Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture
draft-ietf-rats-architecture-12
RATS Working Group H. Birkholz
Internet-Draft Fraunhofer SIT
Intended status: Informational D. Thaler
Expires: 25 October 2021 Microsoft
M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
N. Smith
Intel
W. Pan
Huawei Technologies
23 April 2021
Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture
draft-ietf-rats-architecture-12
Abstract
In network protocol exchanges it is often useful for one end of a
communication to know whether the other end is in an intended
operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of
the entities involved that make such tests possible through the
process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary claims.
An attempt is made to provide for a model that is neutral toward
processor architectures, the content of claims, and protocols.
Note to Readers
Discussion of this document takes place on the RATS Working Group
mailing list (rats@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/).
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/architecture (https://github.com/
ietf-rats-wg/architecture).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Reference Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Network Endpoint Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Confidential Machine Learning Model Protection . . . . . 5
2.3. Confidential Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Critical Infrastructure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning . . . . . . . 7
2.6. Hardware Watchdog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.7. FIDO Biometric Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Layered Attestation Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. Composite Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2. Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Topological Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Passport Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2. Background-Check Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3. Combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Roles and Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. Relying Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.2. Attester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.3. Relying Party Owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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7.4. Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.5. Endorser, Reference Value Provider, and Verifier Owner . 27
8. Conceptual Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.1. Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.2. Endorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.3. Reference Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.4. Attestation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.5. Appraisal Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9. Claims Encoding Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10. Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
10.1. Explicit Timekeeping using Synchronized Clocks . . . . . 33
10.2. Implicit Timekeeping using Nonces . . . . . . . . . . . 33
10.3. Implicit Timekeeping using Epoch IDs . . . . . . . . . . 33
10.4. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
12.1. Attester and Attestation Key Protection . . . . . . . . 36
12.1.1. On-Device Attester and Key Protection . . . . . . . 37
12.1.2. Attestation Key Provisioning Processes . . . . . . . 37
12.2. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12.3. Epoch ID-based Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12.4. Trust Anchor Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
14. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
15. Notable Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
16. Appendix A: Time Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
16.1. Example 1: Timestamp-based Passport Model Example . . . 43
16.2. Example 2: Nonce-based Passport Model Example . . . . . 44
16.3. Example 3: Epoch ID-based Passport Model Example . . . . 46
16.4. Example 4: Timestamp-based Background-Check Model
Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
16.5. Example 5: Nonce-based Background-Check Model Example . 48
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1. Introduction
The question of how one system can know that another system can be
trusted has found new interest and relevance in a world where trusted
computing elements are maturing in processor architectures.
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Systems that have been attested and verified to be in a good state
(for some value of "good") can improve overall system posture.
Conversely, systems that cannot be attested and verified to be in a
good state can be taken out of service, or otherwise flagged for
repair.
For example:
* A bank back-end system might refuse to transact with another
system that is not known to be in a good state.
* A healthcare system might refuse to transmit electronic healthcare
records to a system that is not known to be in a good state.
In Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS), one peer (the "Attester")
produces believable information about itself - Evidence - to enable a
remote peer (the "Relying Party") to decide whether to consider that
Attester a trustworthy peer or not. RATS are facilitated by an
additional vital party, the Verifier.
The Verifier appraises Evidence via appraisal policies and creates
the Attestation Results to support Relying Parties in their decision
process. This document defines a flexible architecture consisting of
attestation roles and their interactions via conceptual messages.
Additionally, this document defines a universal set of terms that can
be mapped to various existing and emerging Remote Attestation
Procedures. Common topological patterns and the sequence of data
flows associated with them, such as the "Passport Model" and the
"Background-Check Model", are illustrated. The purpose is to define
useful terminology for remote attestation and enable readers to map
their solution architecture to the canonical attestation architecture
provided here. Having a common terminology that provides well-
understood meanings for common themes such as roles, device
composition, topological patterns, and appraisal procedures is vital
for semantic interoperability across solutions and platforms
involving multiple vendors and providers.
Amongst other things, this document is about trust and
trustworthiness. Trust is a choice one makes about another system.
Trustworthiness is a quality about the other system that can be used
in making one's decision to trust it or not. This is subtle
difference and being familiar with the difference is crucial for
using this document. Additionally, the concepts of freshness and
trust relationships with respect to RATS are elaborated on to enable
implementers to choose appropriate solutions to compose their Remote
Attestation Procedures.
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2. Reference Use Cases
This section covers a number of representative and generic use cases
for remote attestation, independent of specific solutions. The
purpose is to provide motivation for various aspects of the
architecture presented in this document. Many other use cases exist,
and this document does not intend to have a complete list, only to
illustrate a set of use cases that collectively cover all the
functionality required in the architecture.
Each use case includes a description followed by an additional
summary of the Attester and Relying Party roles derived from the use
case.
2.1. Network Endpoint Assessment
Network operators want a trustworthy report that includes identity
and version information about the hardware and software on the
machines attached to their network, for purposes such as inventory,
audit, anomaly detection, record maintenance and/or trending reports
(logging). The network operator may also want a policy by which full
access is only granted to devices that meet some definition of
hygiene, and so wants to get Claims about such information and verify
its validity. Remote attestation is desired to prevent vulnerable or
compromised devices from getting access to the network and
potentially harming others.
Typically, solutions start with a specific component (called a root
of trust) that is intended to provide trustworthy device identity and
protected storage for measurements. The system components perform a
series of measurements that may be signed via functions provided by a
root of trust, considered as Evidence about present system
components, such as hardware, firmware, BIOS, software, etc.
Attester: A device desiring access to a network.
Relying Party: Network equipment such as a router, switch, or access
point, responsible for admission of the device into the network.
2.2. Confidential Machine Learning Model Protection
A device manufacturer wants to protect its intellectual property.
The intellectual property's scope primarily encompasses the machine
learning (ML) model that is deployed in the devices purchased by its
customers. The protection goals include preventing attackers,
potentially the customer themselves, from seeing the details of the
model.
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This typically works by having some protected environment in the
device go through a remote attestation with some manufacturer service
that can assess its trustworthiness. If remote attestation succeeds,
then the manufacturer service releases either the model, or a key to
decrypt a model already deployed on the Attester in encrypted form,
to the requester.
Attester: A device desiring to run an ML model.
Relying Party: A server or service holding ML models it desires to
protect.
2.3. Confidential Data Protection
This is a generalization of the ML model use case above, where the
data can be any highly confidential data, such as health data about
customers, payroll data about employees, future business plans, etc.
As part of the attestation procedure, an assessment is made against a
set of policies to evaluate the state of the system that is
requesting the confidential data. Attestation is desired to prevent
leaking data via compromised devices.
Attester: An entity desiring to retrieve confidential data.
Relying Party: An entity that holds confidential data for release to
authorized entities.
2.4. Critical Infrastructure Control
Potentially harmful physical equipment (e.g., power grid, traffic
control, hazardous chemical processing, etc.) is connected to a
network in support of critical infrastructure. The organization
managing such infrastructure needs to ensure that only authorized
code and users can control corresponding critical processes, and that
these processes are protected from unauthorized manipulation or other
threats. When a protocol operation can affect a critical system
component of the infrastructure, devices attached to that critical
component require some assurances depending on the security context,
including that: a requesting device or application has not been
compromised, and the requesters and actors act on applicable
policies. As such, remote attestation can be used to only accept
commands from requesters that are within policy.
Attester: A device or application wishing to control physical
equipment.
Relying Party: A device or application connected to potentially
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dangerous physical equipment (hazardous chemical processing,
traffic control, power grid, etc.).
2.5. Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning
A Trusted Application Manager (TAM) server is responsible for
managing the applications running in a Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE) of a client device, as described in
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]. To achieve its purpose, the TAM needs
to assess the state of a TEE, or of applications in the TEE, of a
client device. The TEE conducts Remote Attestation Procedures with
the TAM, which can then decide whether the TEE is already in
compliance with the TAM's latest policy. If not, the TAM has to
uninstall, update, or install approved applications in the TEE to
bring it back into compliance with the TAM's policy.
Attester: A device with a TEE capable of running trusted
applications that can be updated.
Relying Party: A TAM.
2.6. Hardware Watchdog
There is a class of malware that holds a device hostage and does not
allow it to reboot to prevent updates from being applied. This can
be a significant problem, because it allows a fleet of devices to be
held hostage for ransom.
A solution to this problem is a watchdog timer implemented in a
protected environment such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), as
described in [TCGarch] section 43.3. If the watchdog does not
receive regular, and fresh, Attestation Results as to the system's
health, then it forces a reboot.
Attester: The device that should be protected from being held
hostage for a long period of time.
Relying Party: A watchdog capable of triggering a procedure that
resets a device into a known, good operational state.
2.7. FIDO Biometric Authentication
In the Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) protocol [WebAuthN], [CTAP], the
device in the user's hand authenticates the human user, whether by
biometrics (such as fingerprints), or by PIN and password. FIDO
authentication puts a large amount of trust in the device compared to
typical password authentication because it is the device that
verifies the biometric, PIN and password inputs from the user, not
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the server. For the Relying Party to know that the authentication is
trustworthy, the Relying Party needs to know that the Authenticator
part of the device is trustworthy. The FIDO protocol employs remote
attestation for this.
The FIDO protocol supports several remote attestation protocols and a
mechanism by which new ones can be registered and added. Remote
attestation defined by RATS is thus a candidate for use in the FIDO
protocol.
Other biometric authentication protocols such as the Chinese IFAA
standard and WeChat Pay as well as Google Pay make use of remote
attestation in one form or another.
