Transport Mappings for Real-time Application Quality-of-Service Monitoring (RAQMON) Protocol Data Unit (PDU)
draft-ietf-rmonmib-raqmon-pdu-14
The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 4712.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Yong (Yongbum) Kim , Dan Romascanu , Mahfuzur Rahman , Anwar A. Siddiqui , Eugene Golovinsky | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2006-07-26) | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 4712 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | David Kessens | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-rmonmib-raqmon-pdu-14
Network Working Group A. Siddiqui
Internet-Draft Avaya Labs
Expires: January 26, 2007 D. Romascanu
Avaya Inc.
E. Golovinsky
BMC Software
M. Rahman
Samsung Information Systems
America
Y. Kim
Broadcom
July 25, 2006
Transport Mappings for Real-time Application Quality of Service
Monitoring (RAQMON) Protocol Data Unit (PDU)
draft-ietf-rmonmib-raqmon-pdu-14
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 26, 2007.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
This memo specifies two transport mappings of the Real-time
Application Quality of Service Monitoring (RAQMON) information model
defined in [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] using TCP as a native transport and the
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) to carry the RAQMON
information from a RAQMON Data Source (RDS) to a RAQMON Report
Collector (RRC).
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Transporting RAQMON Protocol Data Units . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. TCP as an RDS/RRC Network Transport Protocol . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. The RAQMON PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2. The basic part of the RAQMON Protocol Data Unit . . . 7
2.1.3. APP part of the RAQMON Protocol Data Unit . . . . . . 15
2.1.4. Byte Order, Alignment and Time Format of RAQMON
PDUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2. Securing RAQMON session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1. Sequencing of the Start TLS Operation . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.2. Closing a TLS Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3. SNMP Notifications as an RDS/RRC Network Transport
Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1. Encoding RAQMON using the RAQMON RDS MIB module . . . 24
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4. Congestion-safe RAQMON Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.1. Usage of TLS with RAQMON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.1. Confidentiality & Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.2. TLS CipherSuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1.3. RAQMON Authorization State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix A. Pseudo-code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 54
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
1. Introduction
The Real-Time Application QoS Monitoring (RAQMON) Framework as
outlined by [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] extends the Remote Monitoring family
of protocols (RMON) by defining entities such as RAQMON Data Sources
RDS) and RAQMON Report Collectors (RRC) to perform various
application monitoring in real time. [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] defines the
relevant metrics for RAQMON monitoring carried by the common protocol
data unit (PDU) used between a RDS and RRC to report QoS statistics.
This memo contains a syntactical description of the RAQMON PDU
structure.
The following sections of this memo contain detailed specifications
for the usage of TCP and SNMP to carry RAQMON information.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
2. Transporting RAQMON Protocol Data Units
The RAQMON Protocol Data Unit (PDU) utilizes a common data format
understood by the RDS and the RRC. A RAQMON PDU does not transport
application data but rather occupies the place of a payload
specification at the application layer of the protocol stack. As
part of the specification, this memo also specifies the usage of TCP
and SNMP as underlying transport protocols to carry RAQMON PDUs
between RDSs and RRCs. While two transport protocol choices have
been provided as options to chose from for RDS implementers, RRCs
MUST implement the TCP transport and MAY implement the SNMP
transport.
2.1. TCP as an RDS/RRC Network Transport Protocol
A transport binding using TCP is included within the RAQMON
specification to facilitate reporting from various types of embedded
devices that run applications such as Voice over IP, Voice over Wi-
Fi, Fax over IP, Video over IP, Instant Messaging (IM), E-mail,
software download applications, e-business style transactions, web
access from wired or wireless computing devices etc. For many of
these devices PDUs and a TCP-based transport fit the deployment
needs.
The RAQMON transport requirements for end-to-end congestion control
and reliability are inherently built into TCP as a transport protocol
[RFC793].
To use TCP to transport RAQMON PDUs, it is sufficient to send the
PDUs as TCP data. As each PDU carries its length, the receiver can
determine the PDU boundaries.
The following section details the RAQMON PDU specifications. Though
transmitted as one Protocol Data Unit, a RAQMON PDU is functionally
divided into two different parts, namely the basic part and
application extensions required for vendor specific extension
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]. Both functional parts follow a field carrying a
SMI Network Management Private Enterprise code currently maintained
by IANA http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers, which is
used to identify the organization that defined the information
carried in the PDU.
A RAQMON PDU in the current version is marked as PDU Type (PDT) = 1.
The parameters carried by RAQMON PDUs are shown in Figure 1 and are
defined in section 5 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK].
Vendors MUST use the Basic part of the PDU to report parameters pre-
listed here in the specification for interoperability as opposed to
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
using the application specific portion. Vendors MAY also use
application specific extensios to convey application, vendor, or
device specific parameters not included in the Basic part of the
specification, and explicitly publish such data externally to attain
extended interoperability.
2.1.1. The RAQMON PDU
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|PDT = 1 |B| T |P|S|R| RC | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DSRC |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SMI Enterprise Code = 0 |Report Type = 0| RC_N |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |flag
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data Source Address {DA} |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Receiver's Address (RA) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| NTP Timestamp, most significant word |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| NTP Timestamp, least significant word |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Application Name (AN) ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Data Source Name (DN) ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Receiver's Name (RN) ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Session State ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session Duration |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Round Trip End-to-End Network Delay |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| One Way End-to-End Network Delay |
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cumulative Packet Loss |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cumulative Application Packet Discard |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Total # Application Packets sent |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Total # Application Packets received |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Total # Application Octets sent |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Total # Application Octets received |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data Source Device Port Used | Receiver Device Port Used |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| S_Layer2 | S_Layer3 | S_Layer2 | S_Layer3 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Source Payload |Receiver | CPU | Memory |
|Type |Payload Type | Utilization | Utilization |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session Setup Delay | Application Delay |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IP Packet Delay Variation | Inter arrival Jitter |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Discrd | Packet loss | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SMI Enterprise Code = "xxx" |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Report Type = "yyy" | Length of Application Part |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| application/vendor specific extension |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ............... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ............... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ............... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SMI Enterprise Code = "abc" |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Report Type = "zzz" | Length of Application Part |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| application/vendor specific extension |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ............... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
RAQMON Protocol Data Unit
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Figure 1
2.1.2. The basic part of the RAQMON Protocol Data Unit
A RAQMON PDU must contain the following basic part fields at all
times:
PDU type (PDT): 5 bits - This indicates the type of RAQMON PDU being
sent. PDT = 1 is used for the current RAQMON PDU version defined
in this document.
basic (B): 1 bit - While set to 1, the basic flag indicates that the
PDU has basic part of the RAQMON PDU. A value of zero is
considered to be valid and indicates a RAQMON NULL PDU.
trailer (T) : 3 bits - Total number of Application Specific
Extensions that follow the BASIC Part of RAQMON PDU. A value of
zero is considered to be valid as many times there is no
application specific information to add to the basic information.
padding (P): 1 bit - If the padding bit is set, the basic Part of the
RAQMON PDU contains some additional padding octets at the end of
the Basic Part of the PDU which are not part of the monitoring
information. Padding may be needed in some cases as reporting is
based on the intent of a RDS to report certain parameters. Also
some parameters may be reported only once at the beginning of the
reporting session e.g. Data Source Name, Receiver Name, Pay Load
type etc. Actual padding at the end of the Basic part of the PDU,
is either 0,8, 16 or 24 bits to make the basic part of the PDU
multiple of 32 bits long.
Source IP version Flag (S): 1 bit - While set to 1, the source IP
version flag indicates that the Source IP address contained in the
PDU is a IPv6 address.
