaro Retana, Murray Kucherawy, and Alissa Cooper for their review and comments. Aldrin, et al. Expires November 24, 2020 [Page 19] Internet-Draft SFC OAM Framework May 2020 12. Contributing Authors Nobo Akiya Ericsson Email: nobo.akiya.dev@gmail.com 13. Informative References [CFM] IEEE, ""Connectivity Fault Management clause of IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks--Bridges and Bridged Networks", IEEE Std 802.1Q-2014, November 2014". [EFM] IEEE, ""IEEE Standard for Ethernet (Clause 57 for Operations, Administration, and Maintenance)", IEEE Std 802.3-2018, June 2018". [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., Pignataro, C., Gredler, H., Leddy, J., Youell, S., Mizrahi, T., Mozes, D., Lapukhov, P., remy@barefootnetworks.com, r., daniel.bernier@bell.ca, d., and J. Lemon, "Data Fields for In-situ OAM", draft- ietf-ippm-ioam-data-09 (work in progress), March 2020. [I-D.ietf-sfc-ioam-nsh] Brockners, F. and S. Bhandari, "Network Service Header (NSH) Encapsulation for In-situ OAM (IOAM) Data", draft- ietf-sfc-ioam-nsh-03 (work in progress), March 2020. [I-D.ietf-sfc-proof-of-transit] Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., Mizrahi, T., Dara, S., and S. Youell, "Proof of Transit", draft-ietf-sfc-proof-of- transit-04 (work in progress), November 2019. [I-D.penno-sfc-trace] Penno, R., Quinn, P., Pignataro, C., and D. Zhou, "Services Function Chaining Traceroute", draft-penno-sfc- trace-03 (work in progress), September 2015. [RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>. [RFC2330] Paxson, V., Almes, G., Mahdavi, J., and M. Mathis, "Framework for IP Performance Metrics", RFC 2330, DOI 10.17487/RFC2330, May 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2330>. Aldrin, et al. Expires November 24, 2020 [Page 20] Internet-Draft SFC OAM Framework May 2020 [RFC3393] Demichelis, C. and P. Chimento, "IP Packet Delay Variation Metric for IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)", RFC 3393, DOI 10.17487/RFC3393, November 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3393>. [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>. [RFC4656] Shalunov, S., Teitelbaum, B., Karp, A., Boote, J., and M. Zekauskas, "A One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP)", RFC 4656, DOI 10.17487/RFC4656, September 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4656>. [RFC5357] Hedayat, K., Krzanowski, R., Morton, A., Yum, K., and J. Babiarz, "A Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)", RFC 5357, DOI 10.17487/RFC5357, October 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5357>. [RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>. [RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881, DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881>. [RFC5884] Aggarwal, R., Kompella, K., Nadeau, T., and G. Swallow, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for MPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs)", RFC 5884, DOI 10.17487/RFC5884, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5884>. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. [RFC6291] Andersson, L., van Helvoort, H., Bonica, R., Romascanu, D., and S. Mansfield, "Guidelines for the Use of the "OAM" Acronym in the IETF", BCP 161, RFC 6291, DOI 10.17487/RFC6291, June 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6291>. Aldrin, et al. Expires November 24, 2020 [Page 21] Internet-Draft SFC OAM Framework May 2020 [RFC6374] Frost, D. and S. Bryant, "Packet Loss and Delay Measurement for MPLS Networks", RFC 6374, DOI 10.17487/RFC6374, September 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6374>. [RFC7498] Quinn, P., Ed. and T. Nadeau, Ed., "Problem Statement for Service Function Chaining", RFC 7498, DOI 10.17487/RFC7498, April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7498>. [RFC7665] Halpern, J., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665, DOI 10.17487/RFC7665, October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7665>. [RFC7679] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., Zekauskas, M., and A. Morton, Ed., "A One-Way Delay Metric for IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)", STD 81, RFC 7679, DOI 10.17487/RFC7679, January 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7679>. [RFC7680] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., Zekauskas, M., and A. Morton, Ed., "A One-Way Loss Metric for IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)", STD 82, RFC 7680, DOI 10.17487/RFC7680, January 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7680>. [RFC7880] Pignataro, C., Ward, D., Akiya, N., Bhatia, M., and S. Pallagatti, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD)", RFC 7880, DOI 10.17487/RFC7880, July 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7880>. [RFC7881] Pignataro, C., Ward, D., and N. Akiya, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD) for IPv4, IPv6, and MPLS", RFC 7881, DOI 10.17487/RFC7881, July 