Attester: Every FIDO Authenticator contains an Attester.
Relying Party: Any web site, mobile application back-end, or service
that relies on authentication data based on biometric information.
3. Architectural Overview
Figure 1 depicts the data that flows between different roles,
independent of protocol or use case.
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************ ************* ************ *****************
* Endorser * * Reference * * Verifier * * Relying Party *
************ * Value * * Owner * * Owner *
| * Provider * ************ *****************
| ************* | |
| | | |
|Endorsements |Reference |Appraisal |Appraisal
| |Values |Policy |Policy for
| | |for |Attestation
.-----------. | |Evidence |Results
| | | |
| | | |
v v v |
.---------------------------. |
.----->| Verifier |------. |
| '---------------------------' | |
| | |
| Attestation| |
| Results | |
| Evidence | |
| | |
| v v
.----------. .---------------.
| Attester | | Relying Party |
'----------' '---------------'
Figure 1: Conceptual Data Flow
The text below summarizes the activities conducted by the roles
illustrated in Figure 1.
An Attester creates Evidence that is conveyed to a Verifier.
A Verifier uses the Evidence, any Reference Values from Reference
Value Providers, and any Endorsements from Endorsers, by applying an
Appraisal Policy for Evidence to assess the trustworthiness of the
Attester. This procedure is called the appraisal of Evidence.
Subsequently, the Verifier generates Attestation Results for use by
Relying Parties.
The Appraisal Policy for Evidence might be obtained from the Verifier
Owner via some protocol mechanism, or might be configured into the
Verifier by the Verifier Owner, or might be programmed into the
Verifier, or might be obtained via some other mechanism.
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A Relying Party uses Attestation Results by applying its own
appraisal policy to make application-specific decisions, such as
authorization decisions. This procedure is called the appraisal of
Attestation Results.
The Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results might be obtained from
the Relying Party Owner via some protocol mechanism, or might be
configured into the Relying Party by the Relying Party Owner, or
might be programmed into the Relying Party, or might be obtained via
some other mechanism.
See Section 8 for further discussion of the conceptual messages shown
in Figure 1. ## Two Types of Environments of an Attester
As shown in Figure 2, an Attester consists of at least one Attesting
Environment and at least one Target Environment. In some
implementations, the Attesting and Target Environments might be
combined. Other implementations might have multiple Attesting and
Target Environments, such as in the examples described in more detail
in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. Other examples may exist. All
compositions of Attesting and Target Environments discussed in this
architecture can be combined into more complex implementations.
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.--------------------------------.
| |
| Verifier |
| |
'--------------------------------'
^
|
.-------------------------|----------.
| | |
| .----------------. | |
| | Target | | |
| | Environment | | |
| | | | Evidence |
| '----------------' | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Collect | | |
| Claims | | |
| | | |
| v | |
| .-------------. |
| | Attesting | |
| | Environment | |
| | | |
| '-------------' |
| Attester |
'------------------------------------'
Figure 2: Two Types of Environments
Claims are collected from Target Environments. That is, Attesting
Environments collect the values and the information to be represented
in Claims, by reading system registers and variables, calling into
subsystems, taking measurements on code, memory, or other security
related assets of the Target Environment. Attesting Environments
then format the Claims appropriately, and typically use key material
and cryptographic functions, such as signing or cipher algorithms, to
generate Evidence. There is no limit to or requirement on the types
of hardware or software environments that can be used to implement an
Attesting Environment, for example: Trusted Execution Environments
(TEEs), embedded Secure Elements (eSEs), Trusted Platform Modules
(TPMs) [TCGarch], or BIOS firmware.
An arbitrary execution environment may not, by default, be capable of
Claims collection for a given Target Environment. Execution
environments that are designed specifically to be capable of Claims
collection are referred to in this document as Attesting
Environments. For example, a TPM doesn't actively collect Claims
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itself, it instead requires another component to feed various values
to the TPM. Thus, an Attesting Environment in such a case would be
the combination of the TPM together with whatever component is
feeding it the measurements.
3.1. Layered Attestation Environments
By definition, the Attester role generates Evidence. An Attester may
consist of one or more nested environments (layers). The root layer
of an Attester includes at least one root of trust. In order to
appraise Evidence generated by an Attester, the Verifier needs to
trust the Attester's root of trust. Trust in the Attester's root of
trust can be established in various ways as discussed in Section 7.4.
In layered attestation, a root of trust is the initial Attesting
Environment. Claims can be collected from or about each layer. The
corresponding Claims can be structured in a nested fashion that
reflects the nesting of the Attester's layers. Normally, Claims are
not self-asserted, rather a previous layer acts as the Attesting
Environment for the next layer. Claims about a root of trust
typically are asserted by an Endorser.
The example device illustrated in Figure 3 includes (A) a BIOS stored
in read-only memory, (B) a bootloader, and (C) an operating system
kernel.
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.-------------. Endorsement for ROM
| Endorser |-----------------------.
'-------------' |
v
.-------------. Reference .----------.
| Reference | Values for | |
| Value |----------------->| Verifier |
| Provider(s) | ROM, bootloader, | |
'-------------' and kernel '----------'
^
.------------------------------------. |
| | |
| .---------------------------. | |
| | Kernel | | |
| | | | | Layered
| | Target | | | Evidence
| | Environment | | | for
| '---------------------------' | | bootloader
| Collect | | | and
| Claims | | | kernel
| .---------------|-----------. | |
| | Bootloader v | | |
| | .-----------. | | |
| | Target | Attesting | | | |
| | Environment |Environment|-----------'
| | | | | |
| | '-----------' | |
| | ^ | |
| '-----------------|---------' |
| Collect | | Evidence for |
| Claims v | bootloader |
| .---------------------------. |
| | ROM | |
| | | |
| | Attesting | |
| | Environment | |
| '---------------------------' |
| |
'------------------------------------'
Figure 3: Layered Attester
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The first Attesting Environment, the read-only BIOS in this example,
has to ensure the integrity of the bootloader (the first Target
Environment). There are potentially multiple kernels to boot, and
the decision is up to the bootloader. Only a bootloader with intact
integrity will make an appropriate decision. Therefore, the Claims
relating to the integrity of the bootloader have to be measured
securely. At this stage of the boot-cycle of the device, the Claims
collected typically cannot be composed into Evidence.
After the boot sequence is started, the BIOS conducts the most
important and defining feature of layered attestation, which is that
the successfully measured bootloader now becomes (or contains) an
Attesting Environment for the next layer. This procedure in layered
attestation is sometimes called "staging". It is important that the
bootloader not be able to alter any Claims about itself that were
collected by the BIOS. This can be ensured having those Claims be
either signed by the BIOS or stored in a tamper-proof manner by the
BIOS.
Continuing with this example, the bootloader's Attesting Environment
is now in charge of collecting Claims about the next Target
Environment, which in this example is the kernel to be booted. The
final Evidence thus contains two sets of Claims: one set about the
bootloader as measured and signed by the BIOS, plus a set of Claims
about the kernel as measured and signed by the bootloader.
This example could be extended further by making the kernel become
another Attesting Environment for an application as another Target
Environment. This would result in a third set of Claims in the
Evidence pertaining to that application.
The essence of this example is a cascade of staged environments.
Each environment has the responsibility of measuring the next
environment before the next environment is started. In general, the
number of layers may vary by device or implementation, and an
Attesting Environment might even have multiple Target Environments
that it measures, rather than only one as shown by example in
Figure 3.
3.2. Composite Device
A composite device is an entity composed of multiple sub-entities
such that its trustworthiness has to be determined by the appraisal
of all these sub-entities.
Each sub-entity has at least one Attesting Environment collecting the
Claims from at least one Target Environment, then this sub-entity
generates Evidence about its trustworthiness. Therefore, each sub-
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entity can be called an Attester. Among all the Attesters, there may
be only some which have the ability to communicate with the Verifier
while others do not.
For example, a carrier-grade router consists of a chassis and
multiple slots. The trustworthiness of the router depends on all its
slots' trustworthiness. Each slot has an Attesting Environment, such
as a TEE, collecting the Claims of its boot process, after which it
generates Evidence from the Claims.
Among these slots, only a "main" slot can communicate with the
Verifier while other slots cannot. But other slots can communicate
with the main slot by the links between them inside the router. So
the main slot collects the Evidence of other slots, produces the
final Evidence of the whole router and conveys the final Evidence to
the Verifier. Therefore the router is a composite device, each slot
is an Attester, and the main slot is the lead Attester.
Another example is a multi-chassis router composed of multiple single
carrier-grade routers. Multi-chassis router setups create redundancy
groups that provide higher throughput by interconnecting multiple
routers in these groups, which can be treated as one logical router
for simpler management. A multi-chassis router setup provides a
management point that connects to the Verifier. Typically one router
in the group is designated as the main router. Other routers in the
multi-chassis setup are connected to the main router only via
physical network links and are therefore managed and appraised via
the main router's help. In consequence, a multi-chassis router setup
is a composite device, each router is an Attester, and the main
router is the lead Attester.
Figure 4 depicts the conceptual data flow for a composite device.