Receiver IP version Flag (R): 1 bit - While set to 1, the receiver IP
version flag indicates that the receiver IP address contained in
the PDU is a IPv6 address.
record count (RC): 4 bits - Total number of application records
contained in the Basic part of the PDU. A value of zero is
considered to be valid but Useless, with the exception of the case
of a NULL PDU indicating the end of a RDS reporting session.
length: 16 bits (unsigned integer) - The length of the Basic Part of
the RAQMON PDU in units of 32-bit words minus one, count which
includes the header and any padding.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
DSRC: 32 bits - Data Source identifier represents a unique RAQMON
reporting session descriptor that points to a specific reporting
session between RDS and RRC. Uniqueness of DSRC is valid only
within a reporting session. DSRC values should be randomly
generated using vendor chosen algorithms for each communication
session. It is not sufficient to obtain a DSRC simply by calling
random() without carefully initializing the state. One could use
an algorithm like the one defined in Appendix A.6 in [RFC3550] to
create a DSRC. Depending on the choice of algorithm, there is a
finite probability that two DSRCS from two different RDSs may be
the same. To further reduce the probability that two RDSs pick
the same DSRC for two different reporting session, it is
recommended that an RRC use parameters like Data Source Address
(DA), Data Source Name (DN), layer 2 Media Access Control (MAC)
Address in the PDU in conjunction with a DSRC value. It is not
mandatory for RDSs to send parameters like Data Source Address
(DA), Data Source Name (DN), MAC Address in every PDU sent to RRC,
but sending these parameters occasionally will reduce the
probability of DSRC collision drastically. However this will
cause an additional overhead per PDU.
A value of zero for basic (B) bit and trailer (T) bits set
constitutes a RAQMON NULL PDU (i.e. nothing to report). RDSs MUST
send a RAQMON NULL PDU to RRC to indicate end of RDS reporting
session. A NULL PDU ends with the DSRC field.
SMI Enterprise Code: 16 bits. A value of SMI Enterprise Code = 0 is
used to indicate RMON WG compliant Basic part of the RAQMON PDU
format.
Report Type: 8 bits - These bits are reserved by the IETF RMON Work
Group. A value of 0 within SMI Enterprise Code = 0 is used for
the version of the PDU defined by this document.
The basic part of each RAQMON PDU consists of Record Count Number
(RC_N) and RAQMON Parameter Presence Flags (RPPF) to indicate the
presence of appropriate RAQMON parameters within a record, as
defined in Table 1.
RC_N: 8 bits - The Record Count number indicates a sub-session within
a communication session. A value of zero is a valid record
number. The maximum number of records that can be described in
one RAQMON Packet is 256.
RAQMON Parameter Presence Flags (RPPF): 32 bits
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Each of these flags while set represent that this RAQMON PDU
contains corresponding parameters as specified in Table 1.
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Bit Sequence | Presence/Absence of corresponding Parameter |
| Number | within this RAQMON PDU |
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | Data Source Address (DA) |
| | |
| 1 | Receiver Address (RA) |
| | |
| 2 | NTP Timestamp |
| | |
| 3 | Application Name |
| | |
| 4 | Data Source Name (DN) |
| | |
| 5 | Receiver Name (RN) |
| | |
| 6 | Session Setup Status |
| | |
| 7 | Session Duration |
| | |
| 8 | ound Trip End-to-End Net Delay (RTT) |
| | |
| 9 | One Way End-to-End Network Delay (OWD) |
| | |
| 10 | Cumulative Packets Loss |
| | |
| 11 | Cumulative Packets Discards |
| | |
| 12 | Total number of App Packets sent |
| | |
| 13 | Total number of App Packets received |
| | |
| 14 | Total number of App Octets sent |
| | |
| 15 | Total number of App Octets received |
| | |
| 16 | Data Source Device Port Used |
| | |
| 17 | Receiver Device Port Used |
| | |
| 18 | Source Layer 2 Priority |
| | |
| 19 | Source Layer 3 Priority |
| | |
| 20 | Destination Layer 2 Priority |
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
| 21 | Destination Layer 3 Priority |
| | |
| 22 | Source Payload Type |
| | |
| 23 | Receiver Payload Type |
| | |
| 24 | CPU Utilization |
| | |
| 25 | Memory Utilization |
| | |
| 26 | Session Setup Delay |
| | |
| 27 | Application Delay |
| | |
| 28 | IP Packet Delay Variation |
| | |
| 29 | Inter arrival Jitter |
| | |
| 30 | Packet Discard (in fraction) |
| | |
| 31 | Packet Loss (in fraction) |
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
RAQMON Parameters and corresponding RPPF
Table 1
Data Source Address (DA): 32 bits or 160 bits in binary
representation - This parameter is defined in section 5.1 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]. IP version 6 addresses are incorporated in
Data Source Address by setting the source IP version flag (S bit)
of the RAQMON PDU header to 1.
Receiver Address (RA): 32 bits or 160 bits - This parameter is
defined in section 5.2 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]. Follows exact same
syntax as Data Source Address but used to indicate a Receiver
Address. IP version 6 addresses are incorporated in Receiver
Address by setting the receiver IP version flag (R bit) of the
RAQMON PDU header to 1.
Session Setup Date/Time (NTP timestamp): 64 bits - This parameter is
defined in section 5.7 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] represented using the
timestamp format of the Network Time Protocol (NTP), which is in
seconds [RFC1305]. The full resolution NTP timestamp is a 64-bit
unsigned fixed-point number with the integer part in the first 32
bits and the fractional part in the last 32 bits.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Application Name: - This parameter is defined in section 5.32 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]. The Application Name field starts with an
8-bit octet count describing the length of the text followed the
text itself using UTF-8 encoding. Application Name field is
multiple of 32 bits, and padding will be used if necessary.
A Data Source that does not support NTP SHOULD set the appropriate
RAQMON flag to 0 to avoid wasting 64 bits in the PDU. Since the
NTP time stamp is intended to provide the setup Date/Time of a
session, it is RECOMMENDED that the NTP Timestamp be used only in
the first RAQMON PDU after sub-session RC_N setup is completed, in
order to use network resources efficiently.
Data Source Name (DN): - defined in section 5.3 of [RAQMON-
FRAMEWORK]. The Data Source Name field starts with an 8-bit octet
count describing the length of the text followed by the text
itself. Padding is being used to ensure that the length and text
encoding occupy a multiple of 32 bit in the DN field of the PDU.
The text MUST NOT be longer than 255 octets. The text is encoded
according to the UTF-8 encoding specified in [RFC3629].
Applications SHOULD instruct RDSs to send out the Data Source Name
infrequently to ensure efficient usage of network resources as
this parameter is expected to remain constant for the duration of
the reporting session.
Receiver Name (RN): - This metric is defined in section 5.4 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]. Like Data Source Name, the Receiver Name
field starts with an 8-bit octet count describing the length of
the text followed by the text itself. The Receiver Name including
the length field encoding is a multiple of 32 bits and follows the
same padding rules as applied to the Data Source Name. Since the
Receiver Name is expected to remain constant during entire
reporting sessions, this information SHOULD be sent out
occasionally over random time intervals to maximize success of
reaching a RRC and also conserve network bandwidth.
Session Setup Status: - The Session (sub-session) Setup Status is
defined in section 5.10 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]. This field starts
with an 8-bit length field followed by the text itself. Session
Setup Status is a multiple of 32 bits.
Session Duration: 32 bits - The Session (sub-session) Duration metric
is defined in section 5.9 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]. Session Duration
is an unsigned integer expressed in seconds.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Round Trip End-to-End Network Delay: 32 bits - The Round Trip End-to-
End Network Delay is defined in section 5.11 of [RAQMON-
FRAMEWORK]. This field represents the Round Trip End-to-End Delay
of sub-session RC_N, which is an unsigned integer, expressed in
milliseconds.
One Way End-to-End Network Delay: 32 bits - The One Way End-to-End
Network Delay is defined in section 5.12 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK].
This field represents the One Way End-to-End Delay of sub-session
RC_N, which is an unsigned integer, expressed in milliseconds.
Cumulative Application Packet Loss: 32 bits - This parameter is
defined in section 5.20 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] as an unsigned
integer, representing the total number of packets from sub-session
RC_N that have been lost while this RAQMON PDU was generated.
Cumulative Application Packet Discards: 32 bits - This parameter is
defined in section 5.22 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] as an unsigned
integer representing the total number of packets from sub-session
RC_N that have been discarded while this RAQMON PDU was generated.
