TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification
draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-05
RATS Working Group G. Fedorkow, Ed.
Internet-Draft Juniper Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational E. Voit
Expires: April 29, 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc.
J. Fitzgerald-McKay
National Security Agency
October 26, 2020
TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification
draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-05
Abstract
This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of the
integrity of firmware and software installed on network devices that
contain Trusted Platform Modules [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0], as defined by
the Trusted Computing Group (TCG).
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2021.
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Fedorkow, et al. Expires April 29, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Network Device RIV October 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Description of Remote Integrity Verification (RIV) . . . 5
1.5. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.6.1. Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1. RIV Software Configuration Attestation using TPM . . . . 9
2.1.1. What Does RIV Attest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2. Notes on PCR Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2. RIV Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3. RIV Information Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4. RIV Simplifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.1. Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs) . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2. Attestation Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3. Standards Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1. Prerequisites for RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.1. Unique Device Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.3. Appraisal Policy for Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2. Reference Model for Challenge-Response . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.1. Transport and Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3. Centralized vs Peer-to-Peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1. Keys Used in RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2. Prevention of Spoofing and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks . . 28
5.3. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.4. Owner-Signed Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.5. Other Factors for Trustworthy Operation . . . . . . . . . 30
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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