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.-----------------------------.
| Verifier |
'-----------------------------'
^
|
| Evidence of
| Composite Device
|
.----------------------------------|-------------------------------.
| .--------------------------------|-----. .------------. |
| | Collect .------------. | | | |
| | Claims .--------->| Attesting |<--------| Attester B |-. |
| | | |Environment | | '------------. | |
| | .----------------. | |<----------| Attester C |-. |
| | | Target | | | | '------------' | |
| | | Environment(s) | | |<------------| ... | |
| | | | '------------' | Evidence '------------' |
| | '----------------' | of |
| | | Attesters |
| | lead Attester A | (via Internal Links or |
| '--------------------------------------' Network Connections) |
| |
| Composite Device |
'------------------------------------------------------------------'
Figure 4: Composite Device
In a composite device, each Attester generates its own Evidence by
its Attesting Environment(s) collecting the Claims from its Target
Environment(s). The lead Attester collects Evidence from other
Attesters and conveys it to a Verifier. Collection of Evidence from
sub-entities may itself be a form of Claims collection that results
in Evidence asserted by the lead Attester. The lead Attester
generates Evidence about the layout of the whole composite device,
while sub-Attesters generate Evidence about their respective
(sub-)modules.
In this scenario, the trust model described in Section 7 can also be
applied to an inside Verifier.
3.3. Implementation Considerations
An entity can take on multiple RATS roles (e.g., Attester, Verifier,
Relying Party, etc.) at the same time. Multiple entities can
cooperate to implement a single RATS role as well. In essence, the
combination of roles and entities can be arbitrary. For example, in
the composite device scenario, the entity inside the lead Attester
can also take on the role of a Verifier, and the outer entity of
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Verifier can take on the role of a Relying Party. After collecting
the Evidence of other Attesters, this inside Verifier uses
Endorsements and appraisal policies (obtained the same way as by any
other Verifier) as part of the appraisal procedures that generate
Attestation Results. The inside Verifier then conveys the
Attestation Results of other Attesters to the outside Verifier,
whether in the same conveyance protocol as part of the Evidence or
not.
4. Terminology
This document uses the following terms.
4.1. Roles
Attester: A role performed by an entity (typically a device) whose
Evidence must be appraised in order to infer the extent to which
the Attester is considered trustworthy, such as when deciding
whether it is authorized to perform some operation.
Produces: Evidence
Relying Party: A role performed by an entity that depends on the
validity of information about an Attester, for purposes of
reliably applying application specific actions. Compare /relying
party/ in [RFC4949].
Consumes: Attestation Results
Verifier: A role performed by an entity that appraises the validity
of Evidence about an Attester and produces Attestation Results to
be used by a Relying Party.
Consumes: Evidence, Reference Values, Endorsements, Appraisal
Policy for Evidence
Produces: Attestation Results
Relying Party Owner: A role performed by an entity (typically an
administrator), that is authorized to configure Appraisal Policy
for Attestation Results in a Relying Party.
Produces: Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results
Verifier Owner: A role performed by an entity (typically an
administrator), that is authorized to configure Appraisal Policy
for Evidence in a Verifier.
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Produces: Appraisal Policy for Evidence
Endorser: A role performed by an entity (typically a manufacturer)
whose Endorsements help Verifiers appraise the authenticity of
Evidence.
Produces: Endorsements
Reference Value Provider: A role performed by an entity (typically a
manufacturer) whose Reference Values help Verifiers appraise
Evidence to determine if acceptable known Claims have been
recorded by the Attester.
Produces: Reference Values
4.2. Artifacts
Claim: A piece of asserted information, often in the form of a name/
value pair. Claims make up the usual structure of Evidence and
other RATS artifacts. Compare /claim/ in [RFC7519].
Endorsement: A secure statement that an Endorser vouches for the
integrity of an Attester's various capabilities such as Claims
collection and Evidence signing.
Consumed By: Verifier
Produced By: Endorser
Evidence: A set of Claims generated by an Attester to be appraised
by a Verifier. Evidence may include configuration data,
measurements, telemetry, or inferences.
Consumed By: Verifier
Produced By: Attester
Attestation Result: The output generated by a Verifier, typically
including information about an Attester, where the Verifier
vouches for the validity of the results.
Consumed By: Relying Party
Produced By: Verifier
Appraisal Policy for Evidence: A set of rules that informs how a
Verifier evaluates the validity of information about an Attester.
Compare /security policy/ in [RFC4949].
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Consumed By: Verifier
Produced By: Verifier Owner
Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results: A set of rules that direct
how a Relying Party uses the Attestation Results regarding an
Attester generated by the Verifiers. Compare /security policy/ in
[RFC4949].
Consumed by: Relying Party
Produced by: Relying Party Owner
Reference Values: A set of values against which values of Claims can
be compared as part of applying an Appraisal Policy for Evidence.
Reference Values are sometimes referred to in other documents as
known-good values, golden measurements, or nominal values,
although those terms typically assume comparison for equality,
whereas here Reference Values might be more general and be used in
any sort of comparison.
Consumed By: Verifier
Produced By: Reference Value Provider
5. Topological Patterns
Figure 1 shows a data-flow diagram for communication between an
Attester, a Verifier, and a Relying Party. The Attester conveys its
Evidence to the Verifier for appraisal, and the Relying Party
receives the Attestation Result from the Verifier. This section
refines the data-flow diagram by describing two reference models, as
well as one example composition thereof. The discussion that follows
is for illustrative purposes only and does not constrain the
interactions between RATS roles to the presented patterns.
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5.1. Passport Model
The passport model is so named because of its resemblance to how
nations issue passports to their citizens. The nature of the
Evidence that an individual needs to provide to its local authority
is specific to the country involved. The citizen retains control of
the resulting passport document and presents it to other entities
when it needs to assert a citizenship or identity Claim, such as an
airport immigration desk. The passport is considered sufficient
because it vouches for the citizenship and identity Claims, and it is
issued by a trusted authority. Thus, in this immigration desk
analogy, the passport issuing agency is a Verifier, the passport is
an Attestation Result, and the immigration desk is a Relying Party.
In this model, an Attester conveys Evidence to a Verifier, which
compares the Evidence against its appraisal policy. The Verifier
then gives back an Attestation Result. If the Attestation Result was
a successful one, the Attester can then present the Attestation
Result (and possibly additional Claims) to a Relying Party, which
then compares this information against its own appraisal policy.
Three ways in which the process may fail include:
* First, the Verifier may not issue a positive Attestation Result
due to the Evidence not passing the Appraisal Policy for Evidence.
* The second way in which the process may fail is when the
Attestation Result is examined by the Relying Party, and based
upon the Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results, the result does
not pass the policy.
* The third way is when the Verifier is unreachable or unavailable.
Since the resource access protocol between the Attester and Relying
Party includes an Attestation Result, in this model the details of
that protocol constrain the serialization format of the Attestation
Result. The format of the Evidence on the other hand is only
constrained by the Attester-Verifier remote attestation protocol.
This implies that interoperability and standardization is more
relevant for Attestation Results than it is for Evidence.
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+------------+
| | Compare Evidence
| Verifier | against appraisal policy
| |
+------------+
^ |
Evidence | | Attestation
| | Result
| v
+------------+ +-------------+
| |------------->| | Compare Attestation
| Attester | Attestation | Relying | Result against
| | Result | Party | appraisal policy
+------------+ +-------------+
Figure 5: Passport Model
5.2. Background-Check Model
The background-check model is so named because of the resemblance of
how employers and volunteer organizations perform background checks.
When a prospective employee provides Claims about education or
previous experience, the employer will contact the respective
institutions or former employers to validate the Claim. Volunteer
organizations often perform police background checks on volunteers in
order to determine the volunteer's trustworthiness. Thus, in this
analogy, a prospective volunteer is an Attester, the organization is
the Relying Party, and the organization that issues a report is a
Verifier.
In this model, an Attester conveys Evidence to a Relying Party, which
simply passes it on to a Verifier. The Verifier then compares the
Evidence against its appraisal policy, and returns an Attestation
Result to the Relying Party. The Relying Party then compares the
Attestation Result against its own appraisal policy.
The resource access protocol between the Attester and Relying Party
includes Evidence rather than an Attestation Result, but that
Evidence is not processed by the Relying Party. Since the Evidence
is merely forwarded on to a trusted Verifier, any serialization
format can be used for Evidence because the Relying Party does not
need a parser for it. The only requirement is that the Evidence can
be _encapsulated in_ the format required by the resource access
protocol between the Attester and Relying Party.
However, like in the Passport model, an Attestation Result is still
consumed by the Relying Party. Code footprint and attack surface
area can be minimized by using a serialization format for which the
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Relying Party already needs a parser to support the protocol between
the Attester and Relying Party, which may be an existing standard or
widely deployed resource access protocol. Such minimization is
especially important if the Relying Party is a constrained node.
+-------------+
| | Compare Evidence
| Verifier | against appraisal
| | policy
+-------------+
^ |
Evidence | | Attestation
| | Result
| v
+------------+ +-------------+
| |-------------->| | Compare Attestation
| Attester | Evidence | Relying | Result against
| | | Party | appraisal policy
+------------+ +-------------+
Figure 6: Background-Check Model
5.3. Combinations
One variation of the background-check model is where the Relying
Party and the Verifier are on the same machine, performing both
functions together. In this case, there is no need for a protocol
between the two.
It is also worth pointing out that the choice of model depends on the
use case, and that different Relying Parties may use different
topological patterns.
The same device may need to create Evidence for different Relying
Parties and/or different use cases. For instance, it would use one
model to provide Evidence to a network infrastructure device to gain
access to the network, and the other model to provide Evidence to a
server holding confidential data to gain access to that data. As
such, both models may simultaneously be in use by the same device.