Total number of Application Packets sent: 32 bits - This parameter is
defined in section 5.17 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] as an unsigned
integer, representing the total number of packets transmitted
within sub- session RC_N by the sender.
Total number of Application Packets received: 32 bits - This
parameter is defined in section 5.16 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] and is
represented as an unsigned integer, representing the total number
of packets transmitted within sub-session RC_N by the receiver.
Total number of Application Octets sent: 32 bits - This parameter is
defined in section 5.19 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] as an unsigned
integer, representing the total number of payload octets (i.e.,
not including header or padding) transmitted in packets by the
sender within sub- session RC_N.
Total number of Application Octets received: 32 bits - This parameter
is defined in section 5.18 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] as an unsigned
integer representing the total number of payload octets (i.e., not
including header or padding) transmitted in packets by the
receiver within sub-session RC_N.
Data Source Device Port Used: 16 bits - This parameter is defined in
section 5.5 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] and describes the port Number
used by the Data Source as used by the application in RC_N session
while this RAQMON PDU was generated.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Receiver Device Port Used: 16 bits - This parameter is defined in
section 5.6 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK], and describes the receiver port
used by the application to communicate to the receiver. It
follows same syntax as Source Device Port Used.
S_Layer2: 8 bits - This parameter defined in section 5.26 of [RAQMON-
FRAMEWORK] is a 8-bit field associated to source's IEEE 802.1D
priority tagging of traffic in the communication sub-session RC_N.
Since IEEE 802.1 priority tags are 3 bits-long, the first 3 bits
of this parameter represent the IEEE 802.1 tag value and the last
5 bits are padded to 0.
S_Layer3: 8 bits - This parameter defined in section 5.27 of [RAQMON-
FRAMEWORK] is a 8-bit field which represents the layer 3 QoS
marking used to send packets to the receiver by this data source
during sub- session RC_N.
D_Layer2: 8 bits - This parameter defined in section 5.28 of [RAQMON-
FRAMEWORK] is a 8-bit field which represents layer 2 IEEE 802.1D
priority tags used by the receiver to send packets to the data
source during sub-session RC_N session if the Data Source can
learn such information. Since IEEE 802.1 priority tags are 3
bits-long, the first 3 bits of this parameter represent the IEEE
802.1 priority tag value and the last 5 bits are padded to 0.
D_Layer3: 8 bits - This parameter defined in section 5.29 of [RAQMON-
FRAMEWORK] is a 8-bit field which represents the layer 3 QoS
marking used by the receiver to send packets to the data source
during sub- session RC_N, if the Data Source can learn such
information.
Source Payload Type: 8 bit - This parameter is defined in section
5.24 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] as an 8-bit field. It specifies the
payload type of the data source of the communication sub-session
RC_N as defined in [RFC3551].
Receiver Payload Type: 8 bit - This parameter is defined in section
5.25 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] as an 8-bit field. It specifies the
receiver payload type of the communication sub-session RC_N as
defined in [RFC3551].
CPU Utilization: 8 bits - This parameter defined in section 5.30 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] represents the percentage of CPU used during
session RC_N from the last report until the time this RAQMON PDU
was generated. The CPU Utilization is expressed in percents in
the range 0 to 100. The value should indicate not only CPU
utilization associated to a session RC_N but also actual CPU
Utilization, to indicate a snapshot of the CPU utilization of the
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
host running the RDS while session RC_N in progress.
Memory Utilization: 8 bits - This parameter defined in section 5.31
of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] represents the percentage of total memory
used during session RC_N up until the time this RAQMON PDU was
generated. The memory utilization is expressed in percents 0 to
100. The Memory Utilization value should indicate not only the
memory utilization associated to a session RC_N but the total
memory utilization, to indicate a snapshot of end device memory
utilization while session RC_N in progress.
Session Setup Delay: 16 bits - The Session (sub-session) Setup Delay
metric is defined in section 5.8 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] and
expressed in milliseconds.
Application Delay: 16 bits - The Application Delay is defined in
section 5.13 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] and is represented as an
unsigned integer expressed in milliseconds.
IP Packet Delay Variation: 16 bits - The IP Packet Delay Variation is
defined in section 5.15 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] and is represented
as an unsigned integer expressed in milliseconds.
Inter-Arrival Jitter: 16 bits - The Inter-Arrival Jitter is defined
in section 5.14 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] and is represented as an
unsigned integer expressed in milliseconds.
Packet Discard in Fraction: 8 bits - This parameter is defined in
section 5.23 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] expressed as a fixed point
number with the binary point at the left edge of the field. (That
is equivalent to taking the integer part after multiplying the
discard fraction by 256.) This metric is defined to be the number
of packets discarded divided by the total number of packets.
Packet Loss in Fraction: 8 bits - This parameter is defined in
section 5.21 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] expressed as a fixed-point
number, with the binary point at the left edge of the field. The
metric is defined to be the number of packets lost divided by the
number of packets expected. The value is calculated by dividing
the total number of packets lost (after the effects of applying
any error protection such as FEC) by the total number of packets
expected, multiplying the result of the division by 256, limiting
the maximum value to 255 (to avoid overflow), and taking the
integer part.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
padding: 0, 8, 16 or 24 bits - If the padding bit (P) is set , then
this field may be present. The actual padding at the end of the
Basic part of the PDU is 0,8, 16 or 24 bits to make the basic part
of the PDU multiple of 32 bits long.
2.1.3. APP part of the RAQMON Protocol Data Unit
The APP part of the RAQMON PDU is intended to accommodate extensions
for new applications in a modular manner and without requiring a PDU
type value registration.
Vendors may design and publish application specific extensions. Any
RAQMON compliant RRC MUST be able to recognize vendors SMI Enterprise
Code and MUST recognize the presence of application specific
extensions identified by using Report Type fields. As represented in
Figure 1, the Report Type and Application Length fields are always
located at a fixed offset relative to the start of the extension
fields. There is no need for the RRC to understand the semantics of
the enterprise specific parts of the PDU.
SMI Enterprise Code: 32 bits - Vendors and Application developers
should fill in appropriate SMI Enterprise IDs available at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers. A Non-Zero
SMI Enterprise Code indicates a vendor or application specific
extension.
RAQMON PDUs are capable of carrying multiple Application Parts
within a PDU.
Report Type: 16 bits - Vendors and Application developers should fill
in appropriate Report type within a specified SMI Enterprise Code.
It is RECOMMENDED that vendors publish application specific
extensions and maintain such report types for better
interoperability.
Length of the Application Part: 16 bits (unsigned integer) - The
length of the Application Part of the RAQMON PDU in 32-bit words
minus one, which includes the header of the Application Part.
Application-dependent data: variable length - Application/vendor-
dependent data is defined by the application developers. It is
interpreted by the vendor specific application and not by the RRC
itself. It must be a multiple of 32 bits long, and will be padded
if necessary.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
2.1.4. Byte Order, Alignment and Time Format of RAQMON PDUs
All integer fields are carried in network byte order, that is, most
significant byte (octet) first. This byte order is commonly known as
big-endian. The transmission order is described in detail in
[RFC791]. Unless otherwise noted, numeric constants are in decimal
(base 10).
All header data is aligned to its natural length, i.e., 16-bit fields
are aligned on even offsets, 32-bit fields are aligned at offsets
divisible by four, etc. Octets designated as padding have the value
zero.
2.2. Securing RAQMON session
The RAQMON session, initiated over TCP transport, between an RDS and
an RRC carries monitoring information from an RDS client to the RRC,
the collector. The RRC distinguishes between clients based on
various identifiers used by the RDS to identify itself to the RRC
(Data Source Address and Data Source Name) and the RRC (Receiver's
Address and Receiver's Name).
In order to ensure integrity of the claimed identities of RDS and RRC
to each other authentication services are required.
Subsequently, where protection from unauthorized modification and
unauthorized disclosure of RAQMON data in transit from RDS to RRC is
needed, data confidentiality and message integrity services will be
required. In order to prevent monitoring-misinformation due to
session-recording and replay by unauthorized sources, replay
protection services may be required.
