TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification
draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-02
RATS Working Group G. Fedorkow, Ed.
Internet-Draft Juniper Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational E. Voit
Expires: January 14, 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc.
J. Fitzgerald-McKay
National Security Agency
July 13, 2020
TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification
draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-02
Abstract
This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of the
integrity of network devices.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.
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Fedorkow, et al. Expires January 14, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Network Device RIV July 2020
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Description of Remote Integrity Verification (RIV) . . . 5
1.5. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6.1. Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. RIV Software Configuration Attestation using TPM . . . . 8
2.1.1. What Does RIV Attest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. RIV Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3. RIV Information Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4. RIV Simplifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.1. Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs) . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2. Attestation Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Standards Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1. Prerequisites for RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.1. Unique Device Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.3. Appraisal Policy for Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2. Reference Model for Challenge-Response . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1. Transport and Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3. Centralized vs Peer-to-Peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.1. Layering Model for Network Equipment Attester and
Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.1.1. Why is OS Attestation Different? . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.2. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.3. Root of Trust for Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1. Introduction
There are many aspects to consider in fielding a trusted computing
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