Figure 7 shows another example of a combination where Relying Party 1
uses the passport model, whereas Relying Party 2 uses an extension of
the background-check model. Specifically, in addition to the basic
functionality shown in Figure 6, Relying Party 2 actually provides
the Attestation Result back to the Attester, allowing the Attester to
use it with other Relying Parties. This is the model that the
Trusted Application Manager plans to support in the TEEP architecture
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
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+-------------+
| | Compare Evidence
| Verifier | against appraisal policy
| |
+-------------+
^ |
Evidence | | Attestation
| | Result
| v
+-------------+
| | Compare
| Relying | Attestation Result
| Party 2 | against appraisal policy
+-------------+
^ |
Evidence | | Attestation
| | Result
| v
+-------------+ +-------------+
| |-------------->| | Compare Attestation
| Attester | Attestation | Relying | Result against
| | Result | Party 1 | appraisal policy
+-------------+ +-------------+
Figure 7: Example Combination
6. Roles and Entities
An entity in the RATS architecture includes at least one of the roles
defined in this document.
An entity can aggregate more than one role into itself, such as being
both a Verifier and a Relying Party, or being both a Reference Value
Provider and an Endorser. As such, any conceptual messages (see
Section 8 for more discussion) originating from such roles might also
be combined. For example, Reference Values might be conveyed as part
of an appraisal policy if the Verifier Owner and Reference Value
Provider roles are combined. Similarly, Reference Values might be
conveyed as part of an Endorsement if the Endorser and Reference
Value Provider roles are combined.
Interactions between roles aggregated into the same entity do not
necessarily use the Internet Protocol. Such interactions might use a
loopback device or other IP-based communication between separate
environments, but they do not have to. Alternative channels to
convey conceptual messages include function calls, sockets, GPIO
interfaces, local busses, or hypervisor calls. This type of
conveyance is typically found in composite devices. Most
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importantly, these conveyance methods are out-of-scope of RATS, but
they are presumed to exist in order to convey conceptual messages
appropriately between roles.
In essence, an entity that combines more than one role creates and
consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this
document.
7. Trust Model
7.1. Relying Party
This document covers scenarios for which a Relying Party trusts a
Verifier that can appraise the trustworthiness of information about
an Attester. Such trust might come by the Relying Party trusting the
Verifier (or its public key) directly, or might come by trusting an
entity (e.g., a Certificate Authority) that is in the Verifier's
certificate path. Such trust is expressed by storing one or more
"trust anchors" in a secure location known as a trust anchor store.
As defined in [RFC6024], "A trust anchor represents an authoritative
entity via a public key and associated data. The public key is used
to verify digital signatures, and the associated data is used to
constrain the types of information for which the trust anchor is
authoritative." The trust anchor may be a certificate or it may be a
raw public key along with additional data if necessary such as its
public key algorithm and parameters.
The Relying Party might implicitly trust a Verifier, such as in a
Verifier/Relying Party combination where the Verifier and Relying
Party roles are combined. Or, for a stronger level of security, the
Relying Party might require that the Verifier first provide
information about itself that the Relying Party can use to assess the
trustworthiness of the Verifier before accepting its Attestation
Results.
For example, one explicit way for a Relying Party "A" to establish
such trust in a Verifier "B", would be for B to first act as an
Attester where A acts as a combined Verifier/Relying Party. If A
then accepts B as trustworthy, it can choose to accept B as a
Verifier for other Attesters.
As another example, the Relying Party can establish trust in the
Verifier by out of band establishment of key material, combined with
a protocol like TLS to communicate. There is an assumption that
between the establishment of the trusted key material and the
creation of the Evidence, that the Verifier has not been compromised.
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Similarly, the Relying Party also needs to trust the Relying Party
Owner for providing its Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results, and
in some scenarios the Relying Party might even require that the
Relying Party Owner go through a remote attestation procedure with it
before the Relying Party will accept an updated policy. This can be
done similarly to how a Relying Party could establish trust in a
Verifier as discussed above.
7.2. Attester
In some scenarios, Evidence might contain sensitive information such
as Personally Identifiable Information (PII) or system identifiable
information. Thus, an Attester must trust entities to which it
conveys Evidence, to not reveal sensitive data to unauthorized
parties. The Verifier might share this information with other
authorized parties, according to a governing policy that address the
handling of sensitive information (potentially included in Appraisal
Policies for Evidence). In the background-check model, this Evidence
may also be revealed to Relying Party(s).
When Evidence contains sensitive information, an Attester typically
requires that a Verifier authenticates itself (e.g., at TLS session
establishment) and might even request a remote attestation before the
Attester sends the sensitive Evidence. This can be done by having
the Attester first act as a Verifier/Relying Party, and the Verifier
act as its own Attester, as discussed above.
7.3. Relying Party Owner
The Relying Party Owner might also require that the Relying Party
first act as an Attester, providing Evidence that the Owner can
appraise, before the Owner would give the Relying Party an updated
policy that might contain sensitive information. In such a case,
authentication or attestation in both directions might be needed, in
which case typically one side's Evidence must be considered safe to
share with an untrusted entity, in order to bootstrap the sequence.
See Section 11 for more discussion.
7.4. Verifier
The Verifier trusts (or more specifically, the Verifier's security
policy is written in a way that configures the Verifier to trust) a
manufacturer, or the manufacturer's hardware, so as to be able to
appraise the trustworthiness of that manufacturer's devices. Such
trust is expressed by storing one or more trust anchors in the
Verifier's trust anchor store.
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In a typical solution, a Verifier comes to trust an Attester
indirectly by having an Endorser (such as a manufacturer) vouch for
the Attester's ability to securely generate Evidence, in which case
the Endorser's key material is stored in the Verifier's trust anchor
store.
In some solutions, a Verifier might be configured to directly trust
an Attester by having the Verifier have the Attester's key material
(rather than the Endorser's) in its trust anchor store.
Such direct trust must first be established at the time of trust
anchor store configuration either by checking with an Endorser at
that time, or by conducting a security analysis of the specific
device. Having the Attester directly in the trust anchor store
narrows the Verifier's trust to only specific devices rather than all
devices the Endorser might vouch for, such as all devices
manufactured by the same manufacturer in the case that the Endorser
is a manufacturer.
Such narrowing is often important since physical possession of a
device can also be used to conduct a number of attacks, and so a
device in a physically secure environment (such as one's own
premises) may be considered trusted whereas devices owned by others
would not be. This often results in a desire to either have the
owner run their own Endorser that would only endorse devices one
owns, or to use Attesters directly in the trust anchor store. When
there are many Attesters owned, the use of an Endorser enables better
scalability.
That is, a Verifier might appraise the trustworthiness of an
application component, operating system component, or service under
the assumption that information provided about it by the lower-layer
firmware or software is true. A stronger level of assurance of
security comes when information can be vouched for by hardware or by
ROM code, especially if such hardware is physically resistant to
hardware tampering. In most cases, components that have to be
vouched for via Endorsements because no Evidence is generated about
them are referred to as roots of trust.
The manufacturer having arranged for an Attesting Environment to be
provisioned with key material with which to sign Evidence, the
Verifier is then provided with some way of verifying the signature on
the Evidence. This may be in the form of an appropriate trust
anchor, or the Verifier may be provided with a database of public
keys (rather than certificates) or even carefully curated and secured
lists of symmetric keys.
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The nature of how the Verifier manages to validate the signatures
produced by the Attester is critical to the secure operation of a
remote attestation system, but is not the subject of standardization
within this architecture.
A conveyance protocol that provides authentication and integrity
protection can be used to convey Evidence that is otherwise
unprotected (e.g., not signed). Appropriate conveyance of
unprotected Evidence (e.g., [I-D.birkholz-rats-uccs]) relies on the
following conveyance protocol's protection capabilities:
1. The key material used to authenticate and integrity protect the
conveyance channel is trusted by the Verifier to speak for the
Attesting Environment(s) that collected Claims about the Target
Environment(s).
2. All unprotected Evidence that is conveyed is supplied exclusively
by the Attesting Environment that has the key material that
protects the conveyance channel
3. The root of trust protects both the conveyance channel key
material and the Attesting Environment with equivalent strength
protections.
As illustrated in [I-D.birkholz-rats-uccs], an entity that receives
unprotected Evidence via a trusted conveyance channel always takes on
the responsibility of vouching for the Evidence's authenticity and
freshness. If protected Evidence is generated, the Attester's
Attesting Environments take on that responsibility. In cases where
unprotected Evidence is processed by a Verifier, Relying Parties have
to trust that the Verifier is capable of handling Evidence in a
manner that preserves the Evidence's authenticity and freshness.
Generating and conveying unprotected Evidence always creates
significant risk and the benefits of that approach have to be
carefully weighed against potential drawbacks.
See Section 12 for discussion on security strength.
7.5. Endorser, Reference Value Provider, and Verifier Owner
In some scenarios, the Endorser, Reference Value Provider, and
Verifier Owner may need to trust the Verifier before giving the
Endorsement, Reference Values, or appraisal policy to it. This can
be done similarly to how a Relying Party might establish trust in a
Verifier.
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As discussed in Section 7.3, authentication or attestation in both
directions might be needed, in which case typically one side's
identity or Evidence must be considered safe to share with an
untrusted entity, in order to bootstrap the sequence. See Section 11
for more discussion.
8. Conceptual Messages
Figure 1 illustrates the flow of a conceptual messages between
various roles. This section provides additional elaboration and
implementation considerations. It is the responsibility of protocol
specifications to define the actual data format and semantics of any
relevant conceptual messages.