TLS provides, at the transport layer, the required authentication
services through the handshake protocol and subequent data
confidentiality, message integrity and replay protection of the
application protocol using ciphersuite negotiated during
authentication.
The RDS client authenticates the RRC in session. The RRC optionally
authenticates the RDS.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|PDT = 1 |B| T |P|S|R| RC | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DSRC |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SMI Enterprise Code = 0 |Report Type = | RC_N |
| | TLS_REQ| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
RAQMON StartTLS Request - TLS_REQ
Figure 2
The protection of RAQMON session starts with the RDS client StartTLS
request upon successful establishment of the TCP session. The RDS
sends the StartTLS request by transmitting the TLS_REQ PDU as in
Figure 2. This PDU is distinguished by TLS_REQ Report Type.
The client MUST NOT send any PDUs on this connection following this
request until it receives a StartTLS response.
Other fields of the PDU are as specified in Figure 1.
The flags field do not carry any significance and exist for
compatibility with the generic RAQMON PDU. The flags field in this
version MUST be ignored.
When a StartTLS request is made, the target server, RRC, MUST return
a RAQMON PDU containing a StartTLS response, TLS_RESP. A RAQMON
TLS_RESP is defined as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|PDT = 1 |B| T |P|S|R| RC | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DSRC |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SMI Enterprise Code = 0 |Report Type = | Result |
| | TLS_RESP| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
RAQMON StartTLS Response - TLS_RESP
Figure 3
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
The RRC responds to the StartTLS request by transmitting the TLS_RESP
PDU as in Figure 3. This PDU is distinguished by TLS_RESP Report
Type.
The Result field is an octet containing the result of the request.
This field can carry one of the following values:
+-------+------------------+----------------------------------------+
| Value | Mnemonic | Result |
+-------+------------------+----------------------------------------+
| 0 | OK | Success. The server is willing and |
| | | able to negotiate TLS. |
| | | |
| 1 | OP_ERR | Sequencing Error (e.g., TLS already |
| | | established). |
| | | |
| 2 | PROTO_ERR | TLS not supported or incorrect PDU |
| | | format. |
| | | |
| 3 | UNAVAIL | TLS service problem or RRC server |
| | | going down. |
| | | |
| 4 | CONF_REQD | Confidentiality Service Required. |
| | | |
| 5 | STRONG_AUTH_REQD | Strong Authentication Service |
| | | Required. |
| | | |
| 6 | REFERRAL | Referral to a RRC Server supporting |
| | | TLS. |
+-------+------------------+----------------------------------------+
Table 2
Other fields of the PDU are as specified in Figure 1.
The server MUST return OP_ERR if the client violates any of the
StartTLS operation sequencing requirements described in section
below.
If the server does not support TLS (whether by design or by current
configuration), it MUST set the resultCode to PROTO_ERR or to
REFERRAL. The server MUST include an actual referral value in the
RAQMON REFER field if it returns a resultCode of referral. The
client's current session is unaffected if the server does not support
TLS. The client MAY proceed with RAQMON session, or it MAY close the
connection.
The server MUST return UNAVAIL if it supports TLS but cannot
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
establish a TLS connection for some reason, e.g. the certificate
server not responding, it cannot contact its TLS implementation, or
if the server is in process of shutting down. The client MAY retry
the StartTLS operation, or it MAY proceed with RAQMON session, or it
MAY close the connection.
2.2.1. Sequencing of the Start TLS Operation
This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers
MUST follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into
consideration various aspects of the overall security of the RAQMON
connection including discovery of resulting security level.
2.2.1.1. Requesting to Start TLS on a RAQMON Association
The client MAY send the StartTLS request at any time after
establishing an RAQMON (TCP) connection, except that in the following
cases the client MUST NOT send a StartTLS request:
o if TLS is currently established on the connection, or
o if RAQMON traffic is in progress on the connection.
The result of violating any of these requirements is a Result of
OP_ERR, as described above in Table 2.
If the client did not establish a TLS connection before sending any
other requests, and the server requires the client to establish a TLS
connection before performing a particular request, the server MUST
reject that request with a CONF_REQD or STRONG_AUTH_REQD result. The
client MAY send a Start TLS extended request, or it MAY choose to
close the connection.
2.2.1.2. Starting TLS
The server will return an extended response with the resultCode of
success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS. It will return
other resultCodes, documented above, if it is unable.
In the successful case, the client, which has ceased to transfer
PAQMON PDUs on the connection, MUST either begin a TLS negotiation or
close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record
Protocol directly over the underlying transport connection to the
server to initiate TLS negotiation [TLS].
2.2.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation
Negotiating the version of TLS or SSL to be used is a part of the TLS
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Handshake Protocol, as documented in [TLS]. The reader is referred
to that document for details.
2.2.1.4. Discovery of Resultant Security Level
After a TLS connection is established on an RAQMON connection, both
parties MUST individually decide whether or not to continue based on
the security assurance level achieved. Ascertaining the TLS
connection's assurance level is implementation dependent, and
accomplished by communicating with one's respective local TLS
implementation.
If the client or server decides that the level of authentication or
confidentiality is not high enough for it to continue, it SHOULD
gracefully close the TLS connection immediately after the TLS
negotiation has completed Section 2.2.2.1.
The client MAY attempt to Start TLS again, or MAY disconnect or
proceed to send RAQMON session data, if RRC policy permits.
2.2.1.5. Server Identity Check
The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname
against the server's identity as presented in the server's
Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Matching is performed according to these rules:
o The client MUST use the server address it used to open the RAQMON
connection as the value to compare against the server name as
expressed in the Subject Name field of server's certificate as a
X.500 Distinsuished Name. The client MUST NOT use the server's
canonical DNS name or any other derived form of name.
o Matching is case-insensitive.
o The "*" wildcard character is allowed. If present, it applies
only to the left-most name component.
E.g. *.example.com would match a.example.com, b.example.com, etc.
but not example.com. If more than one identity of a given type is
present in the certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a
match in any one of the set is considered acceptable.
If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the
certificate per the above check, automated clients SHOULD close the
connection, returning and/or logging an error indicating that the
server's identity is suspect.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Beyond the server identity checks described in this section, clients
SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that the server
is authorized to provide the service it is observed to provide. The
client MAY need to make use of local policy information.
We also refer readers to similar guidelines as applied for LDAP over
TLS [LDAP-TLS]
2.2.1.6. Client Identity Check
Anonomyous TLS authentication helps establish a TLS RAQMON session
that offers
o server-authentication in course of TLS establishment
o confidentiality and replay protection of RAQMON traffic, but
o no protection against man-in-the-middle attacks during session
establishment.
o no protection from spoofing attacks by unauthorized clients
The server MUST authenticate the RDS client when deployment is
susceptible to above threats. This is done by requiring client
authentication during TLS session establishment.
In the TLS negotiation, the server MUST request a certificate. The
client will provide its certificate to the server, and MUST perform a
private key-based encryption, proving it has the private key
associated with the certificate.
As deployments will require protection of sensitive data in transit,
the client and server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite which contains a
bulk encryption algorithm of appropriate strength.
The server MUST verify that the client's certificate is valid. The
server will normally check that the certificate is issued by a known
CA, and that none of the certificates on the client's certificate
chain are invalid or revoked. There are several procedures by which
the server can perform these checks.
The server validates the certificate by the Distinguished Name of the
RDS client entity in the Subject field of the certificate.
A corresponding set of guidelines will apply to use of TLS-PSK modes
[TLS-PSK] using pre-shared keys instead of client certificates.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
2.2.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information
The client MUST refresh any cached server capabilities information
upon TLS session establishment, such as prior RRC state related to a
previous RAQMON session based on another DSRC. This is necessary to
protect against active-intermediary attacks which may have altered
any server capabilities information retrieved prior to TLS
establishment. The server MAY advertise different capabilities after
TLS establishment.
2.2.2. Closing a TLS Connection
2.2.2.1. Graceful Closure
Either the client or server MAY terminate the TLS connection on an
RAQMON session by sending a TLS closure alert. This will leave the
RAQMON connection intact.