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7881>. [RFC8029] Kompella, K., Swallow, G., Pignataro, C., Ed., Kumar, N., Aldrin, S., and M. Chen, "Detecting Multiprotocol Label Switched (MPLS) Data-Plane Failures", RFC 8029, DOI 10.17487/RFC8029, March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8029>. [RFC8300] Quinn, P., Ed., Elzur, U., Ed., and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Network Service Header (NSH)", RFC 8300, DOI 10.17487/RFC8300, January 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8300>. Aldrin, et al. Expires November 24, 2020 [Page 22]quot;The MIB module describing Message Transfer Agents (MTAs)" ::= { mib-2 28 } mtaTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF MtaEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The table holding information specific to an MTA." ::= {mta 1} mtaEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX MtaEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The entry associated with each MTA." INDEX {applIndex} Kille & Freed [Page 4] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 ::= {mtaTable 1} MtaEntry ::= SEQUENCE { mtaReceivedMessages Counter32, mtaStoredMessages Gauge32, mtaTransmittedMessages Counter32, mtaReceivedVolume Counter32, mtaStoredVolume Gauge32, mtaTransmittedVolume Counter32, mtaReceivedRecipients Counter32, mtaStoredRecipients Gauge32, mtaTransmittedRecipients Counter32 } mtaReceivedMessages OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of messages received since MTA initialization." ::= {mtaEntry 1} mtaStoredMessages OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Gauge32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The total number of messages currently stored in the MTA." ::= {mtaEntry 2} mtaTransmittedMessages OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of messages transmitted since MTA initialization." ::= {mtaEntry 3} Kille & Freed [Page 5] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 mtaReceivedVolume OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 UNITS "K-octets" MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The total volume of messages received since MTA initialization, measured in kilo-octets. This volume should include all transferred data that is logically above the mail transport protocol level. For example, an SMTP-based MTA should use the number of kilo-octets in the message header and body, while an X.400-based MTA should use the number of kilo-octets of P2 data." ::= {mtaEntry 4} mtaStoredVolume OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Gauge32 UNITS "K-octets" MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The total volume of messages currently stored in the MTA, measured in kilo-octets. This volume should include all stored data that is logically above the mail transport protocol level. For example, an SMTP-based MTA should use the number of kilo-octets in the message header and body, while an X.400-based MTA would use the number of kilo-octets of P2 data." ::= {mtaEntry 5} mtaTransmittedVolume OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 UNITS "K-octets" MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The total volume of messages transmitted since MTA initialization, measured in kilo-octets. This volume should include all transferred data that is logically above the mail transport protocol level. For example, an SMTP-based MTA should use the number of kilo-octets in the message header and body, while an X.400-based MTA should use the number of kilo-octets of P2 data." ::= {mtaEntry 6} Kille & Freed [Page 6] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 mtaReceivedRecipients OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The total number of recipients specified in all messages received since MTA initialization. Recipients this MTA had no responsibility for should not be counted even if information about such recipients is available." ::= {mtaEntry 7} mtaStoredRecipients OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Gauge32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The total number of recipients specified in all messages currently stored in the MTA. Recipients this MTA had no responsibility for should not be counted." ::= {mtaEntry 8} mtaTransmittedRecipients OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The total number of recipients specified in all messages transmitted since MTA initialization. Recipients this MTA had no responsibility for should not be counted." ::= {mtaEntry 9} -- MTAs typically group inbound reception, queue storage, and -- outbound transmission in some way. In the most extreme case -- information will be maintained for each different entity that -- receives messages and for each entity the MTA stores messages for -- and delivers messages to. Other MTAs may elect to treat all -- reception equally, all queue storage equally, all deliveries -- equally, or some combination of this. -- In any case, a grouping abstraction is an extremely useful for -- breaking down the activities of an MTA. For purposes of labelling -- this will be called a "group" in this MIB. Kille & Freed [Page 7] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 -- Each group contains all the variables needed to monitor all aspects -- of an MTA's operation. However, the fact that all groups contain -- all possible variables does not imply that all groups must use all -- possible variables. For example, a single group might be used to -- monitor only one kind of event (inbound processing, outbound -- processing, or storage). In this sort of configuration all unused -- counters would be inaccessible; e.g., returning either a -- noSuchName error (for an SNMPv1 get), or a noSuchInstance -- exception (for an SNMPv2 get). -- Groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A given event may -- be recorded by more than one group, a message may be seen as -- stored by more than one group, and so on. Groups should be all -- inclusive, however: if groups are implemented all aspects of an -- MTA's operation should be registered in at least one group. This -- freedom lets implementors use different sets of groups to -- provide differents "views" of an MTA. -- The possibility of overlap between groups means that summing -- variables across groups may not produce values equal to those in -- the mtaTable. mtaTable should always provide accurate information -- about the MTA as a whole. -- The term "channel" is often used in MTA implementations; channels -- are usually, but not always, equivalent to a group. However, -- this MIB does not use the term "channel" because there is no -- requirement that an MTA supporting this MIB has to map its -- "channel" abstraction one-to-one onto the MIB's group abstration. mtaGroupTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF MtaGroupEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The table holding information specific to each MTA group." ::= {mta 2} mtaGroupEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX MtaGroupEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The entry associated with each MTA group." INDEX {applIndex, mtaGroupIndex} ::= {mtaGroupTable 1} Kille & Freed [Page 8] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 MtaGroupEntry ::= SEQUENCE { mtaGroupIndex INTEGER, mtaGroupReceivedMessages Counter32, mtaGroupRejectedMessages Counter32, mtaGroupStoredMessages Gauge32, mtaGroupTransmittedMessages Counter32, mtaGroupReceivedVolume Counter32, mtaGroupStoredVolume Gauge32, mtaGroupTransmittedVolume Counter32, mtaGroupReceivedRecipients Counter32, mtaGroupStoredRecipients Gauge32, mtaGroupTransmittedRecipients Counter32, mtaGroupOldestMessageStored TimeInterval, mtaGroupInboundAssociations Gauge32, mtaGroupOutboundAssociations Gauge32, mtaGroupAccumulatedInboundAssociations Counter32, mtaGroupAccumulatedOutboundAssociations Counter32, mtaGroupLastInboundActivity TimeInterval, mtaGroupLastOutboundActivity TimeInterval, mtaGroupRejectedInboundAssociations Counter32, mtaGroupFailedOutboundAssociations Counter32, mtaGroupInboundRejectionReason DisplayString, mtaGroupOutboundConnectFailureReason DisplayString, mtaGroupScheduledRetry TimeInterval, mtaGroupMailProtocol Kille & Freed [Page 9] RFC 1566 Mail Monitoring MIB January 1994 OBJECT IDENTIFIER, mtaGroupName DisplayString } mtaGroupIndex OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX INTEGER (1..2147483647) MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The index associated with a group for a given MTA." ::= {mtaGroupEntry 1} mtaGroupReceivedMessages OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of messages received to this group since MTA initialization." ::= {mtaGroupEntry 2} mtaGroupRejectedMessages OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of messages rejected by this group since MTA initialization." ::= {mtaGroupEntry 3} mtaGroupStoredMessages OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Gauge32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The total number of messages currently stored in this group's queue." ::= {mtaGroupEntry 4} mtaGroupTransmittedMessages OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of messages transmitted by this group since MTA initialization.& Internet-Draft SFC OAM Framework May 2020 [RFC8459] Dolson, D., Homma, S., Lopez, D., and M. Boucadair, "Hierarchical Service Function Chaining (hSFC)", RFC 8459, DOI 10.17487/RFC8459, September 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8459>. [Y.1731] ITU-T, "OAM Functions and mechanisms for Ethernet based networks", <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-G.8013-201508-I/en>. Authors' Addresses Sam K. Aldrin Google Email: aldrin.ietf@gmail.com Carlos Pignataro (editor) Cisco Systems, Inc. Email: cpignata@cisco.com Nagendra Kumar (editor) Cisco Systems, Inc. Email: naikumar@cisco.com Ram Krishnan VMware Email: ramkri123@gmail.com Anoop Ghanwani Dell Email: anoop@alumni.duke.edu Aldrin, et al. Expires November 24, 2020 [Page 23]