8.1. Evidence
Evidence is a set of Claims about the target environment that reveal
operational status, health, configuration or construction that have
security relevance. Evidence is appraised by a Verifier to establish
its relevance, compliance, and timeliness. Claims need to be
collected in a manner that is reliable. Evidence needs to be
securely associated with the target environment so that the Verifier
cannot be tricked into accepting Claims originating from a different
environment (that may be more trustworthy). Evidence also must be
protected from man-in-the-middle attackers who may observe, change or
misdirect Evidence as it travels from Attester to Verifier. The
timeliness of Evidence can be captured using Claims that pinpoint the
time or interval when changes in operational status, health, and so
forth occur.
8.2. Endorsements
An Endorsement is a secure statement that some entity (e.g., a
manufacturer) vouches for the integrity of the device's signing
capability. For example, if the signing capability is in hardware,
then an Endorsement might be a manufacturer certificate that signs a
public key whose corresponding private key is only known inside the
device's hardware. Thus, when Evidence and such an Endorsement are
used together, an appraisal procedure can be conducted based on
appraisal policies that may not be specific to the device instance,
but merely specific to the manufacturer providing the Endorsement.
For example, an appraisal policy might simply check that devices from
a given manufacturer have information matching a set of Reference
Values, or an appraisal policy might have a set of more complex logic
on how to appraise the validity of information.
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However, while an appraisal policy that treats all devices from a
given manufacturer the same may be appropriate for some use cases, it
would be inappropriate to use such an appraisal policy as the sole
means of authorization for use cases that wish to constrain _which_
compliant devices are considered authorized for some purpose. For
example, an enterprise using remote attestation for Network Endpoint
Assessment [RFC5209] may not wish to let every healthy laptop from
the same manufacturer onto the network, but instead only want to let
devices that it legally owns onto the network. Thus, an Endorsement
may be helpful information in authenticating information about a
device, but is not necessarily sufficient to authorize access to
resources which may need device-specific information such as a public
key for the device or component or user on the device.
8.3. Reference Values
Reference Values used in appraisal procedures come from a Reference
Value Provider and are then used by the Verifier to compare to
Evidence. Reference Values with matching Evidence produces
acceptable Claims. Additionally, appraisal policy may play a role in
determining the acceptance of Claims.
8.4. Attestation Results
Attestation Results are the input used by the Relying Party to decide
the extent to which it will trust a particular Attester, and allow it
to access some data or perform some operation.
Attestation Results may carry a boolean value indicating compliance
or non-compliance with a Verifier's appraisal policy, or may carry a
richer set of Claims about the Attester, against which the Relying
Party applies its Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results.
The quality of the Attestation Results depends upon the ability of
the Verifier to evaluate the Attester. Different Attesters have a
different _Strength of Function_ [strengthoffunction], which results
in the Attestation Results being qualitatively different in strength.
An Attestation Result that indicates non-compliance can be used by an
Attester (in the passport model) or a Relying Party (in the
background-check model) to indicate that the Attester should not be
treated as authorized and may be in need of remediation. In some
cases, it may even indicate that the Evidence itself cannot be
authenticated as being correct.
By default, the Relying Party does not believe the Attester to be
compliant. Upon receipt of an authentic Attestation Result and given
the Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results is satisfied, the
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Attester is allowed to perform the prescribed actions or access. The
simplest such appraisal policy might authorize granting the Attester
full access or control over the resources guarded by the Relying
Party. A more complex appraisal policy might involve using the
information provided in the Attestation Result to compare against
expected values, or to apply complex analysis of other information
contained in the Attestation Result.
Thus, Attestation Results often need to include detailed information
about the Attester, for use by Relying Parties, much like physical
passports and drivers licenses include personal information such as
name and date of birth. Unlike Evidence, which is often very device-
and vendor-specific, Attestation Results can be vendor-neutral, if
the Verifier has a way to generate vendor-agnostic information based
on the appraisal of vendor-specific information in Evidence. This
allows a Relying Party's appraisal policy to be simpler, potentially
based on standard ways of expressing the information, while still
allowing interoperability with heterogeneous devices.
Finally, whereas Evidence is signed by the device (or indirectly by a
manufacturer, if Endorsements are used), Attestation Results are
signed by a Verifier, allowing a Relying Party to only need a trust
relationship with one entity, rather than a larger set of entities,
for purposes of its appraisal policy.
8.5. Appraisal Policies
The Verifier, when appraising Evidence, or the Relying Party, when
appraising Attestation Results, checks the values of matched Claims
against constraints specified in its appraisal policy. Examples of
such constraints checking include:
* comparison for equality against a Reference Value, or
* a check for being in a range bounded by Reference Values, or
* membership in a set of Reference Values, or
* a check against values in other Claims.
Upon completing all appraisal policy constraints, the remaining
Claims are accepted as input toward determining Attestation Results,
when appraising Evidence, or as input to a Relying Party, when
appraising Attestation Results.
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9. Claims Encoding Formats
The following diagram illustrates a relationship to which remote
attestation is desired to be added:
+-------------+ +------------+ Evaluate
| |-------------->| | request
| Attester | Access some | Relying | against
| | resource | Party | security
+-------------+ +------------+ policy
Figure 8: Typical Resource Access
In this diagram, the protocol between Attester and a Relying Party
can be any new or existing protocol (e.g., HTTP(S), COAP(S), ROLIE
[RFC8322], 802.1x, OPC UA [OPCUA], etc.), depending on the use case.
Typically, such protocols already have mechanisms for passing
security information for authentication and authorization purposes.
Common formats include JWTs [RFC7519], CWTs [RFC8392], and X.509
certificates.
Retrofitting already deployed protocols with remote attestation
requires adding RATS conceptual messages to the existing data flows.
This must be done in a way that does not degrade the security
properties of the systems involved and should use native extension
mechanisms provided by the underlying protocol. For example, if a
TLS handshake is to be extended with remote attestation capabilities,
attestation Evidence may be embedded in an ad-hoc X.509 certificate
extension (e.g., [TCG-DICE]), or into a new TLS Certificate Type
(e.g., [I-D.tschofenig-tls-cwt]).
Especially for constrained nodes there is a desire to minimize the
amount of parsing code needed in a Relying Party, in order to both
minimize footprint and to minimize the attack surface. While it
would be possible to embed a CWT inside a JWT, or a JWT inside an
X.509 extension, etc., there is a desire to encode the information
natively in a format that is already supported by the Relying Party.
This motivates having a common "information model" that describes the
set of remote attestation related information in an encoding-agnostic
way, and allowing multiple encoding formats (CWT, JWT, X.509, etc.)
that encode the same information into the Claims format needed by the
Relying Party.
The following diagram illustrates that Evidence and Attestation
Results might be expressed via multiple potential encoding formats,
so that they can be conveyed by various existing protocols. It also
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motivates why the Verifier might also be responsible for accepting
Evidence that encodes Claims in one format, while issuing Attestation
Results that encode Claims in a different format.
Evidence Attestation Results
.--------------. CWT CWT .-------------------.
| Attester-A |------------. .----------->| Relying Party V |
'--------------' v | `-------------------'
.--------------. JWT .------------. JWT .-------------------.
| Attester-B |-------->| Verifier |-------->| Relying Party W |
'--------------' | | `-------------------'
.--------------. X.509 | | X.509 .-------------------.
| Attester-C |-------->| |-------->| Relying Party X |
'--------------' | | `-------------------'
.--------------. TPM | | TPM .-------------------.
| Attester-D |-------->| |-------->| Relying Party Y |
'--------------' '------------' `-------------------'
.--------------. other ^ | other .-------------------.
| Attester-E |------------' '----------->| Relying Party Z |
'--------------' `-------------------'
Figure 9: Multiple Attesters and Relying Parties with Different
Formats
10. Freshness
A Verifier or Relying Party might need to learn the point in time
(i.e., the "epoch") an Evidence or Attestation Result has been
produced. This is essential in deciding whether the included Claims
and their values can be considered fresh, meaning they still reflect
the latest state of the Attester, and that any Attestation Result was
generated using the latest Appraisal Policy for Evidence.
Freshness is assessed based on the Appraisal Policy for Evidence or
Attestation Results that compares the estimated epoch against an
"expiry" threshold defined locally to that policy. There is,
however, always a race condition possible in that the state of the
Attester, and the appraisal policies might change immediately after
the Evidence or Attestation Result was generated. The goal is merely
to narrow their recentness to something the Verifier (for Evidence)
or Relying Party (for Attestation Result) is willing to accept. Some
flexibility on the freshness requirement is a key component for
enabling caching and reuse of both Evidence and Attestation Results,
which is especially valuable in cases where their computation uses a
substantial part of the resource budget (e.g., energy in constrained
devices).
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There are three common approaches for determining the epoch of
Evidence or an Attestation Result.
10.1. Explicit Timekeeping using Synchronized Clocks
The first approach is to rely on synchronized and trustworthy clocks,
and include a signed timestamp (see [I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda]) along
with the Claims in the Evidence or Attestation Result. Timestamps
can also be added on a per-Claim basis to distinguish the time of
generation of Evidence or Attestation Result from the time that a
specific Claim was generated. The clock's trustworthiness can
generally be established via Endorsements and typically requires
additional Claims about the signer's time synchronization mechanism.
In some use cases, however, a trustworthy clock might not be
available. For example, in many Trusted Execution Environments
(TEEs) today, a clock is only available outside the TEE and so cannot
be trusted by the TEE.
10.2. Implicit Timekeeping using Nonces
A second approach places the onus of timekeeping solely on the
Verifier (for Evidence) or the Relying Party (for Attestation
Results), and might be suitable, for example, in case the Attester
does not have a trustworthy clock or time synchronization is
otherwise impaired. In this approach, a non-predictable nonce is
sent by the appraising entity, and the nonce is then signed and
included along with the Claims in the Evidence or Attestation Result.