Before closing a TLS connection, the client MUST either wait for any
outstanding RAQMON transmissions to complete. This happens naturally
when the RAQMON client is single-threaded and synchronous.
After the initiator of a close has sent a closure alert, it MUST
discard any TLS messages until it has received an alert from the
other party. It will cease to send TLS Record Protocol PDUs, and
following the receipt of the alert, MAY send and receive RAQMON PDUs.
The other party, if it receives a closure alert, MUST immediately
transmit a TLS closure alert. It will subsequently cease to send TLS
Record Protocol PDUs, and MAY send and receive RAQMON PDUs.
2.2.2.2. Abrupt Closure
Either the client or server MAY abruptly close the entire RAQMON
session and any TLS connection established on it by dropping the
underlying TCP connection. It MAY be possible for RRC to send RDS a
message notifying disconnect - allowing the client to know the
connectivity to be due to other than network failure. However, this
message is not defined in this version.
2.3. SNMP Notifications as an RDS/RRC Network Transport Protocol
It was an inherent objective of the RAQMON Framework to re-use
existing application level transport protocols to maximize the usage
of existing installations as well as to avoid transport protocol
level complexities in the design process. Choice of SNMP as a means
to transport RAQMON PDU was motivated by the intent of using existing
installed based of devices implementing SNMP agents as RAQMON Data
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Sources (RDS).
There are some potential problems with the usage of SNMP as a
transport mapping protocol:
o The potential of congestion is higher than with the TCP transport,
because of the usage of UDP at the transport layer.
o The encoding of the information is less efficient and this results
in bigger message size, which again may impact negatively
congestion conditions and memory size requirements in the devices.
In order to avoid these potential problems, the following
recommendations are made:
o Usage of the TCP transport is RECOMMENDED in deployment over the
SNMP transport wherever available for a pair of RDS/RRC.
o The usage of Inform PDUs is RECOMMENDED.
o The usage of Traps PDU is NOT RECOMMENDED.
o It is RECOMMENDED that information carried by notifications be
maintained within the limits of the MTU size in order to avoid
fragmentation.
If SNMP is chosen as a mechanism to transport RAQMON PDUs, the
following specification applies to RAQMON related usage of SNMP:
o RDSs implement the capability of embedding RAQMON parameters in
SNMP Notifications, re-using well known SNMP mechanisms to report
RAQMON Statistics. The RAQMON RDS MIB module as specified in
2.1.1 MUST be used in order to map the RAQMON PDUs onto the SNMP
Notifications transport.
o Since RDSs are not computationally rich and to keep the RDS
realization as lightweight as possible, RDSs MAY fail to respond
to SNMP requests like GET, SET, etc., with the exception of the
GET and SET commands required to implement the User-Based Security
Model (USM) defined by [RFC3414].
o In order to meet congestion safety requirements, SNMP INFORM PDUs
SHOULD be used. In case INFORM PDUs are used, RDSs MUST process
the SNMP INFORM responses from RRCs, and MUST serialize the PDU
transmission rate, i.e. limit the number of PDUS sent in a
specific time interval.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
o Standard UDP port 162 SHOULD be used for SNMP Notifications.
2.3.1. Encoding RAQMON using the RAQMON RDS MIB module
The RAQMON RDS MIB module is used to map RAQMON PDUs onto SNMP
Notifications for transport purposes. The MIB module defines the
objects needed for mapping the Basic part of RAQMON PDU defined in
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] as well as the Notifications themselves. In order
to incorporate any application-specific extensions in the Application
(APP) part of RAQMON PDU as defined in [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK], additional
variable bindings MAY be included in RAQMON notifications as
described in the MIB module.
For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
[RFC3410].
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally
accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB
module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58,
[RFC2578], STD 58, [RFC2579] and STD 58, [RFC2580].
The following MIB module IMPORTS definitions from the following:
SNMPv2-SMI [RFC2578]
SNMPv2-TC [RFC2579]
SNMPv2-CONF [RFC2580]
RMON-MIB [RFC2819]
DIFFSERV-DSCP-TC [RFC3289]
SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [RFC3411]
INET-ADDRESS-MIB [RFC4001]
It also uses REFERENCE clauses to refer to [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK].
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
RAQMON-RDS-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, NOTIFICATION-TYPE,
Counter32, Unsigned32
FROM SNMPv2-SMI
DateAndTime
FROM SNMPv2-TC
rmon
FROM RMON-MIB
SnmpAdminString
FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB
InetAddressType, InetAddress, InetPortNumber
FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB
Dscp
FROM DIFFSERV-DSCP-TC
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP, NOTIFICATION-GROUP
FROM SNMPv2-CONF;
raqmonDsMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "200601230000Z" -- January 23, 2006
ORGANIZATION "RMON Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO
"WG EMail: rmonmib@ietf.org
Subscribe: rmonmib-request@ietf.org
MIB Editor:
Eugene Golovinsky
Postal: BMC Software, Inc.
2101 CityWest Boulevard,
Houston, TX, 77094
USA
Tel: +713-918-1816
Email: egolovin@bmc.com
"
DESCRIPTION
" This is the RAQMON Data Source notification MIB Module.
It provides a mapping of RAQMON PDUs to SNMP
notifications.
Ds stands for data source.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Note that all of the object types defined in this module
are accessible-for-notify, and would consequently not be
available to a browser using simple Get, GetNext, or
GetBulk requests.
Copyright (c) The Internet Society (2006).
-- RFC EDITOR: please replace yyyy with actual number
This version of this MIB module is part of RFC yyyy;
See the RFC itself for full legal notices.
"
REVISION "200601230000Z" -- January 23, 2006
DESCRIPTION
"Initial version, published as RFCyyyy."
-- RFC Editor: Please fill in RFCyyyy
::= { rmon 32 }
-- This OID allocation conforms to [RFC3737]
raqmonDsNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { raqmonDsMIB 0 }
raqmonDsMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { raqmonDsMIB 1 }
raqmonDsConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { raqmonDsMIB 2 }
raqmonDsNotificationTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF RaqmonDsNotificationEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This conceptual table provides the SNMP mapping of
the RAQMON Basic PDU. It is indexed by the RAQMON
Data Source, sub-session, and address of the peer
entity.
Note that there is no concern about the indexation of
this table exceeding the limits defined by RFC 2578
Section 3.5. According to
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
, Section
5.1, only IPv4 and IPv6 addresses can be reported as
participant addresses.
"
::= { raqmonDsMIBObjects 1 }
raqmonDsNotificationEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RaqmonDsNotificationEntry
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The entry (row) is not retrievable and is not kept by
RDSs. It serves data organization purpose only.
"
INDEX { raqmonDsDSRC, raqmonDsRCN, raqmonDsPeerAddrType,
raqmonDsPeerAddr }
::= { raqmonDsNotificationTable 1 }
RaqmonDsNotificationEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
raqmonDsDSRC Unsigned32,
raqmonDsRCN Unsigned32,
raqmonDsPeerAddrType InetAddressType,
raqmonDsPeerAddr InetAddress,
raqmonDsAppName SnmpAdminString,
raqmonDsDataSourceDevicePort InetPortNumber,
raqmonDsReceiverDevicePort InetPortNumber,
raqmonDsSessionSetupDateTime DateAndTime,
raqmonDsSessionSetupDelay Unsigned32,
raqmonDsSessionDuration Unsigned32,
raqmonDsSessionSetupStatus SnmpAdminString,
raqmonDsRoundTripEndToEndNetDelay Unsigned32,
raqmonDsOneWayEndToEndNetDelay Unsigned32,
raqmonDsApplicationDelay Unsigned32,
raqmonDsInterArrivalJitter Unsigned32,
raqmonDsIPPacketDelayVariation Unsigned32,
raqmonDsTotalPacketsReceived Counter32,
raqmonDsTotalPacketsSent Counter32,
raqmonDsTotalOctetsReceived Counter32,
raqmonDsTotalOctetsSent Counter32,
raqmonDsCumulativePacketLoss Counter32,
raqmonDsPacketLossFraction Unsigned32,
raqmonDsCumulativeDiscards Counter32,
raqmonDsDiscardsFraction Unsigned32,
raqmonDsSourcePayloadType Unsigned32,
raqmonDsReceiverPayloadType Unsigned32,
raqmonDsSourceLayer2Priority Unsigned32,
raqmonDsSourceDscp Dscp,
raqmonDsDestinationLayer2Priority Unsigned32,
raqmonDsDestinationDscp Dscp,
raqmonDsCpuUtilization Unsigned32,
raqmonDsMemoryUtilization Unsigned32 }
raqmonDsDSRC OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
DESCRIPTION
"Data Source identifier represents a unique session
descriptor that points to a specific session
between communicating entities. Identifiers unique for
sessions conducted between two entities are
generated by the communicating entities. Zero is a
valid value, with no special semantics."
