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End-to-End Security in Roaming
draft-ietf-roamops-roamsec-02

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (roamops WG)
Expired & archived
Authors Dr. Bernard D. Aboba , Pat R. Calhoun
Last updated 1998-07-24
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:

Abstract

As noted in Roaming Requirements, there is a need for end-to-end secu- rity in roaming, including end-to-end integrity protection, and confi- dentiality. In roaming implementations based on proxy chaining, pack- ets are routed between the NAS and home server through a series of proxies. Current roaming implementations provide only hop-by-hop security, guarding only against modification of packets in transit between hops. This makes it possible for untrusted proxies to modify packets sent between a NAS and a home server without detection, as well as to decrypt PAP passwords, Tunnel passwords, and other hidden attributes which are available to it in cleartext. This document provides a framework for end-to-end security in roaming, making it possible to provide end-to-end message integrity and attribute hiding through addition of three new attributes.

Authors

Dr. Bernard D. Aboba
Pat R. Calhoun

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)