After checking that the sent and received nonces are the same, the
appraising entity knows that the Claims were signed after the nonce
was generated. This allows associating a "rough" epoch to the
Evidence or Attestation Result. In this case the epoch is said to be
rough because:
* The epoch applies to the entire Claim set instead of a more
granular association, and
* The time between the creation of Claims and the collection of
Claims is indistinguishable.
10.3. Implicit Timekeeping using Epoch IDs
A third approach relies on having epoch identifiers (or "IDs")
periodically sent to both the sender and receiver of Evidence or
Attestation Results by some "Epoch ID Distributor".
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Epoch IDs are different from nonces as they can be used more than
once and can even be used by more than one entity at the same time.
Epoch IDs are different from timestamps as they do not have to convey
information about a point in time, i.e., they are not necessarily
monotonically increasing integers.
Like the nonce approach, this allows associating a "rough" epoch
without requiring a trustworthy clock or time synchronization in
order to generate or appraise the freshness of Evidence or
Attestation Results. Only the Epoch ID Distributor requires access
to a clock so it can periodically send new epoch IDs.
The most recent epoch ID is included in the produced Evidence or
Attestation Results, and the appraising entity can compare the epoch
ID in received Evidence or Attestation Results against the latest
epoch ID it received from the Epoch ID Distributor to determine if it
is within the current epoch. An actual solution also needs to take
into account race conditions when transitioning to a new epoch, such
as by using a counter signed by the Epoch ID Distributor as the epoch
ID, or by including both the current and previous epoch IDs in
messages and/or checks, by requiring retries in case of mismatching
epoch IDs, or by buffering incoming messages that might be associated
with a epoch ID that the receiver has not yet obtained.
More generally, in order to prevent an appraising entity from
generating false negatives (e.g., discarding Evidence that is deemed
stale even if it is not), the appraising entity should keep an "epoch
window" consisting of the most recently received epoch IDs. The
depth of such epoch window is directly proportional to the maximum
network propagation delay between the first to receive the epoch ID
and the last to receive the epoch ID, and it is inversely
proportional to the epoch duration. The appraising entity shall
compare the epoch ID carried in the received Evidence or Attestation
Result with the epoch IDs in its epoch window to find a suitable
match.
Whereas the nonce approach typically requires the appraising entity
to keep state for each nonce generated, the epoch ID approach
minimizes the state kept to be independent of the number of Attesters
or Verifiers from which it expects to receive Evidence or Attestation
Results, as long as all use the same Epoch ID Distributor.
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10.4. Discussion
Implicit and explicit timekeeping can be combined into hybrid
mechanisms. For example, if clocks exist and are considered
trustworthy but are not synchronized, a nonce-based exchange may be
used to determine the (relative) time offset between the involved
peers, followed by any number of timestamp based exchanges.
It is important to note that the actual values in Claims might have
been generated long before the Claims are signed. If so, it is the
signer's responsibility to ensure that the values are still correct
when they are signed. For example, values generated at boot time
might have been saved to secure storage until network connectivity is
established to the remote Verifier and a nonce is obtained.
A more detailed discussion with examples appears in Section 16.
For a discussion on the security of epoch IDs see Section 12.3.
11. Privacy Considerations
The conveyance of Evidence and the resulting Attestation Results
reveal a great deal of information about the internal state of a
device as well as potentially any users of the device. In many
cases, the whole point of attestation procedures is to provide
reliable information about the type of the device and the firmware/
software that the device is running. This information might be
particularly interesting to many attackers. For example, knowing
that a device is running a weak version of firmware provides a way to
aim attacks better.
Many Claims in Evidence and Attestation Results are potentially
Personally Identifying Information (PII) depending on the end-to-end
use case of the remote attestation procedure. Remote attestation
that goes up to include containers and applications, e.g., a blood
pressure monitor, may further reveal details about specific systems
or users.
In some cases, an attacker may be able to make inferences about the
contents of Evidence from the resulting effects or timing of the
processing. For example, an attacker might be able to infer the
value of specific Claims if it knew that only certain values were
accepted by the Relying Party.
Evidence and Attestation Results are expected to be integrity
protected (i.e., either via signing or a secure channel) and
optionally might be confidentiality protected via encryption. If
confidentiality protection via signing the conceptual messages is
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omitted or unavailable, the protecting protocols that convey Evidence
or Attestation Results are responsible for detailing what kinds of
information are disclosed, and to whom they are exposed.
As Evidence might contain sensitive or confidential information,
Attesters are responsible for only sending such Evidence to trusted
Verifiers. Some Attesters might want a stronger level of assurance
of the trustworthiness of a Verifier before sending Evidence to it.
In such cases, an Attester can first act as a Relying Party and ask
for the Verifier's own Attestation Result, and appraising it just as
a Relying Party would appraise an Attestation Result for any other
purpose.
Another approach to deal with Evidence is to remove PII from the
Evidence while still being able to verify that the Attester is one of
a large set. This approach is often called "Direct Anonymous
Attestation". See [CCC-DeepDive] section 6.2 for more discussion.
12. Security Considerations
This document provides an architecture for doing remote attestation.
No specific wire protocol is documented here. Without a specific
proposal to compare against, it is impossible to know if the security
threats listed below have been mitigated well. The security
considerations below should be read as being essentially requirements
against realizations of the RATS Architecture. Some threats apply to
protocols, some are against implementations (code), and some threats
are against physical infrastructure (such as factories).
12.1. Attester and Attestation Key Protection
Implementers need to pay close attention to the protection of the
Attester and the manufacturing processes for provisioning attestation
key material. If either of these are compromised, intended levels of
assurance for RATS are compromised because attackers can forge
Evidence or manipulate the Attesting Environment. For example, a
Target Environment should not be able to tamper with the Attesting
Environment that measures it, by isolating the two environments from
each other in some way.
Remote attestation applies to use cases with a range of security
requirements, so the protections discussed here range from low to
high security where low security may be limited to application or
process isolation by the device's operating system, and high security
may involve specialized hardware to defend against physical attacks
on a chip.
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12.1.1. On-Device Attester and Key Protection
It is assumed that an Attesting Environment is sufficiently isolated
from the Target Environment it collects Claims about and that it
signs the resulting Claims set with an attestation key, so that the
Target Environment cannot forge Evidence about itself. Such an
isolated environment might be provided by a process, a dedicated
chip, a TEE, a virtual machine, or another secure mode of operation.
The Attesting Environment must be protected from unauthorized
modification to ensure it behaves correctly. Confidentiality
protection of the Attesting Environment's signing key is vital so it
cannot be misused to forge Evidence.
In many cases the user or owner of a device that includes the role of
Attester must not be able to modify or extract keys from the
Attesting Environments, to prevent creating forged Evidence. Some
common examples include the user of a mobile phone or FIDO
authenticator. An essential value-add provided by RATS is for the
Relying Party to be able to trust the Attester even if the user or
owner is not trusted.
Measures for a minimally protected system might include process or
application isolation provided by a high-level operating system, and
restricted access to root or system privileges. In contrast, For
really simple single-use devices that don't use a protected mode
operating system, like a Bluetooth speaker, the only factual
isolation might be the sturdy housing of the device.
Measures for a moderately protected system could include a special
restricted operating environment, such as a TEE. In this case, only
security-oriented software has access to the Attester and key
material.
Measures for a highly protected system could include specialized
hardware that is used to provide protection against chip decapping
attacks, power supply and clock glitching, faulting injection and RF
and power side channel attacks.
12.1.2. Attestation Key Provisioning Processes
Attestation key provisioning is the process that occurs in the
factory or elsewhere to establish signing key material on the device
and the validation key material off the device. Sometimes this is
procedure is referred to as personalization or customization.
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12.1.2.1. Off-Device Key Generation
One way to provision key material is to first generate it external to
the device and then copy the key onto the device. In this case,
confidentiality protection of the generator, as well as for the path
over which the key is provisioned, is necessary. The manufacturer
needs to take care to protect corresponding key material with
measures appropriate for its value.
The degree of protection afforded to this key material can vary by
device, based upon considerations as to a cost/benefit evaluation of
the intended function of the device. The confidentiality protection
is fundamentally based upon some amount of physical protection: while
encryption is often used to provide confidentiality when a key is
conveyed across a factory, where the attestation key is created or
applied, it must be available in an unencrypted form. The physical
protection can therefore vary from situations where the key is
unencrypted only within carefully controlled secure enclaves within
silicon, to situations where an entire facility is considered secure,
by the simple means of locked doors and limited access.
The cryptography that is used to enable confidentiality protection of
the attestation key comes with its own requirements to be secured.
This results in recursive problems, as the key material used to
provision attestation keys must again somehow have been provisioned
securely beforehand (requiring an additional level of protection, and
so on).
So, this is why, in general, a combination of some physical security
measures and some cryptographic measures is used to establish
confidentiality protection.
12.1.2.2. On-Device Key Generation
When key material is generated within a device and the secret part of
it never leaves the device, then the problem may lessen. For public-
key cryptography, it is, by definition, not necessary to maintain
confidentiality of the public key: however integrity of the chain of
custody of the public key is necessary in order to avoid attacks
where an attacker is able get a key they control endorsed.
To summarize: attestation key provisioning must ensure that only
valid attestation key material is established in Attesters.