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 1 }
raqmonDsRCN OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..15)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Record Count Number indicates a sub-session
within a communication session. A maximum number of 16
sub-sessions are supported - this limitation is
dictated by reasons of compatibility with other
transport protocols."
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 2 }
raqmonDsPeerAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The type of the Internet address of the peer participant
for this session."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.2 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 3 }
raqmonDsPeerAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Internet Address of the peer participant for this
session."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.2 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 4 }
raqmonDsAppName OBJECT-TYPE
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This is a text string giving the name and possibly
version of the application associated with that session,
e.g., 'XYZ VoIP Agent 1.2'."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.28 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 5 }
raqmonDsDataSourceDevicePort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetPortNumber
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The port number from which data for this session was sent
by the Data Source device."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.5 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 6 }
raqmonDsReceiverDevicePort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetPortNumber
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The port number where the data for this session was
received."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.6 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 7 }
raqmonDsSessionSetupDateTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DateAndTime
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The time when session was initiated."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.7 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 8 }
raqmonDsSessionSetupDelay OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..65535)
UNITS "milliseconds"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Session setup time."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.8 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 9 }
raqmonDsSessionDuration OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
UNITS "seconds"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Session duration, including setup time. The SYNTAX of
this object allows to express the duration of sessions
that do not exceed 4660 hours and 20 minutes."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.9 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 10 }
raqmonDsSessionSetupStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Describes appropriate communication session states e.g.
Call Established successfully, RSVP reservation
failed etc."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.10 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 11 }
raqmonDsRoundTripEndToEndNetDelay OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
UNITS "milliseconds"
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Most recent available information about the
round trip end to end network delay."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.11 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 12}
raqmonDsOneWayEndToEndNetDelay OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
UNITS "milliseconds"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" Most recent available information about the
one way end to end network delay."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.12 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 13}
raqmonDsApplicationDelay OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..65535)
UNITS "milliseconds"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" Most recent available information about the
application delay."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.13 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 14}
raqmonDsInterArrivalJitter OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..65535)
UNITS "milliseconds"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An estimate of the inter-arrival jitter."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.14 of
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 15}
raqmonDsIPPacketDelayVariation OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..65535)
UNITS "milliseconds"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An estimate of the inter-arrival delay variation."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.15 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 16}
raqmonDsTotalPacketsReceived OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "packets"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of packets transmitted within a communication
session by the receiver since the start of the session."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.16 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 17 }
raqmonDsTotalPacketsSent OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "packets"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of packets transmitted within a communication
session by the sender since the start of the session."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.17 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 18 }
raqmonDsTotalOctetsReceived OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "octets"
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of payload octets (i.e., not including
header or padding octets) transmitted in packets by the
receiver within a communication session since the start
of the session."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.18 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 19 }
raqmonDsTotalOctetsSent OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "octets"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of payload octets (i.e., not including headers
or padding) transmitted in packets by the sender within
a communication sub-session since the start of the
session."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.19 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 20 }
raqmonDsCumulativePacketLoss OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "packets"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of packets from this session whose loss
had been detected since the start of the session."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.20 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 21 }
raqmonDsPacketLossFraction OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..100)
UNITS "percentage of packets sent"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
DESCRIPTION
"The percentage of lost packets with respect to the
overall packets sent. This is defined to be 100 times
the number of packets lost divided by the number of
packets expected."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.21 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 22 }
raqmonDsCumulativeDiscards OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "packets"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of packet discards
detected since the start of the session."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.22 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 23 }
raqmonDsDiscardsFraction OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..100)
UNITS "percentage of packets sent"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The percentage of discards with respect to the overall
packets sent. This is defined to be 100 times the number
of discards divided by the number of packets expected."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.23 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 24 }
raqmonDsSourcePayloadType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..127)
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The payload type of the packet sent by this RDS."
REFERENCE
"RFC 1890, Section 5.24 of
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 25 }
raqmonDsReceiverPayloadType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..127)
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The payload type of the packet received by this RDS."
REFERENCE
"RFC 1890, Section 5.25 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 26 }
raqmonDsSourceLayer2Priority OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..7)
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Source Layer 2 priority used by the sata source to send
packets to the receiver by this data source during this
communication session.
"
REFERENCE
"Section 5.26 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 27 }
raqmonDsSourceDscp OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Dscp
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Layer 3 TOS/DSCP values used by the Data Source to
prioritize traffic sent."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.27 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 28 }
raqmonDsDestinationLayer2Priority OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..7)
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
DESCRIPTION
"Destination Layer 2 priority. This is the priority used
by the peer communicating entity to send packets to the
data source.
"
REFERENCE
"Section 5.28 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 29 }
raqmonDsDestinationDscp OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Dscp
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Layer 3 TOS/DSCP values used by the
peer communicating entiy to prioritize traffic
sent to the source."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.29 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 30 }
raqmonDsCpuUtilization OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..100)
UNITS "percent"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Latest available information about the total CPU
utilization."
REFERENCE
"Section 5.30 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 31 }
raqmonDsMemoryUtilization OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..100)
UNITS "percent"
MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Latest available information about the total memory
utilization."
REFERENCE
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
"Section 5.31 of
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
"
::= { raqmonDsNotificationEntry 32 }
-- definitions of the notifications
--
-- raqmonDsAppName is the only object that MUST be sent by an
-- RDS every time the static notification is generated.
-- raqmonDsTotalPacketsReceived is the only object that MUST be
-- sent by an RD every time the dynamic notification is generated.
-- Other objects from the raqmonDsNotificationTable may be
-- included in the variable binding list. Specifically, a raqmon
-- notification will include MIB objects that provide information
-- about metrics that characterize the application session
raqmonDsStaticNotification NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS { raqmonDsAppName }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This notification maps the static parameters in the
Basic RAQMON PDU onto an SNMP transport.
This notification is expected to be sent once per
session, or when a new sub-session is initiated.
The following objects MAY be carried by the
raqmonDsStaticNotification:
raqmonDsDataSourceDevicePort,
raqmonDsReceiverDevicePort,
raqmonDsSessionSetupDateTime,
raqmonDsSessionSetupDelay,
raqmonDsSessionDuration,
raqmonDsSourcePayloadType,
raqmonDsReceiverPayloadType,
raqmonDsSourceLayer2Priority,
raqmonDsSourceDscp,
raqmonDsDestinationLayer2Priority,
raqmonDsDestinationDscp
It is RECOMMENDED to keep the size of a notification
within the MTU size limits in order to avoid
fragmentation."
::= { raqmonDsNotifications 1 }
raqmonDsDynamicNotification NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS { raqmonDsTotalPacketsReceived }
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This notification maps the dynamic parameters in the
Basic RAQMON PDU onto an SNMP transport.
The following objects MAY be carried by the
raqmonDsDynamicNotification:
raqmonDsRoundTripEndToEndNetDelay,
raqmonDsOneWayEndToEndNetDelay,
raqmonDsApplicationDelay,
raqmonDsInterArrivalJitter,
raqmonDsIPPacketDelayVariation,
raqmonDsTotalPacketsSent,
raqmonDsTotalOctetsReceived,
raqmonDsTotalOctetsSent,
raqmonDsCumulativePacketLoss,
raqmonDsPacketLossFraction,
raqmonDsCumulativeDiscards,
raqmonDsDiscardsFraction,
raqmonDsCpuUtilization,
raqmonDsMemoryUtilization
It is RECOMMENDED to keep the size of a notification
within the MTU size limits in order to avoid
fragmentation."
::= { raqmonDsNotifications 2 }
raqmonDsByeNotification NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS { raqmonDsAppName }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The BYE Notification. This Notification is the equivalent
of the RAQMON NULL PDU, which signals the end of a RAQMON
session.
"
::= { raqmonDsNotifications 3 }
--
-- conformance information
raqmonDsCompliance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ raqmonDsConformance 1 }
raqmonDsGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { raqmonDsConformance 2 }
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
raqmonDsBasicCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The compliance statement for SNMP entities which
implement this MIB module.
There are a number of INDEX objects that cannot be
represented in the form of OBJECT clauses in SMIv2, but
for which we have the following compliance requirements,
expressed in OBJECT clause form in this description
clause:
-- OBJECT raqmonDsPeerAddrType
-- SYNTAX InetAddressType { ipv4(1), ipv6(2) }
-- DESCRIPTION
-- This MIB requires support for only global IPv4
-- and IPv6 address types.
--
-- OBJECT raqmonDsPeerAddr
-- SYNTAX InetAddress (SIZE(4|16))
-- DESCRIPTION
-- This MIB requires support for only global IPv4
-- and IPv6 address types.
--
"
MODULE -- this module
MANDATORY-GROUPS { raqmonDsNotificationGroup,
raqmonDsPayloadGroup }
::= { raqmonDsCompliance 1 }
raqmonDsNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP
NOTIFICATIONS { raqmonDsStaticNotification,
raqmonDsDynamicNotification,
raqmonDsByeNotification }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Standard RAQMON Data Source Notification group."
::= { raqmonDsGroups 1 }
raqmonDsPayloadGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS { raqmonDsAppName,
raqmonDsDataSourceDevicePort,
raqmonDsReceiverDevicePort,
raqmonDsSessionSetupDateTime,
raqmonDsSessionSetupDelay,
raqmonDsSessionDuration,
raqmonDsSessionSetupStatus,
raqmonDsRoundTripEndToEndNetDelay,
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
raqmonDsOneWayEndToEndNetDelay,
raqmonDsApplicationDelay,
raqmonDsInterArrivalJitter,
raqmonDsIPPacketDelayVariation,
raqmonDsTotalPacketsReceived,
raqmonDsTotalPacketsSent,
raqmonDsTotalOctetsReceived,
raqmonDsTotalOctetsSent,
raqmonDsCumulativePacketLoss,
raqmonDsPacketLossFraction,
raqmonDsCumulativeDiscards,
raqmonDsDiscardsFraction,
raqmonDsSourcePayloadType,
raqmonDsReceiverPayloadType,
raqmonDsSourceLayer2Priority,
raqmonDsSourceDscp,
raqmonDsDestinationLayer2Priority,
raqmonDsDestinationDscp,
raqmonDsCpuUtilization,
raqmonDsMemoryUtilization }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Standard RAQMON Data Source payload MIB objects group."
::= { raqmonDsGroups 2 }
END
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
3. IANA Considerations
Applications using RAQMON Framework requires a single fixed port.
Port number 7XXX is registered with IANA for use as the default port
for RAQMON PDUs over TCP. Hosts that run multiple applications may
use this port as an indication to have used RAQMON or provision a
separate TCP port as part of provisioning RAQMON RDS and RAQMON
Collector.
[editor note we are requiring that 7XXX be allocated by IANA, and
this note to be removed]
The particular port number was chosen to lie in the range above 5000
to accommodate port number allocation practice within the Unix
operating system, where privileged processes can only use port
numbers below 1024 and port numbers between 1024 and 5000 are
automatically assigned by the operating systems.
The OID assignment for the raqmonDsMIB MODULE-IDENTITY is made
according to [RFC3737] and there is no need for any IANA action on
this respect.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
4. Congestion-safe RAQMON Operation
As outlined in earlier sections, TCP congestion control mechanism
provides inherent congestion safety features when TCP is implemented
as transport to carry RAQMON PDU.
To ensure congestion safety, clearly the best thing to do is to use a
congestion-safe transport protocol such as TCP. If this is not
feasible, it may be necessary to fall back to UDP since SNMP over UDP
is a widely deployed transport protocol.
When SNMP is chosen as RAQMON PDU Transport, implementers MUST follow
section 3.0 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] guidelines that outlines measures
that MUST be taken to use RAQMON in congestion safe manner.
Congestion safety requirements in section 3.0 of [RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
would ensure that a RAQMON implementation using SNMP over UDP does
not lead to congestion under heavy network load.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
5. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Bill Walker and Joseph Mastroguilio
from Avaya and Bin Hu from Motorola for their discussions. The
authors would also like to extend special thanks to Randy Presuhn,
who reviewed this document for spelling and formatting purposes, as
well as for a deep review of the technical content. We also would
like to thank Bert Wijnen for the permanent coaching during the
evolution of this document and the detailed review of its final
versions. The Security Considerations section was reviewed by Sam
Hartman and Kurt D. Zeilenga; and almost completely re-written by
Mahalingam Mani.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
6. Security Considerations
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK] outlines a threat model associated with RAQMON and
security considerations to be taken into account in the RAQMON
specification to mitigate against those threats. It is imperative
that RAQMON PDU implementations be able to provide the following
protection mechanisms in order to attain end-to-end security:
1. Authentication - the RRC SHOULD be able to verify that a RAQMON
report was originated by the RDS claiming to have sent it. At
minimum, an RDS/RRC pair MUST use a digest-based authentication
procedure to authenticate, like the one defined in [RFC1321].
2. Privacy - RAQMON information includes identification of the
parties participating in a communication session. RAQMON
deployments SHOULD be able to provide protection from
eavesdropping, and to prevent an unauthorized third party from
gathering potentially sensitive information. This can be
achieved by using secure transport protocols supporting
confidentiality based on encryption technologies such as DES
(Data Encryption Standard), [3DES], and AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard) [AES].
3. Protection from Denial of Service attacks directed at the RRC -
RDSs send RAQMON reports as a side effect of external events (for
example, receipt of a phone call). An attacker can try to
overwhelm the RRC (or the network) by initiating a large number
of events in order to swamp the RRC with excessive numbers of
RAQMON PDUs.
To prevent DoS (denial-of-service) attacks against the RRC, the
RDS will send the first report for a session only after the
session has been established, so that the session set-up process
is not affected.
4. NAT and Firewall Friendly Design: the presence of IP addresses
and TCP/UDP port information in RAQMON PDUs may be NAT
unfriendly. Where NAT-friendliness is a requirement, the RDS MAY
omit IP address information from the RAQMON PDU. Another way to
avoid this problem is by using NAT-Aware Application Layer
Gateways (ALGs) to ensure that correct IP addresses appear in
RAQMON PDUs.
For the usage of TCP, TLS MUST be used to provide transport layer
security. Section 6.1 describes the usage of TLS with RAQMON.
This memo also defines the RAQMON-RDS-MIB module with the purpose of
mapping the RAQMON PDUs into SNMP Notifications. To attain end-to-
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
end security the following measures have been taken in the RAQMON-
RDS-MIB module design:
There are no management objects defined in this MIB module that have
a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Consequently,
if this MIB module is implemented correctly, there is no risk that an
intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB
module via direct SNMP SET operations.
Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to
control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly
to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over
the network via SNMP. These are the tables and objects and their
sensitivity/vulnerability:
raqmonDsNotificationTable
The objects in this table contain user session information, and their
disclosure may be sensitive in some environments.
SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec),
even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is
allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects
in this MIB module.
It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as
provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410], section 8),
including full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic mechanisms (for
authentication and confidentiality).
It is a customer/operator responsibility to ensure that the SNMP
entity giving access to an instance of this MIB module is properly
configured to give access to the objects only to those principals
(users) that have legitimate rights to indeed GET or SET (change/
create/delete) them.