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12.2. Integrity Protection
Any solution that conveys information used for security purposes,
whether such information is in the form of Evidence, Attestation
Results, Endorsements, or appraisal policy must support end-to-end
integrity protection and replay attack prevention, and often also
needs to support additional security properties, including:
* end-to-end encryption,
* denial of service protection,
* authentication,
* auditing,
* fine grained access controls, and
* logging.
Section 10 discusses ways in which freshness can be used in this
architecture to protect against replay attacks.
To assess the security provided by a particular appraisal policy, it
is important to understand the strength of the root of trust, e.g.,
whether it is mutable software, or firmware that is read-only after
boot, or immutable hardware/ROM.
It is also important that the appraisal policy was itself obtained
securely. If an attacker can configure appraisal policies for a
Relying Party or for a Verifier, then integrity of the process is
compromised.
Security protections in RATS may be applied at different layers,
whether by a conveyance protocol, or an information encoding format.
This architecture expects conceptual messages (see Section 8) to be
end-to-end protected based on the role interaction context. For
example, if an Attester produces Evidence that is relayed through
some other entity that doesn't implement the Attester or the intended
Verifier roles, then the relaying entity should not expect to have
access to the Evidence.
12.3. Epoch ID-based Attestation
Epoch IDs, described in Section 10.3, can be tampered with, replayed,
dropped, delayed, and reordered by an attacker.
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An attacker could be either external or belong to the distribution
group, for example, if one of the Attester entities have been
compromised.
An attacker who is able to tamper with epoch IDs can potentially lock
all the participants in a certain epoch of choice for ever,
effectively freezing time. This is problematic since it destroys the
ability to ascertain freshness of Evidence and Attestation Results.
To mitigate this threat, the transport should be at least integrity
protected and provide origin authentication.
Selective dropping of epoch IDs is equivalent to pinning the victim
node to a past epoch. An attacker could drop epoch IDs to only some
entities and not others, which will typically result in a denial of
service due to the permanent staleness of the Attestation Result or
Evidence.
Delaying or reordering epoch IDs is equivalent to manipulating the
victim's timeline at will. This ability could be used by a malicious
actor (e.g., a compromised router) to mount a confusion attack where,
for example, a Verifier is tricked into accepting Evidence coming
from a past epoch as fresh, while in the meantime the Attester has
been compromised.
Reordering and dropping attacks are mitigated if the transport
provides the ability to detect reordering and drop. However, the
delay attack described above can't be thwarted in this manner.
12.4. Trust Anchor Protection
As noted in Section 7, Verifiers and Relying Parties have trust
anchor stores that must be secured. Specifically, a trust anchor
store must resist modification against unauthorized insertion,
deletion, and modification.
If certificates are used as trust anchors, Verifiers and Relying
Parties are also responsible for validating the entire certificate
path up to the trust anchor, which includes checking for certificate
revocation. See Section 6 of [RFC5280] for details.
13. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any actions by IANA.
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14. Acknowledgments
Special thanks go to Joerg Borchert, Nancy Cam-Winget, Jessica
Fitzgerald-McKay, Diego Lopez, Laurence Lundblade, Paul Rowe, Hannes
Tschofenig, Frank Xia, and David Wooten.
15. Notable Contributions
Thomas Hardjono created initial versions of the terminology section
in collaboration with Ned Smith. Eric Voit provided the conceptual
separation between Attestation Provision Flows and Attestation
Evidence Flows. Monty Wisemen created the content structure of the
first three architecture drafts. Carsten Bormann provided many of
the motivational building blocks with respect to the Internet Threat
Model.
16. Appendix A: Time Considerations
Section 10 discussed various issues and requirements around freshness
of evidence, and summarized three approaches that might be used by
different solutions to address them. This appendix provides more
details with examples to help illustrate potential approaches, to
inform those creating specific solutions.
The table below defines a number of relevant events, with an ID that
is used in subsequent diagrams. The times of said events might be
defined in terms of an absolute clock time, such as the Coordinated
Universal Time timescale, or might be defined relative to some other
timestamp or timeticks counter, such as a clock resetting its epoch
each time it is powered on.
+====+============+=================================================+
| ID | Event | Explanation of event |
+====+============+=================================================+
| VG | Value | A value to appear in a Claim was created. |
| | generated | In some cases, a value may have technically |
| | | existed before an Attester became aware of |
| | | it but the Attester might have no idea how |
| | | long it has had that value. In such a |
| | | case, the Value created time is the time at |
| | | which the Claim containing the copy of the |
| | | value was created. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| NS | Nonce sent | A nonce not predictable to an Attester |
| | | (recentness & uniqueness) is sent to an |
| | | Attester. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| NR | Nonce | A nonce is relayed to an Attester by |
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| | relayed | another entity. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| IR | Epoch ID | An epoch ID is successfully received and |
| | received | processed by an entity. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| EG | Evidence | An Attester creates Evidence from collected |
| | generation | Claims. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| ER | Evidence | A Relying Party relays Evidence to a |
| | relayed | Verifier. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| RG | Result | A Verifier appraises Evidence and generates |
| | generation | an Attestation Result. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| RR | Result | A Relying Party relays an Attestation |
| | relayed | Result to a Relying Party. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| RA | Result | The Relying Party appraises Attestation |
| | appraised | Results. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| OP | Operation | The Relying Party performs some operation |
| | performed | requested by the Attester via a resource |
| | | access protocol as depicted in Figure 8, |
| | | e.g., across a session created earlier at |
| | | time(RA). |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| RX | Result | An Attestation Result should no longer be |
| | expiry | accepted, according to the Verifier that |
| | | generated it. |
+----+------------+-------------------------------------------------+
Table 1
Using the table above, a number of hypothetical examples of how a
solution might be built are illustrated below. This list is not
intended to be complete, but is just representative enough to
highlight various timing considerations.
All times are relative to the local clocks, indicated by an "_a"
(Attester), "_v" (Verifier), or "_r" (Relying Party) suffix.
Times with an appended Prime (') indicate a second instance of the
same event.
How and if clocks are synchronized depends upon the model.
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In the figures below, curly braces indicate containment. For
example, the notation Evidence{foo} indicates that 'foo' is contained
in the Evidence and is thus covered by its signature.
16.1. Example 1: Timestamp-based Passport Model Example
The following example illustrates a hypothetical Passport Model
solution that uses timestamps and requires roughly synchronized
clocks between the Attester, Verifier, and Relying Party, which
depends on using a secure clock synchronization mechanism. As a
result, the receiver of a conceptual message containing a timestamp
can directly compare it to its own clock and timestamps.
.----------. .----------. .---------------.
| Attester | | Verifier | | Relying Party |
'----------' '----------' '---------------'
time(VG_a) | |
| | |
~ ~ ~
| | |
time(EG_a) | |
|------Evidence{time(EG_a)}------>| |
| time(RG_v) |
|<-----Attestation Result---------| |
| {time(RG_v),time(RX_v)} | |
~ ~
| |
|----Attestation Result{time(RG_v),time(RX_v)}-->time(RA_r)
| |
~ ~
| |
| time(OP_r)
The Verifier can check whether the Evidence is fresh when appraising
it at time(RG_v) by checking "time(RG_v) - time(EG_a) < Threshold",
where the Verifier's threshold is large enough to account for the
maximum permitted clock skew between the Verifier and the Attester.
If time(VG_a) is also included in the Evidence along with the Claim
value generated at that time, and the Verifier decides that it can
trust the time(VG_a) value, the Verifier can also determine whether
the Claim value is recent by checking "time(RG_v) - time(VG_a) <
Threshold". The threshold is decided by the Appraisal Policy for
Evidence, and again needs to take into account the maximum permitted
clock skew between the Verifier and the Attester.
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The Relying Party can check whether the Attestation Result is fresh
when appraising it at time(RA_r) by checking "time(RA_r) - time(RG_v)
< Threshold", where the Relying Party's threshold is large enough to
account for the maximum permitted clock skew between the Relying
Party and the Verifier. The result might then be used for some time
(e.g., throughout the lifetime of a connection established at
time(RA_r)). The Relying Party must be careful, however, to not
allow continued use beyond the period for which it deems the
Attestation Result to remain fresh enough. Thus, it might allow use
(at time(OP_r)) as long as "time(OP_r) - time(RG_v) < Threshold".
However, if the Attestation Result contains an expiry time time(RX_v)
then it could explicitly check "time(OP_r) < time(RX_v)".
16.2. Example 2: Nonce-based Passport Model Example
The following example illustrates a hypothetical Passport Model
solution that uses nonces instead of timestamps. Compared to the
timestamp-based example, it requires an extra round trip to retrieve
a nonce, and requires that the Verifier and Relying Party track state
to remember the nonce for some period of time.
The advantage is that it does not require that any clocks are
synchronized. As a result, the receiver of a conceptual message
containing a timestamp cannot directly compare it to its own clock or
timestamps. Thus we use a suffix ("a" for Attester, "v" for
Verifier, and "r" for Relying Party) on the IDs below indicating
which clock generated them, since times from different clocks cannot
be compared. Only the delta between two events from the sender can
be used by the receiver.
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.----------. .----------. .---------------.
| Attester | | Verifier | | Relying Party |
'----------' '----------' '---------------'
time(VG_a) | |
| | |
~ ~ ~
| | |
|<--Nonce1---------------------time(NS_v) |
time(EG_a) | |
|---Evidence--------------------->| |
| {Nonce1, time(EG_a)-time(VG_a)} | |
| time(RG_v) |
|<--Attestation Result------------| |
| {time(RX_v)-time(RG_v)} | |
~ ~
| |
|<--Nonce2-------------------------------------time(NS_r)
time(RR_a) |
|--[Attestation Result{time(RX_v)-time(RG_v)}, -->|time(RA_r)
| Nonce2, time(RR_a)-time(EG_a)] |
~ ~
| |
| time(OP_r)
In this example solution, the Verifier can check whether the Evidence
is fresh at "time(RG_v)" by verifying that "time(RG_v)-time(NS_v) <
Threshold".