6.1. Usage of TLS with RAQMON
6.1.1. Confidentiality & Message Integrity
The subsequently authorized RAQMON data flow itself is protected by
the same TLS security association that protects the client-side
exchange. This standard TLS channel is now bound to the server
through the above client-side authentication. The session itself is
identified by the tuple {RDS ip-address:RDS_port / RRC ip-address:
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
RRC port}.
6.1.2. TLS CipherSuites
Several issues should be considered when selecting TLS ciphersuites
that are appropriate for use in a given circumstance. These issues
include the following:
The ciphersuite's ability to provide adequate confidentiality
protection for passwords and other data sent over the transport
connection. Client and server implementers should recognize that
some TLS ciphersuites provide no confidentiality protection while
other ciphersuites that do provide confidentiality protection may be
vulnerable to being cracked using brute force methods, especially in
light of ever-increasing CPU speeds that reduce the time needed to
successfully mount such attacks.
Client and server implementers should carefully consider the value of
the password or data being protected versus the level of
confidentiality protection provided by the ciphersuite to ensure that
the level of protection afforded by the ciphersuite is appropriate.
The ciphersuite's vulnerability (or lack thereof) to man-in-the-
middle attacks. Ciphersuites vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks
SHOULD NOT be used to protect passwords or sensitive data, unless the
network configuration is such that the danger of a man-in-the-middle
attack is negligible.
After a TLS negotiation (either initial or subsequent) is completed,
both protocol peers should independently verify that the security
services provided by the negotiated ciphersuite are adequate for the
intended use of the RAQMON session. If not, the TLS layer should be
closed.
Spoofing Attacks: When anonymous TLS alone is negotiated without
client authentication, client's identity is never established. This
easily allows any end-entity to establish a TLS-secured RAQMON
connection to the RRC. Not only does this offer an opportunity to
spoof legitimate RDS clients and hence compromise the integrity of
RRC monitoring data but also opens the RRC up to unauthorized clients
posing as genuine RDS entities to launch a DoS by flooding data.
RAQMON deployment policy MUST consider requiring RDS client
authentication during TLS session establishment - especially when RDS
clients communicate across unprotected internet.
Insider attacks: Even client-authenticated TLS connections is open to
spoofing attacks by one trusted client on another. Validation of RDS
source address against RDS TLS-session source address SHOULD be
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
performed to detect such attempts.
6.1.3. RAQMON Authorization State
Every RAQMON session (between RDS and RRC) has an associated
authorization state. This state is comprised of numerous factors
such as what (if any) authorization state has been established, how
it was established, and what security services are in place. Some
factors may be determined and/or affected by protocol events (e.g.,
StartTLS, or TLS closure), and some factors may be determined by
external events (e.g., time of day or server load).
While it is often convenient to view authorization state in
simplistic terms (as we often do in this technical specification)
such as "an anonymous state", it is noted that authorization systems
in RAQMON implementations commonly involve many factors which
interrelate.
Authorization in RAQMON is a local matter. One of the key factors in
making authorization decisions is authorization identity. The
initial session establishment defined in Section 2.2 allows
information to be exchanged between the client and server to
establish an authorization identity for the RAQMON session. The RRC
is not to allow any RDS transactions-related traffic through for
processing until the client authentication is complete unless
anonymous authentication mode is negotiated.
Upon initial establishment of the RAQMON session, the session has an
anonymous authorization identity. Among other things this implies
that the client need not send a TLSStartRequired in the first PDU of
the RAQMON message. The client may send any operation request prior
to binding RDS to any authentication, and the RRC MUST treat it as if
it had been performed after an anonymous RAQMON session start.
The RDS automatically is placed in an unauthorized state upon RRC
sending a TLSstart request to the RRC.
It is noted that other events both internal and external to RAQMON
may result in the authentication and authorization states being moved
to an anonymous one. For instance, the establishment, change or
closure of data security services may result in a move to an
anonymous state, or the user's credential information (e.g.,
certificate) may have expired. The former is an example of an event
internal to RAQMON whereas the latter is an example of an event
external to RAQMON.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RAQMON-FRAMEWORK]
Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D., and E. Golovinsky, "Framework
for Real-time Application Quality of Service Monitoring
(RAQMON)", draft-ietf-raqmon-framework-15.txt (work in
progress), february 2006.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J.,
Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management
Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578,
April 1999.
[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J.,
Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for
SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.
[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J.,
Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for
SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999.
[RFC2819] Waldbusser, S., "Remote Network Monitoring Management
Information Base", STD 59, RFC 2819, May 2000.
[RFC3289] Baker, F., Chan, K., and A. Smith, "Management Information
Base for the Differentiated Services Architecture",
RFC 3289, May 2002.
[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Preshun, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
December 2002.
[RFC4001] Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., and J.
Schoenwalder, "Textual Conventions for Internet Network
Addresses", RFC 4001, February 2005.
[RFC791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, September 1981.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
[TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999.
7.2. Informative References
[3DES] Americation National Standards Institute, "Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation", ANSI X9.52-1998.
[AES] Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS),
"Specifications for the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD(AES)", Publication 197, November 2001.
[IEEE802.1D]
"Information technology-Telecommunications and information
exchange between systems--Local and metropolitan area
networks-Common Specification a--Media access control
(MAC) bridges:15802-3: 1998(ISO/IEC)", [ANSI/IEEE
Std 802.1D Edition], 1998.
[LDAP-TLS]
Hodges, J. and R. Morgan, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (v3): Extension for Transport Layer Security",
RFC 2830, May 2000.
[RFC1305] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol Version 3", RFC 1305,
March 1992.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "Message Digest Algorithm MD5", RFC 1321,
April 1992.
[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002.
[RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)", RFC 3414, December 2002.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RFC3551] Schulzrinne, H. and S. Casner, "RTP Profile for Audio and
Video Conferences with Minimal Control", STD 65, RFC 3551,
July 2003.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
[RFC3737] Wijnen, B. and A. Bierman, "IANA Guidelines for the
Registry of Remote Monitoring (RMON) MIB modules",
RFC 3737, April 2004.
[TLS-PSK] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279,
December 2005.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Appendix A. Pseudo-code
The implementation notes included in Appendix are for informational
purposes only and are meant to clarify the RAQMON specification.
Pseudo code for RDS & RRC
We provide examples of Psuedo code for aspects of RDS and RRC. There
may be other implementation methods that are faster in particular
operating environments or have other advantages.
RDS:
when (session starts} {
report.identifier = session.endpoints, session.starttime;
report.timestamp = 0;
while (session in progress) {
wait interval;
report.statistics = update statistics;
report.curtimestamp += interval;
if encryption required
report_data = encrypt(report, encrypt parameters);
else
report_data = report;
raqmon_pdu = header, report_data;
send raqmon-pdu;
}
}
RRC:
listen on raqmon port
when ( raqmon_pdu received ) {
decrypt raqmon_pdu.data if needed
if report.identifier in database
if report.current_time_stamp > last update
update session statistics from report.statistics
else
discard report
}
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Authors' Addresses
Anwar Siddiqui
Avaya Labs
307 Middletown Lincroft Road
Lincroft, NJ 80302
USA
Phone: +1 732 852-3200
Email: anwars@avaya.com
Dan Romascanu
Avaya Inc.
Atidim Technology Park, Bldg #3
Tel Aviv, 61131
Israel
Phone: +972-3-645-8414
Email: dromasca@avaya.com
Eugene Golovinsky
BMC Software
2101 Citywest Blvd
Houston, TX 77042
USA
Phone: +1 713 918-1816
Email: eugene_golovinsky@bmc.com
Mahfuzur Rahman
Samsung Information Systems America
75 West Plumeria Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Phone: +1 408 544-5559
Email:
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Yongbum Yong Kim
Broadcom
3151 Zanker Road
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Phone: +1 408 501-7800
Email: ybkim@broadcom.com
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft Transport Mappings for RAQMON PDU July 2006
Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Siddiqui, et al. Expires January 26, 2007 [Page 54]