The Verifier cannot, however, simply rely on a Nonce to determine
whether the value of a Claim is recent, since the Claim value might
have been generated long before the nonce was sent by the Verifier.
However, if the Verifier decides that the Attester can be trusted to
correctly provide the delta "time(EG_a)-time(VG_a)", then it can
determine recency by checking "time(RG_v)-time(NS_v) + time(EG_a)-
time(VG_a) < Threshold".
Similarly if, based on an Attestation Result from a Verifier it
trusts, the Relying Party decides that the Attester can be trusted to
correctly provide time deltas, then it can determine whether the
Attestation Result is fresh by checking "time(OP_r)-time(NS_r) +
time(RR_a)-time(EG_a) < Threshold". Although the Nonce2 and
"time(RR_a)-time(EG_a)" values cannot be inside the Attestation
Result, they might be signed by the Attester such that the
Attestation Result vouches for the Attester's signing capability.
The Relying Party must still be careful, however, to not allow
continued use beyond the period for which it deems the Attestation
Result to remain valid. Thus, if the Attestation Result sends a
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validity lifetime in terms of "time(RX_v)-time(RG_v)", then the
Relying Party can check "time(OP_r)-time(NS_r) < time(RX_v)-
time(RG_v)".
16.3. Example 3: Epoch ID-based Passport Model Example
The example in Figure 10 illustrates a hypothetical Passport Model
solution that uses epoch IDs instead of nonces or timestamps.
The Epoch ID Distributor broadcasts epoch ID "I" which starts a new
epoch "E" for a protocol participant upon reception at "time(IR)".
The Attester generates Evidence incorporating epoch ID "I" and
conveys it to the Verifier.
The Verifier appraises that the received epoch ID "I" is "fresh"
according to the definition provided in Section 10.3 whereby retries
are required in the case of mismatching epoch IDs, and generates an
Attestation Result. The Attestation Result is conveyed to the
Attester.
After the transmission of epoch ID "I'" a new epoch "E'" is
established when "I'" is received by each protocol participant. The
Attester relays the Attestation Result obtained during epoch "E"
(associated with epoch ID "I") to the Relying Party using the epoch
ID for the current epoch "I'". If the Relying Party had not yet
received "I'", then the Attestation Result would be rejected, but in
this example, it is received.
In the illustrated scenario, the epoch ID for relaying an Attestation
Result to the Relying Party is current, while a previous epoch ID was
used to generate Verifier evaluated evidence. This indicates that at
least one epoch transition has occurred, and the Attestation Results
may only be as fresh as the previous epoch. If the Relying Party
remembers the previous epoch ID "I" during an epoch window as
discussed in Section 10.3, and the message is received during that
window, the Attestation Result is accepted as fresh, and otherwise it
is rejected as stale.
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.-------------.
.----------. | Epoch ID | .----------. .---------------.
| Attester | | Distributor | | Verifier | | Relying Party |
'----------' '-------------' '----------' '---------------'
time(VG_a) | | |
| | | |
~ ~ ~ ~
| | | |
time(IR_a)<------I--+--I--------time(IR_v)----->time(IR_r)
| | | |
time(EG_a) | | |
|---Evidence--------------------->| |
| {I,time(EG_a)-time(VG_a)} | |
| | | |
| | time(RG_v) |
|<--Attestation Result------------| |
| {I,time(RX_v)-time(RG_v)} | |
| | | |
time(IR'_a)<-----I'-+--I'-------time(IR'_v)---->time(IR'_r)
| | | |
|---[Attestation Result--------------------->time(RA_r)
| {I,time(RX_v)-time(RG_v)},I'] | |
| | | |
~ ~ ~ ~
| | | |
| | | time(OP_r)
Figure 10: Epoch ID-based Passport Model
16.4. Example 4: Timestamp-based Background-Check Model Example
The following example illustrates a hypothetical Background-Check
Model solution that uses timestamps and requires roughly synchronized
clocks between the Attester, Verifier, and Relying Party.
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.----------. .---------------. .----------.
| Attester | | Relying Party | | Verifier |
'----------' '---------------' '----------'
time(VG_a) | |
| | |
~ ~ ~
| | |
time(EG_a) | |
|----Evidence------->| |
| {time(EG_a)} time(ER_r)--Evidence{time(EG_a)}->|
| | time(RG_v)
| time(RA_r)<-Attestation Result---|
| | {time(RX_v)} |
~ ~ ~
| | |
| time(OP_r) |
The time considerations in this example are equivalent to those
discussed under Example 1 above.
16.5. Example 5: Nonce-based Background-Check Model Example
The following example illustrates a hypothetical Background-Check
Model solution that uses nonces and thus does not require that any
clocks are synchronized. In this example solution, a nonce is
generated by a Verifier at the request of a Relying Party, when the
Relying Party needs to send one to an Attester.
.----------. .---------------. .----------.
| Attester | | Relying Party | | Verifier |
'----------' '---------------' '----------'
time(VG_a) | |
| | |
~ ~ ~
| | |
| |<-------Nonce-----------time(NS_v)
|<---Nonce-----------time(NR_r) |
time(EG_a) | |
|----Evidence{Nonce}--->| |
| time(ER_r)--Evidence{Nonce}--->|
| | time(RG_v)
| time(RA_r)<-Attestation Result-|
| | {time(RX_v)-time(RG_v)} |
~ ~ ~
| | |
| time(OP_r) |
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The Verifier can check whether the Evidence is fresh, and whether a
Claim value is recent, the same as in Example 2 above.
However, unlike in Example 2, the Relying Party can use the Nonce to
determine whether the Attestation Result is fresh, by verifying that
"time(OP_r)-time(NR_r) < Threshold".
The Relying Party must still be careful, however, to not allow
continued use beyond the period for which it deems the Attestation
Result to remain valid. Thus, if the Attestation Result sends a
validity lifetime in terms of "time(RX_v)-time(RG_v)", then the
Relying Party can check "time(OP_r)-time(ER_r) < time(RX_v)-
time(RG_v)".
17. References
17.1. Normative References
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8392>.
17.2. Informative References
[CCC-DeepDive]
Confidential Computing Consortium, "Confidential Computing
Deep Dive", n.d.,
<https://confidentialcomputing.io/whitepaper-02-latest>.
[CTAP] FIDO Alliance, "Client to Authenticator Protocol", n.d.,
<https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/
fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-id-
20180227.html>.
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[I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda]
Fuchs, A., Birkholz, H., McDonald, I. E., and C. Bormann,
"Time-Based Uni-Directional Attestation", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-04, 13
January 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-04>.
[I-D.birkholz-rats-uccs]
Birkholz, H., O'Donoghue, J., Cam-Winget, N., and C.
Bormann, "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims Sets",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-
uccs-03, 8 March 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-uccs-03>.
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-teep-architecture-14, 22 February 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-teep-architecture-
14>.
[I-D.tschofenig-tls-cwt]
Tschofenig, H. and M. Brossard, "Using CBOR Web Tokens
(CWTs) in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt-02, 13 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt-02>.
[OPCUA] OPC Foundation, "OPC Unified Architecture Specification,
Part 2: Security Model, Release 1.03", OPC 10000-2 , 25
November 2015, <https://opcfoundation.org/developer-tools/
specifications-unified-architecture/part-2-security-
model/>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949>.
[RFC5209] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J.
Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and
Requirements", RFC 5209, DOI 10.17487/RFC5209, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5209>.
[RFC6024] Reddy, R. and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Management
Requirements", RFC 6024, DOI 10.17487/RFC6024, October
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6024>.
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[RFC8322] Field, J., Banghart, S., and D. Waltermire, "Resource-
Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE)",
RFC 8322, DOI 10.17487/RFC8322, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8322>.
[strengthoffunction]
NISC, "Strength of Function", n.d.,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/
strength_of_function>.
[TCG-DICE] Trusted Computing Group, "DICE Certificate Profiles",
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/DICE-Certificate-Profiles-
r01_3june2020-1.pdf>.
[TCGarch] Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library
- Part 1: Architecture", 8 November 2019,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf>.
[WebAuthN] W3C, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key
Credentials", n.d., <https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-1/>.
Contributors
Monty Wiseman
Email: montywiseman32@gmail.com
Liang Xia
Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Laurence Lundblade
Email: lgl@island-resort.com
Eliot Lear
Email: elear@cisco.com
Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay
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Sarah C. Helbe
Andrew Guinn
Peter Loscocco
Email: pete.loscocco@gmail.com
Eric Voit
Thomas Fossati
Email: thomas.fossati@arm.com
Paul Rowe
Carsten Bormann
Email: cabo@tzi.org
Giri Mandyam
Email: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com
Kathleen Moriarty
Email: kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com
Guy Fedorkow
Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net
Simon Frost
Email: Simon.Frost@arm.com
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Authors' Addresses
Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt
Germany
Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
Dave Thaler
Microsoft
United States of America
Email: dthaler@microsoft.com
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Canada
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
Ned Smith
Intel Corporation
United States of America
Email: ned.smith@intel.com
Wei Pan
Huawei Technologies
Email: william.panwei@huawei.com
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